Brewer v. Quarterman

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2006 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

BREWER v. QUARTERMAN, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DE

PARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL

INSTITUTIONS DIVISION

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 05–11287. Argued January 17, 2007—Decided April 25, 2007
Petitioner Brewer was convicted of murder committed during the
course of a robbery. At sentencing, he introduced mitigating evidence
of his mental illness, his father’s extensive abuse of him and his
mother, and his substance abuse. His counsel made the strategic de
cision not to present any expert psychological or psychiatric testi
mony. The trial judge rejected all of Brewer’s proposed instructions
designed to give effect to the mitigating evidence he presented, in
structing the jury instead to answer only two special issues: whether
his conduct was committed deliberately and with the reasonable ex
pectation it would result in his victim’s death and whether it was
probable he would commit future violent acts constituting a continu
ing threat to society. In closing argument, the prosecutor empha
sized that Brewer’s violent response to physical abuse by his father
supported an affirmative answer to the “future dangerousness” spe
cial issue; he deemphasized any mitigating effect such evidence
should have, stressing that the jurors lacked the power to exercise
moral judgment and, in determining Brewer’s sentence, must answer
the questions according to the evidence. Ultimately, the jury an
swered both special issues in the affirmative, and Brewer was sen
tenced to death. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (CCA) af
firmed on direct appeal and denied Brewer’s application for state
postconviction relief. He then filed a federal habeas petition. Follow
ing supplemental briefing concerning Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U. S.
274, the District Court granted conditional relief, but the Fifth Cir
cuit reversed and rendered its own judgment denying the petition.
2 BREWER v. QUARTERMAN

Syllabus

Held: Because the Texas capital sentencing statute, as interpreted by
the CCA, impermissibly prevented Brewer’s jury from giving mean
ingful consideration and effect to constitutionally relevant mitigating
evidence, the CCA’s decision denying Brewer relief under Penry v. Ly
naugh, 492 U. S. 302 (Penry I), was both “contrary to” and “involved
an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as de
termined [this] Court,” 28 U. S. C. §2254(d). Pp. 5–9.
(a) Brewer’s trial was infected with the same constitutional error
that occurred in Penry I, where the Court held that jury instructions
that merely articulated the Texas special issues, without directing
the sentencing jury “to consider fully Penry’s mitigating evidence as
it bears on his personal culpability,” did not provide an adequate op
portunity for the jury to decide whether that evidence might provide
a legitimate basis for imposing a sentence other than death. 492
U. S., at 323. The Court characterized Penry’s mental-retardation
and childhood-abuse evidence as a “two-edged sword” that “dimin
ish[ed] his blameworthiness for his crime even as it indicat[ed] a
probability” of future dangerousness. Id., at 324. Brewer’s mitigat
ing evidence similarly served as a “two-edged sword.” Even if his
evidence was less compelling than Penry’s, that does not justify the
CCA’s refusal to apply Penry I here. It is reasonably likely the jurors
accepted the prosecutor’s argument to limit their decision to whether
Brewer had acted deliberately and was likely a future danger, disre
garding any independent concern that his troubled background might
make him undeserving of death. Also unpersuasive is the Fifth Cir
cuit’s explanation that Brewer’s lack of expert evidence and that
court’s precedents holding that mental retardation, but not mental ill
ness, can give rise to a Penry I violation prompted the Circuit’s rever
sal of the grant of habeas relief. This Court has never suggested that
the question whether the jury could have adequately considered miti
gating evidence is a matter purely of quantity, degree, or immutabil
ity. Rather, the Court has focused on whether such evidence has
mitigating relevance to the special issues and the extent to which it
may diminish a defendant’s moral culpability for the crime. See id.,
at 322. Pp. 5–7.
(b) Under the narrowest possible reading of Penry I, Texas’ special
issues do not provide for adequate jury consideration of mitigating
evidence that functions as a “two-edged sword.” The Fifth Circuit’s
mischaracterization of the law as demanding only that such evidence
be given “sufficient mitigating effect,” and improperly equating “suf
ficient effect” with “full effect,” is not consistent with the reasoning of
Penry v. Johnson, 532 U. S. 782 (Penry II), which issued after Penry’s
resentencing (and before the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in this case).
Like the “constitutional relevance” standard rejected in Tennard, a
 Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 3

Syllabus

“sufficient effect” standard has “no foundation” in this Court’s deci
sions. 542 U. S., at 284. For the reasons explained in this case and
in Abdul-Kabir, ante, p. ___, the Circuit’s conclusions that Brewer’s
mental-illness and substance-abuse evidence could not constitute a
Penry violation, and that troubled-childhood evidence may, because of
its temporary character, fall sufficiently within the special issues’
ambit, fail to heed this Court’s repeated warnings about the extent to
which the jury must be allowed not only to consider mitigating evi
dence, or to have such evidence before it, but to respond to it in a rea
soned, moral manner and assign it weight in deciding whether a de
fendant truly deserves death. Pp. 7–9.
442 F. 3d 273, reversed.

STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which KENNEDY,
SOUTER, GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ., joined. ROBERTS, C. J., filed a dis
senting opinion, in which SCALIA, THOMAS, and ALITO, JJ., joined.
SCALIA, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which THOMAS, J., joined, and
in which ALITO, J., joined as to Part I.
 Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________

No. 05–11287
_________________

BRENT RAY BREWER, PETITIONER v. NATHANIEL

QUARTERMAN, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT

OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL

INSTITUTIONS DIVISION

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

[April 25, 2007]

JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a companion case to Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman,
ante, p. __. Like the petitioner in that case, petitioner
Brent Ray Brewer claims that the former Texas capital
sentencing statute impermissibly prevented his sentenc
ing jury from giving meaningful consideration to constitu
tionally relevant mitigating evidence.
In Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U. S. 302 (1989) (Penry I), we
held that jury instructions that merely articulated the
Texas “special issues,” without directing the jury “to con
sider fully Penry’s mitigating evidence as it bears on his
personal culpability,” did not provide his sentencing jury
with an adequate opportunity to decide whether that
evidence might provide a legitimate basis for imposing a
sentence other than death. Id., at 323. We characterized
the evidence of Penry’s mental retardation and history of
childhood abuse as a “two-edged sword,” because “it may
diminish his blameworthiness for his crime even as it
indicates that there is a probability that he will be dan
gerous in the future.” Id., at 324.
2 BREWER v. QUARTERMAN

Opinion of the Court

As an overview of the cases both preceding and following
Penry I demonstrates, we have long recognized that a sen
tencing jury must be able to give a “ ‘reasoned moral re
sponse’ ” to a defendant’s mitigating evidence—particularly
that evidence which tends to diminish his culpability—
when deciding whether to sentence him to death. Id., at
323; see also Abdul-Kabir, ante, at 10–20, 25–28. This
principle first originated in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586
(1978), and Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U. S. 104 (1982), in
which we held that sentencing juries in capital cases
“must be permitted to consider any relevant mitigating
factor,” id., at 112 (emphasis added). In more recent
years, we have repeatedly emphasized that a Penry viola
tion exists whenever a statute, or a judicial gloss on a
statute, prevents a jury from giving meaningful effect to
mitigating evidence that may justify the imposition of a
life sentence rather than a death sentence. See Abdul-
Kabir, ante, at 25–28. We do so again here, and hold that
the Texas state court’s decision to deny relief to Brewer
under Penry I was both “contrary to” and “involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal
law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States.” 28 U. S. C. §2254(d).
I
In 1991, Brewer was convicted of murder committed
during the course of a robbery. At sentencing, he introduced
several different types of mitigating evidence, including
“that he had a bout with depression three months be
fore the murder; that he was briefly hospitalized for
that depression; that his co-defendant, a woman with
whom he was apparently obsessed, dominated and
manipulated him; that he had been abused by his fa
ther; that he had witnessed his father abuse his
mother; and that he had abused drugs.” Brewer v.
Dretke, 442 F. 3d 273, 275 (CA5 2006) (per curiam)
 Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 3

