(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2006 1
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL CORP. ET AL. v.
UNITED STATES ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE TENTH CIRCUIT
No. 05–1272. Argued December 5, 2006—Decided March 27, 2007
While employed as an engineer at a nuclear weapons plant run by peti
tioner Rockwell under a Government contract, respondent Stone pre
dicted that Rockwell’s system for creating solid “pondcrete” blocks
from toxic pond sludge and cement would not work because of prob
lems in piping the sludge. However, Rockwell successfully made such
blocks and discovered “insolid” ones only after Stone was laid off in
1986. In 1989, Stone filed a qui tam suit under the False Claims Act,
which prohibits submitting false or fraudulent payment claims to the
United States, 31 U. S. C. §3729(a); permits remedial civil actions to
be brought by the Attorney General, §3730(a), or by private individu
als in the Government’s name, §3730(b)(1); but eliminates federal-
court jurisdiction over actions “based upon the public disclosure of al
legations or transactions . . . , unless the action is brought by the At
torney General or the person bringing the action is an original source
of the information,” §3730(e)(4)(A). An “original source” “has direct
and independent knowledge of the information on which the allega
tions are based and has voluntarily provided the information to the
Government before filing an action . . . based on the information.”
§3730(e)(4)(B). In 1996, the Government intervened, and, with
Stone, filed an amended complaint, which did not allege that Stone’s
predicted piping-system defect caused the insolid blocks. Nor was
such defect mentioned in a statement of claims included in the final
pretrial order, which instead alleged that the pondcrete failed be
cause a new foreman used an insufficient cement-to-sludge ratio.
The jury found for respondents with respect to claims covering the
pondcrete allegations, but found for Rockwell with respect to all other
2 ROCKWELL INT’L CORP. v. UNITED STATES
Syllabus
claims. The District Court denied Rockwell’s postverdict motion to
dismiss Stone’s claims, finding that Stone was an original source.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed in part, but remanded for the District
Court to determine whether Stone had disclosed his information to
the Government before filing the action. The District Court found
Stone’s disclosure inadequate, but the Tenth Circuit disagreed and
held that Stone was an original source.
Held:
1. Section 3730(e)(4)’s original-source requirement is jurisdictional.
Thus, regardless of whether Rockwell conceded Stone’s original-
source status, this Court must decide whether Stone meets this juris
dictional requirement. Pp. 8–11.
2. Because Stone does not meet §3730(e)(4)(B)’s requirement that a
relator have “direct and independent knowledge of the information on
which the allegations are based,” he is not an original source.
Pp. 12–18.
(a) The “information” to which subparagraph (B) speaks is the in
formation on which the relator’s allegations are based rather than
the information on which the publicly disclosed allegations that trig
gered the public-disclosure bar are based. The subparagraph stand
ing on its own suggests that disposition. And those “allegations” are
not the same as the allegations referred to in subparagraph (A),
which bars actions based on the “public disclosure of allegations or
transactions” with an exception for cases brought by “an original
source of the information.” Had Congress wanted to link original-
source status to information underlying public disclosure it would
have used the identical phrase, “allegations or transactions.” Fur
thermore, it is difficult to understand why Congress would care
whether a relator knows about the information underlying a publicly
disclosed allegation when the relator has direct and independent
knowledge of different information supporting the same allegation.
Pp. 12–14.
(b) In determining which “allegations” are relevant, that term is
not limited to “allegations” in the original complaint, but includes the
allegations as amended. The statute speaks of the relator’s “allega
tions,” simpliciter. Absent some limitation of §3730(e)(4)’s require
ment to the initial complaint, this Court will not infer one. Here,
where the final pretrial order superseded prior pleadings, this Court
looks to the final pretrial order to determine original-source status.
Pp. 14–17.
(c) Judged according to these principles, Stone’s knowledge falls
short. The only false claims found by the jury involved insolid pond
crete discovered after Stone left his employment. Thus, he did not
know that the pondcrete had failed; he predicted it. And his predic
Cite as: 549 U. S. ____ (2007) 3
Syllabus
tion was a failed one, for Stone believed the piping system was defec
tive when, in fact, the pondcrete problem would be caused by a fore
man’s actions after Stone had left the plant. Stone’s original-source
status with respect to a separate, spray-irrigation claim did not pro
vide jurisdiction over all of his claims. Section 3730(e)(4) does not
permit jurisdiction in gross just because a relator is an original
source with respect to some claim. Pp. 17–18.
3. The Government’s intervention in this case did not provide an
independent basis of jurisdiction with respect to Stone. The statute
draws a sharp distinction between actions brought by a private per
son under §3730(b) and actions brought by the Attorney General un
der §3730(b). An action originally brought by a private person, which
the Attorney General has joined, becomes an action brought by the
Attorney General only after the private person has been ousted.
Pp. 18–20.
92 Fed. Appx. 708, reversed.
SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
C. J., and KENNEDY, SOUTER, THOMAS, and ALITO, JJ., joined. STEVENS,
J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which GINSBURG, J., joined. BREYER, J.,
took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
Cite as: 549 U. S. ____ (2007) 1
Opinion of the Court
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 05–1272
_________________
ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL CORP., ET AL.,
PETITIONERS v. UNITED STATES ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
[March 27, 2007]
JUSTICE SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court.
The False Claims Act, 31 U. S. C. §§3729–3733, elimi
nates federal-court jurisdiction over actions under §3730
of the Act that are based upon the public disclosure of
allegations or transactions “unless the action is brought by
the Attorney General or the person bringing the action is
an original source of the information.” §3730(e)(4)(A). We
decide whether respondent James Stone was an original
source.
