Scott v. Harris

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2006 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

SCOTT v. HARRIS

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 05–1631. Argued February 26, 2007—Decided April 30, 2007
Deputy Timothy Scott, petitioner here, terminated a high-speed pursuit
of respondent’s car by applying his push bumper to the rear of the
vehicle, causing it to leave the road and crash. Respondent was ren
dered quadriplegic. He filed suit under 42 U. S. C. §1983 alleging, in
ter alia, the use of excessive force resulting in an unreasonable sei
zure under the Fourth Amendment. The District Court denied
Scott’s summary judgment motion, which was based on qualified
immunity. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed on interlocutory appeal,
concluding, inter alia, that Scott’s actions could constitute “deadly
force” under Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U. S. 1; that the use of such
force in this context would violate respondent’s constitutional right to
be free from excessive force during a seizure; and that a reasonable
jury could so find.
Held: Because the car chase respondent initiated posed a substantial
and immediate risk of serious physical injury to others, Scott’s at
tempt to terminate the chase by forcing respondent off the road was
reasonable, and Scott is entitled to summary judgment. Pp. 3–13.
(a) Qualified immunity requires resolution of a “threshold question:
Taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do
the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional
right?” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U. S. 194, 201. Pp. 3–4.
(b) The record in this case includes a videotape capturing the
events in question. Where, as here, the record blatantly contradicts
the plaintiff’s version of events so that no reasonable jury could be
lieve it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes
of ruling on a summary judgment motion. Pp. 5–8.
(c) Viewing the facts in the light depicted by the videotape, it is
clear that Deputy Scott did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
2 SCOTT v. HARRIS

Syllabus

Pp. 8–13.
(i) Garner did not establish a magical on/off switch that triggers
rigid preconditions whenever an officer’s actions constitute “deadly
force.” The Court there simply applied the Fourth Amendment’s
“reasonableness” test to the use of a particular type of force in a par
ticular situation. That case has scant applicability to this one, which
has vastly different facts. Whether or not Scott’s actions constituted
“deadly force,” what matters is whether those actions were reason
able. Pp. 8–10.
(ii) In determining a seizure’s reasonableness, the Court balances
the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth
Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental in
terests allegedly justifying the intrusion. United States v. Place, 462
U. S. 696, 703. In weighing the high likelihood of serious injury or
death to respondent that Scott’s actions posed against the actual and
imminent threat that respondent posed to the lives of others, the
Court takes account of the number of lives at risk and the relative
culpability of the parties involved. Respondent intentionally placed
himself and the public in danger by unlawfully engaging in reckless,
high-speed flight; those who might have been harmed had Scott not
forced respondent off the road were entirely innocent. The Court
concludes that it was reasonable for Scott to take the action he did.
It rejects respondent’s argument that safety could have been assured
if the police simply ceased their pursuit. The Court rules that a po
lice officer’s attempt to terminate a dangerous high-speed car chase
that threatens the lives of innocent bystanders does not violate the
Fourth Amendment, even when it places the fleeing motorist at risk
of serious injury or death. Pp. 10–13.
433 F. 3d 807, reversed.

SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
C. J., and KENNEDY, SOUTER, THOMAS, GINSBURG, BREYER, and ALITO,
JJ., joined. GINSBURG, J., and BREYER, J., filed concurring opinions.
STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
 Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash
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that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________

No. 05–1631
_________________

TIMOTHY SCOTT, PETITIONER v. VICTOR HARRIS
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

[April 30, 2007]

JUSTICE SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court.
We consider whether a law enforcement official can,
consistent with the Fourth Amendment, attempt to stop a
fleeing motorist from continuing his public-endangering
flight by ramming the motorist’s car from behind. Put
another way: Can an officer take actions that place a
fleeing motorist at risk of serious injury or death in order
to stop the motorist’s flight from endangering the lives of
innocent bystanders?
I
In March 2001, a Georgia county deputy clocked re
spondent’s vehicle traveling at 73 miles per hour on a road
with a 55-mile-per-hour speed limit. The deputy activated
his blue flashing lights indicating that respondent should
pull over. Instead, respondent sped away, initiating a
chase down what is in most portions a two-lane road, at
speeds exceeding 85 miles per hour. The deputy radioed
his dispatch to report that he was pursuing a fleeing
vehicle, and broadcast its license plate number. Peti
tioner, Deputy Timothy Scott, heard the radio communica
tion and joined the pursuit along with other officers. In
the midst of the chase, respondent pulled into the parking
2 SCOTT v. HARRIS

Opinion of the Court

lot of a shopping center and was nearly boxed in by the
various police vehicles. Respondent evaded the trap by
making a sharp turn, colliding with Scott’s police car,
exiting the parking lot, and speeding off once again down a
two-lane highway.
Following respondent’s shopping center maneuvering,
which resulted in slight damage to Scott’s police car, Scott
took over as the lead pursuit vehicle. Six minutes and
nearly 10 miles after the chase had begun, Scott decided to
attempt to terminate the episode by employing a “Preci
sion Intervention Technique (‘PIT’) maneuver, which
causes the fleeing vehicle to spin to a stop.” Brief for
Petitioner 4. Having radioed his supervisor for permis
sion, Scott was told to “ ‘[g]o ahead and take him out.’ ”
Harris v. Coweta County, 433 F. 3d 807, 811 (CA11 2005).
Instead, Scott applied his push bumper to the rear of
respondent’s vehicle.1 As a result, respondent lost control
of his vehicle, which left the roadway, ran down an em
bankment, overturned, and crashed. Respondent was
badly injured and was rendered a quadriplegic.
Respondent filed suit against Deputy Scott and others
under Rev. Stat. §1979, 42 U. S. C. §1983, alleging, inter
alia, a violation of his federal constitutional rights, viz.
use of excessive force resulting in an unreasonable seizure
under the Fourth Amendment. In response, Scott filed a
motion for summary judgment based on an assertion of
qualified immunity. The District Court denied the motion,
finding that “there are material issues of fact on which the
issue of qualified immunity turns which present sufficient
disagreement to require submission to a jury.” Harris v.
——————
1 Scott says he decided not to employ the PIT maneuver because he

was “concerned that the vehicles were moving too quickly to safely
execute the maneuver.” Brief for Petitioner 4. Respondent agrees that
the PIT maneuver could not have been safely employed. See Brief for
Respondent 9. It is irrelevant to our analysis whether Scott had
permission to take the precise actions he took.
 Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 3