Opinion of the Court

(footnotes omitted).1
As a result of a strategic decision on his counsel’s part,
Brewer neither secured nor presented any expert psycho
logical or psychiatric testimony.
At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, Brewer
submitted several additional instructions designed to give
effect to the mitigating evidence he did present. App. 81–
87. The trial judge rejected all of his proposed instructions
and instead instructed the jury to answer only two special
issues:
“ ‘Do you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable
doubt that the conduct of the defendant, BRENT RAY
BREWER, that caused the death of the deceased,
Robert Doyle Laminack, was committed deliberately
and with the reasonable expectation that the death of
the deceased would result?
. . . . .
“ ‘Do you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable
doubt that there is a probability that the defendant,
BRENT RAY BREWER, would commit criminal acts
——————
1 On direct appeal, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (CCA) sum

marized the same evidence as follows:
“1) Appellant was not mentally retarded, but was involuntarily commit
ted on January 1, 1990, for ‘major depression, single episode, without
psychotic features, polysubstance abuse.’ The examining physician
based his opinion on a suicide note appellant wrote to his mother. On
January 25, appellant signed a request for voluntary admission to Big
Springs State Hospital for fourteen days.
“2) Appellant came from an abused background where he was ignored
by both his father and step-father. He did not have a relationship or
live with his real father until after he was fifteen-years old. Appellant’s
father hit him on several occasions, once with the butt of a pistol and
once with a flashlight. Appellant’s father frequently beat his mother.
Appellant’s father had once told him, ‘If you ever draw your hand back,
you’d better kill me because I’ll kill you.’
“3) Appellant had smoked marijuana when he was a teenager.” Brewer
v. State, No. 71,307 (June 22, 1994), p. 15, App. 140 (footnotes omitted).
4 BREWER v. QUARTERMAN

Opinion of the Court

of violence that would constitute a continuing threat
to society?’ ” 442 F. 3d, at 277.
In closing argument, the prosecutor emphasized that
Brewer’s violent response to his father’s extensive physical
abuse of both Brewer and his mother supported an af
firmative answer to the “future dangerousness” special
issue. In contrast, he deemphasized any mitigating effect
that such evidence should have on the jury’s determina
tion of Brewer’s fate:
“And, you know, folks, you can take a puppy, and you
can beat that puppy and you can make him mean, but
if that dog bites, he is going to bite the rest of his life,
for whatever reason.
“Whatever got him to this point, he is what he is to
day. And that will never change. That will never
change.
“All that’s happened to this time or all those years
cannot change the violence and the cold, cold
bloodedness that he’s exhibited right here. Not one
tear. Not one tear, because life means nothing to him.
Zero.
“You go back, you look at the evidence and you decide,
not because of a poor family and not because of the
survivors, because of the evidence that you see that he
has shown.” App. 118.
The prosecutor stressed that the jurors lacked the power
to exercise moral judgment in determining Brewer’s sen
tence, admonishing them that “[y]ou don’t have the power
to say whether [Brewer] lives or dies. You answer the
questions according to the evidence, mu[ch] like you did at
the guilt or innocence [sic]. That’s all.” Id., at 114. Ulti
mately, the jury answered both special issues in the af
firmative, and Brewer was sentenced to death.
Brewer’s conviction and sentence were affirmed on
 Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 5

Opinion of the Court

direct appeal.2 Brewer v. State, No. 71,307 (Tex. Crim.
App., June 22, 1994) (en banc), App. 122–171. He then
filed an application for state postconviction relief, which
the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (CCA) denied on
January 31, 2001, over the dissent of three judges.3 Ex
parte Brewer, 50 S. W. 3d 492 (2001) (per curiam order).
Brewer subsequently filed a federal habeas petition in
the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Texas. After requesting supplemental briefing concern
ing Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U. S. 274 (2004), the District
Court granted conditional relief. Brewer v. Dretke, No.
Civ.A.2:01–CV–0112–J (Aug. 2, 2004), App. 185–213. On
March 1, 2006, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit reversed the judgment of the District Court
and rendered its own judgment denying the petition. 442
F. 3d, at 282. We granted certiorari. 549 U. S. ___ (2006).
II
Like the petitioner in Abdul-Kabir, Brewer contends
that the same constitutional error that infected Penry’s
sentencing hearing occurred in his trial. We agree. As did
Penry’s, Brewer’s mitigating evidence served as a “two
edged sword” because it tended to confirm the State’s
evidence of future dangerousness as well as lessen his
——————
2 The CCA’s opinion on direct appeal provides the only meaningful
explanation by a Texas state court as to why Brewer’s Penry I claim
was denied. See n. 5, infra. When Brewer raised the same claim in his
state postconviction proceedings, the trial court set forth, and the CCA
adopted, a one-sentence ruling embracing the holding previously made
on direct appeal: “The . . . special issues . . . were an adequate vehicle
for the jury’s consideration of the mitigating evidence . . . .” App. 176;
Ex parte Brewer, 50 S. W. 3d 492, 493 (2001) (per curiam).
3 Judge Price filed a dissent to the order dismissing Brewer’s postcon

viction application for relief, joined by Judges Johnson and Holcomb.
Id., at 493–495. In the dissenters’ view, Brewer had alleged a colorable
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, based on his counsel’s failure
to procure a mental health expert who could have examined him in
preparation for trial. Id., at 493.
6 BREWER v. QUARTERMAN

Opinion of the Court

culpability for the crime.4 Penry I, 492 U. S., at 324. It
may well be true that Brewer’s mitigating evidence was
less compelling than Penry’s, but, contrary to the view of
the CCA, that difference does not provide an acceptable
justification for refusing to apply the reasoning in Penry I
to this case.5 There is surely a reasonable likelihood that
the jurors accepted the prosecutor’s argument at the close
of the sentencing hearing that all they needed to decide
was whether Brewer had acted deliberately and would
likely be dangerous in the future,6 necessarily disregard
ing any independent concern that, given Brewer’s troubled
background, he may not be deserving of a death sentence.
Also unpersuasive in distinguishing the instant case
——————
4 For example, the prosecution introduced the testimony of a police

officer who had been called to quell a family dispute as evidence of
Brewer’s violent character. App. 6–15. The prosecution also introduced
testimony from a doctor who treated Brewer’s father after Brewer
struck him with a broom handle in response to his father’s attack on his
mother. Id., at 23–25.
5 The CCA’s opinion purporting to distinguish Penry I simply stated:

“We conclude the second punishment issue provided an adequate
vehicle for the jurors to give effect to appellant’s mitigating evidence.
We have held a stay in a mental hospital does not evidence a ‘long term
mental illness which would affect appellant’s ability to conform to the
requirements of society.’ Joiner [v. State, 825 S. W. 2d 701, 707 (1992)
(en banc)]. As in Joiner, the evidence shows no more than appellant’s
threat to commit suicide and a stay at a hospital on one occasion. Id.
Further, appellant’s evidence of drug abuse and an abusive homelife
was given effect within the scope of the punishment issues. Ex parte
Ellis, 810 S.W. 2d 208, 211–212 (Tex. Cr. App. 1991) (drug addiction);
Goss v. State, 826 S.W. 2d 162, 166 (Tex. Cr. App. 1992) (abusive
household).” No. 71,307, at 15, App. 141. In neither its opinion in this
case nor in Joiner did the CCA explain why Brewer’s evidence was not
the same kind of “two-edged sword” as Penry’s, other than to suggest
that it was less persuasive. 492 U. S., at 324.
6 “It’s not a matter of life and death. It’s whether it was deliberate.

