Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc.

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2006 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

LEDBETTER v. GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER CO., INC.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 05–1074. Argued November 27, 2006—Decided May 29, 2007
During most of the time that petitioner Ledbetter was employed by
respondent Goodyear, salaried employees at the plant where she
worked were given or denied raises based on performance evalua
tions. Ledbetter submitted a questionnaire to the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) in March 1998 and a formal EEOC
charge in July 1998. After her November 1998 retirement, she filed
suit, asserting, among other things, a sex discrimination claim under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The District Court allowed
her Title VII pay discrimination claim to proceed to trial. There,
Ledbetter alleged that several supervisors had in the past given her
poor evaluations because of her sex; that as a result, her pay had not
increased as much as it would have if she had been evaluated fairly;
that those past pay decisions affected the amount of her pay through
out her employment; and that by the end of her employment, she was
earning significantly less than her male colleagues. Goodyear main
tained that the evaluations had been nondiscriminatory, but the jury
found for Ledbetter, awarding backpay and damages. On appeal,
Goodyear contended that the pay discrimination claim was time
barred with regard to all pay decisions made before September 26,
1997—180 days before Ledbetter filed her EEOC questionnaire—and
that no discriminatory act relating to her pay occurred after that
date. The Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that a Title VII pay dis
crimination claim cannot be based on allegedly discriminatory events
that occurred before the last pay decision that affected the employee’s
pay during the EEOC charging period, and concluding that there was
insufficient evidence to prove that Goodyear had acted with discrimi
natory intent in making the only two pay decisions during that pe
riod, denials of raises in 1997 and 1998.
2 LEDBETTER v. GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER CO.

Syllabus

Held: Because the later effects of past discrimination do not restart the
clock for filing an EEOC charge, Ledbetter’s claim is untimely.
Pp. 4–24.
(a) An individual wishing to bring a Title VII lawsuit must first file
an EEOC charge within, as relevant here, 180 days “after the alleged
unlawful employment practice occurred.” 42 U. S. C. §2000e–2(a)(1).
In addressing the issue of an EEOC charge’s timeliness, this Court
has stressed the need to identify with care the specific employment
practice at issue. Ledbetter’s arguments—that the paychecks that
she received during the charging period and the 1998 raise denial
each violated Title VII and triggered a new EEOC charging period—
fail because they would require the Court in effect to jettison the de
fining element of the disparate-treatment claim on which her Title
VII recovery was based, discriminatory intent. United Air Lines, Inc.
v. Evans, 431 U. S. 553, Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U. S.
250, Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 490 U. S. 900, and National
Railroad Passenger Corporation v. Morgan, 536 U. S. 101, clearly in
struct that the EEOC charging period is triggered when a discrete
unlawful practice takes place. A new violation does not occur, and a
new charging period does not commence, upon the occurrence of sub
sequent nondiscriminatory acts that entail adverse effects resulting
from the past discrimination. But if an employer engages in a series
of separately actionable intentionally discriminatory acts, then a
fresh violation takes place when each act is committed. Ledbetter
makes no claim that intentionally discriminatory conduct occurred
during the charging period or that discriminatory decisions occurring
before that period were not communicated to her. She argues simply
that Goodyear’s nondiscriminatory conduct during the charging pe
riod gave present effect to discriminatory conduct outside of that pe
riod. But current effects alone cannot breathe life into prior, un
charged discrimination. Ledbetter should have filed an EEOC charge
within 180 days after each allegedly discriminatory employment de
cision was made and communicated to her. Her attempt to shift for
ward the intent associated with prior discriminatory acts to the 1998
pay decision is unsound, for it would shift intent away from the act
that consummated the discriminatory employment practice to a later
act not performed with bias or discriminatory motive, imposing liabil
ity in the absence of the requisite intent. Her argument would also
distort Title VII’s “integrated, multistep enforcement procedure.” Oc
cidental Life Ins. Co. of Cal. v. EEOC, 432 U. S. 355, 359. The short
EEOC filing deadline reflects Congress’ strong preference for the
prompt resolution of employment discrimination allegations through
voluntary conciliation and cooperation. Id., at 367–368. Nothing in
Title VII supports treating the intent element of Ledbetter’s dispa
 Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 3

Syllabus

rate-treatment claim any differently from the employment practice
element of the claim. Pp. 4–13.
(b) Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U. S. 385 (per curiam), which con
cerned a disparate-treatment pay claim, is entirely consistent with
Evans, Ricks, Lorance, and Morgan. Bazemore’s rule is that an em
ployer violates Title VII and triggers a new EEOC charging period
whenever the employer issues paychecks using a discriminatory pay
structure. It is not, as Ledbetter contends, a “paycheck accrual rule”
under which each paycheck, even if not accompanied by discrimina
tory intent, triggers a new EEOC charging period during which the
complainant may properly challenge any prior discriminatory con
duct that impacted that paycheck’s amount, no matter how long ago
the discrimination occurred. Because Ledbetter has not adduced evi
dence that Goodyear initially adopted its performance-based pay sys
tem in order to discriminate based on sex or that it later applied this
system to her within the charging period with discriminatory animus,
Bazemore is of no help to her. Pp. 13–21.
(c) Ledbetter’s “paycheck accrual rule” is also not supported by ei
ther analogies to the statutory regimes of the Equal Pay Act of 1963,
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, or the National Labor Rela
tions Act, or policy arguments for giving special treatment to pay
claims. Pp. 21–24.
421 F. 3d 1169, affirmed.

ALITO, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J.,
and SCALIA, KENNEDY, and THOMAS, JJ., joined. GINSBURG, J., filed a
dissenting opinion, in which STEVENS, SOUTER, and BREYER, JJ., joined.
 Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________

No. 05–1074
_________________

LILLY M. LEDBETTER, PETITIONER v. THE GOOD

YEAR TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY, INC.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

[May 29, 2007]

JUSTICE ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case calls upon us to apply established precedent in
a slightly different context. We have previously held that
the time for filing a charge of employment discrimination
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) begins when the discriminatory act occurs. We
have explained that this rule applies to any “[d]iscrete
ac[t]” of discrimination, including discrimination in “ter
mination, failure to promote, denial of transfer, [and]
refusal to hire.” National Railroad Passenger Corporation
v. Morgan, 536 U. S. 101, 114 (2002). Because a pay-
setting decision is a “discrete act,” it follows that the pe
riod for filing an EEOC charge begins when the act occurs.
Petitioner, having abandoned her claim under the Equal
Pay Act, asks us to deviate from our prior decisions in
order to permit her to assert her claim under Title VII.
Petitioner also contends that discrimination in pay is
different from other types of employment discrimination
and thus should be governed by a different rule. But
because a pay-setting decision is a discrete act that occurs
at a particular point in time, these arguments must be
2 LEDBETTER v. GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER CO.

Opinion of the Court

rejected. We therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of
Appeals.
I
Petitioner Lilly Ledbetter (Ledbetter) worked for respon
dent Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company (Goodyear) at its
Gadsden, Alabama, plant from 1979 until 1998. During
much of this time, salaried employees at the plant were
given or denied raises based on their supervisors’ evalua
tion of their performance. In March 1998, Ledbetter sub
mitted a questionnaire to the EEOC alleging certain acts of
sex discrimination, and in July of that year she filed a
formal EEOC charge. After taking early retirement in
November 1998, Ledbetter commenced this action, in
which she asserted, among other claims, a Title VII pay
discrimination claim and a claim under the Equal Pay Act
of 1963 (EPA), 29 U. S. C. §206(d).
The District Court granted summary judgment in favor
of Goodyear on several of Ledbetter’s claims, including her
Equal Pay Act claim, but allowed others, including her
Title VII pay discrimination claim, to proceed to trial. In
support of this latter claim, Ledbetter introduced evidence
that during the course of her employment several supervi
sors had given her poor evaluations because of her sex,
that as a result of these evaluations her pay was not in
creased as much as it would have been if she had been
evaluated fairly, and that these past pay decisions contin
ued to affect the amount of her pay throughout her em
ployment. Toward the end of her time with Goodyear, she
was being paid significantly less than any of her male
colleagues. Goodyear maintained that the evaluations had
been nondiscriminatory, but the jury found for Ledbetter
and awarded her backpay and damages.
On appeal, Goodyear contended that Ledbetter’s pay
discrimination claim was time barred with respect to all
pay decisions made prior to September 26, 1997—that is,
 Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 3

Opinion of the Court

180 days before the filing of her EEOC questionnaire.1
And Goodyear argued that no discriminatory act relating
to Ledbetter’s pay occurred after that date.
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed,
holding that a Title VII pay discrimination claim cannot
be based on any pay decision that occurred prior to the
last pay decision that affected the employee’s pay during
the EEOC charging period. 421 F. 3d 1169, 1182–1183
(2005). The Court of Appeals then concluded that there
was insufficient evidence to prove that Goodyear had acted
with discriminatory intent in making the only two pay
decisions that occurred within that time span, namely, a
decision made in 1997 to deny Ledbetter a raise and a
similar decision made in 1998. Id., at 1186–1187.
Ledbetter filed a petition for a writ of certiorari but did
not seek review of the Court of Appeals’ holdings regard
ing the sufficiency of the evidence in relation to the 1997
and 1998 pay decisions. Rather, she sought review of the
following question:
“Whether and under what circumstances a plaintiff
may bring an action under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 alleging illegal pay discrimination
when the disparate pay is received during the statu
tory limitations period, but is the result of intention
ally discriminatory pay decisions that occurred out
side the limitations period.” Pet. for Cert. i.
In light of disagreement among the Courts of Appeals as
to the proper application of the limitations period in Title
VII disparate-treatment pay cases, compare 421 F. 3d
——————
1 The parties assume that the EEOC charging period runs backwards

from the date of the questionnaire, even though Ledbetter’s discrimina
tory pay claim was not added until the July 1998 formal charge. 421
F. 3d 1169, 1178 (CA11 2005). We likewise assume for the sake of
argument that the filing of the questionnaire, rather than the formal
charge, is the appropriate date.
4 LEDBETTER v. GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER CO.

