Wallace v. Kato

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2006 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

WALLACE v. KATO ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 05–1240. Argued November 6, 2006—Decided February 21, 2007

In January 1994, Chicago police arrested petitioner, a minor, for mur
der. He was tried and convicted, but the charges were ultimately
dropped in April 2002. In April 2003, he filed this suit under 42
U. S. C. §1983 against the city and several of its officers, seeking
damages for, inter alia, his unlawful arrest in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. The District Court granted respondents summary
judgment, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed, ruling that the §1983
suit was time barred because petitioner’s cause of action accrued at
the time of his arrest, not when his conviction was later set aside.
Held: The statute of limitations upon a §1983 claim seeking damages
for a false arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment, where the
arrest is followed by criminal proceedings, begins to run at the time
the claimant becomes detained pursuant to legal process. Pp. 2–12.
(a) The statute of limitations in a §1983 suit is that provided by the
State for personal-injury torts, e.g., Owens v. Okure, 488 U. S. 235,
249–250; here, two years under Illinois law. For false imprisonment
and its subspecies false arrest, “[t]he . . . cause[s] of action provid[ing]
the closest analogy to claims of the type considered here,” Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U. S. 477, 484, the statute of limitations begins to
run when the alleged false imprisonment ends, see, e.g., 4 Restate
ment (Second) of Torts §899, Comment c, that is, in the present con
text, when the victim becomes held pursuant to legal process, see,
e.g., Heck, supra, at 484. Thus, petitioner’s false imprisonment did
not end, as he contends, when he was released from custody after the
State dropped the charges against him, but rather when he appeared
before the examining magistrate and was bound over for trial. Since
2 WALLACE v. KATO

Syllabus

more than two years elapsed between that date and the filing of this
suit—even leaving out of the count the period before he reached his
majority—the action was time barred. Pp. 2–7.
(b) Petitioner’s contention that Heck compels the conclusion that
his suit could not accrue until the State dropped its charges against
him is rejected. The Heck Court held that “in order to recover dam
ages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for
other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a
conviction or sentence invalid, a §1983 plaintiff must prove that the
conviction or sentence has been [set aside]. A claim for damages
bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not
been so invalidated is not cognizable under §1983.” 512 U. S., at
486–487. Even assuming that the Heck deferred-accrual rule would
be applied to the date petitioner was first held pursuant to legal
process, there was in existence at that time no criminal conviction
that the cause of action would impugn. What petitioner seeks is the
adoption of a principle going well beyond Heck: that an action which
would impugn an anticipated future conviction cannot be brought un
til that conviction occurs and is set aside. The impracticality of such
a speculative rule is obvious.
The fact that §1983 actions sometimes accrue before the setting
aside of—indeed, even before the existence of—the related criminal
conviction raises the question whether, assuming the Heck bar takes
effect when the later conviction is obtained, the statute of limitations
on the once valid cause of action is tolled as long as the Heck bar sub
sists. However, this Court generally refers to state-law tolling rules,
e.g., Hardin v. Straub, 490 U. S. 536, 538–539, and is unaware of Il
linois cases providing tolling in even remotely comparable circum
stances. Moreover, a federal tolling rule to this effect would create a
jurisprudential limbo in which it would not be known whether tolling
is appropriate by reason of the Heck bar until it is established that
the newly entered conviction would be impugned by the not-yet-filed,
and thus utterly indeterminate, §1983 claim. Pp. 7–12.
440 F. 3d 421, affirmed.

SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
C. J., and KENNEDY, THOMAS, and ALITO, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed
an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which SOUTER, J., joined.
BREYER, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which GINSBURG, J., joined.
 Cite as: 549 U. S. ____ (2007) 1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________

No. 05–1240
_________________

ANDRE WALLACE, PETITIONER v. KRISTEN

KATO ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

[February 21, 2007]

JUSTICE SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner filed suit under Rev. Stat. §1979, 42 U. S. C.
§1983, seeking damages for an arrest that violated the
Fourth Amendment. We decide whether his suit is timely.
I
On January 17, 1994, John Handy was shot to death in
the city of Chicago. Sometime around 8 p.m. two days
later, Chicago police officers located petitioner, then 15
years of age, and transported him to a police station for
questioning. After interrogations that lasted into the
early morning hours the next day, petitioner agreed to
confess to Handy’s murder. An assistant state’s attorney
prepared a statement to this effect, and petitioner signed
it, at the same time waiving his Miranda rights.
Prior to trial in the Circuit Court of Cook County, peti
tioner unsuccessfully attempted to suppress his station
house statements as the product of an unlawful arrest. He
was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to 26
years in prison. On direct appeal, the Appellate Court of
Illinois held that officers had arrested petitioner without
probable cause, in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
2 WALLACE v. KATO