Opinion of the Court

Coweta County, No. 3:01–CV–148–WBH (ND Ga., Sept.
23, 2003), App. to Pet. for Cert. 41a–42a. On interlocutory
appeal,2 the United States Court of Appeals for the Elev
enth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision to allow
respondent’s Fourth Amendment claim against Scott to
proceed to trial.3 Taking respondent’s view of the facts as
given, the Court of Appeals concluded that Scott’s actions
could constitute “deadly force” under Tennessee v. Garner,
471 U. S. 1 (1985), and that the use of such force in this
context “would violate [respondent’s] constitutional right
to be free from excessive force during a seizure. Accord
ingly, a reasonable jury could find that Scott violated
[respondent’s] Fourth Amendment rights.” 433 F. 3d, at
816. The Court of Appeals further concluded that “the law
as it existed [at the time of the incident], was sufficiently
clear to give reasonable law enforcement officers ‘fair
notice’ that ramming a vehicle under these circumstances
was unlawful.” Id., at 817. The Court of Appeals thus
concluded that Scott was not entitled to qualified immu
nity. We granted certiorari, 549 U. S. __ (2006), and now
reverse.
II
In resolving questions of qualified immunity, courts are
required to resolve a “threshold question: Taken in the
light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do
——————
2 Qualified immunity is “an immunity from suit rather than a mere
defense to liability; and like an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost
if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.” Mitchell v. Forsyth,
472 U. S. 511, 526 (1985). Thus, we have held that an order denying
qualified immunity is immediately appealable even though it is inter
locutory; otherwise, it would be “effectively unreviewable.” Id., at 527.
Further, “we repeatedly have stressed the importance of resolving
immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in litigation.” Hunter
v. Bryant, 502 U. S. 224, 227 (1991) (per curiam).
3 None of the other claims respondent brought against Scott or any

other party are before this Court.
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Opinion of the Court

the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a
constitutional right? This must be the initial inquiry.”
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U. S. 194, 201 (2001). If, and only if,
the court finds a violation of a constitutional right, “the
next, sequential step is to ask whether the right was
clearly established . . . in light of the specific context of the
case.” Ibid. Although this ordering contradicts “[o]ur
policy of avoiding unnecessary adjudication of constitu
tional issues,” United States v. Treasury Employees, 513
U. S. 454, 478 (1995) (citing Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S.
288, 346–347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring)), we have
said that such a departure from practice is “necessary to
set forth principles which will become the basis for a
[future] holding that a right is clearly established.” Sau
cier, supra, at 201.4 We therefore turn to the threshold
inquiry: whether Deputy Scott’s actions violated the
Fourth Amendment.

——————
4 Prior to this Court’s announcement of Saucier’s “rigid ‘order of bat

tle,’ ” Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U. S. 194, 201–202 (2004) (BREYER, J.,
concurring), we had described this order of inquiry as the “better
approach,” County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U. S. 833, 841, n. 5
(1998), though not one that was required in all cases. See id., at 858–
859 (BREYER, J., concurring); id., at 859 (STEVENS, J., concurring in
judgment). There has been doubt expressed regarding the wisdom of
Saucier’s decision to make the threshold inquiry mandatory, especially
in cases where the constitutional question is relatively difficult and the
qualified immunity question relatively straightforward. See, e.g.,
Brosseau, supra, at 201 (BREYER, J., joined by SCALIA and GINSBURG,
JJ., concurring); Bunting v. Mellen, 541 U. S. 1019 (2004) (STEVENS, J.,
joined by GINSBURG and BREYER, JJ., respecting denial of certiorari);
id., at 1025 (SCALIA, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). See also
Lyons v. Xenia, 417 F. 3d 565, 580–584 (CA6 2005) (Sutton, J., concur
ring). We need not address the wisdom of Saucier in this case, how
ever, because the constitutional question with which we are presented
is, as discussed in Part III–B, infra, easily decided. Deciding that
question first is thus the “better approach,” Lewis, supra, at 841, n. 5,
regardless of whether it is required.
 Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 5

Opinion of the Court

III

A

The first step in assessing the constitutionality of Scott’s
actions is to determine the relevant facts. As this case
was decided on summary judgment, there have not yet
been factual findings by a judge or jury, and respondent’s
version of events (unsurprisingly) differs substantially
from Scott’s version. When things are in such a posture,
courts are required to view the facts and draw reasonable
inferences “in the light most favorable to the party oppos
ing the [summary judgment] motion.” United States v.
Diebold, Inc., 369 U. S. 654, 655 (1962) (per curiam);
Saucier, supra, at 201. In qualified immunity cases, this
usually means adopting (as the Court of Appeals did here)
the plaintiff’s version of the facts.
There is, however, an added wrinkle in this case: exis
tence in the record of a videotape capturing the events in
question. There are no allegations or indications that this
videotape was doctored or altered in any way, nor any
contention that what it depicts differs from what actually
happened. The videotape quite clearly contradicts the
version of the story told by respondent and adopted by the
Court of Appeals.5 For example, the Court of Appeals
adopted respondent’s assertions that, during the chase,
“there was little, if any, actual threat to pedestrians or
other motorists, as the roads were mostly empty and
[respondent] remained in control of his vehicle.” 433 F. 3d,
at 815. Indeed, reading the lower court’s opinion, one gets
——————
5 JUSTICE STEVENS suggests that our reaction to the videotape is
somehow idiosyncratic, and seems to believe we are misrepresenting
its contents. See post, at 4 (dissenting opinion) (“In sum, the
factual statements by the Court of Appeals quoted by the
Court . . . were entirely accurate”). We are happy to allow the
videotape to speak for itself. See Record 36, Exh. A, available at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/video/scott_v_harris.rmvb and
in Clerk of Court’s case file.
6 SCOTT v. HARRIS