I
The mixture of concrete and pond sludge that is the
subject of this case has taken nearly two decades to seep,
so to speak, into this Court. Given the long history and
the complexity of this litigation, it is well to describe the
facts in some detail.
A
From 1975 through 1989, petitioner Rockwell Interna
tional Corp. was under a management and operating
contract with the Department of Energy (DOE) to run the
Rocky Flats nuclear weapons plant in Colorado. The most
2 ROCKWELL INT’L CORP. v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
significant portion of Rockwell’s compensation came in the
form of a semiannual “ ‘award fee,’ ” the amount of which
depended on DOE’s evaluation of Rockwell’s performance
in a number of areas, including environmental, safety, and
health concerns. United States ex rel. Stone v. Rockwell
Int’l, Corp., 92 Fed. Appx. 708, 714 (CA10 2004).
From November 1980 through March 1986, James Stone
worked as an engineer at the Rocky Flats plant. In the
early 1980’s, Rockwell explored the possibility of disposing
of the toxic pond sludge that accumulated in solar evapo
ration ponds at the facility, by mixing it with cement. The
idea was to pour the mixture into large rectangular boxes,
where it would solidify into “pondcrete” blocks that could
be stored onsite or transported to other sites for disposal.
Stone reviewed a proposed manufacturing process for
pondcrete in 1982. He concluded that the proposal “would
not work,” App. 175, and communicated that conclusion to
Rockwell management in a written “Engineering Order.”
As Stone would later explain, he believed “the suggested
process would result in an unstable mixture that would
later deteriorate and cause unwanted release of toxic
wastes to the environment.” Ibid. He believed this be
cause he “foresaw that the piping system” that extracted
sludge from the solar ponds “would not properly remove
the sludge and would lead to an inadequate mixture of
sludge/waste and cement such that the ‘pond crete’ blocks
would rapidly disintegrate thus creating additional con
tamination problems.” Id., at 290.
Notwithstanding Stone’s prediction, Rockwell proceeded
with its pondcrete project and successfully manufactured
“concrete hard” pondcrete during the period of Stone’s
employment at Rocky Flats. It was only after Stone was
laid off in March 1986 that what the parties have called
“insolid” pondcrete blocks were discovered. According to
respondents, Rockwell knew by October 1986 that a sub
stantial number of pondcrete blocks were insolid, but
Cite as: 549 U. S. ____ (2007) 3
Opinion of the Court
DOE did not become aware of the problem until May 1988,
when several pondcrete blocks began to leak, leading to
the discovery of thousands of other insolid blocks. The
media reported these discoveries, 3 Appellants’ App. in
Nos. 99–1351, 99–1352, 99–1353 (CA10), pp. 889–38 to
889–39; and attributed the malfunction to Rockwell’s
reduction of the ratio of concrete to sludge in the mixture.
In June 1987, more than a year after he had left Rock-
well’s employ, Stone went to the Federal Bureau of Inves
tigation (FBI) with allegations of environmental crimes at
Rocky Flats during the time of his employment. According
to the court below, Stone alleged that
“contrary to public knowledge, Rocky Flats accepted
hazardous and nuclear waste from other DOE facili
ties; that Rockwell employees were ‘forbidden from
discussing any controversies in front of a DOE em
ployee’; that although Rocky Flats’ fluid bed incinera
tors failed testing in 1981, the pilot incinerator re
mained on line and was used to incinerate wastes
daily since 1981, including plutonium wastes which
were then sent out for burial; that Rockwell distilled
and fractionated various oils and solvents although
the wastes were geared for incineration; that Stone
believed that the ground water was contaminated
from previous waste burial and land application, and
that hazardous waste lagoons tended to overflow dur
ing and after ‘a good rain,’ causing hazardous wastes
to be discharged without first being treated.” App. to
Pet. for Cert. 4a.
Stone provided the FBI with 2,300 pages of documents,
buried among which was his 1982 engineering report
predicting that the pondcrete-system design would not
work. Stone did not discuss his pondcrete allegations with
4 ROCKWELL INT’L CORP. v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
the FBI in their conversations.1
Based in part on information allegedly learned from
Stone, the Government obtained a search warrant for
Rocky Flats, and on June 6, 1989, 75 FBI and Environ
mental Protection Agency agents raided the facility. The
affidavit in support of the warrant included allegations (1)
that pondcrete blocks were insolid “due to an inadequate
waste-concrete mixture,” App. 429, (2) that Rockwell
obtained award fees based on its alleged “ ‘excellent’ ”
management of Rocky Flats, id., at 98, and (3) that Rock-
well made false statements and concealed material facts in
violation of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
of 1976 (RCRA), 90 Stat. 2811, 42 U. S. C. §6928, and 18
U. S. C. §1001. Newspapers published these allegations.
In March 1992, Rockwell pleaded guilty to 10 environ
mental violations, including the knowing storage of insolid
pondcrete blocks in violation of RCRA. Rockwell agreed to
pay $18.5 million in fines.
B
In July 1989, Stone filed a qui tam suit under the False
Claims Act.2 That Act prohibits false or fraudulent claims
for payment to the United States, 31 U. S. C. §3729(a),
and authorizes civil actions to remedy such fraud to be
brought by the Attorney General, §3730(a), or by private
individuals in the Government’s name, §3730(b)(1). The
Act provides, however, that “[n]o court shall have jurisdic
tion over an action under this section based upon the
public disclosure of allegations or transactions . . . from
the news media, unless the action is brought by the Attor
ney General or the person bringing the action is an origi
——————
1 Stone claimed the contrary, but the District Court found that he had
failed to establish that fact.