Was this act deliberate? Will he continue to commit violent acts?
That’s all you answer. And every one of you people told me you would
base that not upon the result, but upon what the evidence dictates you
must do.” App. 115 (paragraph break omitted).
 Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 7

Opinion of the Court

from others to which Penry I applies is the Fifth Circuit’s
explanation regarding the lack of expert evidence in
Brewer’s case (as compared to that presented by the peti
tioner in Abdul-Kabir) and its distinction between mental
illness and mental retardation. In its opinion reversing the
District Court’s conditional grant of habeas relief, the
Court of Appeals noted that, under its precedents, “[t]he
only instances in which mental illness has given rise to
Penry I violations involve those where the illness in ques
tion is chronic and/or immutable [as in the case of mental
retardation].” 442 F. 3d, at 280. The court also empha
sized the lack of expert psychiatric evidence in this case,
contrasting the record below with that in Abdul-Kabir, and
concluded that Brewer “came nowhere near to producing
evidence sufficient for us to grant relief.” 442 F. 3d, at 281.
Nowhere in our Penry line of cases have we suggested that
the question whether mitigating evidence could have been
adequately considered by the jury is a matter purely of
quantity, degree, or immutability. Rather, we have fo
cused on whether such evidence has mitigating relevance
to the special issues and the extent to which it may dimin
ish a defendant’s moral culpability for the crime. The
transient quality of such mitigating evidence may make it
more likely to fall in part within the ambit of the special
issues; however, as we explained in Penry I, such evidence
may still have “relevance to the defendant’s moral culpabil
ity beyond the scope of the special verdict questions.” 492
U. S., at 322 (citing and quoting Franklin v. Lynaugh,
487 U. S. 164, 185 (1988) (O’Connor, J., concurring in
judgment)).
III
Under the narrowest possible reading of our opinion in
Penry I, the Texas special issues do not provide for ade
quate consideration of a defendant’s mitigating evidence
when that evidence functions as a “two-edged sword.” As
8 BREWER v. QUARTERMAN

Opinion of the Court

the District Court explained in its opinion granting habeas
corpus relief in this case:
“The mitigating evidence presented may have served
as a basis for mercy even if a jury decided that the
murder was committed deliberately and that Peti
tioner posed a continuing threat. Without an instruc
tion, much less a special issue on mitigation, this evi
dence was out of the jury’s reach. Given the nature of
the mitigating evidence before the jury and the lack of
any instruction on mitigation, there is a reasonable
likelihood that the jury applied its instructions in a
way that prevented the consideration of the mitigat
ing evidence. Reviewing the evidence in light of the
special issues, a jury would be very hard pressed to
see the evidence presented as anything but aggravat
ing. Failure to submit an instruction on mitigation
evidence was an unreasonable application of federal
law and Supreme Court precedent. Accordingly, ha
beas relief on this issue is conditionally granted.” No.
Civ.A.2:01–CV–0112–J, at 9, App. 196.
In reversing the District Court’s grant of habeas relief,
and rejecting that court’s conclusion that Brewer’s miti
gating evidence was effectively “out of the jury’s reach,”
the Court of Appeals mischaracterized the law as demand
ing only that such evidence be given “sufficient mitigating
effect,” and improperly equated “sufficient effect” with
“full effect.”7 This is not consistent with the reasoning of
——————
7 The Court of Appeals explained: “For the mitigating evidence to be

within the effective reach of the jury in answering the special issues,
the special interrogatories must be capable of giving relevant evidence
constitutionally sufficient mitigating effect. Whether that sufficiency
requires that the evidence be given ‘full,’ or merely ‘some,’ mitigating
effect has been the subject of considerable discussion in this court, but
ultimately the distinction is only one of semantics, because regardless
of what label is put on the word ‘effect,’ it is indisputable that the effect
must be constitutionally ‘sufficient.’ Even if the requirement is called
 Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 9

Opinion of the Court

our opinion issued after Penry’s resentencing (and before
the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in this case). See Penry v.
Johnson, 532 U. S. 782 (2001) (Penry II). Like the “ ‘con
stitutional relevance’ ” standard that we rejected in Ten-
nard, a “sufficient effect” standard has “no foundation in
the decisions of this Court.” 542 U. S., at 284.
For reasons not supported by our prior precedents, but
instead dictated by what until quite recently has been the
Fifth Circuit’s difficult Penry jurisprudence, the Court of
Appeals concluded that Brewer’s evidence of mental ill
ness and substance abuse could not constitute a Penry
violation. It further concluded that “evidence of a troubled
childhood may, as a result of its temporary character, fall
sufficiently within the ambit of” the special issues. 442
F. 3d, at 280. For the reasons explained above, as well as
in our opinion in Abdul-Kabir, these conclusions fail to
heed the warnings that have repeatedly issued from this
Court regarding the extent to which the jury must be
allowed not only to consider such evidence, or to have such
evidence before it, but to respond to it in a reasoned, moral
manner and to weigh such evidence in its calculus of
deciding whether a defendant is truly deserving of death.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
reversed.
It is so ordered.

——————

‘full,’ it means nothing more than ‘sufficient.’ ” Brewer v. Dretke, 442

F. 3d 273, 278–279 (CA5 2006) (per curiam) (footnote omitted).
 Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 1

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________

Nos. 05–11284 and 05–11287
_________________

JALIL ABDUL-KABIR, FKA TED CALVIN COLE,
PETITIONER
05–11284 v.
NATHANIEL QUARTERMAN, DIRECTOR, TEXAS
DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, COR-
RECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS DIVISION

BRENT RAY BREWER, PETITIONER
05–11287 v.
NATHANIEL QUARTERMAN, DIRECTOR, TEXAS
DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, COR-
RECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS DIVISION
ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
[April 25, 2007]

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS, with whom JUSTICE SCALIA,
JUSTICE THOMAS, and JUSTICE ALITO join, dissenting.
A jury imposed a sentence of death in each of these
cases, despite hearing mitigating evidence from the defen
dants about their troubled backgrounds. The convictions
and sentences were upheld on direct review. On state
collateral review, each defendant claimed that the jury
instructions did not allow sufficient consideration of the
mitigating evidence. This Court had considered similar
challenges to the same instructions no fewer than five
times in the years before the state habeas courts consid
ered the challenges at issue here. See Jurek v. Texas, 428
U. S. 262 (1976); Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U. S. 164
(1988); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U. S. 302 (1989) (Penry I);
2 ABDUL-KABIR v. QUARTERMAN