Opinion of the Court

People v. Wallace, 299 Ill. App. 3d 9, 17–18, 701 N. E. 2d
87, 94 (1998). According to that court (whose determina
tion we are not reviewing here), even assuming petitioner
willingly accompanied police to the station, his presence
there “escalated to an involuntary seizure prior to his
formal arrest.” Id., at 18, 701 N. E. 2d, at 94. After an
other round of appeals, the Appellate Court concluded on
August 31, 2001, that the effect of petitioner’s illegal
arrest had not been sufficiently attenuated to render his
statements admissible, see Brown v. Illinois, 422 U. S. 590
(1975), and remanded for a new trial. Judgt. order re
ported sub nom. People v. Wallace, 324 Ill. App. 3d 1139,
805 N. E. 2d 756 (2001). On April 10, 2002, prosecutors
dropped the charges against petitioner.
On April 2, 2003, petitioner filed this §1983 suit against
the city of Chicago and several Chicago police officers,
seeking damages arising from, inter alia, his unlawful
arrest.1 The District Court granted summary judgment to
respondents and the Court of Appeals affirmed. According
to the Seventh Circuit, petitioner’s §1983 suit was time
barred because his cause of action accrued at the time of
his arrest, and not when his conviction was later set aside.
Wallace v. Chicago, 440 F. 3d 421, 427 (2006). We granted
certiorari, 547 U. S. ___ (2006).
II
Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action, but in
several respects relevant here federal law looks to the law
of the State in which the cause of action arose. This is so
for the length of the statute of limitations: It is that which
the State provides for personal-injury torts. Owens v.
Okure, 488 U. S. 235, 249–250 (1989); Wilson v. Garcia,
——————
1 All
of petitioner’s other state and federal claims were resolved ad
versely to him and are not before us. We expressly limited our grant of
certiorari to the Fourth Amendment false-arrest claim. See 547 U. S.
___ (2006). The city of Chicago is no longer a party to this suit.
 Cite as: 549 U. S. ____ (2007) 3

Opinion of the Court

471 U. S. 261, 279–280 (1985). The parties agree that
under Illinois law, this period is two years. Ill. Comp.
Stat., ch. 735, §5/13–202 (West 2003). Thus, if the statute
on petitioner’s cause of action began to run at the time of
his unlawful arrest, or even at the time he was ordered
held by a magistrate, his §1983 suit was plainly dilatory,
even according him tolling for the two-plus years of his
minority, see §5/13–211. But if, as the dissenting judge
argued below, the commencement date for running of the
statute is governed by this Court’s decision in Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U. S. 477 (1994), that date may be the
date on which petitioner’s conviction was vacated, in
which case the §1983 suit would have been timely filed.
While we have never stated so expressly, the accrual
date of a §1983 cause of action is a question of federal law
that is not resolved by reference to state law. The parties
agree, the Seventh Circuit in this case so held, see 440
F. 3d, at 424, and we are aware of no federal court of
appeals holding to the contrary. Aspects of §1983 which
are not governed by reference to state law are governed by
federal rules conforming in general to common-law tort
principles. See Heck, supra, at 483; Carey v. Piphus, 435
U. S. 247, 257–258 (1978). Under those principles, it is
“the standard rule that [accrual occurs] when the plaintiff
has ‘a complete and present cause of action.’ ” Bay Area
Laundry and Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar
Corp. of Cal., 522 U. S. 192, 201 (1997) (quoting Rawlings
v. Ray, 312 U. S. 96, 98 (1941)), that is, when “the plaintiff
can file suit and obtain relief,” Bay Area Laundry, supra,
at 201. There can be no dispute that petitioner could have
filed suit as soon as the allegedly wrongful arrest oc
curred, subjecting him to the harm of involuntary deten
tion, so the statute of limitations would normally com
mence to run from that date.
There is, however, a refinement to be considered, arising
from the common law’s distinctive treatment of the torts of
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Opinion of the Court

false arrest and false imprisonment, “[t]he . . . cause[s] of
action [that] provid[e] the closest analogy to claims of the
type considered here,” Heck, supra, at 484. See 1 D.
Dobbs, Law of Torts §47, p. 88 (2001). False arrest and
false imprisonment overlap; the former is a species of the
latter. “Every confinement of the person is an imprison
ment, whether it be in a common prison or in a private
house, or in the stocks, or even by forcibly detaining one in
the public streets; and when a man is lawfully in a house,
it is imprisonment to prevent him from leaving the room
in which he is.” M. Newell, Law of Malicious Prosecution,
False Imprisonment, and Abuse of Legal Process §2, p. 57
(1892) (footnotes omitted). See also 7 S. Speiser, C.
Krause, & A. Gans, American Law of Torts §27:2, pp. 940–
942 (1990). We shall thus refer to the two torts together
as false imprisonment. That tort provides the proper
analogy to the cause of action asserted against the present
respondents for the following reason: The sort of unlawful
detention remediable by the tort of false imprisonment is
detention without legal process, see, e.g., W. Keeton, D.
Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Law
of Torts §11, p. 54, §119, pp. 885–886 (5th ed. 1984); 7
Speiser, supra, §27:2, at 943–944, and the allegations
before us arise from respondents’ detention of petitioner
without legal process in January 1994. They did not have
a warrant for his arrest.
The running of the statute of limitations on false im
prisonment is subject to a distinctive rule—dictated, per
haps, by the reality that the victim may not be able to sue
while he is still imprisoned: “Limitations begin to run
against an action for false imprisonment when the alleged
false imprisonment ends.” 2 H. Wood, Limitation of Ac
tions §187d(4), p. 878 (4th rev. ed. 1916); see also 4 Re
statement (Second) of Torts §899, Comment c (1977); A.
Underhill, Principles of Law of Torts 202 (1881). Thus, to
determine the beginning of the limitations period in this
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Opinion of the Court