2 Qui tam is short for “qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in
hac parte sequitur,” which means “who pursues this action on our Lord
the King’s behalf as well as his own.”
Cite as: 549 U. S. ____ (2007) 5
Opinion of the Court
nal source of the information.” §3730(e)(4)(A). An “origi
nal source” is “an individual who has direct and independ
ent knowledge of the information on which the allegations
are based and has voluntarily provided the information to
the Government before filing an action under this section
which is based on the information.” §3730(e)(4)(B).
Stone’s complaint alleged that Rockwell was required to
comply with certain federal and state environmental laws
and regulations, including RCRA; that Rockwell commit
ted numerous violations of these laws and regulations
throughout the 1980’s3; and that, in order to induce the
Government to make payments or approvals under Rock-
well’s contract, Rockwell knowingly presented false and
fraudulent claims to the Government in violation of the
False Claims Act, 31 U. S. C. §3729(a). As required under
the Act, Stone filed his complaint under seal and simulta
neously delivered to the Government a confidential disclo
sure statement describing “substantially all material
evidence and information” in his possession, §3730(b)(2).
The statement identified 26 environmental and safety
issues, only one of which involved pondcrete. With respect
to that issue, Stone explained in his statement that he had
——————
3 The laws and regulations allegedly violated included DOE Order
Nos. 5480.2 (Dec. 1982), 5483.1 as superseded by 5483.1A (June 22,
1983), and 6430.1 (Dec. 12, 1983) (DOE General Design Criteria Man
ual); Colo. Rev. Stat. §25–5–501 et seq. (1982) (Hazardous Substances),
25–7–101 et seq. (1982 and Supp. 1988) (Air Quality Control Program),
25–7–501 et seq. (Asbestos Control), 25–15–101 (Hazardous Waste
Management Act, 25–8–201 (1982) (Water Quality Control Act), 25–11–
101 (1982 and Supp. 1988) (Radiation Control), 29–22–101 (Hazardous
Substance Incidents), 25–5–503 (1982), 25–8–506, 25–8–608, 25–15–
308 through 25–15–310, and 29–22–108; the Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970, 29 U. S. C. §651 et seq.; the Atomic Energy Act of
1954, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §2011 et seq.; the Energy Reorganization
Act of 1974, 42 U. S. C. §5801 et seq.; the Water Pollution Prevention
and Control Act, 33 U. S. C. §1251 et seq.; the Clean Air Act, 42 U. S. C.
§7401 et seq.; the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U. S. C. §300f et seq.; and
regulations promulgated under these statutes.
6 ROCKWELL INT’L CORP. v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
reviewed the design for the pondcrete system and had
foreseen that the piping mechanism would not properly
remove the sludge, which in turn would lead to an inade
quate mixture of sludge and cement.
In December 1992, Rockwell moved to dismiss Stone’s
action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, arguing that
the action was based on publicly disclosed allegations and
that Stone was not an original source. The District Court
denied the motion because, in its view, “Stone had direct
and independent knowledge that Rockwell’s compensation
was linked to its compliance with environmental, health
and safety regulations and that it allegedly concealed its
deficient performance so that it would continue to receive
payments.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 61a.
The Government initially declined to intervene in
Stone’s action, but later reversed course, and in November
1996, the District Court granted the Government’s inter
vention. Several weeks later, at the suggestion of the
District Court, the Government and Stone filed a joint
amended complaint. As relevant here, the amended com
plaint alleged that Rockwell violated RCRA by storing
leaky pondcrete blocks, but did not allege that any defect
in the piping system (as predicted by Stone) caused insolid
pondcrete.4 Respondents clarified their allegations even
further in a statement of claims which became part of the
final pretrial order and which superseded their earlier
pleadings. This said that the pondcrete’s insolidity was
due to “an incorrect cement/sludge ratio used in pondcrete
operations, as well as due to inadequate process controls
and inadequate inspection procedures.” App. 470. It
continued:
——————
4 In addition to the pondcrete allegations, respondents charged Rock-
well with concealing problems with “saltcrete” (a mixture of cement and
salt from liquid waste treatment processes) and “spray irrigation” (a
method of disposing of waste water generated by the sewage treatment
plant at Rocky Flats).
Cite as: 549 U. S. ____ (2007) 7
Opinion of the Court
“During the winter of 1986, Rockwell replaced its then
pondcrete foreman, Norman Fryback, with Ron Teel.
Teel increased pondcrete production rates in part by,
among other things, reducing the amount of cement
added to the blocks. Following the May 23, 1988 spill,
Rockwell acknowledged that this reduced cement-to
sludge ratio was a major contributor to the existence
of insufficiently solid pondcrete blocks on the storage
pads.” Id., at 476–477.
The statement of claims again did not mention the piping
problem asserted by Stone years earlier.
Respondents’ False Claims Act claims went to trial in
1999. None of the witnesses Stone had identified during
discovery as having relevant knowledge testified at trial.
And none of the documents Stone provided to the Gov
ernment with his confidential disclosure statement was
introduced in evidence at trial. Nor did respondents allege
at trial that the defect in the piping system predicted by
Stone caused insolid pondcrete. To the contrary, during
closing arguments both Stone’s counsel and the Govern
ment’s counsel repeatedly explained to the jury that the
pondcrete failed because Rockwell’s new foreman used an
insufficient cement-to-sludge ratio in an effort to increase
pondcrete production.
The verdict form divided the False Claims Act count into
several different claims corresponding to different award-
fee periods. The jury found in favor of respondents for the
three periods covering the pondcrete allegations (April 1,
1987, to September 30, 1988), and found for Rockwell as to
the remaining periods. The jury awarded damages of
$1,390,775.80, which the District Court trebled pursuant
to 31 U. S. C. §3729(a).
