BP America Production Co. Ex Rel. Amoco Production Co. v. Burton

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2006 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

BP AMERICA PRODUCTION CO., SUCCESSOR IN

INTEREST TO AMOCO PRODUCTION CO., ET AL. v.

BURTON, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY, LAND

AND MINERALS MANAGEMENT, DEPARTMENT

OF THE INTERIOR, ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 05–669. Argued October 4, 2006—Decided December 11, 2006
After the Interior Department’s Minerals Management Service (MMS)
issued administrative orders assessing petitioners for royalty under
payments on gas leases they held on Government lands, petitioners
filed an administrative appeal, contending, inter alia, that the pro
ceedings were barred by 28 U. S. C. §2415(a), which provides in rele
vant part: “[E]very action for money damages brought by the United
States or an . . . agency thereof which is founded upon any contract
. . . , shall be barred unless the complaint is filed within six years af
ter the right of action accrues or within one year after final decisions
have been rendered in applicable administrative proceedings.” (Em
phasis added.) The Assistant Secretary of the Interior denied the ap
peals, ruling that §2415(a) did not govern the administrative order.
The District Court agreed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
Held: Section 2415(a)’s 6-year statute of limitations applies only to
court actions, not to the administrative payment orders involved in
this case. Pp. 5–16.
(a) Unless otherwise defined, statutory terms are generally inter
preted in accordance with their ordinary meaning. Read in this way,
§2415(a)’s text is quite clear: Its key terms—“action” and “com
plaint”—are ordinarily used in connection with judicial, not adminis
trative, proceedings. See, e.g., Unexcelled Chem. Corp. v. United
States, 345 U. S. 59, 66. The phrase “action for money damages” re
inforces this reading because the term “damages” is generally used to
2 BP AMERICA PRODUCTION CO. v. BURTON

Syllabus

mean pecuniary compensation or indemnity recovered in court.
Moreover, the fact that §2415(a) distinguishes between judicial and
administrative proceedings by providing that an “action” must com
mence “within one year after final decisions have been rendered in
applicable administrative proceedings” shows that Congress knew
how to identify administrative proceedings and manifestly had two
separate concepts in mind when it enacted §2415(a). Pp. 5–6.
(b) Petitioners’ assertion that §2415(a)’s term “action” is commonly
used to refer to administrative, as well as judicial, proceedings, is not
persuasive. The numerous statutes and regulations cited to docu
ment this supposed usage actually undermine petitioners’ argument,
since none of them uses the term “action” standing alone to refer to
administrative proceedings. Rather, each includes a modifier, refer
ring to an “administrative action,” a “civil or administrative action,”
or “administrative enforcement actions.” Section 2415(a)’s references
to “every action for money damages” founded upon “any contract”
(emphasis added) do not assist petitioners, as they do not broaden the
ordinary meaning of the key term “action.” Pennsylvania v. Delaware
Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 478 U. S. 546, and West v. Gib
son, 527 U. S. 212, distinguished. Pp. 6–9.
(c) Petitioners’ suggestion that an MMS payment order constitutes
a “complaint” under §2415(a) is also rejected. Their examples of
statutes and regulations employing the term “complaint” in the ad
ministrative context are unavailing, since such occasional usage of
the term does not alter its primary meaning, which concerns the ini
tiation of a civil action. Moreover, an MMS payment order lacks the
essential attributes of a complaint, which is a filing that commences
a proceeding that may result in a legally binding order providing re
lief. In contrast, an MMS order in and of itself imposes a legal obli
gation on the party to which it is issued. Given that the failure to
comply with such an order can result in fines of up to $10,000 a day,
see 30 U. S. C. §1719(c), the order plays an entirely different role
from that of a “complaint.” Pp. 9–10.
(d) Any remaining doubts are erased by the canon that statutes of
limitations are construed narrowly against the government. This
canon is rooted in the traditional rule that time does not run against
the King. A corollary of this rule is that a sovereign that elects to
subject itself to a statute of limitations is given the benefit of the
doubt if the statute’s scope is ambiguous. Bowers v. New York & Al
bany Lighterage Co., 273 U. S. 346, distinguished. Pp. 10–11.
(e) The Court disagrees with petitioners’ argument that interpret
ing §2415(a) as applying only to judicial actions renders §2415(i)—
which specifies that “[t]he provisions of this section shall not prevent
the United States . . . from collecting any claim . . . by means of ad
 Cite as: 549 U. S. ____ (2006) 3