case, we must determine when petitioner’s false impris
onment came to an end.
Reflective of the fact that false imprisonment consists of
detention without legal process, a false imprisonment ends
once the victim becomes held pursuant to such process—
when, for example, he is bound over by a magistrate or
arraigned on charges. Dobbs, supra, §39, at 74, n. 2;
Keeton, supra, §119, at 888; H. Stephen, Actions for Mali
cious Prosecution 120–123 (1888). Thereafter, unlawful
detention forms part of the damages for the “entirely
distinct” tort of malicious prosecution, which remedies
detention accompanied, not by absence of legal process,
but by wrongful institution of legal process.2 Keeton,
supra, §119, at 885–886; see 1 F. Harper, F. James, & O.
Gray, Law of Torts §3.9, p. 3:36 (3d ed. 1996); 7 Speiser,
supra, §27:2, at 943–945. “If there is a false arrest claim,
damages for that claim cover the time of detention up
until issuance of process or arraignment, but not more.
From that point on, any damages recoverable must be
based on a malicious prosecution claim and on the wrong
ful use of judicial process rather than detention itself.”
Keeton, supra, §119, at 888; see also Heck, supra, at 484; 8
Speiser, supra, §28:15, at 80. Thus, petitioner’s contention
——————
2 We have never explored the contours of a Fourth Amendment mali
cious-prosecution suit under §1983, see Albright v. Oliver, 510 U. S.
266, 270–271, 275 (1994) (plurality opinion), and we do not do so here.
See generally 1 M. Schwartz, Section 1983 Litigation §3.18[C], pp. 3–
605 to 3–629 (4th ed. 2004) (noting a range of approaches in the lower
courts). Assuming without deciding that such a claim is cognizable
under §1983, petitioner has not made one. Petitioner did not include
such a claim in his complaint. He in fact abandoned a state-law mali
cious-prosecution claim in the District Court, and stated, in his opposi
tion to respondents’ first motion for summary judgment, that “Plaintiff
does not seek to raise . . . a malicious prosecution claim under §1983,”
Record, Doc. 17, p. 3, n. 5. In this Court, he has told us that respon
dents are “mistaken in characterizing petitioner’s cause of action as
involving ‘unwarranted prosecution.’ ” Reply Brief 12.
6 WALLACE v. KATO

Opinion of the Court

that his false imprisonment ended upon his release from
custody, after the State dropped the charges against him,
must be rejected. It ended much earlier, when legal proc
ess was initiated against him, and the statute would have
begun to run from that date, but for its tolling by reason of
petitioner’s minority.3
Petitioner asserts that the date of his release from
custody must be the relevant date in the circumstances of
the present suit, since he is seeking damages up to that
time. The theory of his complaint is that the initial
Fourth Amendment violation set the wheels in motion for
his subsequent conviction and detention: The unlawful
arrest led to the coerced confession, which was introduced
at his trial, producing his conviction and incarceration. As
we have just explained, at common law damages for de
tention after issuance of process or arraignment would be
attributable to a tort other than the unlawful arrest al
leged in petitioner’s complaint—and probably a tort
chargeable to defendants other than the respondents here.
Even assuming, however, that all damages for detention
pursuant to legal process could be regarded as consequen
tial damages attributable to the unlawful arrest, that
would not alter the commencement date for the statute of
limitations. “Under the traditional rule of accrual . . . the
tort cause of action accrues, and the statute of limitations
commences to run, when the wrongful act or omission
results in damages. The cause of action accrues even
though the full extent of the injury is not then known or
——————
3 This
is not to say, of course, that petitioner could not have filed suit
immediately upon his false arrest. While the statute of limitations did
not begin to run until petitioner became detained pursuant to legal
process, he was injured and suffered damages at the moment of his
arrest, and was entitled to bring suit at that time. See Adler v. Beverly
Hills Hospital, 594 S. W. 2d 153, 156 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980) (“We may
concede that a person falsely imprisoned has the right to sue on the
first day for his detention”).
 Cite as: 549 U. S. ____ (2007) 7