Opinion of the Court

1169, with Forsyth v. Federation Employment & Guidance
Serv., 409 F. 3d 565 (CA2 2005); Shea v. Rice, 409 F. 3d
448 (CADC 2005), we granted certiorari, 548 U. S. ___
(2006).
II
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it an
“unlawful employment practice” to discriminate “against
any individual with respect to his compensation . . . be
cause of such individual’s . . . sex.” 42 U. S. C. §2000e–
2(a)(1). An individual wishing to challenge an employ
ment practice under this provision must first file a charge
with the EEOC. §2000e–5(e)(1). Such a charge must be
filed within a specified period (either 180 or 300 days,
depending on the State) “after the alleged unlawful em
ployment practice occurred,” ibid., and if the employee
does not submit a timely EEOC charge, the employee may
not challenge that practice in court, §2000e–5(f)(1).
In addressing the issue whether an EEOC charge was
filed on time, we have stressed the need to identify with
care the specific employment practice that is at issue.
Morgan, 536 U. S., at 110–111. Ledbetter points to two
different employment practices as possible candidates.
Primarily, she urges us to focus on the paychecks that
were issued to her during the EEOC charging period (the
180-day period preceding the filing of her EEOC question
naire), each of which, she contends, was a separate act of
discrimination. Alternatively, Ledbetter directs us to the
1998 decision denying her a raise, and she argues that this
decision was “unlawful because it carried forward inten
tionally discriminatory disparities from prior years.”
Reply Brief for Petitioner 20. Both of these arguments fail
because they would require us in effect to jettison the
defining element of the legal claim on which her Title VII
recovery was based.
Ledbetter asserted disparate treatment, the central
 Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 5

Opinion of the Court

element of which is discriminatory intent. See Chardon v.
Fernandez, 454 U. S. 6, 8 (1981) (per curiam); Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U. S. 324, 335, n. 15 (1977); Watson v.
Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U. S. 977, 1002 (1998)
(Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan, and Marshall, JJ.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (“[A]
disparate-treatment challenge focuses exclusively on the
intent of the employer”). However, Ledbetter does not
assert that the relevant Goodyear decisionmakers acted
with actual discriminatory intent either when they issued
her checks during the EEOC charging period or when they
denied her a raise in 1998. Rather, she argues that the
paychecks were unlawful because they would have been
larger if she had been evaluated in a nondiscriminatory
manner prior to the EEOC charging period. Brief for
Petitioner 22. Similarly, she maintains that the 1998
decision was unlawful because it “carried forward” the
effects of prior, uncharged discrimination decisions. Reply
Brief for Petitioner 20. In essence, she suggests that it is
sufficient that discriminatory acts that occurred prior to
the charging period had continuing effects during that
period. Brief for Petitioner 13 (“[E]ach paycheck that
offers a woman less pay than a similarly situated man
because of her sex is a separate violation of Title VII with
its own limitations period, regardless of whether the pay
check simply implements a prior discriminatory decision
made outside the limitations period”); see also Reply Brief
for Petitioner 20. This argument is squarely foreclosed by
our precedents.
In United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U. S. 553 (1977),
we rejected an argument that is basically the same as
Ledbetter’s. Evans was forced to resign because the air
line refused to employ married flight attendants, but she
did not file an EEOC charge regarding her termination.
Some years later, the airline rehired her but treated her
as a new employee for seniority purposes. Id., at 554–555.
6 LEDBETTER v. GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER CO.

Opinion of the Court

Evans then sued, arguing that, while any suit based on
the original discrimination was time barred, the airline’s
refusal to give her credit for her prior service gave “pre
sent effect to [its] past illegal act and thereby perpetu
ate[d] the consequences of forbidden discrimination.” Id.,
at 557.
We agreed with Evans that the airline’s “seniority sys
tem [did] indeed have a continuing impact on her pay and
fringe benefits,” id., at 558, but we noted that “the critical
question [was] whether any present violation exist[ed].”
Ibid. (emphasis in original). We concluded that the con
tinuing effects of the precharging period discrimination
did not make out a present violation. As JUSTICE STEVENS
wrote for the Court:
“United was entitled to treat [Evans’ termination] as
lawful after respondent failed to file a charge of dis
crimination within the 90 days then allowed by
§706(d). A discriminatory act which is not made the
basis for a timely charge . . . is merely an unfortunate
event in history which has no present legal conse
quences.” Ibid.
It would be difficult to speak to the point more directly.
Equally instructive is Delaware State College v. Ricks,
449 U. S. 250 (1980), which concerned a college librarian,
Ricks, who alleged that he had been discharged because of
race. In March 1974, Ricks was denied tenure, but he was
given a final, nonrenewable one-year contract that expired
on June 30, 1975. Id., at 252–253. Ricks delayed filing a
charge with the EEOC until April 1975, id., at 254, but he
argued that the EEOC charging period ran from the date of
his actual termination rather than from the date when
tenure was denied. In rejecting this argument, we recog
nized that “one of the effects of the denial of tenure,”
namely, his ultimate termination, “did not occur until
later.” Id., at 258 (emphasis in original). But because
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Opinion of the Court

Ricks failed to identify any specific discriminatory act “that
continued until, or occurred at the time of, the actual
termination of his employment,” id., at 257, we held that
the EEOC charging period ran from “the time the tenure
decision was made and communicated to Ricks,” id., at 258.
This same approach dictated the outcome in Lorance v.
AT&T Technologies, Inc., 490 U. S. 900 (1989), which grew
out of a change in the way in which seniority was calcu
lated under a collective-bargaining agreement. Before
1979, all employees at the plant in question accrued sen
iority based simply on years of employment at the plant.
In 1979, a new agreement made seniority for workers in
the more highly paid (and traditionally male) position of
“tester” depend on time spent in that position alone and
not in other positions in the plant. Several years later,
when female testers were laid off due to low seniority as
calculated under the new provision, they filed an EEOC
charge alleging that the 1979 scheme had been adopted
with discriminatory intent, namely, to protect incumbent
male testers when women with substantial plant seniority
began to move into the traditionally male tester positions.
Id., at 902–903.
We held that the plaintiffs’ EEOC charge was not timely
because it was not filed within the specified period after
the adoption in 1979 of the new seniority rule. We noted
that the plaintiffs had not alleged that the new seniority
rule treated men and women differently or that the rule
had been applied in a discriminatory manner. Rather,
their complaint was that the rule was adopted originally
with discriminatory intent. Id., at 905. And as in Evans
and Ricks, we held that the EEOC charging period ran
from the time when the discrete act of alleged intentional
discrimination occurred, not from the date when the ef
fects of this practice were felt. 490 U. S., at 907–908. We
stated:
8 LEDBETTER v. GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER CO.

Opinion of the Court

“Because the claimed invalidity of the facially nondis
criminatory and neutrally applied tester seniority sys
tem is wholly dependent on the alleged illegality of
signing the underlying agreement, it is the date of
that signing which governs the limitations period.”
Id., at 911.2
Our most recent decision in this area confirms this
understanding. In Morgan, we explained that the statu
tory term “employment practice” generally refers to “a
discrete act or single ‘occurrence’ ” that takes place at a
particular point in time. 536 U. S., at 110–111. We
pointed to “termination, failure to promote, denial of
transfer, [and] refusal to hire” as examples of such “dis
crete” acts, and we held that a Title VII plaintiff “can only
file a charge to cover discrete acts that ‘occurred’ within
the appropriate time period.” Id., at 114.
The instruction provided by Evans, Ricks, Lorance, and
Morgan is clear. The EEOC charging period is triggered
when a discrete unlawful practice takes place. A new
violation does not occur, and a new charging period does

——————
2 After Lorance, Congress amended Title VII to cover the specific

situation involved in that case. See 42 U. S. C. §2000e–5(e)(2) (allowing
for Title VII liability arising from an intentionally discriminatory
seniority system both at the time of its adoption and at the time of its
application). The dissent attaches great significance to this amend
ment, suggesting that it shows that Lorance was wrongly reasoned as
an initial matter. Post, at 10–12 (opinion of GINSBURG, J.). However,
the very legislative history cited by the dissent explains that this
amendment and the other 1991 Title VII amendments “ ‘expand[ed] the
scope of relevant civil rights statutes in order to provide adequate
protection to victims of discrimination.’ ” Post, at 11 (emphasis added).
For present purposes, what is most important about the amendment in
question is that it applied only to the adoption of a discriminatory
seniority system, not to other types of employment discrimination.
Evans and Ricks, upon which Lorance relied, 490 U. S., at 906–908, and
which employed identical reasoning, were left in place, and these
decisions are more than sufficient to support our holding today.
 Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 9

Opinion of the Court

not commence, upon the occurrence of subsequent non
discriminatory acts that entail adverse effects resulting
from the past discrimination. But of course, if an em
ployer engages in a series of acts each of which is inten
tionally discriminatory, then a fresh violation takes place
when each act is committed. See Morgan, supra, at 113.
Ledbetter’s arguments here—that the paychecks that
she received during the charging period and the 1998 raise
denial each violated Title VII and triggered a new EEOC
charging period—cannot be reconciled with Evans, Ricks,
Lorance, and Morgan. Ledbetter, as noted, makes no
claim that intentionally discriminatory conduct occurred
during the charging period or that discriminatory deci
sions that occurred prior to that period were not communi
cated to her. Instead, she argues simply that Goodyear’s
conduct during the charging period gave present effect to
discriminatory conduct outside of that period. Brief for
Petitioner 13. But current effects alone cannot breathe
life into prior, uncharged discrimination; as we held in
Evans, such effects in themselves have “no present legal
consequences.” 431 U. S., at 558. Ledbetter should have
filed an EEOC charge within 180 days after each allegedly
discriminatory pay decision was made and communicated
to her. She did not do so, and the paychecks that were
issued to her during the 180 days prior to the filing of her
EEOC charge do not provide a basis for overcoming that
prior failure.
In an effort to circumvent the need to prove discrimina
tory intent during the charging period, Ledbetter relies on
the intent associated with other decisions made by other
persons at other times. Reply Brief for Petitioner 6 (“Inten
tional discrimination . . . occurs when . . . differential treat
ment takes place, even if the intent to engage in that con
duct for a discriminatory purpose was made previously”).
Ledbetter’s attempt to take the intent associated with
the prior pay decisions and shift it to the 1998 pay deci
10 LEDBETTER v. GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER CO.