Rockwell filed a postverdict motion to dismiss Stone’s
claims under §3730(e)(4), arguing that the claims were
based on publicly disclosed allegations and that Stone was
8 ROCKWELL INT’L CORP. v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
not an original source. In response, Stone acknowledged
that his successful claims were based on publicly disclosed
allegations, but asserted original-source status. The
District Court agreed with Stone. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed in relevant
part, but remanded the case for the District Court to
determine whether Stone had disclosed his information to
the Government before filing his qui tam action, as
§3730(e)(4)(B) required. On remand, the District Court
found that Stone had produced the 1982 engineering order
to the Government, but that the order was insufficient to
communicate Stone’s allegations. The District Court also
found that Stone had not carried his burden of proving
that he orally informed the FBI about his allegations
before filing suit. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit disagreed
with the District Court’s conclusion and held (over the
dissent of Judge Briscoe) that the 1982 engineering order
sufficed to carry Stone’s burden of persuasion. 92 Fed.
Appx. 708. We granted certiorari, 548 U. S. ____ (2006), to
decide whether Stone was an original source.
II
Section 3730(e)(4)(A) provides that
“[n]o court shall have jurisdiction over an action under
this section based upon the public disclosure of allega
tions or transactions in a criminal, civil, or adminis
trative hearing, in a congressional, administrative, or
Government Accounting Office report, hearing, audit,
or investigation, or from the news media, unless the
action is brought by the Attorney General or the per
son bringing the action is an original source of the in
formation.” (Footnote omitted.)
As discussed above, §3730(e)(4)(B) defines “original
source” as “an individual who [1] has direct and independ
ent knowledge of the information on which the allegations
Cite as: 549 U. S. ____ (2007) 9
Opinion of the Court
are based and [2] has voluntarily provided the information
to the Government before filing an action under this sec
tion which is based on the information.” As this case
comes to the Court, it is conceded that the claims on which
Stone prevailed were based upon publicly disclosed allega
tions within the meaning of §3730(e)(4)(A). The question
is whether Stone qualified under the original-source ex
ception to the public-disclosure bar.
We begin with the possibility that little analysis is
required in this case, for Stone asserts that Rockwell
conceded his original-source status. Rockwell responds
that it conceded no such thing and that, even had it done
so, the concession would have been irrelevant because
§3730(e)(4) is jurisdictional. We agree with the latter
proposition. It is true enough that the word “jurisdiction”
does not in every context connote subject-matter jurisdic
tion. Noting that “jurisdiction” is “ ‘a word of many, too
many, meanings,’ ” we concluded in Steel Co. v. Citizens for
Better Environment, 523 U. S. 83 (1998), that establishing
the elements of an offense was not made a jurisdictional
matter merely because the statute creating the cause of
action was phrased as providing for “jurisdiction” over
such suits. Id., at 90 (quoting United States v. Vanness, 85
F. 3d 661, 663, n. 2 (CADC 1996)). Here, however, the
issue is not whether casting the creation of a cause of
action in jurisdictional terms somehow limits the general
grant of jurisdiction under which that cause of action
would normally be brought, but rather whether a clear
and explicit withdrawal of jurisdiction withdraws jurisdic
tion. It undoubtedly does so. Just last Term we stated
that, “[i]f the Legislature clearly states that a threshold
limitation on a statute’s scope shall count as jurisdictional,
the courts and litigants will be duly instructed and will
not be left to wrestle with the issue.” Arbaugh v. Y & H
Corp., 546 U. S. 500, 515–516 (2006) (footnote omitted).
Here the jurisdictional nature of the original-source re
10 ROCKWELL INT’L CORP. v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
quirement is clear ex visceribus verborum. Indeed, we
have already stated that §3730(e)(4) speaks to “the power
of a particular court” as well as “the substantive rights of
the parties.” Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel.
Schumer, 520 U. S. 939, 951 (1997).
Stone’s contrary position rests entirely on dicta from a
single Court of Appeals decision, see United States ex rel.
Fallon v. Accudyne Corp., 97 F. 3d 937, 940–941 (CA7
1996). Accudyne thought it significant that jurisdiction
over False Claims Act cases is conferred by 28 U. S. C.
§§1331 and 1345 (the federal-question and United-States
as-plaintiff provisions of the Judicial Code) and 31
U. S. C. §3732(a) (the provision of the False Claims Act
establishing federal-court venue and conferring federal-
court jurisdiction over related state-law claims), rather
than §3730, which is the “section” referenced in
§3730(e)(4). To eliminate jurisdiction, the court believed,
it is those jurisdiction-conferring sections that would have
to be referenced. We know of nothing in logic or authority
to support this. The jurisdiction-removing provision here
does not say “no court shall have jurisdiction under this
section,” but rather “no court shall have jurisdiction over
an action under this section.” That is surely the most
natural way to achieve the desired result of eliminating
jurisdiction over a category of False Claims Act actions—
rather than listing all the conceivable provisions of the
United States Code whose conferral of jurisdiction is being
eliminated. (In addition to the provisions cited by the
Accudyne court, one might also have to mention the diver
sity-jurisdiction provision, 28 U. S. C. §1332, and the
supplemental-jurisdiction provision, §1367.) Accudyne
next observed that the public-disclosure bar limits only
who may speak for the United States on a subject and who
if anyone gets a financial reward, not the “categories of
disputes that may be resolved (a real ‘jurisdictional’
limit).” 97 F. 3d, at 941. But this is a classic begging of
Cite as: 549 U. S. ____ (2007) 11
Opinion of the Court
the question, which is precisely whether there has been
removed from the courts’ jurisdiction that category of
disputes consisting of False Claims Act qui tam suits
based on publicly disclosed allegations as to which the
relator is not an original source of the information. Noth
ing prevents Congress from defining the “category” of
excluded suits in any manner it wishes. See, e.g., 28
U. S. C. §1500 (no jurisdiction over “any claim for or in
respect to which the plaintiff . . . has pending in any other
court any suit . . . against the United States”). Lastly,
Accudyne asserted that “the Supreme Court had held that
a similar reference to jurisdiction in the Norris-LaGuardia
Act, 29 U. S. C. §§101, 104, limits remedies rather than
subject-matter jurisdiction.” 97 F. 3d, at 941 (citing Bur
lington Northern R. Co. v. Maintenance of Way Employes,
481 U. S. 429, 444–446 (1987)). But the language of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act is in fact not similar. It provides
that “[n]o court of the United States shall have jurisdiction
to issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent
injunction in any case involving or growing out of any
labor dispute . . . .” 29 U. S. C. §104 (emphasis added). It
is facially a limitation upon the relief that can be accorded,
not a removal of jurisdiction over “any case involving or
growing out of a labor dispute.” Here, by contrast, the text
says “[n]o court shall have jurisdiction over an action
under this section.”