Opinion of the Court

predictable.” 1 C. Corman, Limitation of Actions §7.4.1,
pp. 526–527 (1991) (footnotes omitted); see also 54 C. J. S.,
Limitations of Actions §112, p. 150 (2005). Were it other
wise, the statute would begin to run only after a plaintiff
became satisfied that he had been harmed enough, placing
the supposed statute of repose in the sole hands of the
party seeking relief.
We conclude that the statute of limitations on peti
tioner’s §1983 claim commenced to run when he appeared
before the examining magistrate and was bound over for
trial. Since more than two years elapsed between that
date and the filing of this suit—even leaving out of the
count the period before he reached his majority—the
action was time barred.
III
This would end the matter, were it not for petitioner’s
contention that Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U. S., at 477,
compels the conclusion that his suit could not accrue until
the State dropped its charges against him. In Heck, a
state prisoner filed suit under §1983 raising claims which,
if true, would have established the invalidity of his out
standing conviction. We analogized his suit to one for
malicious prosecution, an element of which is the favor
able termination of criminal proceedings. Id., at 484. We
said:
“[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly unconsti
tutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm
caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a
conviction or sentence invalid, a §1983 plaintiff must
prove that the conviction or sentence has been re
versed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order,
declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to
make such determination, or called into question by a
federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28
U. S. C. §2254. A claim for damages bearing that re
8 WALLACE v. KATO

Opinion of the Court

lationship to a conviction or sentence that has not
been so invalidated is not cognizable under §1983.”
Id., at 486–487 (footnote omitted).
We rested this conclusion upon “the hoary principle that
civil tort actions are not appropriate vehicles for challeng
ing the validity of outstanding criminal judgments.” Id.,
at 486. “ ‘Congress,’ ” we said, “ ‘has determined that ha
beas corpus is the appropriate remedy for state prisoners
attacking the validity of the fact or length of their con
finement, and that specific determination must override
the general terms of §1983.’ ” Id., at 482 (quoting Preiser
v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 475, 490 (1973)).
As the above excerpts show, the Heck rule for deferred
accrual is called into play only when there exists “a convic
tion or sentence that has not been . . . invalidated,” that is
to say, an “outstanding criminal judgment.” It delays
what would otherwise be the accrual date of a tort action
until the setting aside of an extant conviction which suc
cess in that tort action would impugn. We assume that,
for purposes of the present tort action, the Heck principle
would be applied not to the date of accrual but to the date
on which the statute of limitations began to run, that is,
the date petitioner became held pursuant to legal process.
See supra, at 4–5. Even at that later time, there was in
existence no criminal conviction that the cause of action
would impugn; indeed, there may not even have been an
indictment.
What petitioner seeks, in other words, is the adoption of
a principle that goes well beyond Heck: that an action
which would impugn an anticipated future conviction
cannot be brought until that conviction occurs and is set
aside. The impracticality of such a rule should be obvious.
In an action for false arrest it would require the plaintiff
(and if he brings suit promptly, the court) to speculate
about whether a prosecution will be brought, whether it
 Cite as: 549 U. S. ____ (2007) 9

Opinion of the Court

will result in conviction, and whether the pending civil
action will impugn that verdict, see Heck, 512 U. S., at
487, n. 7—all this at a time when it can hardly be known
what evidence the prosecution has in its possession. And
what if the plaintiff (or the court) guesses wrong, and the
anticipated future conviction never occurs, because of
acquittal or dismissal? Does that event (instead of the
Heck-required setting aside of the extant conviction) trig
ger accrual of the cause of action? Or what if prosecution
never occurs—what will the trigger be then?
We are not disposed to embrace this bizarre extension of
Heck. If a plaintiff files a false arrest claim before he has
been convicted (or files any other claim related to rulings
that will likely be made in a pending or anticipated crimi
nal trial), it is within the power of the district court, and
in accord with common practice, to stay the civil action
until the criminal case or the likelihood of a criminal case
is ended. See id., at 487–488, n. 8 (noting that “abstention
may be an appropriate response to the parallel state-court
proceedings”); Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U. S.
706, 730 (1996). If the plaintiff is ultimately convicted,
and if the stayed civil suit would impugn that conviction,
Heck will require dismissal; otherwise, the civil action will
proceed, absent some other bar to suit. Edwards v. Bali
sok, 520 U. S. 641, 649 (1997); Heck, 512 U. S., at 487.
There is, however, one complication that we must ad
dress here. It arises from the fact that §1983 actions,
unlike the tort of malicious prosecution which Heck took
as its model, see id., at 484, sometimes accrue before the
setting aside of—indeed, even before the existence of—the
related criminal conviction. That of course is the case
here, and it raises the question whether, assuming that
the Heck bar takes effect when the later conviction is
obtained, the statute of limitations on the once valid cause
of action is tolled as long as the Heck bar subsists. In the
context of the present case: If petitioner’s conviction on
10 WALLACE v. KATO

Opinion of the Court

April 19, 1996, caused the statute of limitations on his
(possibly) impugning but yet-to-be-filed cause of action to
be tolled until that conviction was set aside, his filing here
would have been timely.
We have generally referred to state law for tolling rules,
just as we have for the length of statutes of limitation.
Hardin v. Straub, 490 U. S. 536, 538–539 (1989); Board of
Regents of Univ. of State of N. Y. v. Tomanio, 446 U. S.
478, 484–486 (1980). Petitioner has not brought to our
attention, nor are we aware of, Illinois cases providing
tolling in even remotely comparable circumstances. (In
deed, petitioner did not even argue for such tolling below,
though he supported its suggestion at oral argument.)
Nor would we be inclined to adopt a federal tolling rule to
this effect. Under such a regime, it would not be known
whether tolling is appropriate by reason of the Heck bar
until it is established that the newly entered conviction
would be impugned by the not-yet-filed, and thus utterly
indeterminate, §1983 claim.4 It would hardly be desirable
to place the question of tolling vel non in this jurispruden
tial limbo, leaving it to be determined by those later
events, and then pronouncing it retroactively. Defendants
need to be on notice to preserve beyond the normal limita
tions period evidence that will be needed for their defense;
and a statute that becomes retroactively extended, by the
action of the plaintiff in crafting a conviction-impugning
cause of action, is hardly a statute of repose.5
——————
4 Had petitioner filed suit upon his arrest and had his suit then been