Opinion of the Court

sion is unsound. It would shift intent from one act (the act
that consummates the discriminatory employment prac
tice) to a later act that was not performed with bias or
discriminatory motive. The effect of this shift would be to
impose liability in the absence of the requisite intent.
Our cases recognize this point. In Evans, for example,
we did not take the airline’s discriminatory intent in 1968,
when it discharged the plaintiff because of her sex, and
attach that intent to its later act of neutrally applying its
seniority rules. Similarly, in Ricks, we did not take the
discriminatory intent that the college allegedly possessed
when it denied Ricks tenure and attach that intent to its
subsequent act of terminating his employment when his
nonrenewable contract ran out. On the contrary, we held
that “the only alleged discrimination occurred—and the
filing limitations periods therefore commenced—at the
time the tenure decision was made and communicated to
Ricks.” 449 U. S., at 258.
Not only would Ledbetter’s argument effectively elimi
nate the defining element of her disparate-treatment
claim, but it would distort Title VII’s “integrated,
multistep enforcement procedure.” Occidental Life Ins.
Co. of Cal. v. EEOC, 432 U. S. 355, 359 (1977). We have
previously noted the legislative compromises that pre
ceded the enactment of Title VII, Mohasco Corp. v. Silver,
447 U. S. 807, 819–821 (1980); EEOC v. Commercial Office
Products Co., 486 U. S. 107, 126 (1988) (STEVENS, J.,
joined by Rehnquist, C. J., and SCALIA, J., dissenting).
Respectful of the legislative process that crafted this
scheme, we must “give effect to the statute as enacted,”
Mohasco, supra, at 819, and we have repeatedly rejected
suggestions that we extend or truncate Congress’ dead
lines. See, e.g., Electrical Workers v. Robbins & Myers,
Inc., 429 U. S. 229, 236–240 (1976) (union grievance pro
cedures do not toll EEOC filing deadline); Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U. S. 36, 47–49 (1974) (arbitral
 Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 11

Opinion of the Court

decisions do not foreclose access to court following a timely
filed EEOC complaint).
Statutes of limitations serve a policy of repose. Ameri
can Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U. S. 538, 554–555
(1974). They
“represent a pervasive legislative judgment that it is
unjust to fail to put the adversary on notice to defend
within a specified period of time and that ‘the right to
be free of stale claims in time comes to prevail over
the right to prosecute them.’ ” United States v. Ku
brick, 444 U. S. 111, 117 (1979) (quoting Railroad
Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321
U. S. 342, 349 (1944)).
The EEOC filing deadline “protect[s] employers from the
burden of defending claims arising from employment
decisions that are long past.” Ricks, supra, at 256–257.
Certainly, the 180-day EEOC charging deadline, 42
U. S. C. §2000e–5(e)(1), is short by any measure, but “[b]y
choosing what are obviously quite short deadlines, Con
gress clearly intended to encourage the prompt processing
of all charges of employment discrimination.” Mohasco,
supra, at 825. This short deadline reflects Congress’
strong preference for the prompt resolution of employment
discrimination allegations through voluntary conciliation
and cooperation. Occidental Life Ins., supra, at 367–368;
Alexander, supra, at 44.
A disparate-treatment claim comprises two elements: an
employment practice, and discriminatory intent. Nothing
in Title VII supports treating the intent element of
Ledbetter’s claim any differently from the employment
practice element.3 If anything, concerns regarding stale
——————
3 Of course, there may be instances where the elements forming a
cause of action span more than 180 days. Say, for instance, an em
ployer forms an illegal discriminatory intent towards an employee but
does not act on it until 181 days later. The charging period would not
12 LEDBETTER v. GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER CO.

Opinion of the Court

claims weigh more heavily with respect to proof of the
intent associated with employment practices than with the
practices themselves. For example, in a case such as this
in which the plaintiff’s claim concerns the denial of raises,
the employer’s challenged acts (the decisions not to in
crease the employee’s pay at the times in question) will
almost always be documented and will typically not even
be in dispute. By contrast, the employer’s intent is almost
always disputed, and evidence relating to intent may fade
quickly with time. In most disparate-treatment cases,
much if not all of the evidence of intent is circumstantial.
Thus, the critical issue in a case involving a long-past
performance evaluation will often be whether the evalua
tion was so far off the mark that a sufficient inference of
discriminatory intent can be drawn. See Watson, 487
U. S., at 1004 (Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan and Mar
shall, JJ., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)
(noting that in a disparate-treatment claim, the McDon
nell Douglas factors establish discrimination by inference).
See also, e.g., Zhuang v. Datacard Corp., 414 F. 3d 849
(CA8 2005) (rejecting inference of discrimination from
performance evaluations); Cooper v. Southern Co., 390
F. 3d 695, 732–733 (CA11 2004) (same). This can be a
subtle determination, and the passage of time may seri
ously diminish the ability of the parties and the factfinder
to reconstruct what actually happened.4
——————
begin to run until the employment practice was executed on day 181
because until that point the employee had no cause of action. The act
and intent had not yet been joined. Here, by contrast, Ledbetter’s
cause of action was fully formed and present at the time that the
discriminatory employment actions were taken against her, at which
point she could have, and should have, sued.
4 The dissent dismisses this concern, post, at 15–16, but this case

illustrates the problems created by tardy lawsuits. Ledbetter’s claims
of sex discrimination turned principally on the misconduct of a single
Goodyear supervisor, who, Ledbetter testified, retaliated against her
when she rejected his sexual advances during the early 1980’s, and did
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Opinion of the Court

Ledbetter contends that employers would be protected
by the equitable doctrine of laches, but Congress plainly
did not think that laches was sufficient in this context.
Indeed, Congress took a diametrically different approach,
including in Title VII a provision allowing only a few
months in most cases to file a charge with the EEOC. 42
U. S. C. §2000e–5(e)(1).
Ultimately, “experience teaches that strict adherence
to the procedural requirements specified by the legisla
ture is the best guarantee of evenhanded administration
of the law.” Mohasco, 447 U. S., at 826. By operation of
§§2000e–5(e)(1) and 2000e–5(f)(1), a Title VII “claim is
time barred if it is not filed within these time limits.”
Morgan, 536 U. S., at 109; Electrical Workers, 429 U. S.,
at 236. We therefore reject the suggestion that an em
ployment practice committed with no improper purpose
and no discriminatory intent is rendered unlawful none
theless because it gives some effect to an intentional
discriminatory act that occurred outside the charging
period. Ledbetter’s claim is, for this reason, untimely.
III

A

In advancing her two theories Ledbetter does not seri
ously contest the logic of Evans, Ricks, Lorance, and Mor
gan as set out above, but rather argues that our decision
in Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U. S. 385 (1986) (per curiam),
requires different treatment of her claim because it relates
to pay. Ledbetter focuses specifically on our statement

——————
so again in the mid-1990’s when he falsified deficiency reports about
her work. His misconduct, Ledbetter argues, was “a principal basis for
[her] performance evaluation in 1997.” Brief for Petitioner 6; see also
id., at 5–6, 8, 11 (stressing the same supervisor’s misconduct). Yet, by
the time of trial, this supervisor had died and therefore could not
testify. A timely charge might have permitted his evidence to be
weighed contemporaneously.
14 LEDBETTER v. GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER CO.

Opinion of the Court

that “[e]ach week’s paycheck that delivers less to a black
than to a similarly situated white is a wrong actionable
under Title VII.” Id., at 395. She argues that in Bazemore
we adopted a “paycheck accrual rule” under which each
paycheck, even if not accompanied by discriminatory
intent, triggers a new EEOC charging period during which
the complainant may properly challenge any prior dis
criminatory conduct that impacted the amount of that
paycheck, no matter how long ago the discrimination
occurred. On this reading, Bazemore dispensed with the
need to prove actual discriminatory intent in pay cases
and, without giving any hint that it was doing so, repudi
ated the very different approach taken previously in Ev
ans and Ricks. Ledbetter’s interpretation is unsound.
Bazemore concerned a disparate-treatment pay claim
brought against the North Carolina Agricultural Exten
sion Service (Service). 478 U. S., at 389–390. Service
employees were originally segregated into “a white
branch” and “a ‘Negro branch,’ ” with the latter receiving
less pay, but in 1965 the two branches were merged. Id.,
at 390–391. After Title VII was extended to public em
ployees in 1972, black employees brought suit claiming
that pay disparities attributable to the old dual pay scale
persisted. Id., at 391. The Court of Appeals rejected this
claim, which it interpreted to be that the “ ‘discriminatory
difference in salaries should have been affirmatively
eliminated.’ ” Id., at 395.
This Court reversed in a per curiam opinion, 478 U. S.,
at 386–388, but all of the Members of the Court joined
Justice Brennan’s separate opinion, see id., at 388 (opin
ion concurring in part). Justice Brennan wrote:
“The error of the Court of Appeals with respect to sal
ary disparities created prior to 1972 and perpetuated
thereafter is too obvious to warrant extended discus
sion: that the Extension Service discriminated with
 Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 15

Opinion of the Court

respect to salaries prior to the time it was covered by
Title VII does not excuse perpetuating that discrimi
nation after the Extension Service became covered by
Title VII. To hold otherwise would have the effect of
exempting from liability those employers who were
historically the greatest offenders of the rights of
blacks. A pattern or practice that would have consti
tuted a violation of Title VII, but for the fact that the
statute had not yet become effective, became a viola
tion upon Title VII’s effective date, and to the extent
an employer continued to engage in that act or prac
tice, it is liable under that statute. While recovery
may not be permitted for pre-1972 acts of discrimina
tion, to the extent that this discrimination was per
petuated after 1972, liability may be imposed.” Id., at
395 (emphasis in original).
Far from adopting the approach that Ledbetter ad
vances here, this passage made a point that was “too
obvious to warrant extended discussion,” ibid.; namely,
that when an employer adopts a facially discriminatory
pay structure that puts some employees on a lower scale
because of race, the employer engages in intentional dis
crimination whenever it issues a check to one of these
disfavored employees. An employer that adopts and inten
tionally retains such a pay structure can surely be re
garded as intending to discriminate on the basis of race as
long as the structure is used.
Bazemore thus is entirely consistent with our prior
precedents, as Justice Brennan’s opinion took care to point
out. Noting that Evans turned on whether “ ‘any present
violation exist[ed],’ ” Justice Brennan stated that the
Bazemore plaintiffs were alleging that the defendants
“ha[d] not from the date of the Act forward made all their
employment decisions in a wholly nondiscriminatory way,”
478 U. S., at 396–397, n. 6 (emphasis in original; internal
16 LEDBETTER v. GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER CO.