Whether the point was conceded or not, therefore, we
may, and indeed must, decide whether Stone met the
jurisdictional requirement of being an original source.
III
We turn to the first requirement of original-source
status, that the relator have “direct and independent
knowledge of the information on which the allegations are
based.” 31 U. S. C. §3730(e)(4)(B). Because we have not
previously addressed this provision, several preliminary
12 ROCKWELL INT’L CORP. v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
questions require our attention.
A
First, does the phrase “information on which the allega
tions are based” refer to the information on which the
relator’s allegations are based or the information on which
the publicly disclosed allegations that triggered the public-
disclosure bar are based? The parties agree it is the for
mer. See Brief for Petitioners 26, n. 13; Brief for United
States 24, and n. 8; Brief for Respondent Stone 15, 21.
But in view of our conclusion that §3730(e)(4) is jurisdic
tional, we must satisfy ourselves that the parties’ position
is correct.
Though the question is hardly free from doubt,5 we
agree that the “information” to which subparagraph (B)
speaks is the information upon which the relators’ allega
tions are based. To begin with, subparagraph (B) standing
on its own suggests that disposition. The relator must
have “direct and independent knowledge of the informa
tion on which the allegations are based,” and he must
“provid[e] the information to the Government before filing
an action under this section which is based on the infor
mation.” Surely the information one would expect a rela
tor to “provide to the Government before filing an action
. . . based on the information” is the information underly
ing the relator’s claims.
Subparagraph (A) complicates matters. As described
earlier, it bars actions based on the “public disclosure of
allegations or transactions” and provides an exception for
——————
5 The Courts of Appeals have divided over the question. See United
States ex rel. Laird v. Lockheed Martin Eng. & Science Servs. Co., 336
F. 3d 346, 353–355 (CA5 2003) (describing the Courts of Appeals’
divergent approaches). Only by demoting the actual text of §3730(e)(4)
to a footnote and then paraphrasing the statute in a way that assumes
his conclusion can JUSTICE STEVENS assert (without further analysis)
that the statute’s meaning is “plain.” See post, at 1, 2 (dissenting
opinion).
Cite as: 549 U. S. ____ (2007) 13
Opinion of the Court
cases brought by “an original source of the information.”
If the allegations referred to in subparagraph (B)’s phrase
requiring “direct and independent knowledge of the infor
mation on which the allegations are based,” are the same
“allegations” referred to in subparagraph (A), then origi
nal-source status would depend on knowledge of informa
tion underlying the publicly disclosed allegations. The
principal textual difficulty with that interpretation is that
subparagraph (A) does not speak simply of “allegations,”
but of “allegations or transactions.” Had Congress wanted
to link original-source status to information underlying
the public disclosure, it would surely have used the identi
cal phrase, “allegations or transactions”; there is no con
ceivable reason to require direct and independent knowl
edge of publicly disclosed allegations but not of publicly
disclosed transactions.
The sense of the matter offers strong additional support
for this interpretation. Section 3730(e)(4)(A) bars actions
based on publicly disclosed allegations whether or not the
information on which those allegations are based has been
made public. It is difficult to understand why Congress
would care whether a relator knows about the information
underlying a publicly disclosed allegation (e.g., what a
confidential source told a newspaper reporter about insolid
pondcrete) when the relator has direct and independent
knowledge of different information supporting the same
allegation (e.g., that a defective process would inevitably
lead to insolid pondcrete). Not only would that make little
sense, it would raise nettlesome procedural problems,
placing courts in the position of comparing the relator’s
information with the often unknowable information on
which the public disclosure was based. Where that latter
information has not been disclosed (by reason, for exam
ple, of a reporter’s desire to protect his source), the relator
would presumably be out of court. To bar a relator with
direct and independent knowledge of information underly
14 ROCKWELL INT’L CORP. v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
ing his allegations just because no one can know what
information underlies the similar allegations of some other
person simply makes no sense.