dismissed under Heck, the statute of limitations, absent tolling, would
have run by the time he obtained reversal of his conviction. If under
those circumstances he were not allowed to refile his suit, Heck would
produce immunity from §1983 liability, a result surely not intended.
Because in the present case petitioner did not file his suit within the
limitations period, we need not decide, had he done so, how much time
he would have had to refile the suit once the Heck bar was removed.
5 JUSTICE STEVENS reaches the same result by arguing that, under

Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465 (1976), the Heck bar can never come into
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Opinion of the Court

JUSTICE BREYER argues in dissent that equitable tolling
should apply “so long as the issues that [a §1983] claim
would raise are being pursued in state court.” Post, at 4.
We know of no support (nor does the dissent suggest any)
for the far-reaching proposition that equitable tolling is
appropriate to avoid the risk of concurrent litigation. As
best we can tell, the only rationale for such a rule is the
concern that “petitioner would have had to divide his
attention between criminal and civil cases.” Post, at 1.
——————
play in a §1983 suit seeking damages for a Fourth Amendment viola
tion, so that “a habeas remedy was never available to [petitioner] in the
first place.” Post, at 3 (opinion concurring in judgment). This reads
Stone to say more than it does. Under Stone, Fourth Amendment
violations are generally not cognizable on federal habeas, but they are
cognizable when the State has failed to provide the habeas petitioner
“an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment
claim.” 428 U. S., at 482. Federal habeas petitioners have sometimes
succeeded in arguing that Stone’s general prohibition does not apply.
See, e.g., Herrera v. LeMaster, 225 F. 3d 1176, 1178 (2000), aff’d on this
point, 301 F. 3d 1192, 1195, n. 4 (CA10 2002) (en banc); United States
ex rel. Bostick v. Peters, 3 F. 3d 1023, 1029 (CA7 1993); Agee v. White,
809 F. 2d 1487, 1490 (CA11 1987); Doescher v. Estelle, 666 F. 2d 285,
287 (CA5 1982); Boyd v. Mintz, 631 F. 2d 247, 250–251 (CA3 1980); see
also 2 R. Hertz & J. Liebman, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and
Procedure §§27.1–27.3, pp. 1373–1389 (5th ed. 2005). At the time of a
Fourth Amendment wrong, and at the time of conviction, it cannot be
known whether a prospective §1983 plaintiff will receive a full and fair
opportunity to litigate his Fourth Amendment claim. It thus remains
the case that a conflict with the federal habeas statute is possible, that
a Fourth Amendment claim can necessarily imply the invalidity of a
conviction, and that if it does it must, under Heck, be dismissed.
Insofar as JUSTICE STEVENS simply suggests that Heck has no bearing
here because petitioner received a full and fair opportunity to litigate
his Fourth Amendment claim in state court, the argument is equally
untenable. At the time that petitioner became detained pursuant to
legal process, it was impossible to predict whether this would be true.
And even at the point when his limitations period ended, state proceed
ings on his conviction were ongoing; full and fair opportunity up to that
point was not enough. Stone requires full and fair opportunity to
litigate a Fourth Amendment claim “at trial and on direct review.” 428
U. S., at 494–495, n. 37 (emphasis added).
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Opinion of the Court

But when has it been the law that a criminal defendant, or
a potential criminal defendant, is absolved from all other
responsibilities that the law would otherwise place upon
him? If a defendant has a breach-of-contract claim against
the prime contractor for his new home, is he entitled to
tolling for that as well while his criminal case is pending?
Equitable tolling is a rare remedy to be applied in unusual
circumstances, not a cure-all for an entirely common state
of affairs. Besides its never-heard-of-before quality, the
dissent’s proposal suffers from a more ironic flaw. Al
though the dissent criticizes us for having to develop a
system of stays and dismissals, it should be obvious that
the omnibus tolling solution will require the same. De
spite the existence of the new tolling rule, some (if not
most) plaintiffs will nevertheless file suit before or during
state criminal proceedings. How does the dissent propose
to handle such suits? Finally, the dissent’s contention
that law enforcement officers would prefer the possibility
of a later §1983 suit to the more likely reality of an imme
diate filing, post at 5, is both implausible and contradicted
by those who know best. As no fewer than 11 States have
informed us in this litigation, “States and municipalities
have a strong interest in timely notice of alleged miscon
duct by their agents.” Brief for State of Illinois et al. as
Amici Curiae 18.
* * *
We hold that the statute of limitations upon a §1983
claim seeking damages for a false arrest in violation of the
Fourth Amendment, where the arrest is followed by
criminal proceedings, begins to run at the time the claim
ant becomes detained pursuant to legal process. Since in
the present case this occurred (with appropriate tolling for
the plaintiff’s minority) more than two years before the
complaint was filed, the suit was out of time. The judg
ment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
 Cite as: 549 U. S. ____ (2007) 1

STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________

No. 05–1240
_________________

ANDRE WALLACE, PETITIONER v. KRISTEN

KATO ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

[February 21, 2007]

JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE SOUTER joins,
concurring in the judgment.
While I do not disagree with the Court’s conclusion, I
reach it by a more direct route. The alleged Fourth
Amendment violation at issue in this case had two distinct
consequences for petitioner: First, it provided him with a
federal cause of action for damages under 42 U. S. C.
§1983, and second, it provided him with an objection to the
admissibility of certain evidence in his state criminal trial.
The crux of petitioner’s argument before this Court is that
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U. S. 477 (1994), provides the
appropriate rule of accrual for his §1983 claim. As both he
and the majority note, Heck held that
“in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitu
tional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm
caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a
conviction or sentence invalid, a §1983 plaintiff must
prove that the conviction or sentence has been re
versed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order,
declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to
make such determination, or called into question by a
federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28
U. S. C. §2254. . . . Thus, when a state prisoner seeks
damages in a §1983 suit, the district court must con
sider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff
2 WALLACE v. KATO

STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment

would necessarily imply the invalidity of his convic
tion or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be
dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that
the conviction or sentence has already been invali
dated.” Id., at 486–487 (footnote omitted).
Relying on this principle, petitioner contends that his
federal cause of action did not accrue until after the crimi
nal charges against him were dropped.
Unlike the majority, my analysis would not depend on
any common-law tort analogies.1 Instead, I would begin
where all nine Justices began in Heck. That case, we
unanimously agreed, required the Court to reconcile §1983
with the federal habeas corpus statute.2 In concluding
that Heck’s damages claim was not cognizable under
§1983, we found that the writ of habeas corpus, and not
§1983, affords the “ ‘appropriate remedy for state prisoners
attacking the validity of the fact or length of their con
——————
1 SeeHeck, 512 U. S., at, 492 (SOUTER, J., concurring in judgment)
(“Common-law tort rules can provide a ‘starting point for the inquiry
under §1983,’ Carey v. Piphus, 435 U. S. 247, 258 (1978), but . . . [a]t
the same time, we have consistently refused to allow common-law
analogies to displace statutory analysis, declining to import even well-
settled common-law rules into §1983 ‘if [the statute’s] history or pur
pose counsel against applying [such rules] in §1983 actions.’ Wyatt v.
Cole, 504 U. S. 158, 164 (1992)” (brackets in original)).
2 See id., at 480 (“This case lies at the intersection of the two most

fertile sources of federal-court prisoner litigation—the Civil Rights Act
of 1871, Rev. Stat. §1979, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §1983, and the
federal habeas corpus statute, 28 U. S. C. §2254”); id., at 491 (SOUTER,
J., concurring in judgment) (“The Court begins its analysis as I would,
by observing that ‘this case lies at the intersection of the two most
fertile sources of federal-court prisoner litigation—the Civil Rights Act
of 1871, . . . 42 U. S. C. §1983, and the federal habeas corpus statute, 28
U. S. C. §2254’ ”); id., at 490 (THOMAS, J., concurring) (“The Court and
JUSTICE SOUTER correctly begin their analyses with the realization that
‘this case lies at the intersection of . . . the Civil Rights Act of 1871, Rev.
Stat. §1979, as amended, 42 U. S. C §1983, and the federal habeas
corpus statute, 28 U. S. C. §2254’ ”).
 Cite as: 549 U. S. ____ (2007) 3

STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment

finement.’ ” Id., at 482 (quoting Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411
U. S. 475, 490 (1973)). Given our holding in Stone v.
Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 481–482 (1976), however, that writ
cannot provide a remedy for this petitioner. And because
a habeas remedy was never available to him in the first
place, Heck cannot postpone the accrual of petitioner’s
§1983 Fourth Amendment claim.3 So while it may well be
appropriate to stay the trial of claims of this kind until
after the completion of state proceedings, see, e.g., Quack
enbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U. S. 706, 731 (1996); cf.
Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971), I am aware of no
legal basis for holding that the cause of action has not
accrued once the Fourth Amendment violation has been
completed.
The Court regrettably lets the perfect become the enemy
of the good. It eschews my reasoning because “[f]ederal
habeas petitioners have sometimes succeeded in arguing
that Stone’s general prohibition does not apply.” Ante, at
11, n. 5 (emphasis added). However, in the vast run of
cases, a State will provide a habeas petitioner with “an
opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amend
ment claim,” Stone, 428 U. S., at 482, and Heck will not
apply. It is always possible to find aberrant examples in
the law, but we should not craft rules for the needle rather
than the haystack in an area like this.