Opinion of the Court

quotation marks and brackets omitted)–which is to say
that they had engaged in fresh discrimination. Justice
Brennan added that the Court’s “holding in no sense
g[ave] legal effect to the pre-1972 actions, but, consistent
with Evans . . . focuse[d] on the present salary structure,
which is illegal if it is a mere continuation of the pre-1965
discriminatory pay structure.” Id., at 397, n. 6 (emphasis
added).
The sentence in Justice Brennan’s opinion on which
Ledbetter chiefly relies comes directly after the passage
quoted above, and makes a similarly obvious point:
“Each week’s paycheck that delivers less to a black
than to a similarly situated white is a wrong action
able under Title VII, regardless of the fact that this
pattern was begun prior to the effective date of Title
VII.” Id., at 395.5

——————
5 That the focus in Bazemore was on a current violation, not the car

rying forward of a past act of discrimination, was made clearly by the
side opinion in the Court of Appeals:
“[T]he majority holds, in effect, that because the pattern of discrimina
tory salaries here challenged originated before applicable provisions of
the Civil Rights Act made their payment illegal, any ‘lingering effects’
of that earlier pattern cannot (presumably on an indefinitely main
tained basis) be considered in assessing a challenge to post-act con
tinuation of that pattern.
“Hazelwood and Evans indeed made it clear that an employer cannot
be found liable, or sanctioned with remedy, for employment decisions
made before they were declared illegal or as to which the claimant has
lost any right of action by lapse of time. For this reason it is generally
true that, as the catch-phrase has it, Title VII imposed ‘no obligation to
catch-up,’ i.e., affirmatively to remedy present effects of pre-Act dis
crimination, whether in composing a work force or otherwise. But
those cases cannot be thought to insulate employment decisions that
presently are illegal on the basis that at one time comparable decisions
were legal when made by the particular employer. It is therefore one
thing to say that an employer who upon the effective date of Title VII
finds itself with a racially unbalanced work-force need not act affirma
tively to redress the balance; and quite another to say that it may also
 Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 17

Opinion of the Court

In other words, a freestanding violation may always be
charged within its own charging period regardless of its
connection to other violations. We repeated this same
point more recently in Morgan: “The existence of past acts
and the employee’s prior knowledge of their occurrence . . .
does not bar employees from filing charges about related
discrete acts so long as the acts are independently dis
criminatory and charges addressing those acts are them
selves timely filed.” 536 U. S., at 113.6 Neither of these
opinions stands for the proposition that an action not
comprising an employment practice and alleged discrimi
natory intent is separately chargeable, just because it is
related to some past act of discrimination.
Ledbetter attempts to eliminate the obvious inconsis
tencies between her interpretation of Bazemore and the
Evans/Ricks/Lorance/Morgan line of cases on the ground
that none of the latter cases involved pay raises, but the
logic of our prior cases is fully applicable to pay cases. To
take Evans as an example, the employee there was unlaw
fully terminated; this caused her to lose seniority; and the
loss of seniority affected her wages, among other things.
431 U. S., at 555, n. 5 (“[S]eniority determine[s] a flight
——————
continue to make discriminatory hiring decisions because it was by that
means that its present work force was composed. It may not, in short,
under the Hazelwood/Evans principle continue practices now violative
simply because at one time they were not.” Bazemore v. Friday, 751
F. 2d 662, 695–696 (CA4 1984) (Phillips, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (emphasis in original; footnotes omitted).
6 The briefs filed with this Court in Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U. S. 385

(1986) (per curiam), further elucidate the point. The petitioners de
scribed the Service’s conduct as “[t]he continued use of a racially
explicit base wage.” Brief for Petitioner Bazemore et al. in Bazemore v.
Friday, O. T. 1985, No. 85–93, p. 33. The United States’ brief also
properly distinguished the commission of a discrete discriminatory act
with continuing adverse results from the intentional carrying forward
of a discriminatory pay system. Brief for Federal Petitioners in
Bazemore v. Friday, O. T. 1984, Nos. 85–93 and 85–428, p. 17. This
case involves the former, not the latter.
18 LEDBETTER v. GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER CO.

Opinion of the Court

attendant’s wages; the duration and timing of vacations;
rights to retention in the event of layoffs and rights to re
employment thereafter; and rights to preferential selection
of flight assignments”). The relationship between past
discrimination and adverse present effects was the same
in Evans as it is here. Thus, the argument that Ledbetter
urges us to accept here would necessarily have com
manded a different outcome in Evans.
Bazemore stands for the proposition that an employer
violates Title VII and triggers a new EEOC charging
period whenever the employer issues paychecks using a
discriminatory pay structure. But a new Title VII viola
tion does not occur and a new charging period is not trig
gered when an employer issues paychecks pursuant to a
system that is “facially nondiscriminatory and neutrally
applied.” Lorance, 490 U. S., at 911. The fact that pre-
charging period discrimination adversely affects the calcu
lation of a neutral factor (like seniority) that is used in
determining future pay does not mean that each new
paycheck constitutes a new violation and restarts the
EEOC charging period.
Because Ledbetter has not adduced evidence that Good-
year initially adopted its performance-based pay system in
order to discriminate on the basis of sex or that it later
applied this system to her within the charging period with
any discriminatory animus, Bazemore is of no help to her.
Rather, all Ledbetter has alleged is that Goodyear’s agents
discriminated against her individually in the past and
that this discrimination reduced the amount of later pay
checks. Because Ledbetter did not file timely EEOC
charges relating to her employer’s discriminatory pay
decisions in the past, she cannot maintain a suit based on
that past discrimination at this time.
B
The dissent also argues that pay claims are different.
 Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 19

Opinion of the Court

Its principal argument is that a pay discrimination claim
is like a hostile work environment claim because both
types of claims are “ ‘based on the cumulative effect of
individual acts,’ ” post, at 6–7, but this analogy overlooks
the critical conceptual distinction between these two types
of claims. And although the dissent relies heavily on
Morgan, the dissent’s argument is fundamentally incon
sistent with Morgan’s reasoning.
Morgan distinguished between “discrete” acts of dis
crimination and a hostile work environment. A discrete
act of discrimination is an act that in itself “constitutes a
separate actionable ‘unlawful employment practice’ ” and
that is temporally distinct. Morgan, 536 U. S., at 114,
117. As examples we identified “termination, failure to
promote, denial of transfer, or refusal to hire.” Id., at 114.
A hostile work environment, on the other hand, typically
comprises a succession of harassing acts, each of which
“may not be actionable on its own.” In addition, a hostile
work environment claim “cannot be said to occur on any
particular day.” Id., at 115–116. In other words, the
actionable wrong is the environment, not the individual
acts that, taken together, create the environment.7
Contrary to the dissent’s assertion, post, at 6–7, what
Ledbetter alleged was not a single wrong consisting of a
succession of acts. Instead, she alleged a series of discrete
discriminatory acts, see Brief for Petitioner 13, 15 (argu
ing that payment of each paycheck constituted a separate

——————
7 Moreover, the proposed hostile salary environment claim would go

far beyond Morgan’s limits. Morgan still required at least some of the
discriminatorily-motivated acts predicate to a hostile work environment
claim to occur within the charging period. 536 U. S., at 117 (“Provided
that an act contributing to the claim occurs within the filing period, the
entire time period of the hostile environment may be considered by a
court” (emphasis added)). But the dissent would permit claims where
no one acted in any way with an improper motive during the charging
period. Post, at 7, 16.
20 LEDBETTER v. GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER CO.

Opinion of the Court

violation of Title VII), each of which was independently
identifiable and actionable, and Morgan is perfectly clear
that when an employee alleges “serial violations,” i.e., a
series of actionable wrongs, a timely EEOC charge must
be filed with respect to each discrete alleged violation. 536
U. S., at 113.
While this fundamental misinterpretation of Morgan is
alone sufficient to show that the dissent’s approach must
be rejected, it should also be noted that the dissent is coy
as to whether it would apply the same rule to all pay
discrimination claims or whether it would limit the rule to
cases like Ledbetter’s, in which multiple discriminatory
pay decisions are alleged. The dissent relies on the fact
that Ledbetter was allegedly subjected to a series of dis
criminatory pay decisions over a period of time, and the
dissent suggests that she did not realize for some time
that she had been victimized. But not all pay cases share
these characteristics.
If, as seems likely, the dissent would apply the same
rule in all pay cases, then, if a single discriminatory pay
decision made 20 years ago continued to affect an em
ployee’s pay today, the dissent would presumably hold
that the employee could file a timely EEOC charge today.
And the dissent would presumably allow this even if the
employee had full knowledge of all the circumstances
relating to the 20-year-old decision at the time it was
made.8 The dissent, it appears, proposes that we adopt a
special rule for pay cases based on the particular charac
——————
8 The dissent admits as much, responding only that an employer
could resort to equitable doctrines such as laches. Post, at 16. But
first, as we have noted, Congress has already determined that defense
to be insufficient. Supra, at 13. Second, it is far from clear that a suit
filed under the dissent’s theory, alleging that a paycheck paid recently
within the charging period was itself a freestanding violation of Title
VII because it reflected the effects of 20-year-old discrimination, would
even be barred by laches.
 Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 21

Opinion of the Court

teristics of one case that is certainly not representative of
all pay cases and may not even be typical. We refuse to
take that approach.
IV
In addition to the arguments previously discussed,
Ledbetter relies largely on analogies to other statutory
regimes and on extrastatutory policy arguments to sup
port her “paycheck accrual rule.”
A
Ledbetter places significant weight on the EPA, which
was enacted contemporaneously with Title VII and prohib
its paying unequal wages for equal work because of sex.
29 U. S. C. §206(d). Stating that “the lower courts rou
tinely hear [EPA] claims challenging pay disparities that
first arose outside the limitations period,” Ledbetter sug
gests that we should hold that Title VII is violated each
time an employee receives a paycheck that reflects past
discrimination. Brief for Petitioner 34–35.
The simple answer to this argument is that the EPA
and Title VII are not the same. In particular, the EPA
does not require the filing of a charge with the EEOC or
proof of intentional discrimination. See §206(d)(1) (asking
only whether the alleged inequality resulted from “any
other factor other than sex”). Ledbetter originally as
serted an EPA claim, but that claim was dismissed by the
District Court and is not before us. If Ledbetter had pur
sued her EPA claim, she would not face the Title VII
obstacles that she now confronts.9
——————
9 The Magistrate Judge recommended dismissal of Ledbetter’s EPA

claim on the ground that Goodyear had demonstrated that the pay
disparity resulted from Ledbetter’s consistently weak performance, not
her sex. App. to Pet. for Cert. 71a–77a. The Magistrate Judge also
recommended dismissing the Title VII disparate-pay claim on the same
basis. Id., at 65a–69a. Ledbetter objected to the Magistrate Judge’s
disposition of the Title VII and EPA claims, arguing that the Magis
22 LEDBETTER v. GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER CO.