Opinion of the Court

the impression that respondent, rather than fleeing from
police, was attempting to pass his driving test:
“[T]aking the facts from the non-movant’s viewpoint,
[respondent] remained in control of his vehicle, slowed
for turns and intersections, and typically used his in
dicators for turns. He did not run any motorists off
the road. Nor was he a threat to pedestrians in the
shopping center parking lot, which was free from pe
destrian and vehicular traffic as the center was closed.
Significantly, by the time the parties were back on the
highway and Scott rammed [respondent], the motor-
way had been cleared of motorists and pedestrians al
legedly because of police blockades of the nearby inter
sections.” Id., at 815–816 (citations omitted).
The videotape tells quite a different story. There we see
respondent’s vehicle racing down narrow, two-lane roads
in the dead of night at speeds that are shockingly fast. We
see it swerve around more than a dozen other cars, cross
the double-yellow line, and force cars traveling in both
directions to their respective shoulders to avoid being hit.6
We see it run multiple red lights and travel for consider
able periods of time in the occasional center left-turn-only
lane, chased by numerous police cars forced to engage in
——————
6 JUSTICE
STEVENS hypothesizes that these cars “had already pulled to
the side of the road or were driving along the shoulder because they
heard the police sirens or saw the flashing lights,” so that “[a] jury
could certainly conclude that those motorists were exposed to no
greater risk than persons who take the same action in response to a
speeding ambulance.” Post, at 3. It is not our experience that ambu
lances and fire engines careen down two-lane roads at 85-plus miles per
hour, with an unmarked scout car out in front of them. The risk they
pose to the public is vastly less than what respondent created here.
But even if that were not so, it would in no way lead to the conclusion
that it was unreasonable to eliminate the threat to life that respondent
posed. Society accepts the risk of speeding ambulances and fire engines
in order to save life and property; it need not (and assuredly does not)
accept a similar risk posed by a reckless motorist fleeing the police.
 Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 7

Opinion of the Court

the same hazardous maneuvers just to keep up. Far from
being the cautious and controlled driver the lower court
depicts, what we see on the video more closely resembles a
Hollywood-style car chase of the most frightening sort,
placing police officers and innocent bystanders alike at
great risk of serious injury.7
At the summary judgment stage, facts must be viewed in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party only if
there is a “genuine” dispute as to those facts. Fed. Rule
Civ. Proc. 56(c). As we have emphasized, “[w]hen the
moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its
opponent must do more than simply show that there is
some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. . . .
Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a ra
tional trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is
no ‘genuine issue for trial.’ ” Matsushita Elec. Industrial
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U. S. 574, 586–587 (1986)
(footnote omitted). “[T]he mere existence of some alleged
factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an
otherwise properly supported motion for summary judg
ment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of
material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U. S.
242, 247–248 (1986). When opposing parties tell two
different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by
the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a
court should not adopt that version of the facts for pur
poses of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.
That was the case here with regard to the factual issue
whether respondent was driving in such fashion as to
endanger human life. Respondent’s version of events is so
utterly discredited by the record that no reasonable jury
——————
7 This is not to say that each and every factual statement made by the

Court of Appeals is inaccurate. For example, the videotape validates
the court’s statement that when Scott rammed respondent’s vehicle it
was not threatening any other vehicles or pedestrians. (Undoubtedly
Scott waited for the road to be clear before executing his maneuver.)
8 SCOTT v. HARRIS

Opinion of the Court

could have believed him. The Court of Appeals should not
have relied on such visible fiction; it should have viewed
the facts in the light depicted by the videotape.
B
Judging the matter on that basis, we think it is quite
clear that Deputy Scott did not violate the Fourth
Amendment. Scott does not contest that his decision to
terminate the car chase by ramming his bumper into
respondent’s vehicle constituted a “seizure.” “[A] Fourth
Amendment seizure [occurs] . . . when there is a govern
mental termination of freedom of movement through
means intentionally applied.” Brower v. County of Inyo,
489 U. S. 593, 596–597 (1989) (emphasis deleted). See
also id., at 597 (“If . . . the police cruiser had pulled along
side the fleeing car and sideswiped it, producing the crash,
then the termination of the suspect’s freedom of movement
would have been a seizure”). It is also conceded, by both
sides, that a claim of “excessive force in the course of
making [a] . . .‘seizure’ of [the] person . . . [is] properly
analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s ‘objective rea
sonableness’ standard.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386,
388 (1989). The question we need to answer is whether
Scott’s actions were objectively reasonable.8
1
Respondent urges us to analyze this case as we analyzed
Garner, 471 U. S. 1. See Brief for Respondent 16–29. We
——————
8 JUSTICE STEVENS incorrectly declares this to be “a question of fact

best reserved for a jury,” and complains we are “usurp[ing] the jury’s
factfinding function.” Post, at 7. At the summary judgment stage,
however, once we have determined the relevant set of facts and drawn
all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party to the extent supportable
by the record, see Part III–A, supra, the reasonableness of Scott’s
actions—or, in JUSTICE STEVENS’ parlance, “[w]hether [respondent’s]
actions have risen to a level warranting deadly force,” post, at 7—is a
pure question of law.
 Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 9