——————
3 See Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U. S. 1, 21 (1998) (SOUTER, J., joined by

O’Connor, GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ., concurring) (concluding that a
plaintiff may bring §1983 claim if he could not bring the same claim
under the habeas statute); ibid. (GINSBURG, J., concurring) (“I have
come to agree with JUSTICE SOUTER’s reasoning: Individuals without
recourse to the habeas statute because they are not ‘in custody’ . . . fit
within §1983’s ‘broad reach’ ”); id., at 25, n. 8 (STEVENS, J., dissenting)
(“Given the Court’s holding that petitioner does not have a remedy
under the habeas statute, it is perfectly clear, as JUSTICE SOUTER
explains, that he may bring an action under 42 U. S. C. §1983”).
 Cite as: 549 U. S. ____ (2007) 1

BREYER, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________

No. 05–1240
_________________

ANDRE WALLACE, PETITIONER v. KRISTEN

KATO ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

[February 21, 2007]

JUSTICE BREYER, with whom JUSTICE GINSBURG joins,
dissenting.
I agree with the Court that the accrual date of a 42
U. S. C. §1983 claim is not postponed by the presence of a
possible bar to suit under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U. S.
477 (1994). I also agree with the rest of the Court and
with JUSTICE STEVENS that had petitioner timely filed his
§1983 case, the Federal District Court might have found it
appropriate to stay the trial of his claims until the comple
tion of state proceedings. E.g., Quackenbush v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 517 U. S. 706, 731 (1996). In the absence of a
stay, a litigant like petitioner would have had to divide his
attention between criminal and civil cases with attendant
risks of loss of time and energy as well as of inconsistent
findings.
The Court’s holding, however, simply leads to the ques
tion of what is to happen when, for example, the possibil
ity of a Heck problem prevents the court from considering
the merits of a §1983 claim. And I disagree with the
Court’s insistence upon a rule of law that would require
immediate filing, followed by an uncertain system of stays,
dismissals, and possible refiling. Ante, at 9–10, n. 4 (ma
jority opinion); ante, at 3 (STEVENS, J., concurring in
judgment). I disagree because there is a well-established
legal tool better able to deal with the problems presented
2 WALLACE v. KATO

BREYER, J., dissenting

by this type of suit.
Where a “plaintiff because of disability, irremediable
lack of information, or other circumstances beyond his
control just cannot reasonably be expected to sue in time,”
courts have applied a doctrine of “equitable tolling.”
Miller v. Runyon, 77 F. 3d 189, 191 (CA7 1996) (Posner,
C. J.). The doctrine tolls the running of the limitations
period until the disabling circumstance can be overcome.
(This is why the limitations period does not run against a
falsely arrested person until his false imprisonment ends.
His action has certainly accrued because, as the majority
recognizes, he can file his claim immediately if he is able
to do so. Ante, at 4, 6, n. 3.) 77 F. 3d, at 191; see also
Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F. 2d 446, 450–453
(CA7 1990).
In particular, equitable tolling could apply where a
§1983 plaintiff reasonably claims that the unlawful behav
ior of which he complains was, or will be, necessary to a
criminal conviction. It could toll the running of the limita
tions period: (1) from the time charges are brought until
the time they are dismissed or the defendant is acquitted
or convicted, and (2) thereafter during any period in which
the criminal defendant challenges a conviction (on direct
appeal, on state collateral challenge, or on federal habeas)
and reasonably asserts the behavior underlying the §1983
action as a ground for overturning the conviction.
I find it difficult to understand why the Court rejects the
use of “equitable tolling” in regard to typical §1983 plain
tiffs. Ante, at 10. The Court’s alternative—file all §1983
claims (including potentially Heck-barred claims) at once
and then seek stays or be subject to dismissal and refil
ing—suffers serious practical disadvantages. For one
thing, that approach would force all potential criminal
defendants to file all potential §1983 actions soon lest they
lose those claims due to protracted criminal proceedings.
For another, it would often require a federal court, seeking
 Cite as: 549 U. S. ____ (2007) 3

BREYER, J., dissenting

to determine whether to dismiss an action as Heck barred
or to grant a stay, to consider issues likely being litigated
in the criminal proceeding (Was the Constitution violated?
Was the violation-related evidence necessary for convic
tion?). The federal court’s decision as to whether a claim
was Heck barred (say, whether the alleged constitutional
violation was central to the state criminal conviction)
might later bind a state court on conviction review. Be
cause of this, even a claim without a likely Heck bar might
linger on a federal docket because the federal court (or the
plaintiff who has been forced to early file) wishes to avoid
interfering with any state proceedings and therefore must
postpone reaching, not only the merits of the §1983 claim,
but the threshold Heck inquiry as well.
Principles of equitable tolling avoid these difficulties.
Since equitable tolling obviates the need for immediate
filing, it permits the criminal proceedings to winnow the
constitutional wheat from chaff, and thereby increase the
likelihood that the constitutionally meritless claims will
never (in a §1983 action) see the light of day. See Allen v.
McCurry, 449 U. S. 90, 95–96 (1980) (federal court gives
preclusive effect to constitutional determinations as to
issues already litigated in state court). Moreover, an
appropriate equitable tolling principle would apply not
only to state criminal proceedings as here, but also to state
appellate proceedings, state collateral attacks, and federal
habeas proceedings.
Of course, §1983 ordinarily borrows its limitations
principles from state law. 42 U. S. C. §1988(a). And I do
not know whether or which States have comparable equi
table tolling principles in place. If a given state court
lacks the necessary tolling provision, however, §1983, in
my view, permits the federal courts to devise and impose
such principles. See Hardin v. Straub, 490 U. S. 536, 538–
540 (1989) (“[G]aps in federal civil rights acts should be
filled by state law, as long as that law is not inconsistent
4 WALLACE v. KATO