Opinion of the Court

Ledbetter’s appeal to the Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938 (FLSA) is equally unavailing. Stating that it is “well
established that the statute of limitations for violations of
the minimum wage and overtime provisions of the [FLSA]
runs anew with each paycheck,” Brief for Petitioner 35,
Ledbetter urges that the same should be true in a Title
VII pay case. Again, however, Ledbetter’s argument
overlooks the fact that an FLSA minimum wage or over
time claim does not require proof of a specific intent to
discriminate. See 29 U. S. C. §207 (establishing overtime
rules); cf. §255(a) (establishing 2-year statute of limita
tions for FLSA claims, except for claims of a “willful viola
tion,” which may be commenced within 3 years).
Ledbetter is on firmer ground in suggesting that we look
to cases arising under the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA) since the NLRA provided a model for Title VII’s
remedial provisions and, like Title VII, requires the filing
of a timely administrative charge (with the National Labor
Relations Board) before suit may be maintained. Lorance,
490 U. S., at 909; Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U. S. 219,
226, n. 8 (1982). Cf. 29 U. S. C. §160(b) (“[N]o complaint
shall issue based upon any unfair labor practice occurring
more than six months prior to the filing of the charge with
the Board”).
Ledbetter argues that the NLRA’s 6-month statute of
limitations begins anew for each paycheck reflecting a
prior violation of the statute, but our precedents suggest
——————
trate Judge had improperly resolved a disputed factual issue. See
Plaintiff’s Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommenda
tion, 1 Record in No. 03–15246–G (CA11), Doc. 32. The District Court
sustained this objection as to the “disparate pay” claim, but without
specifically mentioning the EPA claim, which had been dismissed by
the Magistrate Judge on the same basis. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 43a–
44a. While the record is not entirely clear, it appears that at this point
Ledbetter elected to abandon her EPA claim, proceeding to trial with
only the Title VII disparate-pay claim, thus giving rise to the dispute
the Court must now resolve.
 Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 23

Opinion of the Court

otherwise. In Machinists v. NLRB, 362 U. S. 411, 416–417
(1960), we held that “where conduct occurring within the
limitations period can be charged to be an unfair labor
practice only through reliance on an earlier unfair labor
practice[,] the use of the earlier unfair labor practice
[merely] serves to cloak with illegality that which was
otherwise lawful.” This interpretation corresponds closely
to our analysis in Evans and Ricks and supports our hold
ing in the present case.
B
Ledbetter, finally, makes a variety of policy arguments
in favor of giving the alleged victims of pay discrimination
more time before they are required to file a charge with
the EEOC. Among other things, she claims that pay
discrimination is harder to detect than other forms of
employment discrimination.10
We are not in a position to evaluate Ledbetter’s policy
arguments, and it is not our prerogative to change the way
in which Title VII balances the interests of aggrieved
employees against the interest in encouraging the “prompt
processing of all charges of employment discrimination,”
Mohasco, 447 U. S., at 825, and the interest in repose.
Ledbetter’s policy arguments for giving special treat
ment to pay claims find no support in the statute and are
inconsistent with our precedents.11 We apply the statute
——————
10 We have previously declined to address whether Title VII suits are
amenable to a discovery rule. National Railroad Passenger Corporation
v. Morgan, 536 U. S. 101, 114, n. 7 (2002). Because Ledbetter does not
argue that such a rule would change the outcome in her case, we have
no occasion to address this issue.
11 Ledbetter argues that the EEOC’s endorsement of her approach in

its Compliance Manual and in administrative adjudications merits
deference. But we have previously declined to extend Chevron defer
ence to the Compliance Manual, Morgan, supra, at 111, n. 6, and
similarly decline to defer to the EEOC’s adjudicatory positions. The
EEOC’s views in question are based on its misreading of Bazemore.
24 LEDBETTER v. GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER CO.

Opinion of the Court

as written, and this means that any unlawful employment
practice, including those involving compensation, must be
presented to the EEOC within the period prescribed by
statute.
* * *
For these reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit is affirmed.
It is so ordered.

——————
See, e.g., Amft v. Mineta, No. 07A40116, 2006 WL 985183, *5 (EEOC
Office of Fed. Operations, Apr. 6, 2006); Albritton v. Postmaster Gen
eral, No. 01A44063, 2004 WL 2983682, *2 (EEOC Office of Fed. Opera
tions, Dec. 17, 2004). Agencies have no special claim to deference in
their interpretation of our decisions. Reno v. Bossier Parish School Bd.,
528 U. S. 320, 336, n. 5 (2000). Nor do we see reasonable ambiguity in
the statute itself, which makes no distinction between compensation
and other sorts of claims and which clearly requires that discrete
employment actions alleged to be unlawful be motivated “because of
such individual’s . . . sex.” 42 U. S. C. §2000e–a(a)(1).
 Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 1

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________

No. 05–1074
_________________

LILLY M. LEDBETTER, PETITIONER v. THE GOOD

YEAR TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY, INC.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

[May 29, 2007]

JUSTICE GINSBURG, with whom JUSTICE STEVENS,
JUSTICE SOUTER, and JUSTICE BREYER join, dissenting.
Lilly Ledbetter was a supervisor at Goodyear Tire and
Rubber’s plant in Gadsden, Alabama, from 1979 until her
retirement in 1998. For most of those years, she worked
as an area manager, a position largely occupied by men.
Initially, Ledbetter’s salary was in line with the salaries of
men performing substantially similar work. Over time,
however, her pay slipped in comparison to the pay of male
area managers with equal or less seniority. By the end of
1997, Ledbetter was the only woman working as an area
manager and the pay discrepancy between Ledbetter and
her 15 male counterparts was stark: Ledbetter was paid
$3,727 per month; the lowest paid male area manager
received $4,286 per month, the highest paid, $5,236. See
421 F. 3d 1169, 1174 (CA11 2005); Brief for Petitioner 4.
Ledbetter launched charges of discrimination before the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) in
March 1998. Her formal administrative complaint speci
fied that, in violation of Title VII, Goodyear paid her a
discriminatorily low salary because of her sex. See 42
U. S. C. §2000e–2(a)(1) (rendering it unlawful for an em
ployer “to discriminate against any individual with respect
to [her] compensation . . . because of such individual’s . . .
sex”). That charge was eventually tried to a jury, which
2 LEDBETTER v. GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER CO.

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

found it “more likely than not that [Goodyear] paid
[Ledbetter] a[n] unequal salary because of her sex.” App.
102. In accord with the jury’s liability determination, the
District Court entered judgment for Ledbetter for backpay
and damages, plus counsel fees and costs.
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed.
Relying on Goodyear’s system of annual merit-based
raises, the court held that Ledbetter’s claim, in relevant
part, was time barred. 421 F. 3d, at 1171, 1182–1183.
Title VII provides that a charge of discrimination “shall be
filed within [180] days after the alleged unlawful employ
ment practice occurred.” 42 U. S. C. §2000e–5(e)(1).1
Ledbetter charged, and proved at trial, that within the
180-day period, her pay was substantially less than the
pay of men doing the same work. Further, she introduced
evidence sufficient to establish that discrimination against
female managers at the Gadsden plant, not performance
inadequacies on her part, accounted for the pay differen
tial. See, e.g., App. 36–47, 51–68, 82–87, 90–98, 112–113.
That evidence was unavailing, the Eleventh Circuit held,
and the Court today agrees, because it was incumbent on
Ledbetter to file charges year-by-year, each time Goodyear
failed to increase her salary commensurate with the sala
ries of male peers. Any annual pay decision not contested
immediately (within 180 days), the Court affirms, becomes
grandfathered, a fait accompli beyond the province of Title
VII ever to repair.
The Court’s insistence on immediate contest overlooks
common characteristics of pay discrimination. Pay dis
parities often occur, as they did in Ledbetter’s case, in
small increments; cause to suspect that discrimination is
——————
1 If the complainant has first instituted proceedings with a state or

local agency, the filing period is extended to 300 days or 30 days after
the denial of relief by the agency. 42 U. S. C. §2000e–5(e)(1). Because
the 180-day period applies to Ledbetter’s case, that figure will be used
throughout. See ante, at 3, 4.
 Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 3

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

at work develops only over time. Comparative pay infor
mation, moreover, is often hidden from the employee’s
view. Employers may keep under wraps the pay differen
tials maintained among supervisors, no less the reasons
for those differentials. Small initial discrepancies may not
be seen as meet for a federal case, particularly when the
employee, trying to succeed in a nontraditional environ
ment, is averse to making waves.
Pay disparities are thus significantly different from
adverse actions “such as termination, failure to promote,
. . . or refusal to hire,” all involving fully communicated
discrete acts, “easy to identify” as discriminatory. See
National Railroad Passenger Corporation v. Morgan, 536
U. S. 101, 114 (2002). It is only when the disparity be
comes apparent and sizable, e.g., through future raises
calculated as a percentage of current salaries, that an
employee in Ledbetter’s situation is likely to comprehend
her plight and, therefore, to complain. Her initial readi
ness to give her employer the benefit of the doubt should
not preclude her from later challenging the then current
and continuing payment of a wage depressed on account of
her sex.
On questions of time under Title VII, we have identified
as the critical inquiries: “What constitutes an ‘unlawful
employment practice’ and when has that practice ‘oc
curred’?” Id., at 110. Our precedent suggests, and lower
courts have overwhelmingly held, that the unlawful prac
tice is the current payment of salaries infected by gender-
based (or race-based) discrimination—a practice that
occurs whenever a paycheck delivers less to a woman than
to a similarly situated man. See Bazemore v. Friday, 478
U. S. 385, 395 (1986) (Brennan, J., joined by all other
Members of the Court, concurring in part).
I
Title VII proscribes as an “unlawful employment prac
4 LEDBETTER v. GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER CO.