The contrary conclusion of some lower courts rests on
the following logic: The term “information” in subpara
graph (B) must be read in tandem with the term “informa
tion” in subparagraph (A), and the term “information” in
subparagraph (A) refers to the information on which the
publicly disclosed allegations are based. See, e.g., United
States ex rel. Laird v. Lockheed Martin Eng. & Science
Servs. Co., 336 F. 3d 346, 354 (CA5 2003). The major
premise of this reasoning seems true enough: “informa
tion” in (A) and (B) means the same thing. The minor
premise, however—that “information” in (A) refers to the
information underlying the publicly disclosed allegations
or transactions—is highly questionable. The complete
phrase at issue is “unless . . . the person bringing the
action is an original source of the information.” It seems
to us more likely (in light of the analysis set forth above)
that the information in question is the information under
lying the action referred to a few words earlier, to-wit, the
action “based upon the public disclosure of allegations or
transactions” referred to at the beginning of the provision.
On this interpretation, “information” in subparagraph (A)
and “information on which the allegations are based” in
subparagraph (B) are one and the same, viz., information
underlying the allegations of the relator’s action.
B
Having determined that the phrase “information on
which the allegations are based” refers to the relator’s
allegations and not the publicly disclosed allegations, we
confront more textual ambiguity: Which of the relator’s
allegations are the relevant ones? Stone’s allegations
changed during the course of the litigation, yet he asks
that we look only to his original complaint. Rockwell
Cite as: 549 U. S. ____ (2007) 15
Opinion of the Court
argues that Stone must satisfy the original-source excep
tion through all stages of the litigation.
In our view, the term “allegations” is not limited to the
allegations of the original complaint. It includes (at a
minimum) the allegations in the original complaint as
amended. The statute speaks not of the allegations in the
“original complaint” (or even the allegations in the “com
plaint”), but of the relator’s “allegations” simpliciter.
Absent some limitation of §3730(e)(4)’s requirement to the
relator’s initial complaint, we will not infer one. Such a
limitation would leave the relator free to plead a trivial
theory of fraud for which he had some direct and inde
pendent knowledge and later amend the complaint to
include theories copied from the public domain or from
materials in the Government’s possession. Even the
Government concedes that new allegations regarding a
fundamentally different fraudulent scheme require re
evaluation of the court’s jurisdiction. See Brief for United
States 40; Tr. of Oral Arg. 40.
The rule that subject-matter jurisdiction “depends on
the state of things at the time of the action brought,”
Mollan v. Torrance, 9 Wheat. 537, 539 (1824), does not
suggest a different interpretation. The state of things and
the originally alleged state of things are not synonymous;
demonstration that the original allegations were false will
defeat jurisdiction. Anderson v. Watt, 138 U. S. 694, 701
(1891); Morris v. Gilmer, 129 U. S. 315, 326 (1889). So
also will the withdrawal of those allegations, unless they
are replaced by others that establish jurisdiction. Thus,
when a plaintiff files a complaint in federal court and then
voluntarily amends the complaint, courts look to the
amended complaint to determine jurisdiction. See Well-
ness Community-Nat. v. Wellness House, 70 F. 3d 46, 49
(CA7 1995); Boelens v. Redman Homes, Inc., 759 F. 2d 504,
16 ROCKWELL INT’L CORP. v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
508 (CA5 1984).6
Here, we have not only an amended complaint, but a
final pretrial order that superseded all prior pleadings and
“controll[ed] the subsequent course of the action,” Fed.
Rule Civ. Proc. 16(e). See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U. S. 189,
190, n. 1 (1974) (where a claim was not included in the
complaint, but was included in the pretrial order, “it is
irrelevant that the pleadings were never formally
amended” (citing Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 15(b), 16)); Wilson
v. Muckala, 303 F. 3d 1207, 1215 (CA10 2002) (“[C]laims,
issues, defenses, or theories of damages not included in
the pretrial order are waived even if they appeared in the
complaint and, conversely, the inclusion of a claim in the
pretrial order is deemed to amend any previous pleadings
which did not include that claim”); Syrie v. Knoll Int’l, 748
F. 2d 304, 308 (CA5 1984) (“[I]ncorporation of a [new]
claim into the pre-trial order . . . amends the previous
pleadings to state [the new] claim”). In these circum
stances, we look to the allegations as amended—here, the
statement of claims in the final pretrial order—to deter
mine original-source status.
The Government objects that this approach risks driving
a wedge between the Government and relators. It worries
that future relators might decline to “acquiesc[e]” in the
Government’s tactical decision to narrow the claims in a
case if that would eliminate jurisdiction with respect to
the relator. Brief for United States 44. Even if this policy
concern were valid, it would not induce us to determine
——————
6 Itis true that, when a defendant removes a case to federal court
based on the presence of a federal claim, an amendment eliminating
the original basis for federal jurisdiction generally does not defeat
jurisdiction. See Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U. S. 343, 346,
357 (1988); St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U. S.
283, 293 (1938). But removal cases raise forum-manipulation concerns
that simply do not exist when it is the plaintiff who chooses a federal
forum and then pleads away jurisdiction through amendment.
Cite as: 549 U. S. ____ (2007) 17
Opinion of the Court
jurisdiction on the basis of whether the relator is an origi
nal source of information underlying allegations that he
no longer makes.
IV
Judged according to the principles set forth above,
Stone’s knowledge falls short. The only false claims ulti
mately found by the jury (and hence the only ones to
which our jurisdictional inquiry is pertinent to the out
come) involved false statements with respect to environ
mental, safety, and health compliance over a one-and-a
half-year period between April 1, 1987, and September 30,
1988. As described by Stone and the Government in the
final pretrial order, the only pertinent problem with re
spect to this period of time for which Stone claimed to
have direct and independent knowledge was insolid pond
crete. Because Stone was no longer employed by Rockwell
at the time, he did not know that the pondcrete was in-
solid; he did not know that pondcrete storage was even
subject to RCRA; he did not know that Rockwell would fail
to remedy the defect; he did not know that the insolid
pondcrete leaked while being stored onsite; and, of course,
he did not know that Rockwell made false statements to
the Government regarding pondcrete storage.