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

Graham v. Collins, 506 U. S. 461 (1993); Johnson v. Texas,
509 U. S. 350 (1993). Four of the cases rejected the defen
dant’s challenge. Only one—Penry I—upheld it. The
guidance the Court gave in these five cases on whether the
jury instructions at issue allowed sufficient consideration
of mitigating evidence amounted to—it depends. It de
pends on the particular characteristics of the evidence in a
specific case. The state courts here rejected the claim as
applied to the particular mitigating evidence in these
cases, and the defendants sought federal habeas review.
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 (AEDPA), however, a state-court decision can
be set aside on federal habeas review only if it is “contrary
to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States.” 28 U. S. C. §2254(d)(1).
When this Court considers similar challenges to the same
jury instructions five separate times, it usually is not
because the applicable legal rules are “clearly estab
lished.” The Court today nonetheless picks from the five
precedents the one that ruled in favor of the defendant—
Penry I—and anoints that case as the one embodying
“clearly established Federal law.” In doing so the Court
fails to give any meaningful weight to the two pertinent
precedents subsequent to Penry I—Graham and Johnson—
even though those cases adopted a more “limited view” of
Penry I than the Court embraces today. Johnson, supra,
at 365. Indeed, the reading of Penry I in Graham and
Johnson prompted every one of the remaining Justices
who had been in the majority in Penry I on the pertinent
question to dissent in Graham and Johnson, on the
ground that the Court was failing to adhere to Penry I.
I suppose the Court today is free to ignore the import of
Graham and Johnson on the question of what Penry I
means, but in 1999 or 2001, respectively—when petition
ers were denied collateral relief—the state courts did not
 Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 3

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

have that luxury. They should not be faulted today for
concluding—exactly as the Graham and Johnson dissent
ers did—that the Court had cut back significantly on
Penry I.
We give ourselves far too much credit in claiming that
our sharply divided, ebbing and flowing decisions in this
area gave rise to “clearly established” federal law. If the
law were indeed clearly established by our decisions “as of
the time of the relevant state-court decision,” Williams v.
Taylor, 529 U. S. 362, 412 (2000), it should not take the
Court more than a dozen pages of close analysis of plural
ity, concurring, and even dissenting opinions to explain
what that “clearly established” law was. Ante, at 10–24.
When the state courts considered these cases, our prece
dents did not provide them with “clearly established” law,
but instead a dog’s breakfast of divided, conflicting, and
ever-changing analyses. That is how the Justices on this
Court viewed the matter, as they shifted from being in the
majority, plurality, concurrence, or dissent from case to
case, repeatedly lamenting the failure of their colleagues
to follow a consistent path. Whatever the law may be
today, the Court’s ruling that ’twas always so—and that
state courts were “objectively unreasonable” not to know
it, Williams, supra, at 409—is utterly revisionist.
I
In 1987, Jalil Abdul-Kabir—referred to by his given
name, Ted Calvin Cole, throughout this opinion, ante, at 1,
n. 1—was convicted of capital murder after he confessed to
strangling 66-year-old Raymond Richardson with a dog
leash to steal $20 from him. Among the 21 claims Cole
raised on state collateral review was a challenge under
Penry I, 492 U. S. 302, to the application of Texas’s special
issue jury instructions. In evaluating Cole’s challenge, the
state habeas trial court stated:
“The issue is whether the sentencing jury had been
4 ABDUL-KABIR v. QUARTERMAN

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

unable to give effect to [Cole’s] mitigating evidence
within the confines of the statutory ‘special issues.’
While [Penry I] held that evidence of a defendant’s
mental retardation and abused childhood could not be
given mitigating effect by a jury within the framework
of the special issues, the cases that followed such as
Graham v. Collins, [506 U. S. 461] (1993), Garcia v.
State, 919 S. W. 2d 370 (1996), Mines v. State, 888
S. W. 2d 816 (1994), and Zimmerman v. State, 881
S. W. 2d 360 (1994) held that the mitigating evidence
of alcoholism, drug abuse, bad family background, bi
polar disorder, low I.Q., substance abuse, head injury,
paranoid personality disorder and child abuse were
sufficiently considered under the special issues. The
issue of whether the mitigating evidence can be suffi
ciently considered must be determined on a case by
case basis, depending on the nature of the mitigating
evidence offered and whether there exists other testi
mony in the record that would allow consideration to
be given.” App. in No. 05–11284, pp. 159–160.
Applying that standard, the state court concluded that
“[t]he evidence presented at the punishment stage of the
trial, especially evidence from [Cole’s] expert witnesses,
provide[d] a basis for the jury to sufficiently consider the
mitigating evidence.” Id., at 161. The Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals adopted the trial court’s findings with
out substantive comment, and denied Cole’s application
for habeas corpus relief on November 24, 1999. Id., at
178–179.
In finding that the state court’s decision was objectively
unreasonable, the Court begins by stating that the princi
ple the state court violated was “firmly established,” based
on “[a] careful review of our jurisprudence in this area.”
Ante, at 10. The only thing clear about our jurisprudence
on the pertinent question in 1999, however, is that it was
 Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 5

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

unsettled and confused.
In Jurek, the Court upheld Texas’s use of the special
issues as facially constitutional, with the controlling opin
ion noting that “the constitutionality of the Texas proce
dures turns on whether the enumerated questions allow
consideration of particularized mitigating factors.” 428
U. S., at 272 (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and
STEVENS, JJ.). In so doing, Jurek left open the possibility
that some mitigating evidence might not be within the
reach of the jury under the special issues; other types of
mitigating evidence, of course, would be. Cf. id., at 272–
273 (suggesting that the future dangerousness special
issue allowed the jury to consider prior criminal conduct,
age, duress, and whether the defendant was under ex
treme mental pressure).
The next occasion the Court had to consider mitigating
evidence under the Texas special issues arose in Franklin,
in which the Court concluded that the defendant’s mitigat
ing evidence of good behavior in prison was taken into
account under the future dangerousness special issue. 487
U. S., at 178–179 (plurality opinion); id., at 186–187
(O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment). A plurality of the
Court also rejected the argument that a jury must be
permitted to give “independent” effect to mitigating evi
dence—beyond the special issues—concluding that “this
submission is foreclosed by Jurek” and rejecting the dis
sent’s argument to the contrary. Id., at 179–180, and
n. 10; see also id., at 199–200 (STEVENS, J., dissenting).
The Court today places great weight on the opinion by
Justice O’Connor concurring in the judgment in Franklin,
an opinion joined only by Justice Blackmun. Ante, at 15–
18. That separate opinion expressed “doubts” about the
plurality’s view that mitigating evidence need not be given
effect beyond the special issues, noting that if the peti
tioner in Franklin had introduced evidence not covered by
the special issues, “we would have to decide whether the
6 ABDUL-KABIR v. QUARTERMAN