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

tice” discrimination “against any individual with respect
to his compensation . . . because of such individual’s race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U. S. C. §2000e–
2(a)(1). An individual seeking to challenge an employment
practice under this proscription must file a charge with
the EEOC within 180 days “after the alleged unlawful
employment practice occurred.” §2000e–5(e)(1). See ante,
at 4; supra, at 2, n. 1.
Ledbetter’s petition presents a question important to the
sound application of Title VII: What activity qualifies as
an unlawful employment practice in cases of discrimina
tion with respect to compensation. One answer identifies
the pay-setting decision, and that decision alone, as the
unlawful practice. Under this view, each particular sal
ary-setting decision is discrete from prior and subsequent
decisions, and must be challenged within 180 days on pain
of forfeiture. Another response counts both the pay-
setting decision and the actual payment of a discrimina
tory wage as unlawful practices. Under this approach,
each payment of a wage or salary infected by sex-based
discrimination constitutes an unlawful employment prac
tice; prior decisions, outside the 180-day charge-filing
period, are not themselves actionable, but they are rele
vant in determining the lawfulness of conduct within the
period. The Court adopts the first view, see ante, at 1, 4,
9, but the second is more faithful to precedent, more in
tune with the realities of the workplace, and more respect
ful of Title VII’s remedial purpose.
A
In Bazemore, we unanimously held that an employer,
the North Carolina Agricultural Extension Service, com
mitted an unlawful employment practice each time it paid
black employees less than similarly situated white em
ployees. 478 U. S., at 395 (opinion of Brennan, J.). Before
1965, the Extension Service was divided into two
 Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 5

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

branches: a white branch and a “Negro branch.” Id., at
390. Employees in the “Negro branch” were paid less than
their white counterparts. In response to the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, which included Title VII, the State merged
the two branches into a single organization, made adjust
ments to reduce the salary disparity, and began giving
annual raises based on nondiscriminatory factors. Id., at
390–391, 394–395. Nonetheless, “some pre-existing salary
disparities continued to linger on.” Id., at 394 (internal
quotation marks omitted). We rejected the Court of Ap
peals’ conclusion that the plaintiffs could not prevail be
cause the lingering disparities were simply a continuing
effect of a decision lawfully made prior to the effective date
of Title VII. See id., at 395–396. Rather, we reasoned,
“[e]ach week’s paycheck that delivers less to a black than
to a similarly situated white is a wrong actionable under
Title VII.” Id., at 395. Paychecks perpetuating past dis
crimination, we thus recognized, are actionable not simply
because they are “related” to a decision made outside the
charge-filing period, cf. ante, at 17, but because they dis
criminate anew each time they issue, see Bazemore, 478
U. S., at 395–396, and n. 6; Morgan, 536 U. S., at 111–112.
Subsequently, in Morgan, we set apart, for purposes of
Title VII’s timely filing requirement, unlawful employ
ment actions of two kinds: “discrete acts” that are “easy to
identify” as discriminatory, and acts that recur and are
cumulative in impact. See id., at 110, 113–115. “[A]
[d]iscrete ac[t] such as termination, failure to promote,
denial of transfer, or refusal to hire,” id., at 114, we ex
plained, “ ‘occur[s]’ on the day that it ‘happen[s].’ A party,
therefore, must file a charge within . . . 180 . . . days of the
date of the act or lose the ability to recover for it.” Id., at
110; see id., at 113 (“[D]iscrete discriminatory acts are not
actionable if time barred, even when they are related to
acts alleged in timely filed charges. Each discrete dis
criminatory act starts a new clock for filing charges alleg
6 LEDBETTER v. GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER CO.

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

ing that act.”).
“[D]ifferent in kind from discrete acts,” we made clear,
are “claims . . . based on the cumulative effect of individ
ual acts.” Id., at 115. The Morgan decision placed hostile
work environment claims in that category. “Their very
nature involves repeated conduct.” Ibid. “The unlawful
employment practice” in hostile work environment claims,
“cannot be said to occur on any particular day. It occurs
over a series of days or perhaps years and, in direct con
trast to discrete acts, a single act of harassment may not
be actionable on its own.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks
omitted). The persistence of the discriminatory conduct
both indicates that management should have known of its
existence and produces a cognizable harm. Ibid. Because
the very nature of the hostile work environment claim
involves repeated conduct,
“[i]t does not matter, for purposes of the statute, that
some of the component acts of the hostile work envi
ronment fall outside the statutory time period. Pro
vided that an act contributing to the claim occurs
within the filing period, the entire time period of the
hostile environment may be considered by a court for
the purposes of determining liability.” Id., at 117.
Consequently, although the unlawful conduct began in the
past, “a charge may be filed at a later date and still en
compass the whole.” Ibid.
Pay disparities, of the kind Ledbetter experienced, have
a closer kinship to hostile work environment claims than
to charges of a single episode of discrimination.
Ledbetter’s claim, resembling Morgan’s, rested not on one
particular paycheck, but on “the cumulative effect of indi
vidual acts.” See id., at 115. See also Brief for Petitioner
13, 15–17, and n. 9 (analogizing Ledbetter’s claim to the
recurring and cumulative harm at issue in Morgan); Reply
Brief for Petitioner 13 (distinguishing pay discrimination
 Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 7

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

from “easy to identify” discrete acts (internal quotation
marks omitted)). She charged insidious discrimination
building up slowly but steadily. See Brief for Petitioner 5–
8. Initially in line with the salaries of men performing
substantially the same work, Ledbetter’s salary fell 15 to
40 percent behind her male counterparts only after suc
cessive evaluations and percentage-based pay adjust
ments. See supra, at 1–2. Over time, she alleged and
proved, the repetition of pay decisions undervaluing her
work gave rise to the current discrimination of which she
complained. Though component acts fell outside the
charge-filing period, with each new paycheck, Goodyear
contributed incrementally to the accumulating harm. See
Morgan, 536 U. S., at 117; Bazemore, 478 U. S., at 395–
396; cf. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery
Corp., 392 U. S. 481, 502, n. 15 (1968).2
B
The realities of the workplace reveal why the discrimi
nation with respect to compensation that Ledbetter suf
fered does not fit within the category of singular discrete
acts “easy to identify.” A worker knows immediately if she
is denied a promotion or transfer, if she is fired or refused
employment. And promotions, transfers, hirings, and
firings are generally public events, known to co-workers.
When an employer makes a decision of such open and
definitive character, an employee can immediately seek
out an explanation and evaluate it for pretext. Compensa
tion disparities, in contrast, are often hidden from sight.
——————
2 National Railroad Passenger Corporation v. Morgan, 536 U. S. 101,
117 (2002), the Court emphasizes, required that “an act contributing to
the claim occu[r] within the [charge-]filing period.” Ante, at 19, and n. 7
(emphasis deleted; internal quotation marks omitted). Here, each
paycheck within the filing period compounded the discrimination
Ledbetter encountered, and thus contributed to the “actionable wrong,”
i.e., the succession of acts composing the pattern of discriminatory pay,
of which she complained.
8 LEDBETTER v. GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER CO.

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

It is not unusual, decisions in point illustrate, for man
agement to decline to publish employee pay levels, or for
employees to keep private their own salaries. See, e.g.,
Goodwin v. General Motors Corp., 275 F. 3d 1005, 1008–
1009 (CA10 2002) (plaintiff did not know what her col
leagues earned until a printout listing of salaries appeared
on her desk, seven years after her starting salary was set
lower than her co-workers’ salaries); McMillan v. Massa
chusetts Soc. for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 140
F. 3d 288, 296 (CA1 1998) (plaintiff worked for employer
for years before learning of salary disparity published in a
newspaper).3 Tellingly, as the record in this case bears
out, Goodyear kept salaries confidential; employees had
only limited access to information regarding their col
leagues’ earnings. App. 56–57, 89.
The problem of concealed pay discrimination is particu
larly acute where the disparity arises not because the
female employee is flatly denied a raise but because male
counterparts are given larger raises. Having received a
pay increase, the female employee is unlikely to discern at
once that she has experienced an adverse employment
decision. She may have little reason even to suspect dis
crimination until a pattern develops incrementally and
she ultimately becomes aware of the disparity. Even if an
employee suspects that the reason for a comparatively low
raise is not performance but sex (or another protected
ground), the amount involved may seem too small, or the
employer’s intent too ambiguous, to make the issue imme
diately actionable—or winnable.
Further separating pay claims from the discrete em
——————
3 See also Bierman & Gely, “Love, Sex and Politics? Sure. Salary? No

Way”: Workplace Social Norms and the Law, 25 Berkeley J. Emp. &
Lab. L. 167, 168, 171 (2004) (one-third of private sector employers have
adopted specific rules prohibiting employees from discussing their
wages with co-workers; only one in ten employers has adopted a pay
openness policy).
 Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 9

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

ployment actions identified in Morgan, an employer gains
from sex-based pay disparities in a way it does not from a
discriminatory denial of promotion, hiring, or transfer.
When a male employee is selected over a female for a
higher level position, someone still gets the promotion and
is paid a higher salary; the employer is not enriched. But
when a woman is paid less than a similarly situated man,
the employer reduces its costs each time the pay differen
tial is implemented. Furthermore, decisions on promo
tions, like decisions installing seniority systems, often
implicate the interests of third-party employees in a way
that pay differentials do not. Cf. Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U. S. 324, 352–353 (1977) (recognizing that
seniority systems involve “vested . . . rights of employees”
and concluding that Title VII was not intended to “destroy
or water down” those rights). Disparate pay, by contrast,
can be remedied at any time solely at the expense of the
employer who acts in a discriminatory fashion.
C
In light of the significant differences between pay dis
parities and discrete employment decisions of the type
identified in Morgan, the cases on which the Court relies
hold no sway. See ante, at 5–10 (discussing United Air
Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U. S. 553 (1977), Delaware State
College v. Ricks, 449 U. S. 250 (1980), and Lorance v.
AT&T Technologies, Inc., 490 U. S. 900 (1989)). Evans
and Ricks both involved a single, immediately identifiable
act of discrimination: in Evans, a constructive discharge,
431 U. S., at 554; in Ricks, a denial of tenure, 449 U. S., at
252. In each case, the employee filed charges well after
the discrete discriminatory act occurred: When United
Airlines forced Evans to resign because of its policy bar
ring married female flight attendants, she filed no charge;
only four years later, when Evans was rehired, did she
allege that the airline’s former no-marriage rule was
10 LEDBETTER v. GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER CO.