Stone’s prediction that the pondcrete would be insolid
because of a flaw in the piping system does not qualify as
“direct and independent knowledge” of the pondcrete
defect. Of course a qui tam relator’s misunderstanding of
why a concealed defect occurred would normally be imma
terial as long as he knew the defect actually existed. But
here Stone did not know that the pondcrete failed; he
predicted it. Even if a prediction can qualify as direct and
independent knowledge in some cases (a point we need not
address), it assuredly does not do so when its premise of
cause and effect is wrong. Stone’s prediction was a failed
prediction, disproved by Stone’s own allegations. As Stone
18 ROCKWELL INT’L CORP. v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
acknowledged, Rockwell was able to produce “concrete
hard” pondcrete using the machinery Stone said was
defective. According to respondents’ allegations in the
final pretrial order, the insolidity problem was caused by a
new foreman’s reduction of the cement-to-sludge ratio in
the winter of 1986, long after Stone had left Rocky Flats.
Stone counters that his original-source status with
respect to his spray-irrigation claim (which related to a
time period different from that for his pondcrete claim,
App. 492) provided jurisdiction with respect to all of his
claims. We disagree. Section 3730(e)(4) does not permit
jurisdiction in gross just because a relator is an original
source with respect to some claim. We, along with every
court to have addressed the question, conclude that
§3730(e)(4) does not permit such claim smuggling. See
United States ex rel. Merena v. SmithKline Beecham Corp.,
205 F. 3d 97, 102 (CA3 2000); Hays v. Hoffman, 325 F. 3d
982, 990 (CA8 2003); Wang ex rel. United States v. FMC
Corp., 975 F. 2d 1412, 1415–1416, 1420 (CA9 1992). As
then-Judge Alito explained, “[t]he plaintiff’s decision to
join all of his or her claims in a single lawsuit should not
rescue claims that would have been doomed by section
(e)(4) if they had been asserted in a separate action. And
likewise, this joinder should not result in the dismissal of
claims that would have otherwise survived.” SmithKline
Beecham, supra, at 102.
Because Stone did not have direct and independent
knowledge of the information upon which his allegations
were based, we need not decide whether Stone met the
second requirement of original-source status, that he have
voluntarily provided the information to the Government
before filing his action.
V
Respondents contend that even if Stone failed the origi
nal-source test as to his pondcrete allegations, the Gov
Cite as: 549 U. S. ____ (2007) 19
Opinion of the Court
ernment’s intervention in his case provided an independ
ent basis of jurisdiction. Section 3730(e)(4)(A) permits
jurisdiction over an action based on publicly disclosed
allegations or transactions if the action is “brought by the
Attorney General.” Respondents say that any inquiry into
Stone’s original-source status with respect to amendments
to the complaint was unnecessary because the Govern
ment had intervened, making this an “action brought by
the Attorney General.”7 Even assuming that Stone was an
original source of allegations in his initial complaint, we
reject respondents’ “intervention” argument.
The False Claims Act contemplates two types of actions.
First, under §3730(a), “[i]f the Attorney General finds that
a person has violated or is violating section 3729, the
Attorney General may bring a civil action under this
section against the person.” Second, under §3730(b), “[a]
person may bring an action for a violation of section 3729
for the person and for the United States Government.”
When a private person brings an action under §3730(b),
the Government may elect to “proceed with the action,”
§3730(b)(4)(A), or it may “declin[e] to take over the action,
in which case the person bringing the action shall have the
right to conduct the action,” §3730(b)(4)(B). The statute
thus draws a sharp distinction between actions brought by
the Attorney General under §3730(a) and actions brought
by a private person under §3730(b). An action brought by
a private person does not become one brought by the
Government just because the Government intervenes and
elects to “proceed with the action.” Section 3730 elsewhere
refers to the Government’s “proceed[ing] with an action
brought by a person under subsection (b)”—which makes
crystal clear the distinction between actions brought by
——————
7 The Government includes a significant caveat: In its view, interven
tion does not cure any pre-existing defects in Stone’s initial complaint;
it only cures defects resulting from amendments to the pleadings.
20 ROCKWELL INT’L CORP. v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
the Government and actions brought by a relator where
the Government intervenes but does not oust the relator.
Does this conclusion cast into doubt the courts’ jurisdic
tion with respect to the Government as well? After all,
§3730(e)(4)(A) bars jurisdiction over any action brought
under §3730, as this one was, unless the action is brought
(1) by the Attorney General or (2) by an original source;
and we have concluded that this is brought by neither.
Not even petitioners have suggested the bizarre result
that the Government’s judgment must be set aside. It is
readily enough avoided, as common sense suggests it must
be, by holding that an action originally brought by a pri
vate person, which the Attorney General has joined, be
comes an action brought by the Attorney General once the
private person has been determined to lack the jurisdic
tional prerequisites for suit. The outcome would be simi
lar to that frequently produced in diversity-jurisdiction
cases, where the “courts of appeals . . . have the authority
to cure a jurisdictional defect by dismissing a dispensable
nondiverse party.” Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Group,
L. P., 541 U. S. 567, 573 (2004) (citing Newman-Green,
Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U. S. 826, 837 (1989)); see
United States Steel Corp. v. EPA, 614 F. 2d 843, 845 (CA3
1979) (“[T]here are instances when an intervenor’s claim
does not rise and fall with the claim of the original party”);
7C C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and
Procedure §1920, p. 491 (2d ed. 1986) (“[A]n intervenor
can proceed to decision after a dismissal of the original
action . . . if there are independent grounds for jurisdiction
of the intervenor’s claim”). What is cured here, by the
jurisdictional ruling regarding Stone’s claim, is the char
acterization of the action as one brought by an original
source. The elimination of Stone leaves in place an action
pursued only by the Attorney General, that can reasonably
be regarded as being “brought” by him for purposes of
§3730(e)(4)(A).