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

jury’s inability to give effect to that evidence amounted to
an Eighth Amendment violation.” 487 U. S., at 183, 185.
The separate opinion concluded, however, that “this is not
such a case.” Id., at 185. According to the Court today, a
discerning state judge should have seen that federal law
was “clearly established” on the point by the concurring
and dissenting opinions, not the plurality. Ante, at 15–18.
Penry I, decided the following Term, concluded that in
that case the Texas instructions did not allow the jury to
give mitigating effect to evidence of Penry’s mental retar
dation and abusive childhood. 492 U. S., at 328, 315
(“Penry does not . . . dispute that some types of mitigating
evidence can be fully considered by the sentencer in the
absence of special jury instructions. Instead, Penry argues
that, on the facts of this case, the jury was unable to fully
consider and give effect to the mitigating evidence . . . in
answering the three special issues” (emphasis added;
citations omitted)). In granting relief, the Court, quoting
the Franklin concurrence, noted that Penry’s evidence
“ ‘had relevance to [his] moral culpability beyond the scope
of the special verdict questions,’ ” 492 U. S., at 322 (quot
ing 487 U. S., at 185 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judg
ment); some alterations deleted), and that it was relevant
to the special issues “only as an aggravating factor.” 492
U. S., at 323 (emphasis in original). According to the
Court today, the views of the Franklin concurrence and
dissent were thus elevated to the opinion of the Court in
Penry I, again clearly establishing federal law. Ante, at
17–18, and n. 15. The four dissenters in Penry I com
plained that the Court’s holding “flatly contradic[ted]”
Jurek, and that in finding a constitutional violation, the
Court was “throwing away Jurek in the process.” 492
U. S., at 355, 354 (SCALIA, J., concurring in part and dis
senting in part).
A state court looking at our pertinent precedents on the
Texas special issue instructions would next have to con
 Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 7

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

sider the significance of Saffle v. Parks, 494 U. S. 484
(1990). That case—issued less than nine months after
Penry I—considered Oklahoma instructions, but exten
sively analyzed Penry I in doing so. See 494 U. S., at 491–
492. The Court concluded that the mitigating evidence in
that case could be adequately considered by the jury under
the instructions given. The four dissenters in Saffle—
including the author of today’s opinion—complained that
the majority’s discussion of Penry I was “strangely remi
niscent” of the position of the Penry I dissenters. 494
U. S., at 504 (opinion of Brennan, J.). The Saffle dissent
ers asserted that the majority’s failure to reject the posi
tion of the Penry I dissenters “creates considerable ambi
guity about which Lockett [v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586 (1978)]
claims a federal court may hereafter consider on habeas
corpus review.” 494 U. S., at 504–505.
In Graham, decided three years later, the Court sought
to clarify the interplay between Jurek, Franklin, and
Penry I:
“It seems to us, however, that reading Penry as peti
tioner urges—and thereby holding that a defendant is
entitled to special instructions whenever he can offer
mitigating evidence that has some arguable relevance
beyond the special issues—would be to require in all
cases that a fourth ‘special issue’ be put to the jury:
‘ “Does any mitigating evidence before you, whether or
not relevant to the above [three] questions, lead you to
believe that the death penalty should not be im
posed?” ’ The Franklin plurality rejected precisely this
contention, finding it irreconcilable with the Court’s
holding in Jurek, and we affirm that conclusion to
day.” 506 U. S., at 476–477 (citation omitted; second
emphasis added).
Thus, in Graham the Court rejected the reading of Frank
lin and Penry I that the Court today endorses, reasoning
8 ABDUL-KABIR v. QUARTERMAN

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

that it would require a new sentencing in every case, and
would be impossible to square with Jurek.1
Although the Court today tells us it was clear that the
applicable federal law was established by the Franklin
concurrence and dissent, and that Penry I had to be read
in that light, ante, at 17–18, the Court majority in Gra
ham specifically relied instead upon the Franklin plurality
in rejecting the same broad reading of Penry I the Court
resuscitates today, nunc pro tunc. Graham, supra, at 476–
477. The dissenters in Graham—including every remain
ing Member of the Penry I majority—were adamant that
Penry I should have been controlling in Graham. See, e.g.,
506 U. S., at 507 (opinion of SOUTER, J., joined by Black
mun, STEVENS, and O’Connor, JJ.) (“Our description of
Penry’s claim applies . . . almost precisely to Graham’s
claim”); id., at 508 (“[Graham’s] position is identical to
that of Penry”); id., at 512 (“Penry controls in this respect,
and we should adhere to it”); id., at 520 (“[T]he case is
controlled by Penry”). The issue is not whether the major
ity or the dissenters in Graham were right about how to
read Penry I, but whether it was reasonable for a state
court in 1999 to read it the way the majority in Graham
plainly did.
Later the same Term, in Johnson, the Court reaffirmed
the “limited view of Penry” it had adopted in Graham. 509
U. S., at 365. Once again the Court majority specifically
relied on the Franklin plurality—not the concurrence and

——————
1 In evaluating the state court’s analysis, the Court criticizes its reli

ance on Graham because Graham primarily addressed retroactivity
under Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288 (1989). Ante, at 23. But in consid
ering whether the rule requested was dictated by precedent, Graham of
course had to evaluate the scope of that precedent—including Penry I—
and did so extensively. See 506 U. S., at 467–477. Moreover, as ex
plained below, the Court in Johnson v. Texas, 509 U. S. 350, 370–372
(1993), adopted the same reading of Penry I adopted in Graham,
without considering the issue under Teague.
 Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 9

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

dissent. See 509 U. S., at 370–371. And once again the
dissenters—including every remaining Member of the
Penry I majority—lamented the Court’s asserted failure to
adhere to Penry I. 509 U. S., at 385–386 (opinion of
O’Connor, J., joined by Blackmun, STEVENS, and SOUTER,
JJ.). The dissent—by the Penry I author—made precisely
the same point made by the Court today about how to read
the Franklin concurrence and dissent. 509 U. S., at 385–
386. The difference, of course, was that in Johnson the
point was made in dissent. It cannot have been “objec
tively unreasonable” for a state court, in 1999, to have
been guided by the Johnson majority on this question,
rather than by the dissent.
In short, a state court reading our opinions would see an
ongoing debate over the meaning and significance of Penry
I. That state court would see four dissenters in Graham
and Johnson—including every remaining Member of the
Penry I majority—arguing that the Court was failing to
follow or sharply limiting Penry I in those cases. On the
flip side, the state court would see four dissenters in Penry
I—every one later joining the majorities in Graham and
Johnson—suggesting that the Penry I majority departed
from Jurek. It is in that context that the Court today tells
us that the state courts should have regarded Penry I as
“clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States.” §2254(d)(1).
The Court asserts that Graham and Johnson did not
“disturb the basic legal principle” at issue, ante, at 23, and
that we cite no post-Penry I cases inconsistent with its
reading of that case, ante, at 17, n. 14. I do not under
stand how the author of today’s opinion can say that Gra
ham did not disturb the principle of Penry I, however,
when he joined a dissent in Graham stating that “[Gra
ham’s] position is identical to that of Penry” and that
Graham’s case “is controlled by Penry.” 506 U. S., at 508,
520 (opinion of SOUTER, J.) (emphasis added). That would
10 ABDUL-KABIR v. QUARTERMAN