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

unlawful and therefore should not operate to deny her
seniority credit for her prior service. See Evans, 431 U. S.,
at 554–557. Similarly, when Delaware State College
denied Ricks tenure, he did not object until his terminal
contract came to an end, one year later. Ricks, 449 U. S.,
at 253–254, 257–258. No repetitive, cumulative discrimi
natory employment practice was at issue in either case.
See Evans, 431 U. S., at 557–558; Ricks, 449 U. S., at 258.4
Lorance is also inapposite, for, in this Court’s view, it
too involved a one-time discrete act: the adoption of a new
seniority system that “had its genesis in sex discrimina
tion.” See 490 U. S., at 902, 905 (internal quotation marks
omitted). The Court’s extensive reliance on Lorance, ante,
at 7–9, 14, 17–18, moreover, is perplexing for that decision
is no longer effective: In the 1991 Civil Rights Act, Con
gress superseded Lorance’s holding. §112, 105 Stat. 1079
(codified as amended at 42 U. S. C. §2000e–5(e)(2)). Re
pudiating our judgment that a facially neutral seniority
system adopted with discriminatory intent must be chal
lenged immediately, Congress provided:
“For purposes of this section, an unlawful employment
practice occurs . . . when the seniority system is
adopted, when an individual becomes subject to the
——————
4 The Court also relies on Machinists v. NLRB, 362 U. S. 411 (1960),
which like Evans and Ricks, concerned a discrete act: the execution of a
collective bargaining agreement containing a union security clause.
362 U. S., at 412, 417. In Machinists, it was undisputed that under the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), a union and an employer may
not agree to a union security clause “if at the time of original execution
the union does not represent a majority of the employees in the [bar
gaining] unit.” Id., at 412–414, 417. The complainants, however, failed
to file a charge within the NLRA’s six-month charge filing period;
instead, they filed charges 10 and 12 months after the execution of the
agreement, objecting to its subsequent enforcement. See id., at 412,
414. Thus, as in Evans and Ricks, but in contrast to Ledbetter’s case,
the employment decision at issue was easily identifiable and occurred
on a single day.
 Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 11

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

seniority system, or when a person aggrieved is in
jured by the application of the seniority system or
provision of the system.” Ibid.
Congress thus agreed with the dissenters in Lorance that
“the harsh reality of [that] decision,” was “glaringly at
odds with the purposes of Title VII.” 490 U. S., at 914
(opinion of Marshall, J.). See also §3, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991
Civil Rights Act was designed “to respond to recent deci
sions of the Supreme Court by expanding the scope of
relevant civil rights statutes in order to provide adequate
protection to victims of discrimination”).
True, §112 of the 1991 Civil Rights Act directly ad
dressed only seniority systems. See ante, at 8, and n. 2.
But Congress made clear (1) its view that this Court had
unduly contracted the scope of protection afforded by Title
VII and other civil rights statutes, and (2) its aim to gen
eralize the ruling in Bazemore. As the Senate Report
accompanying the proposed Civil Rights Act of 1990, the
precursor to the 1991 Act, explained:
“Where, as was alleged in Lorance, an employer
adopts a rule or decision with an unlawful discrimina
tory motive, each application of that rule or decision is
a new violation of the law. In Bazemore . . ., for ex
ample, . . . the Supreme Court properly held that each
application of th[e] racially motivated salary struc
ture, i.e., each new paycheck, constituted a distinct
violation of Title VII. Section 7(a)(2) generalizes the
result correctly reached in Bazemore.” Civil Rights
Act of 1990, S. Rep. No. 101–315, p. 54 (1990).5
See also 137 Cong. Rec. 29046, 29047 (1991) (Sponsors’
Interpretative Memorandum) (“This legislation should be
interpreted as disapproving the extension of [Lorance] to
——————
5 No Senate Report was submitted with the Civil Rights Act of 1991,

which was in all material respects identical to the proposed 1990 Act.
12 LEDBETTER v. GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER CO.

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

contexts outside of seniority systems.”). But cf. ante, at
18 (relying on Lorance to conclude that “when an em
ployer issues paychecks pursuant to a system that is
facially nondiscriminatory and neutrally applied” a new
Title VII violation does not occur (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
Until today, in the more than 15 years since Congress
amended Title VII, the Court had not once relied upon
Lorance. It is mistaken to do so now. Just as Congress’
“goals in enacting Title VII . . . never included conferring
absolute immunity on discriminatorily adopted seniority
systems that survive their first [180] days,” 490 U. S., at
914 (Marshall, J., dissenting), Congress never intended to
immunize forever discriminatory pay differentials unchal
lenged within 180 days of their adoption. This assessment
gains weight when one comprehends that even a relatively
minor pay disparity will expand exponentially over an
employee’s working life if raises are set as a percentage of
prior pay.
A clue to congressional intent can be found in Title VII’s
backpay provision. The statute expressly provides that
backpay may be awarded for a period of up to two years
before the discrimination charge is filed. 42 U. S. C.
§2000e–5(g)(1) (“Back pay liability shall not accrue from a
date more than two years prior to the filing of a charge
with the Commission.”). This prescription indicates that
Congress contemplated challenges to pay discrimination
commencing before, but continuing into, the 180-day filing
period. See Morgan, 536 U. S., at 119 (“If Congress in
tended to limit liability to conduct occurring in the period
within which the party must file the charge, it seems
unlikely that Congress would have allowed recovery for
two years of backpay.”). As we recognized in Morgan, “the
fact that Congress expressly limited the amount of recov
erable damages elsewhere to a particular time period [i.e.,
two years] indicates that the [180-day] timely filing provi
 Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 13

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

sion was not meant to serve as a specific limitation . . .
[on] the conduct that may be considered.” Ibid.
D
In tune with the realities of wage discrimination, the
Courts of Appeals have overwhelmingly judged as a pre
sent violation the payment of wages infected by discrimi
nation: Each paycheck less than the amount payable had
the employer adhered to a nondiscriminatory compensa
tion regime, courts have held, constitutes a cognizable
harm. See, e.g., Forsyth v. Federation Employment and
Guidance Serv., 409 F. 3d 565, 573 (CA2 2005) (“Any
paycheck given within the [charge-filing] period . . . would
be actionable, even if based on a discriminatory pay scale
set up outside of the statutory period.”); Shea v. Rice, 409
F. 3d 448, 452–453 (CADC 2005) (“[An] employer com
mit[s] a separate unlawful employment practice each time
he pa[ys] one employee less than another for a discrimina
tory reason” (citing Bazemore, 478 U. S., at 396)); Goodwin
v. General Motors Corp., 275 F. 3d 1005, 1009–1010 (CA10
2002) (“[Bazemore] has taught a crucial distinction with
respect to discriminatory disparities in pay, establishing
that a discriminatory salary is not merely a lingering
effect of past discrimination—instead it is itself a continu
ally recurring violation. . . . [E]ach race-based discrimina
tory salary payment constitutes a fresh violation of Title
VII.” (footnote omitted)); Anderson v. Zubieta, 180 F. 3d
329, 335 (CADC 1999) (“The Courts of Appeals have re
peatedly reached the . . . conclusion” that pay discrimina
tion is “actionable upon receipt of each paycheck.”); accord
Hildebrandt v. Illinois Dept. of Natural Resources, 347
F. 3d 1014, 1025–1029 (CA7 2003); Cardenas v. Massey,
269 F. 3d 251, 257 (CA3 2001); Ashley v. Boyle’s Famous
Corned Beef Co., 66 F. 3d 164, 167–168 (CA8 1995) (en
banc); Brinkley-Obu v. Hughes Training, Inc., 36 F. 3d
336, 347–349 (CA4 1994); Gibbs v. Pierce County Law
14 LEDBETTER v. GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER CO.