BREYER, J., dissenting

with federal law” and its “chief goals of compensation and
deterrence or its subsidiary goals of uniformity and feder
alism” (footnote omitted)); Heck v. Humphrey, 997 F. 2d
355, 358 (CA7 1993) (Posner, J.) (articulating why federal
tolling regime may apply to §1983 claims), aff’d on other
grounds, 512 U. S., at 489. Cf. Board of Regents of Univ.
of State of N. Y. v. Tomanio, 446 U. S. 478, 490 (1980).
The use of equitable tolling in cases of potential tempo
ral conflict between civil §1983 and related criminal pro
ceedings is consistent with, indeed, it would further,
§1983’s basic purposes. It would provide for orderly adju
dication, minimize the risk of inconsistent legal determina
tions, avoid clogging the courts with potentially unneces
sary “protective” filings, and, above all, assure a plaintiff
who possesses a meritorious §1983 claim that his pursuit
of criminal remedies designed to free him from unlawful
confinement will not compromise his later ability to obtain
civil §1983 redress as well.
The Court is wrong in concluding that the principle I
have described would “place” the tolling “question” in
“jurisprudential limbo.” Ante, at 10. Under the approach
I propose, supra, at 2, a potential §1983 plaintiff knows his
claim is being tolled so long as the issues that claim would
raise are being pursued in state court. Such a rule is
prophylactic (it will sometimes toll claims that would not
be barred by Heck), but under such an approach neither
the plaintiff, nor the defendant, nor the federal court need
speculate as to whether the claims are in any way barred
until the state court has had the opportunity to consider
the claims in the criminal context.
A tolling principle certainly seems to me to create
greater order than the rule the majority sets out, whereby
all criminal defendants must file their §1983 suits imme
diately, some will be stayed, some dismissed, and then
some may be refiled and entitled to tolling, ante, at 10,
n. 4. The majority acknowledges that tolling may be
 Cite as: 549 U. S. ____ (2007) 5

BREYER, J., dissenting

necessary to protect the plaintiff who previously filed and
was dismissed. Ibid. Why not simply apply that tolling
principle across the board?
The majority is also wrong when it suggests that the
proposed equitable tolling rule would create a significant
problem of lack of notice. Ante, at 12. Because the rule
would toll only while the potential §1983 plaintiff is chal
lenging the alleged misconduct in a state court, the State
itself would have notice of the plaintiff’s claims. For similar
reasons, the potential individual §1983 defendants, the
state officers, would also likely have notice of the charge.
But even if they do not, I believe that many would prefer to
forgo immediate notice, for it comes with a pricetag at
tached—the price consists of being immediately sued by the
filing of a §1983 lawsuit, rife with stays and delays, which
otherwise, in the course of time (as claims are winnowed in
state court) might never have been filed.
The Court’s suggested limitations system, like an equita
ble tolling rule, will produce some instances in which a
plaintiff will file a §1983 lawsuit at an initially uncertain
future date. Ante, at 10, n. 4. And, under both approaches,
in the many §1983 suits that do not involve any Heck bar, a
defendant can and will file immediately and his suit would
proceed (for there is no tolling unless the potential §1983
plaintiff is asserting in a conviction challenge that a consti
tutional violation did impugn his conviction). My problem
with the Court’s approach lies in its insistence that all
potential plaintiffs (including those whose suits may be
Heck barred) file immediately—even though their suits
cannot then proceed. With tolling, only rarely would a
plaintiff choose to file a potentially Heck-barred §1983 suit
while his criminal case is pending; and in those cases the
district court could, if it wished, stay the action, or simply
dismiss the suit without prejudice, secure in the knowl
edge that the suit could be timely filed at a later date.
The Court’s refusal to admit the equitable tolling possi
6 WALLACE v. KATO

BREYER, J., dissenting

bility means that large numbers of defendants will be sued
immediately by all potential §1983 plaintiffs with arguable
Heck issues, no matter how meritless the claims; these
suits may be endlessly stayed or dismissed and then, at
some point in the future, some defendants will also be sued
again. With equitable tolling, however, defendants will be
sued once, in suits with constitutional claims that a state
court has not already found meritless, at a time when the
suit can be promptly litigated. Given the practical difficul
ties of the Court’s approach, I would not rule out now, in
advance, the use of an equitable tolling rule along the lines
I have described.
Because this matter has not been fully argued, I would
vacate the Seventh Circuit’s determination and remand
for consideration of the issues I here raise. For these
reasons, I respectfully dissent.