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

seem to suggest that Graham was inconsistent with Penry
I. I do not understand how the author of today’s opinion
can say that Johnson had no effect on Penry I, when he
joined a dissent in Johnson stating that the majority
opinion “upset our settled Eighth Amendment jurispru
dence.” 509 U. S., at 382 (opinion of O’Connor, J.). Now
Johnson is dismissed as just an application of “basic legal
principle[s],” over which Justices can disagree, ante, at 23;
back then it “upset our settled Eighth Amendment juris
prudence.” And what of Saffle? There the author of to
day’s opinion joined a dissent claiming that the majority
was adopting the rule rejected in Penry I. 494 U. S., at
504 (opinion of Brennan, J.). Again, that would seem to
suggest inconsistency with Penry I.2
In fact, Penry I is not even consistent with the reading
the Court ascribes to it—in that case the Court concluded
that a jury could only view Penry’s mitigating evidence as
aggravating, and thus could not give the evidence any
mitigating effect. 492 U. S., at 323 (Penry’s evidence was
“relevant only as an aggravating factor” (emphasis in
original)); see also Graham, supra, at 473 (“Although
Penry’s evidence of mental impairment and childhood
abuse indeed had relevance to the ‘future dangerousness’
inquiry, its relevance was aggravating only” (emphasis in
original)). The Court concedes that Cole’s evidence in the
present case was not purely aggravating, see ante, at 24
——————
2 The Court is correct that “[w]hat is most relevant under AEDPA
. . . is the holdings set forth in majority opinions, rather than the views
of dissenters . . . at the time those opinions were written.” Ante, at 25,
n. 22. But that must include the majority opinions in all the pertinent
cases, not just the lone one of the bunch that ruled in favor of the
defendant. Here it must include the subsequent majority opinions in
Saffle, Graham, and Johnson, as well as in Penry I, and it was not
objectively unreasonable for a state court to view Saffle, Graham, and
Johnson the same way today’s author did at the time—or at least to
conclude that the Court’s current view of Penry I was not as clearly
established as the Court would have it today.
 Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 11

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

(“[T]he jury could give mitigating effect to some of the
experts’ testimony”), thus drawing into even starker con
trast the rule that was established by a fair reading of
Penry I in 1999 versus the rule the Court today reads
Penry I to have “clearly established.”
As might be expected in light of the foregoing, judges
called upon to apply these precedents were confused by
the ambiguity of this Court’s pronouncements. See, e.g.,
Mines v. Texas, 888 S. W. 2d 816, 820 (Tex. Crim. App.
1994) (Baird, J., concurring) (“The Supreme Court’s hold
ings in Penry, Graham and Johnson do not provide an
analytical framework to determine when our capital sen
tencing scheme fails to allow the jury to consider and give
effect to mitigating evidence . . .”); see also Brewer v.
Dretke, 442 F. 3d 273, 279, n. 16 (CA5 2006) (per curiam)
(remarking, in applying Graham and Penry I, that “[t]here
is no easy way to locate [the defendant] at either pole”).
Commentators at the time likewise concluded that Gra
ham and Johnson “put a cap on Penry’s principles.”
Denno, Testing Penry and Its Progeny, 22 Am. J. Crim. L.
1, 10 (1994) (“In Graham, the Court made clear that it did
not interpret Penry ‘as effecting a sea change’ in its
evaluation of the constitutionality of the former Texas
death penalty statute . . .”). See also Twenty-Eighth An
nual Review of Criminal Procedure, 87 Geo. L. J. 1756,
1770 (1999) (“The possible reach of Penry has been cir
cumscribed by [Graham] and [Johnson]”).
It is a familiar adage that history is written by the
victors, but it goes too far to claim that the meaning and
scope of Penry I was “clearly established” in 1999, espe
cially in the wake of Graham and Johnson. In applying
AEDPA, we have recognized that “[a] federal court may
not overrule a state court for simply holding a view differ
ent from its own, when the precedent from this Court is, at
best, ambiguous.” Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U. S. 12, 17
(2003) (per curiam); see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U. S.
12 ABDUL-KABIR v. QUARTERMAN

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

63, 72–73 (2003) (declining to find federal law “clearly
established” when “our precedents in [the] area have not
been a model of clarity”).
When the state court rejected Cole’s claim, it knew that
mitigating evidence of mental retardation and severe
childhood abuse could not be given effect under the special
issues, Penry I, 492 U. S., at 328, but that evidence of
youth and a transient upbringing could be, Graham, 506
U. S., at 476; Johnson, 509 U. S., at 368. The court con
cluded that Cole’s mitigating evidence—a troubled child
hood and “impulse control” disorder—was more like that
considered in Johnson and Graham than in Penry I. And
because Cole’s mitigating evidence was not as troubling as
that at issue in Penry I, the state court did not act unrea
sonably in concluding that the collateral damage of his
upbringing and impulse control disorder would, like youth
in Johnson, dissipate over time, so that Cole would be less
of a danger in the future. It is irrelevant that the ill ef
fects of Cole’s upbringing and impulse control disorder
might not wear off for some time—there was no suggestion
in Johnson that the petitioner in that case would become
less dangerous any time soon.
In other words, our precedents—which confirmed that
the permanence of a mitigating feature was highly rele
vant, and that the correct answer was a case-specific
matter turning on the particular facts—did not provide a
clear answer, because the particular evidence before the
court fell somewhere between the guideposts established
by those precedents. As we have recognized, “the range of
reasonable judgment can depend in part on the nature of
the relevant rule. . . . [Some] rules are more general, and
their meaning must emerge in application over the course
of time.” Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U. S. 652, 664
(2004). See also Brown v. Payton, 544 U. S. 133, 143
(2005) (reviewing state-court application of Supreme
Court precedent “to similar but not identical facts” and
 Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 13

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

concluding that “[e]ven on the assumption that its conclu
sion was incorrect, it was not unreasonable, and is there
fore just the type of decision that AEDPA shields on ha
beas review”).
The state court’s approach to the question was plainly
correct; indeed, we engaged in a similar comparison in
Graham itself in determining that the evidence presented
in that case was cognizable under the special issues:
“Jurek is reasonably read as holding that the circum
stance of youth is given constitutionally adequate con
sideration in deciding the special issues. We see no
reason to regard the circumstances of Graham’s fam
ily background and positive character traits in a dif
ferent light. Graham’s evidence of transient upbring
ing and otherwise nonviolent character more closely
resembles Jurek’s evidence of age, employment his
tory, and familial ties than it does Penry’s evidence of
mental retardation and harsh physical abuse.” 506
U. S., at 476.
The state court thought that Cole’s evidence “more closely
resemble[d]” Johnson and Graham than Penry I. That
cannot be said to be “contrary to, or . . . an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law.”
§2254(d)(1). See Brown, supra, at 143, 147; Williams, 529
U. S., at 411.
The Court further holds that the jury instructions did
not permit Cole’s evidence to have “mitigating force be
yond the scope of the special issues,” ante, at 21, as it now
reads Penry I to require. At the time the state court ruled,
however, Graham and Johnson, decided after Penry I, had
expressly rejected the notion that a jury must “be able to
give effect to mitigating evidence in every conceivable
manner in which the evidence might be relevant,” so long
as the jury could consider “in some manner all of a defen
dant’s relevant mitigating evidence.” Johnson, supra, at
14 ABDUL-KABIR v. QUARTERMAN