Cite as: 549 U. S. ____ (2007) 21
Opinion of the Court
* * *
We hold that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to
enter judgment in favor of Stone. We reverse the Tenth
Circuit’s judgment to the contrary.
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE BREYER took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
Cite as: 549 U. S. ____ (2007) 1
STEVENS, J., dissenting
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 05–1272
_________________
ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL CORP., ET AL.,
PETITIONERS v. UNITED STATES ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
[March 27, 2007]
JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE GINSBURG joins,
dissenting.
Any private citizen may bring an action to enforce the
False Claims Act, 31 U. S. C. §§3729–3733, unless the
information on which his allegations are based is already
in the public domain. Even if the information is publicly
available, however, the citizen may still sue if he was an
“original source” of that information. §3730(e)(4)(A) (“No
court shall have jurisdiction over an action under this
section based upon the public disclosure of allegations or
transactions . . . unless the action is brought by the Attor
ney General or the person bringing the action is an origi
nal source of the information”). Because I believe the
Court has misinterpreted these provisions to require that
an “original source” in a qui tam action have knowledge of
the actual facts underlying the allegations on which he
may ultimately prevail, I respectfully dissent.
In my view, a plain reading of the statute’s provisions—
specifically, §§3730(e)(4)(A) and (B)—makes clear that it is
the information underlying the publicly disclosed allega
tions, not the information underlying the allegations in
the relator’s complaint (original or amended), of which the
relator must be an original source.1 Moreover, the stat
——————
1 Section 3730(e)(4)(A) states that
2 ROCKWELL INT’L CORP. v. UNITED STATES
STEVENS, J., dissenting
ute’s use of the article “an,” rather than “the,” in describ
ing the original source indicates that the relator need not
be the sole source of the information.
By contrast, the majority’s approach suggests that the
relator must have knowledge of actual facts supporting
the theory ultimately proven at trial—in other words,
knowledge of the information underlying the prevailing
claims. See ante, at 17 (limiting the relevant jurisdictional
inquiry to those “false claims ultimately found by the
jury”). I disagree. Such a view is not supported by the
statute, which requires only that the relator have “direct
and independent knowledge” of the information on which
the publicly disclosed allegations are based and that the
relator provide such information to the Government in a
timely manner. As I read the statute, the jurisdictional
inquiry focuses on the facts in the public domain at the
time the action is commenced. If the process of discovery
leads to amended theories of recovery, amendments to the
original complaint would not affect jurisdiction that was
proper at the time of the original filing.2
——————
“No court shall have jurisdiction over an action under this section based
upon the public disclosure of allegations or transactions in a criminal,
civil, or administrative hearing, in a congressional, administrative, or
Government Accounting Office report, hearing, audit, or investigation,
or from the news media, unless the action is brought by the Attorney
General or the person bringing the action is an original source of the
information.” (Footnote omitted.)
Section 3730(e)(4)(B) then states that
“For purposes of this paragraph, ‘original source’ means an individual
who has direct and independent knowledge of the information on which
the allegations are based and has voluntarily provided the information
to the Government before filing an action under this section which is
based on the information.”
2 The majority’s approach requires courts to reevaluate jurisdiction
over a qui tam action brought by an original source every time the
complaint is amended. Such an approach, the Government has argued,
will interfere with its ability to tailor the claims advanced as it sees
appropriate. By contrast, under the approach I would adopt, the
Cite as: 549 U. S. ____ (2007) 3
STEVENS, J., dissenting
In this case, as the Court points out, the fact that Rock-
well was storing thousands of insolid pondcrete blocks at
the Rocky Flats facility had been publicly disclosed by the
news media before Stone filed this lawsuit. Ante, at 3, 4.
In my view, the record establishes that Stone was an
original source of the allegations publicly disclosed by the
media in June 1989, even though he thought that the
deterioration of the pondcrete blocks would be caused by
poor engineering rather than a poor formula for the mix
ture. The search warrant that was executed on June 6,
1989, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) affi
davit that was released to the news media on June 9,
1989, were both based, in part, on interviews with Stone
and on information Stone had provided to the Govern
ment, including the 1982 Engineering Order.
With respect to earlier media coverage of the pondcrete
leakage discovery in May 1988, however, Stone’s status as
an original source is less obvious. Stone first went to the
FBI with allegations of Rockwell’s environmental viola
tions in March 1986. App. 180. He subsequently met with
several FBI agents over the course of several years. Id., at
180–182. During those meetings he provided the FBI with
thousands of pages of documents, including the Engineer
ing Order, in which he predicted that the pondcrete sys
tem design would not work. On the basis of that record, it
seems likely that Stone (1) had “direct and independent
knowledge of the information on which the [publicly dis
closed] allegations [we]re based” and (2) voluntarily pro
vided such information to the Government before filing
suit. It is, however, his burden to establish that he did so.
Because there has been no finding as to whether Stone
——————
jurisdictional inquiry relates only to whether the relator was an origi
nal source of the information underlying the public disclosures, which
can easily be determined when an action is filed and need not be
revisited during later stages of the litigation.
4 ROCKWELL INT’L CORP. v. UNITED STATES
STEVENS, J., dissenting
was an original source as to those public disclosures, I
would vacate and remand for a determination whether
Stone was in fact an original source of the allegations
publicly disclosed by the media in 1988 and 1989.