Opinion of the Court

must first decide, he says, whether the actions Scott took
constituted “deadly force.” (He defines “deadly force” as
“any use of force which creates a substantial likelihood of
causing death or serious bodily injury,” id., at 19.) If so,
respondent claims that Garner prescribes certain precon
ditions that must be met before Scott’s actions can survive
Fourth Amendment scrutiny: (1) The suspect must have
posed an immediate threat of serious physical harm to the
officer or others; (2) deadly force must have been neces
sary to prevent escape;9 and (3) where feasible, the officer
must have given the suspect some warning. See Brief for
Respondent 17–18 (citing Garner, supra, at 9–12). Since
these Garner preconditions for using deadly force were not
met in this case, Scott’s actions were per se unreasonable.
Respondent’s argument falters at its first step; Garner
did not establish a magical on/off switch that triggers rigid
preconditions whenever an officer’s actions constitute
“deadly force.” Garner was simply an application of the
Fourth Amendment’s “reasonableness” test, Graham,
supra, at 388, to the use of a particular type of force in a
particular situation. Garner held that it was unreason
able to kill a “young, slight, and unarmed” burglary sus
——————
9 Respondent, like the Court of Appeals, defines this second precondi

tion as “ ‘necessary to prevent escape,’ ” Brief for Respondent 17; Harris
v. Coweta County, 433 F. 3d 807, 813 (CA11 2005), quoting Garner, 471
U. S., at 11. But that quote from Garner is taken out of context. The
necessity described in Garner was, in fact, the need to prevent “serious
physical harm, either to the officer or to others.” Ibid. By way of
example only, Garner hypothesized that deadly force may be used “if
necessary to prevent escape” when the suspect is known to have “com
mitted a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious
physical harm,” ibid., so that his mere being at large poses an inherent
danger to society. Respondent did not pose that type of inherent threat
to society, since (prior to the car chase) he had committed only a minor
traffic offense and, as far as the police were aware, had no prior crimi
nal record. But in this case, unlike in Garner, it was respondent’s flight
itself (by means of a speeding automobile) that posed the threat of
“serious physical harm . . . to others.” Ibid.
10 SCOTT v. HARRIS

Opinion of the Court

pect, 471 U. S., at 21, by shooting him “in the back of the
head” while he was running away on foot, id., at 4, and
when the officer “could not reasonably have believed that
[the suspect] . . . posed any threat,” and “never attempted
to justify his actions on any basis other than the need to
prevent an escape,” id., at 21. Whatever Garner said
about the factors that might have justified shooting the
suspect in that case, such “preconditions” have scant
applicability to this case, which has vastly different facts.
“Garner had nothing to do with one car striking another or
even with car chases in general . . . . A police car’s bump
ing a fleeing car is, in fact, not much like a policeman’s
shooting a gun so as to hit a person.” Adams v. St. Lucie
County Sheriff’s Dept., 962 F. 2d 1563, 1577 (CA11 1992)
(Edmondson, J., dissenting), adopted by 998 F. 2d 923
(CA11 1993) (en banc) (per curiam). Nor is the threat
posed by the flight on foot of an unarmed suspect even
remotely comparable to the extreme danger to human life
posed by respondent in this case. Although respondent’s
attempt to craft an easy-to-apply legal test in the Fourth
Amendment context is admirable, in the end we must still
slosh our way through the factbound morass of “reason
ableness.” Whether or not Scott’s actions constituted
application of “deadly force,” all that matters is whether
Scott’s actions were reasonable.
2
In determining the reasonableness of the manner in
which a seizure is effected, “[w]e must balance the nature
and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth
Amendment interests against the importance of the gov
ernmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion.”
United States v. Place, 462 U. S. 696, 703 (1983). Scott
defends his actions by pointing to the paramount govern
mental interest in ensuring public safety, and respondent
nowhere suggests this was not the purpose motivating
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Opinion of the Court

Scott’s behavior. Thus, in judging whether Scott’s actions
were reasonable, we must consider the risk of bodily harm
that Scott’s actions posed to respondent in light of the
threat to the public that Scott was trying to eliminate.
Although there is no obvious way to quantify the risks on
either side, it is clear from the videotape that respondent
posed an actual and imminent threat to the lives of any
pedestrians who might have been present, to other civilian
motorists, and to the officers involved in the chase. See
Part III–A, supra. It is equally clear that Scott’s actions
posed a high likelihood of serious injury or death to re
spondent—though not the near certainty of death posed
by, say, shooting a fleeing felon in the back of the head,
see Garner, supra, at 4, or pulling alongside a fleeing
motorist’s car and shooting the motorist, cf. Vaughan v.
Cox, 343 F. 3d 1323, 1326–1327 (CA11 2003). So how does
a court go about weighing the perhaps lesser probability of
injuring or killing numerous bystanders against the per
haps larger probability of injuring or killing a single per
son? We think it appropriate in this process to take into
account not only the number of lives at risk, but also their
relative culpability. It was respondent, after all, who
intentionally placed himself and the public in danger by
unlawfully engaging in the reckless, high-speed flight that
ultimately produced the choice between two evils that
Scott confronted. Multiple police cars, with blue lights
flashing and sirens blaring, had been chasing respondent
for nearly 10 miles, but he ignored their warning to stop.
By contrast, those who might have been harmed had Scott
not taken the action he did were entirely innocent. We
have little difficulty in concluding it was reasonable for
Scott to take the action that he did.10
——————
10 The Court of Appeals cites Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U. S. 593,

595 (1989), for its refusal to “countenance the argument that by con
tinuing to flee, a suspect absolves a pursuing police officer of any
12 SCOTT v. HARRIS