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

Enforcement Support Agency, 785 F. 2d 1396, 1399–1400
(CA9 1986).
Similarly in line with the real-world characteristics of
pay discrimination, the EEOC—the federal agency re
sponsible for enforcing Title VII, see, e.g., 42 U. S. C.
§§2000e–5(f), 2000e–12(a)—has interpreted the Act to
permit employees to challenge disparate pay each time it
is received. The EEOC’s Compliance Manual provides
that “repeated occurrences of the same discriminatory
employment action, such as discriminatory paychecks, can
be challenged as long as one discriminatory act occurred
within the charge filing period.” 2 EEOC Compliance
Manual §2–IV–C(1)(a), p. 605:0024, and n. 183 (2006); cf.
id., §10–III, p. 633:0002 (Title VII requires an employer to
eliminate pay disparities attributable to a discriminatory
system, even if that system has been discontinued).
The EEOC has given effect to its interpretation in a
series of administrative decisions. See Albritton v. Potter,
No. 01A44063, 2004 WL 2983682, *2 (EEOC Office of Fed.
Operations, Dec. 17, 2004) (although disparity arose and
employee became aware of the disparity outside the
charge-filing period, claim was not time barred because
“[e]ach paycheck that complainant receives which is less
than that of similarly situated employees outside of her
protected classes could support a claim under Title VII if
discrimination is found to be the reason for the pay dis
crepancy.” (citing Bazemore, 478 U. S., at 396)). See also
Bynum-Doles v. Winter, No. 01A53973, 2006 WL 2096290
(EEOC Office of Fed. Operations, July 18, 2006); Ward v.
Potter, No. 01A60047, 2006 WL 721992 (EEOC Office of
Fed. Operations, Mar. 10, 2006). And in this very case,
the EEOC urged the Eleventh Circuit to recognize that
Ledbetter’s failure to challenge any particular pay-setting
decision when that decision was made “does not deprive
her of the right to seek relief for discriminatory paychecks
she received in 1997 and 1998.” Brief of EEOC in Support
 Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 15

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

of Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En
Banc, in No. 03–15264–GG (CA11), p. 14 (hereinafter
EEOC Brief) (citing Morgan, 536 U. S., at 113).6
II
The Court asserts that treating pay discrimination as a
discrete act, limited to each particular pay-setting deci
sion, is necessary to “protec[t] employers from the burden
of defending claims arising from employment decisions
that are long past.” Ante, at 11 (quoting Ricks, 449 U. S.,
at 256–257). But the discrimination of which Ledbetter
complained is not long past. As she alleged, and as the
jury found, Goodyear continued to treat Ledbetter differ
ently because of sex each pay period, with mounting harm.
Allowing employees to challenge discrimination “that
extend[s] over long periods of time,” into the charge-filing
period, we have previously explained, “does not leave
employers defenseless” against unreasonable or prejudi
cial delay. Morgan, 536 U. S., at 121. Employers disad
vantaged by such delay may raise various defenses. Id., at
122. Doctrines such as “waiver, estoppel, and equitable
tolling” “allow us to honor Title VII’s remedial purpose
without negating the particular purpose of the filing re
quirement, to give prompt notice to the employer.” Id., at
121 (quoting Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U. S.
385, 398 (1982)); see 536 U. S., at 121 (defense of laches
may be invoked to block an employee’s suit “if he unrea
——————
6 The Court dismisses the EEOC’s considerable “experience and in

formed judgment,” Firefighters v. Cleveland, 478 U. S. 501, 518 (1986)
(internal quotation marks omitted), as unworthy of any deference in
this case, see ante, at 23–24, n. 11. But the EEOC’s interpretations
mirror workplace realities and merit at least respectful attention. In
any event, the level of deference due the EEOC here is an academic
question, for the agency’s conclusion that Ledbetter’s claim is not time
barred is the best reading of the statute even if the Court “were inter
preting [Title VII] from scratch.” See Edelman v. Lynchburg College,
535 U. S. 106, 114 (2002); see supra, at 4–14.
16 LEDBETTER v. GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER CO.

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

sonably delays in filing [charges] and as a result harms
the defendant”); EEOC Brief 15 (“[I]f Ledbetter unrea
sonably delayed challenging an earlier decision, and that
delay significantly impaired Goodyear’s ability to defend
itself . . . Goodyear can raise a defense of laches. . . .”).7
In a last-ditch argument, the Court asserts that this
dissent would allow a plaintiff to sue on a single decision
made 20 years ago “even if the employee had full knowl
edge of all the circumstances relating to the . . . decision at
the time it was made.” Ante, at 20. It suffices to point out
that the defenses just noted would make such a suit fool
hardy. No sensible judge would tolerate such inexcusable
neglect. See Morgan, 536 U. S., at 121 (“In such cases, the
federal courts have the discretionary power . . . to locate a
just result in light of the circumstances peculiar to the
case.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Ledbetter, the Court observes, ante, at 21, n. 9, dropped
an alternative remedy she could have pursued: Had she
persisted in pressing her claim under the Equal Pay Act of
1963 (EPA), 29 U. S. C. §206(d), she would not have en
countered a time bar.8 See ante, at 21 (“If Ledbetter had
pursued her EPA claim, she would not face the Title VII
obstacles that she now confronts.”); cf. Corning Glass
Works v. Brennan, 417 U. S. 188, 208–210 (1974). Nota
——————
7 Further, as the EEOC appropriately recognized in its brief to the

Eleventh Circuit, Ledbetter’s failure to challenge particular pay raises
within the charge-filing period “significantly limit[s] the relief she can
seek. By waiting to file a charge, Ledbetter lost her opportunity to seek
relief for any discriminatory paychecks she received between 1979 and
late 1997.” EEOC Brief 14. See also supra, at 12–13.
8 Under the EPA 29 U. S. C. §206(d), which is subject to the Fair La

bor Standards Act’s time prescriptions, a claim charging denial of equal
pay accrues anew with each paycheck. 1 B. Lindemann & P.
Grossman, Employment Discrimination Law 529 (3d ed. 1996); cf. 29
U. S. C. §255(a) (prescribing a two-year statute of limitations for
violations generally, but a three-year limitation period for willful
violations).
 Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 17

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

bly, the EPA provides no relief when the pay discrimina
tion charged is based on race, religion, national origin,
age, or disability. Thus, in truncating the Title VII rule
this Court announced in Bazemore, the Court does not
disarm female workers from achieving redress for unequal
pay, but it does impede racial and other minorities from
gaining similar relief.9
Furthermore, the difference between the EPA’s prohibi
tion against paying unequal wages and Title VII’s ban on
discrimination with regard to compensation is not as large
as the Court’s opinion might suggest. See ante, at 21. The
key distinction is that Title VII requires a showing of
intent. In practical effect, “if the trier of fact is in equi
poise about whether the wage differential is motivated by
gender discrimination,” Title VII compels a verdict for the
employer, while the EPA compels a verdict for the plain
tiff. 2 C. Sullivan, M. Zimmer, & R. White, Employment
Discrimination: Law and Practice §7.08[F][3], p. 532 (3d
ed. 2002). In this case, Ledbetter carried the burden of
persuading the jury that the pay disparity she suffered
was attributable to intentional sex discrimination. See
supra, at 1–2; infra, this page and 18.
III
To show how far the Court has strayed from interpreta
tion of Title VII with fidelity to the Act’s core purpose, I
return to the evidence Ledbetter presented at trial.
Ledbetter proved to the jury the following: She was a
member of a protected class; she performed work substan
——————
9 For example, under today’s decision, if a black supervisor initially
received the same salary as his white colleagues, but annually received
smaller raises, there would be no right to sue under Title VII outside
the 180-day window following each annual salary change, however
strong the cumulative evidence of discrimination might be. The Court
would thus force plaintiffs, in many cases, to sue too soon to prevail,
while cutting them off as time barred once the pay differential is large
enough to enable them to mount a winnable case.
18 LEDBETTER v. GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER CO.

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

tially equal to work of the dominant class (men); she was
compensated less for that work; and the disparity was
attributable to gender-based discrimination. See supra, at
1–2.
Specifically, Ledbetter’s evidence demonstrated that her
current pay was discriminatorily low due to a long series
of decisions reflecting Goodyear’s pervasive discrimination
against women managers in general and Ledbetter in
particular. Ledbetter’s former supervisor, for example,
admitted to the jury that Ledbetter’s pay, during a par
ticular one-year period, fell below Goodyear’s minimum
threshold for her position. App. 93–97. Although Good-
year claimed the pay disparity was due to poor perform
ance, the supervisor acknowledged that Ledbetter received
a “Top Performance Award” in 1996. Id., at 90–93. The
jury also heard testimony that another supervisor—who
evaluated Ledbetter in 1997 and whose evaluation led to
her most recent raise denial—was openly biased against
women. Id., at 46, 77–82. And two women who had previ
ously worked as managers at the plant told the jury they
had been subject to pervasive discrimination and were
paid less than their male counterparts. One was paid less
than the men she supervised. Id., at 51–68. Ledbetter
herself testified about the discriminatory animus conveyed
to her by plant officials. Toward the end of her career, for
instance, the plant manager told Ledbetter that the “plant
did not need women, that [women] didn’t help it, [and]
caused problems.” Id., at 36.10 After weighing all the
evidence, the jury found for Ledbetter, concluding that the
pay disparity was due to intentional discrimination.
Yet, under the Court’s decision, the discrimination
Ledbetter proved is not redressable under Title VII. Each
——————
10 Given this abundant evidence, the Court cannot tenably maintain

that Ledbetter’s case “turned principally on the misconduct of a single
Goodyear supervisor.” See ante, at 12–13, n. 4.
 Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 19

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

and every pay decision she did not immediately challenge
wiped the slate clean. Consideration may not be given to
the cumulative effect of a series of decisions that, together,
set her pay well below that of every male area manager.
Knowingly carrying past pay discrimination forward must
be treated as lawful conduct. Ledbetter may not be com
pensated for the lower pay she was in fact receiving when
she complained to the EEOC. Nor, were she still em
ployed by Goodyear, could she gain, on the proof she pre
sented at trial, injunctive relief requiring, prospectively,
her receipt of the same compensation men receive for
substantially similar work. The Court’s approbation of
these consequences is totally at odds with the robust
protection against workplace discrimination Congress
intended Title VII to secure. See, e.g., Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U. S., at 348 (“The primary purpose of Title VII
was to assure equality of employment opportunities and to
eliminate . . . discriminatory practices and devices . . . .”
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Albemarle Paper Co.
v. Moody, 422 U. S. 405, 418 (1975) (“It is . . . the purpose
of Title VII to make persons whole for injuries suffered on
account of unlawful employment discrimination.”).
This is not the first time the Court has ordered a
cramped interpretation of Title VII, incompatible with the
statute’s broad remedial purpose. See supra, at 10–12.
See also Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U. S. 642
(1989) (superseded in part by the Civil Rights Act of 1991);
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U. S. 228 (1989) (plural
ity opinion) (same); 1 B. Lindemann & P. Grossman, Em
ployment Discrimination Law 2 (3d ed. 1996) (“A spate of
Court decisions in the late 1980s drew congressional fire
and resulted in demands for legislative change[,]” culmi
nating in the 1991 Civil Rights Act (footnote omitted)).
Once again, the ball is in Congress’ court. As in 1991, the
Legislature may act to correct this Court’s parsimonious
reading of Title VII.
20 LEDBETTER v. GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER CO.

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

* * *
For the reasons stated, I would hold that Ledbetter’s
claim is not time barred and would reverse the Eleventh
Circuit’s judgment.