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

372–373. The state court found that Cole’s mitigating
evidence could be “sufficiently consider[ed]” by the jury
“within the confines of the statutory ‘special issues,’ ” App.
in No. 05–11284, at 161, 159, a holding consistent with
this Court’s precedents as of 1999—and certainly not
contrary to clearly established federal law.
In reaching today’s result, the Court also takes advan
tage of eight years of hindsight and relies on three cases
that postdate the state court’s ruling. Ante, at 28 (citing
Penry v. Johnson, 532 U. S. 782 (2001) (Penry II), Tennard
v. Dretke, 542 U. S. 274 (2004), and Smith v. Texas, 543
U. S. 37 (2004) (per curiam)). What is pertinent under
AEDPA, however, is whether federal law was clearly
established by our decisions when the state court acted.
Williams, supra, at 412.3 AEDPA requires state courts to
reasonably apply clearly established federal law. It does
not require them to have a crystal ball.
II
In 1991, petitioner Brent Ray Brewer was convicted of
murder committed during the course of a robbery. Like
Cole, Brewer claims that the Texas special issues pre
vented the jury from giving effect to mitigating evidence
that he suffered from depression and had been abused as a
teenager. The Texas courts rejected these claims on both
direct and collateral review.
——————
3 The Court criticizes this dissent for failing “to define the rule” that
our post-Penry I cases either did or should have applied. Ante, at 25, n.
22. But the whole point is that “the rule,” far from being “clearly
established” by our decisions, was—at the very least—unsettled and
confused. Under AEDPA, those defending the finality of a state-court
judgment challenged on federal habeas review do not have to show that
the state-court judgment was consistent with some version of “clearly
established Federal law” other than that offered by the challenger;
AEDPA obviously contemplates that there may not be “clearly estab
lished Federal law.” The Court’s criticism only underscores how far the
reasoning employed today strays from AEDPA’s mandate.
 Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 15

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

In evaluating Brewer’s claim, the Court focuses on the
so-called “two-edged sword” nature of the evidence found
to be beyond the jury’s reach in Penry I, and concludes
that Brewer’s mitigating evidence is similarly double
edged. The state court distinguished Penry I, however,
stating that “a stay in a mental hospital does not evidence
a long term mental illness which would affect appellant’s
ability to conform to the requirements of society,” App. in
No. 05–11287, p. 141 (internal quotation marks omitted),
in contrast to Penry’s “organic brain disorder . . . which
made it impossible for him to appreciate the wrongfulness
of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the law,” Penry
I, 492 U. S., at 309. The state court determined that the
nature of Brewer’s evidence allowed the jury to find that
he would not be a future danger, whereas Penry’s did not.
The Court rejects this distinction, noting that while
Brewer’s mitigating evidence may have been less compel
ling than Penry’s, “that difference does not provide an
acceptable justification for refusing to apply the reasoning
in Penry I to this case.” Ante, at 6, and n. 5. This misses
the point. The state court’s distinction goes not to the
relative strength of the mitigating evidence, but rather its
character—an episodic rather than permanent mental
disorder. As discussed in the context of Cole, see supra, at
12, the distinction was not a “refus[al] to apply the reason
ing in Penry I,” ante, at 6, but rather an application of
Penry I that can hardly be said to be “objectively unrea
sonable” based on this Court’s decisions as of 2001. In
deed, in considering future dangerousness, it is difficult to
imagine a more pertinent distinction than whether a
mental condition is or is not permanent.
The Court concedes that “[t]he transient quality of
[Brewer’s] mitigating evidence may make it more likely to
fall in part within the ambit of the special issues,” and yet
still finds the state court’s decision unreasonable because
the evidence may have had relevance beyond the special
16 ABDUL-KABIR v. QUARTERMAN

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

issues. Ante, at 7. As in Cole’s case, this conclusion
squarely conflicts with the Court’s rejection in Graham of
the proposition that “a defendant is entitled to special
instructions whenever he can offer mitigating evidence
that has some arguable relevance beyond the special
issues.” 506 U. S., at 476 (emphasis in original). That
rejection was confirmed in Johnson, see 509 U. S., at 372–
373 (rejecting a rule that “would require that a jury be
able to give effect to mitigating evidence in every conceiv
able manner in which the evidence might be relevant” in
favor of the rule “that a jury be able to consider in some
manner all of a defendant’s relevant mitigating evidence”).
Once again, the Court rejects the state court’s reasonable
reading of existing cases in favor of its own revisionist
reading of this Court’s doctrine, heavily informed by sub
sequent decisions that the state court had no means to
predict.
III
In AEDPA, Congress “work[ed] substantial changes” to
the power of federal courts to grant habeas corpus relief.
Felker v. Turpin, 518 U. S. 651, 654 (1996). In today’s
decisions, the Court trivializes AEDPA’s requirements and
overturns decades-old sentences on the ground that they
were contrary to clearly established federal law at the
time—even though the same Justices who form the major
ity today were complaining at that time that this Court
was changing that “clearly established” law.
Still, perhaps there is no reason to be unduly glum.
After all, today the author of a dissent issued in 1988
writes two majority opinions concluding that the views
expressed in that dissent actually represented “clearly
established” federal law at that time. So there is hope yet
for the views expressed in this dissent, not simply down
the road, but tunc pro nunc. Encouraged by the majority’s
determination that the future can change the past, I re
spectfully dissent.
 Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 1

SCALIA, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________

Nos. 05–11284 and 05–11287
_________________

JALIL ABDUL-KABIR, FKA TED CALVIN COLE,
PETITIONER
05–11284 v.
NATHANIEL QUARTERMAN, DIRECTOR, TEXAS
DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, COR-
RECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS DIVISION

BRENT RAY BREWER, PETITIONER
05–11287 v.
NATHANIEL QUARTERMAN, DIRECTOR, TEXAS
DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, COR-
RECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS DIVISION
ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
[April 25, 2007]

JUSTICE SCALIA, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS joins, and
with whom JUSTICE ALITO joins as to Part I, dissenting.
I remain of the view “that limiting a jury’s discretion to
consider all mitigating evidence does not violate the
Eighth Amendment.” Ayers v. Belmontes, 549 U. S. ___,
___ (2006) (slip op., at 1) (SCALIA, J., concurring) (citing
Walton v. Arizona, 497 U. S. 639, 673 (1990) (SCALIA, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment)).
I
But even under this Court’s precedents to the contrary,
the state-court decisions in these two cases were hardly
objectively unreasonable under the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, as THE CHIEF
JUSTICE’s dissenting opinion demonstrates. That is all
2 ABDUL-KABIR v. QUARTERMAN