Opinion of the Court

But wait, says respondent: Couldn’t the innocent public
equally have been protected, and the tragic accident en
tirely avoided, if the police had simply ceased their pur
suit? We think the police need not have taken that chance
and hoped for the best. Whereas Scott’s action—ramming
respondent off the road—was certain to eliminate the risk
that respondent posed to the public, ceasing pursuit was
not. First of all, there would have been no way to convey
convincingly to respondent that the chase was off, and
that he was free to go. Had respondent looked in his rear
view mirror and seen the police cars deactivate their
flashing lights and turn around, he would have had no
idea whether they were truly letting him get away, or
simply devising a new strategy for capture. Perhaps the
police knew a shortcut he didn’t know, and would reap
pear down the road to intercept him; or perhaps they were
setting up a roadblock in his path. Cf. Brower, 489 U. S.,
at 594. Given such uncertainty, respondent might have
been just as likely to respond by continuing to drive reck
lessly as by slowing down and wiping his brow.11
Second, we are loath to lay down a rule requiring the
——————
possible liability for all ensuing actions during the chase,” 433 F. 3d, at
816. The only question in Brower was whether a police roadblock
constituted a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. In deciding that
question, the relative culpability of the parties is, of course, irrelevant;
a seizure occurs whenever the police are “responsib[le] for the termina
tion of [a person’s] movement,” 433 F. 3d, at 816, regardless of the
reason for the termination. Culpability is relevant, however, to the
reasonableness of the seizure—to whether preventing possible harm to
the innocent justifies exposing to possible harm the person threatening
them.
11 Contrary to JUSTICE STEVENS’ assertions, we do not “assum[e] that

dangers caused by flight from a police pursuit will continue after the
pursuit ends,” post, at 6, nor do we make any “factual assumptions,”
post, at 5, with respect to what would have happened if the police had
gone home. We simply point out the uncertainties regarding what
would have happened, in response to respondent’s factual assumption
that the high-speed flight would have ended.
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Opinion of the Court

police to allow fleeing suspects to get away whenever they
drive so recklessly that they put other people’s lives in
danger. It is obvious the perverse incentives such a rule
would create: Every fleeing motorist would know that
escape is within his grasp, if only he accelerates to 90
miles per hour, crosses the double-yellow line a few times,
and runs a few red lights. The Constitution assuredly
does not impose this invitation to impunity-earned-by
recklessness. Instead, we lay down a more sensible rule: A
police officer’s attempt to terminate a dangerous high-
speed car chase that threatens the lives of innocent by
standers does not violate the Fourth Amendment, even
when it places the fleeing motorist at risk of serious injury
or death.
* * *
The car chase that respondent initiated in this case
posed a substantial and immediate risk of serious physical
injury to others; no reasonable jury could conclude other
wise. Scott’s attempt to terminate the chase by forcing
respondent off the road was reasonable, and Scott is enti
tled to summary judgment. The Court of Appeals’ decision
to the contrary is reversed.
It is so ordered.
 Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 1

GINSBURG, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________

No. 05–1631
_________________

TIMOTHY SCOTT, PETITIONER v. VICTOR HARRIS
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

[April 30, 2007]

JUSTICE GINSBURG, concurring.
I join the Court’s opinion and would underscore two
points. First, I do not read today’s decision as articulating
a mechanical, per se rule. Cf. post, at 3 (BREYER, J., con
curring). The inquiry described by the Court, ante, at 10–
13, is situation specific. Among relevant considerations:
Were the lives and well-being of others (motorists, pedes
trians, police officers) at risk? Was there a safer way,
given the time, place, and circumstances, to stop the flee
ing vehicle? “[A]dmirable” as “[an] attempt to craft an
easy-to-apply legal test in the Fourth Amendment context
[may be],” the Court explains, “in the end we must still
slosh our way through the factbound morass of ‘reason
ableness.’ ” Ante, at 10.
Second, were this case suitable for resolution on quali
fied immunity grounds, without reaching the constitutional
question, JUSTICE BREYER’s discussion would be engaging.
See post, at 1–3 (urging the Court to overrule Saucier v.
Katz, 533 U. S. 194 (2001)). In joining the Court’s opinion,
however, JUSTICE BREYER apparently shares the view that,
in the appeal before us, the constitutional question war
rants an answer. The video footage of the car chase, he
agrees, demonstrates that the officer’s conduct did not
transgress Fourth Amendment limitations. See post, at 1.
Confronting Saucier, therefore, is properly reserved for
another day and case. See ante, at 4, n. 4.
 Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 1

BREYER, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________

No. 05–1631
_________________

TIMOTHY SCOTT, PETITIONER v. VICTOR HARRIS
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

[April 30, 2007]

JUSTICE BREYER, concurring.
I join the Court’s opinion with one suggestion and two
qualifications. Because watching the video footage of the
car chase made a difference to my own view of the case, I
suggest that the interested reader take advantage of the
link in the Court’s opinion, ante, at 5, n. 5, and watch it.
Having done so, I do not believe a reasonable jury could, in
this instance, find that Officer Timothy Scott (who joined
the chase late in the day and did not know the specific
reason why the respondent was being pursued) acted in
violation of the Constitution.
Second, the video makes clear the highly fact-dependent
nature of this constitutional determination. And that fact-
dependency supports the argument that we should over
rule the requirement, announced in Saucier v. Katz, 533
U. S. 194 (2001), that lower courts must first decide the
“constitutional question” before they turn to the “qualified
immunity question.” See id., at 200 (“[T]he first inquiry
must be whether a constitutional right would have been
violated on the facts alleged”). Instead, lower courts
should be free to decide the two questions in whatever
order makes sense in the context of a particular case.
Although I do not object to our deciding the constitutional
question in this particular case, I believe that in order to
lift the burden from lower courts we can and should recon
sider Saucier’s requirement as well.
2 SCOTT v. HARRIS

BREYER, J., concurring

Sometimes (e.g., where a defendant is clearly entitled to
qualified immunity) Saucier’s fixed order-of-battle rule
wastes judicial resources in that it may require courts to
answer a difficult constitutional question unnecessarily.
Sometimes (e.g., where the defendant loses the constitu
tional question but wins on qualified immunity) that
order-of-battle rule may immunize an incorrect constitu
tional ruling from review. Sometimes, as here, the order-
of-battle rule will spawn constitutional rulings in areas of
law so fact dependent that the result will be confusion
rather than clarity. And frequently the order-of-battle
rule violates that older, wiser judicial counsel “not to pass
on questions of constitutionality . . . unless such adjudica
tion is unavoidable.” Spector Motor Service, Inc. v.
McLaughlin, 323 U. S. 101, 105 (1944); see Ashwander v.
TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring)
(“The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question
although properly presented by the record, if there is also
present some other ground upon which the case may be
disposed of”). In a sharp departure from this counsel,
Saucier requires courts to embrace unnecessary constitu
tional questions not to avoid them.
It is not surprising that commentators, judges, and, in
this case, 28 States in an amicus brief, have invited us to
reconsider Saucier’s requirement. See Leval, Judging
Under the Constitution: Dicta About Dicta, 81
N. Y. U. L. Rev. 1249, 1275 (2006) (calling the require
ment “a puzzling misadventure in constitutional dictum”);
Dirrane v. Brookline Police Dept., 315 F. 3d 65, 69–70
(CA1 2002) (referring to the requirement as “an uncom
fortable exercise” when “the answer whether there was a
violation may depend on a kaleidoscope of facts not yet
fully developed”); Lyons v. Xenia, 417 F. 3d 565, 580–584
(CA6 2005) (Sutton, J., concurring); Brief for State
of Illinois et al. as Amici Curiae. I would accept that
invitation.
 Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 3

BREYER, J., concurring

While this Court should generally be reluctant to over
turn precedents, stare decisis concerns are at their weak
est here. See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S. 808, 828
(1991) (“Considerations in favor of stare decisis” are at
their weakest in cases “involving procedural and eviden
tiary rules”). The order-of-battle rule is relatively novel, it
primarily affects judges, and there has been little reliance
upon it.
Third, I disagree with the Court insofar as it articulates
a per se rule. The majority states: “A police officer’s at
tempt to terminate a dangerous high-speed car chase that
threatens the lives of innocent bystanders does not violate
the Fourth Amendment, even when it places the fleeing
motorist at risk of serious injury or death.” Ante, at 13.
This statement is too absolute. As JUSTICE GINSBURG
points out, ante, at 1, whether a high-speed chase violates
the Fourth Amendment may well depend upon more cir
cumstances than the majority’s rule reflects. With these
qualifications, I join the Court’s opinion.
 Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 1

STEVENS, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________

No. 05–1631
_________________

TIMOTHY SCOTT, PETITIONER v. VICTOR HARRIS
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

[April 30, 2007]

JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting.
Today, the Court asks whether an officer may “take
actions that place a fleeing motorist at risk of serious
injury or death in order to stop the motorist’s flight from
endangering the lives of innocent bystanders.” Ante, at 1.
Depending on the circumstances, the answer may be an
obvious “yes,” an obvious “no,” or sufficiently doubtful that
the question of the reasonableness of the officer’s actions
should be decided by a jury, after a review of the degree of
danger and the alternatives available to the officer. A
high speed chase in a desert in Nevada is, after all, quite
different from one that travels through the heart of Las
Vegas.
Relying on a de novo review of a videotape of a portion
of a nighttime chase on a lightly traveled road in Georgia
where no pedestrians or other “bystanders” were present,
buttressed by uninformed speculation about the possible
consequences of discontinuing the chase, eight of the
jurors on this Court reach a verdict that differs from the
views of the judges on both the District Court and the
Court of Appeals who are surely more familiar with the
hazards of driving on Georgia roads than we are. The
Court’s justification for this unprecedented departure from
our well-settled standard of review of factual determina
tions made by a district court and affirmed by a court of
appeals is based on its mistaken view that the Court of
2 SCOTT v. HARRIS

STEVENS, J., dissenting

Appeals’ description of the facts was “blatantly contra
dicted by the record” and that respondent’s version of the
events was “so utterly discredited by the record that no
reasonable jury could have believed him.” Ante, at 7–8.
Rather than supporting the conclusion that what we see
on the video “resembles a Hollywood-style car chase of the
most frightening sort,” ante, at 7,1 the tape actually con
firms, rather than contradicts, the lower courts’ appraisal
of the factual questions at issue. More important, it surely
does not provide a principled basis for depriving the re
spondent of his right to have a jury evaluate the question
whether the police officers’ decision to use deadly force to
bring the chase to an end was reasonable.
Omitted from the Court’s description of the initial
speeding violation is the fact that respondent was on a
four-lane portion of Highway 34 when the officer clocked
his speed at 73 miles per hour and initiated the chase.2
More significant—and contrary to the Court’s assumption
that respondent’s vehicle “force[d] cars traveling in both
directions to their respective shoulders to avoid being hit”
ante, at 6—a fact unmentioned in the text of the opinion
explains why those cars pulled over prior to being passed
——————
1 I can only conclude that my colleagues were unduly frightened by

two or three images on the tape that looked like bursts of lightning or
explosions, but were in fact merely the headlights of vehicles zooming
by in the opposite lane. Had they learned to drive when most high-
speed driving took place on two-lane roads rather than on superhigh
ways—when split-second judgments about the risk of passing a slow
poke in the face of oncoming traffic were routine—they might well have
reacted to the videotape more dispassionately.
2 According to the District Court record, when respondent was clocked

at 73 miles per hour, the deputy who recorded his speed was sitting in
his patrol car on Highway 34 between Lora Smith Road and Sullivan
Road in Coweta County, Georgia. At that point, as well as at the point
at which Highway 34 intersects with Highway 154—where the deputy
caught up with respondent and the videotape begins—Highway 34 is a
four-lane road, consisting of two lanes in each direction with a wide
grass divider separating the flow of traffic.
 Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 3