SCALIA, J., dissenting

which is needful to demonstrate the error of today’s judg
ments. The full truth is worse than that, however. There
was in fact clearly established law that governed these
cases, and it favored the State. When the state courts
rendered their decisions, Johnson v. Texas, 509 U. S. 350
(1993), was this Court’s most recent pronouncement on the
Texas special issues. And in that case, the Court unambi
guously drew back from the broader implications of its
prior decision in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U. S. 302 (1989)
(Penry I). Reiterating what it had recently said in Gra
ham v. Collins, 506 U. S. 461, 475 (1993), the Court made
clear that “ ‘[i]n Penry, the defendant’s evidence was
placed before the sentencer but the sentencer had no
reliable means of giving mitigating effect to that evi
dence.’ ” Johnson, supra, at 366 (emphasis added). Penry
I, said Johnson, stood for the proposition that habeas
relief was appropriate where jurors had been unable to
give any mitigating effect to the evidence at issue. 509
U. S., at 369; see also Graham, supra, at 475. Penry I in
no way meant to imply, Johnson warned, “that a jury
[must] be able to give effect to mitigating evidence in every
conceivable manner in which the evidence might be rele
vant.” 509 U. S., at 372 (emphasis added). Johnson thus
established, in no uncertain terms, that jurors need only
“be able to consider in some manner all of a defendant’s
relevant mitigating evidence.” Ibid. (emphasis added); see
generally id., at 372–373.
The dissenters in Johnson very much disagreed with
that analysis. They read Penry I for the more expansive
proposition that “the Texas special issues violated the
Eighth Amendment to the extent they prevented the jury
from giving full consideration and effect to a defendant’s
relevant mitigating evidence.” 509 U. S., at 385 (opinion
of O’Connor, J.) (citing Penry I, supra; emphasis added
and deleted). “[H]aving some relevance to [a special]
issue,” the dissent said, “was not sufficient.” 509 U. S., at
 Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 3

SCALIA, J., dissenting

385. And because youth (the mitigating feature in John
son) had obvious relevance beyond the special issues, an
additional instruction was needed. Id., at 375. The differ
ences between the Johnson majority and dissenters could
not have been more pronounced.
Today the Court overrules Johnson sub silentio, and
reinstates the “full effect” interpretation of Penry I. For as
THE CHIEF JUSTICE explains, ante, at 12, 15 (dissenting
opinion), it was not objectively unreasonable for the state
courts to conclude that the ill effects of petitioners’ mental
illnesses and difficult childhoods would wear off in due
time, allowing the jury to give that mitigating evidence
some effect through the future dangerousness instruc
tion—just as could be done for the mitigating factor of
youth in Johnson. The Court nonetheless reverses these
sentences because the juries were unable to give effect to
“any independent concern” (independent, that is, of the
Texas special issues) that the defendants “may not be
deserving of a death sentence,” Brewer, ante, at 6, or to
consider the evidence’s “relevance to the defendant’s moral
culpability beyond the scope of the special verdict ques
tions,” id., at 7 (internal quotation marks omitted). The
Court does not acknowledge that it is overruling Johnson,
but makes the Court of Appeals the scapegoat for its
change of heart.
The Fifth Circuit in both of these cases relied heavily on
Johnson when denying relief. See Cole v. Dretke, 418
F. 3d 494, 505 (2005); Brewer v. Dretke, 442 F. 3d 273, 278,
281 (2006) (relying on Cole). How does the Court manage
to distinguish it? The Court tries two main lines of argu
ment. First, the Court explains:
“A critical assumption motivating the Court’s decision
in Johnson was that juries would in fact be able to
give mitigating effect to the evidence, albeit within
the confines of the special issues. . . . Prosecutors in
4 ABDUL-KABIR v. QUARTERMAN

SCALIA, J., dissenting

some subsequent cases, however, have undermined
this assumption, taking pains to convince jurors that
the law compels them to disregard the force of evi
dence offered in mitigation.” Abdul-Kabir, ante, at 26.
Because Johnson’s “critical assumption” has now been
“undermined,” the Court says, Johnson cannot be said to
“foreclos[e] relief in these circumstances.” Abdul-Kabir,
ante, at 26.
This attempt to “distinguish” Johnson wilts under even
the mildest scrutiny. Since when does this Court craft
constitutional rules that depend on the beneficence of the
prosecutor? (Never mind that this “critical assumption” of
Johnson was not so critical as to be mentioned in the
case.) And more importantly, how can prosecutorial style
have any bearing on whether the Eighth Amendment
requires a jury to be able to give “some effect,” as opposed
to “full effect,” to a defendant’s mitigating evidence? It is
of course true that a prosecutor’s arguments may be rele
vant evidence in the final analysis of whether a capital
trial has met the “some effect” test. But it has absolutely
no relevance to which test is selected in the first place.*
Second, the Court explains that “the consideration of the
defendant’s mitigating evidence of youth in Johnson could
easily have directed jurors towards a ‘no’ answer with
regard to the question of future dangerousness,” whereas
a juror considering petitioners’ mitigating evidence “could
feel compelled to provide a ‘yes’ answer to the same ques
tion.” Abdul-Kabir, ante, at 27. But it is quite apparent
that jurors considering youth in Johnson could also have

——————
*Relatedly, the Court thinks Johnson distinguishable because jurors
have “experienced” youth but “have never experienced” the “particular
ized childhood experiences of abuse and neglect” at issue here. Abdul-
Kabir, ante, at 25–26. It is again quite impossible to understand,
however, how that can have any bearing upon whether “some effect” or
“full effect” is the required test.
 Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 5

SCALIA, J., dissenting

“fe[lt] compelled to provide a ‘yes’ answer” to the future
dangerousness question. While one can believe that “the
impetuousness and recklessness that may dominate in
younger years can subside,” Johnson, 509 U. S., at 368,
one can also believe that a person who kills even in his
younger years is fundamentally depraved, and more prone
to a life of violent crime. Johnson itself explicitly recog
nized this point, denying relief despite “the fact that a
juror might view the evidence of youth as aggravating, as
opposed to mitigating.” Ibid.
As the Court’s opinion effectively admits, nothing of a
legal nature has changed since Johnson. What has
changed are the moral sensibilities of the majority of the
Court. For those in Texas who have already received the
ultimate punishment, this judicial moral awakening
comes too late. Johnson was the law, until today. And in
the almost 15 years in-between, the Court today tells us,
state and lower federal courts in countless appeals, and
this Court in numerous denials of petitions for writ of
certiorari, have erroneously relied on Johnson to allow the
condemned to be taken to the death chamber. See, e.g.,
Robison v. Johnson, 151 F. 3d 256, 269 (CA5 1998) (deny
ing petition for rehearing), cert. denied, 526 U. S. 1100
(1999) (petitioner executed Jan. 21, 2000); Motley v.
Collins, 18 F. 3d 1223, 1233–1235 (CA5), cert. denied
sub nom. Motley v. Scott, 513 U. S. 960 (1994) (petitioner
executed Feb. 7, 1995).
II
The individuals duly tried and executed between John
son and today’s decisions were not, in my view (my view at
the time of Johnson, and my view now), entitled to federal
judicial invalidation of their state-imposed sentences.
That is because in my view the meaning of the Eighth
Amendment is to be determined not by the moral percep
tions of the Justices du jour, but by the understanding of
6 ABDUL-KABIR v. QUARTERMAN

SCALIA, J., dissenting

the American people who adopted it—which understand
ing did not remotely include any requirement that a capi
tal jury be permitted to consider all mitigating factors. If,
however, a majority of the Justices are going to govern us
by their moral perceptions, in this area at least they ought
to get their moral perceptions right the first time.
Whether one regards improvised death-is-different juris
prudence with disdain or with approval, no one can be at
ease with the stark reality that this Court’s vacillating
pronouncements have produced grossly inequitable treat
ment of those on death row. Relief from sentence of death
because of the jury’s inability to give “full effect” to all
mitigating factors has been made available only to those
who have managed to drag out their habeas proceedings
until today. This is not justice. It is caprice.