STEVENS, J., dissenting

by respondent. The sirens and flashing lights on the
police cars following respondent gave the same warning
that a speeding ambulance or fire engine would have
provided.3 The 13 cars that respondent passed on his side
of the road before entering the shopping center, and both
of the cars that he passed on the right after leaving the
center, no doubt had already pulled to the side of the road
or were driving along the shoulder because they heard the
police sirens or saw the flashing lights before respondent
or the police cruisers approached.4 A jury could certainly
conclude that those motorists were exposed to no greater
risk than persons who take the same action in response to
a speeding ambulance, and that their reactions were fully
consistent with the evidence that respondent, though
speeding, retained full control of his vehicle.
The police sirens also minimized any risk that may have
arisen from running “multiple red lights,” ibid. In fact,
respondent and his pursuers went through only two inter
sections with stop lights and in both cases all other vehi
cles in sight were stationary, presumably because they
had been warned of the approaching speeders. Inciden
tally, the videos do show that the lights were red when the
police cars passed through them but, because the cameras
were farther away when respondent did so and it is diffi
cult to discern the color of the signal at that point, it is not
entirely clear that he ran either or both of the red lights.
In any event, the risk of harm to the stationary vehicles

——————
3 While still on the four-lane portion of Highway 34, the deputy who

had clocked respondent’s speed turned on his blue light and siren in an
attempt to get respondent to pull over. It was when the deputy turned
on his blue light that the dash-mounted video camera was activated
and began to record the pursuit.
4 Although perhaps understandable, because their volume on the

sound recording is low (possibly due to sound proofing in the officer’s
vehicle), the Court appears to minimize the significance of the sirens
audible throughout the tape recording of the pursuit.
4 SCOTT v. HARRIS

STEVENS, J., dissenting

was minimized by the sirens, and there is no reason to
believe that respondent would have disobeyed the signals
if he were not being pursued.
My colleagues on the jury saw respondent “swerve
around more than a dozen other cars,” and “force cars
traveling in both directions to their respective shoulders,”
ante, at 6, but they apparently discounted the possibility
that those cars were already out of the pursuit’s path as a
result of hearing the sirens. Even if that were not so,
passing a slower vehicle on a two-lane road always in
volves some degree of swerving and is not especially dan
gerous if there are no cars coming from the opposite direc
tion. At no point during the chase did respondent pull into
the opposite lane other than to pass a car in front of him;
he did the latter no more than five times and, on most of
those occasions, used his turn signal. On none of these
occasions was there a car traveling in the opposite direc
tion. In fact, at one point, when respondent found himself
behind a car in his own lane and there were cars traveling
in the other direction, he slowed and waited for the cars
traveling in the other direction to pass before overtaking
the car in front of him while using his turn signal to do so.
This is hardly the stuff of Hollywood. To the contrary, the
video does not reveal any incidents that could even be
remotely characterized as “close calls.”
In sum, the factual statements by the Court of Appeals
quoted by the Court, ante, at 5–6, were entirely accurate.
That court did not describe respondent as a “cautious”
driver as my colleagues imply, ante, at 7, but it did cor
rectly conclude that there is no evidence that he ever lost
control of his vehicle. That court also correctly pointed out
that the incident in the shopping center parking lot did
not create any risk to pedestrians or other vehicles be
cause the chase occurred just before 11 p.m. on a weekday
night and the center was closed. It is apparent from the
record (including the videotape) that local police had
 Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 5

STEVENS, J., dissenting

blocked off intersections to keep respondent from entering
residential neighborhoods and possibly endangering other
motorists. I would add that the videos also show that no
pedestrians, parked cars, sidewalks, or residences were
visible at any time during the chase. The only “innocent
bystanders” who were placed “at great risk of serious
injury,” ante, at 7, were the drivers who either pulled off
the road in response to the sirens or passed respondent in
the opposite direction when he was driving on his side of
the road.
I recognize, of course, that even though respondent’s
original speeding violation on a four-lane highway was
rather ordinary, his refusal to stop and subsequent flight
was a serious offense that merited severe punishment. It
was not, however, a capital offense, or even an offense that
justified the use of deadly force rather than an abandon
ment of the chase. The Court’s concern about the “immi
nent threat to the lives of any pedestrians who might have
been present,” ante, at 11, while surely valid in an appro
priate case, should be discounted in a case involving a
nighttime chase in an area where no pedestrians were
present.
What would have happened if the police had decided to
abandon the chase? We now know that they could have
apprehended respondent later because they had his li
cense plate number. Even if that were not true, and even
if he would have escaped any punishment at all, the use of
deadly force in this case was no more appropriate than the
use of a deadly weapon against a fleeing felon in Tennessee
v. Garner, 471 U. S. 1 (1985). In any event, any uncer
tainty about the result of abandoning the pursuit has not
prevented the Court from basing its conclusions on its own
factual assumptions.5 The Court attempts to avoid the
——————
5 In noting that Scott’s action “was certain to eliminate the risk that

respondent posed to the public” while “ceasing pursuit was not,” the
6 SCOTT v. HARRIS

STEVENS, J., dissenting

conclusion that deadly force was unnecessary by speculat
ing that if the officers had let him go, respondent might
have been “just as likely” to continue to drive recklessly as
to slow down and wipe his brow. Ante, at 12. That specu
lation is unconvincing as a matter of common sense and
improper as a matter of law. Our duty to view the evi
dence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party
would foreclose such speculation if the Court had not used
its observation of the video as an excuse for replacing the
rule of law with its ad hoc judgment. There is no eviden
tiary basis for an assumption that dangers caused by
flight from a police pursuit will continue after the pursuit
ends. Indeed, rules adopted by countless police depart
ments throughout the country are based on a judgment
that differs from the Court’s. See, e.g., App. to Brief for
Georgia Association of Chiefs of Police, Inc., as Amicus
Curiae A–52 (“During a pursuit, the need to apprehend
the suspect should always outweigh the level of danger
created by the pursuit. When the immediate danger to the
public created by the pursuit is greater than the immedi
ate or potential danger to the public should the suspect
remain at large, then the pursuit should be discontinued
or terminated. . . . [P]ursuits should usually be discontin
——————
Court prioritizes total elimination of the risk of harm to the public over
the risk that respondent may be seriously injured or even killed. Ante,
at 12 (emphasis in original). The Court is only able to make such a
statement by assuming, based on its interpretation of events on the
videotape, that the risk of harm posed in this case, and the type of
harm involved, rose to a level warranting deadly force. These are the
same types of questions that, when disputed, are typically resolved by a
jury; this is why both the District Court and the Court of Appeals saw
fit to have them be so decided. Although the Court claims only to have
drawn factual inferences in respondent’s favor “to the extent supportable
by the record,” ante, at 8, n. 8 (emphasis in original), its own view of the
record has clearly precluded it from doing so to the same extent as the
two courts through which this case has already traveled, see ante, at 2–
3, 5–6.
 Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 7

STEVENS, J., dissenting

ued when the violator’s identity has been established to
the point that later apprehension can be accomplished
without danger to the public”).
Although Garner may not, as the Court suggests, “estab
lish a magical on/off switch that triggers rigid precondi
tions” for the use of deadly force, ante, at 9, it did set a
threshold under which the use of deadly force would be
considered constitutionally unreasonable:
“Where the officer has probable cause to believe that
the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm,
either to the officer or to others, it is not constitution
ally unreasonable to prevent escape by using deadly
force. Thus, if the suspect threatens the officer with a
weapon or there is probable cause to believe that he
has committed a crime involving the infliction or
threatened infliction of serious physical harm, deadly
force may be used if necessary to prevent escape, and
if, where feasible, some warning has been given.” 471
U. S., at 11–12.
Whether a person’s actions have risen to a level warrant
ing deadly force is a question of fact best reserved for a
jury.6 Here, the Court has usurped the jury’s factfinding
function and, in doing so, implicitly labeled the four other
judges to review the case unreasonable. It chastises the
Court of Appeals for failing to “vie[w] the facts in the light
depicted by the videotape” and implies that no reasonable
person could view the videotape and come to the conclu
sion that deadly force was unjustified. Ante, at 8. How
ever, the three judges on the Court of Appeals panel ap
——————
6 In its opinion, the Court of Appeals correctly noted: “We reject the

defendants’ argument that Harris’ driving must, as a matter of law, be
considered sufficiently reckless to give Scott probable cause to believe
that he posed a substantial threat of imminent physical harm to
motorists and pedestrians. This is a disputed issue to be resolved by a
jury.” Harris v. Coweta County, 433 F. 3d 807, 815 (CA11 2005).
8 SCOTT v. HARRIS

STEVENS, J., dissenting

parently did view the videotapes entered into evidence7
and described a very different version of events:
“At the time of the ramming, apart from speeding and
running two red lights, Harris was driving in a non-
aggressive fashion (i.e., without trying to ram or run
into the officers). Moreover, . . . Scott’s path on the
open highway was largely clear. The videos intro
duced into evidence show little to no vehicular (or pe
destrian) traffic, allegedly because of the late hour
and the police blockade of the nearby intersections.
Finally, Scott issued absolutely no warning (e.g., over
the loudspeaker or otherwise) prior to using deadly
force.” Harris v. Coweta County, 433 F. 3d 807, 819,
n. 14 (CA11 2005).
If two groups of judges can disagree so vehemently about
the nature of the pursuit and the circumstances surround
ing that pursuit, it seems eminently likely that a reason
able juror could disagree with this Court’s characteriza
tion of events. Moreover, under the standard set forth in
Garner, it is certainly possible that “a jury could conclude
that Scott unreasonably used deadly force to seize Harris
by ramming him off the road under the instant circum
stances.” 433 F. 3d, at 821.
The Court today sets forth a per se rule that presumes
its own version of the facts: “A police officer’s attempt to
terminate a dangerous high-speed car chase that threatens
the lives of innocent bystanders does not violate the Fourth
Amendment, even when it places the fleeing motorist at
risk of serious injury or death.” Ante, at 13 (emphasis
added). Not only does that rule fly in the face of the flexi
ble and case-by-case “reasonableness” approach applied in
Garner and Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386 (1989), but it

——————
7 In total, there are four police tapes which captured portions of the

pursuit, all recorded from different officers’ vehicles.
 Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 9

STEVENS, J., dissenting

is also arguably inapplicable to the case at hand, given
that it is not clear that this chase threatened the life of
any “innocent bystande[r].”8 In my view, the risks inher
ent in justifying unwarranted police conduct on the basis
of unfounded assumptions are unacceptable, particularly
when less drastic measures—in this case, the use of stop
sticks9 or a simple warning issued from a loudspeaker—
could have avoided such a tragic result. In my judgment,
jurors in Georgia should be allowed to evaluate the rea
sonableness of the decision to ram respondent’s speeding
vehicle in a manner that created an obvious risk of death
and has in fact made him a quadriplegic at the age of 19.
I respectfully dissent.

——————
8 It is unclear whether, in referring to “innocent bystanders,” the

Court is referring to the motorists driving unfazed in the opposite
direction or to the drivers who pulled over to the side of the road, safely
out of respondent’s and petitioner’s path.
9 “Stop sticks” are a device which can be placed across the roadway

and used to flatten a vehicle’s tires slowly to safely terminate a pursuit.