Syllabus

ministrative offset”—superfluous in contravention of the canon
against reading a statute in a way that makes part of it redundant.
Under the Court’s interpretation, §2415(i) is not mere surplusage,
but clarifies that administrative offsets are not covered by §2415(a)
even if they are viewed as an adjunct of a court action. To accept pe
titioners’ argument, on the other hand, the Court would have to hold
either that §2415(a) applied to administrative actions when it was
enacted in 1966 or that it was extended to reach administrative ac
tions when §2415(i) was added in 1982. The clear meaning of
§2415(a)’s text, which has not been amended, refutes the first of
these propositions, and accepting the latter would require the unreal
istic conclusion that in 1982 Congress proceeded to enlarge §2415 to
cover administrative proceedings by the oblique and cryptic route of
inserting text expressly excluding a single administrative vehicle
from the statute’s reach. Pp. 11–14.
(f) Although interpreting §2415(a) as applying only to judicial ac
tions may result in certain peculiarities, petitioners’ alternative in
terpretation would itself result in disharmony. For instance, MMS
oil and gas lease payment orders are now prospectively subject to a 7
year statute of limitations except with respect to obligations arising
out of leases of Indian land. 30 U. S. C. §1724(b)(1). Given the ex
hortation that the Interior Secretary “aggressively carry out his trust
responsibility in the administration of Indian oil and gas,”
§1701(a)(4), it seems unlikely that Congress intended to impose a
shorter, 6-year statute of limitations for payment orders regarding
Indian lands. Finally, while cogent, petitioners’ policy arguments as
to why limiting §2415(a) to judicial actions frustrates the statute’s
purposes must be viewed in perspective. For example, because there
are always policy arguments against affording the sovereign special
treatment, the relevant inquiry in a case like this is simply how far
Congress meant to go when it enacted the statute of limitations in
question. Prior to §2415(a)’s enactment, Government contract ac
tions were not subject to any statute of limitations. See Guaranty
Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U. S. 126, 132. Absent congressional
action changing this rule, it remains the law, and §2415(a) betrays no
intent to change the rule as it applies to administrative proceedings.
Pp. 14–16.
410 F. 3d 722, affirmed.

ALITO, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Mem
bers joined, except ROBERTS, C. J., and BREYER, J., who took no part in
the consideration or decision of the case.
 Cite as: 549 U. S. ____ (2006) 1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________

No. 05–669
_________________

BP AMERICA PRODUCTION COMPANY, SUCCESSOR IN

INTEREST TO AMOCO PRODUCTION COMPANY, ET AL.,

PETITIONERS v. REJANE BURTON, ACTING AS-

SISTANT SECRETARY, LAND AND MINERALS

MANAGEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF THE

INTERIOR, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

[December 11, 2006]

JUSTICE ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether administrative
payment orders issued by the Department of the Interior’s
Minerals Management Service (MMS) for the purpose of
assessing royalty underpayments on oil and gas leases fall
within 28 U. S. C. §2415(a), which sets out a 6-year stat
ute of limitations for Government contract actions. We
hold that this provision does not apply to these adminis
trative payment orders, and we therefore affirm.
I

A

The Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 (MLA) authorizes the
Secretary of the Interior to lease public-domain lands to
private parties for the production of oil and gas. 41 Stat.
437, as amended, 30 U. S. C. §181 et seq. MLA lessees are
obligated to pay a royalty of at least “12.5 percent in
amount or value of the production removed or sold from
2 BP AMERICA PRODUCTION CO. v. BURTON

Opinion of the Court

the lease.” §226(b)(1)(A).
In 1982, Congress enacted the Federal Oil and Gas
Royalty Management Act (FOGRMA), 96 Stat. 2447, as
amended, 30 U. S. C. §1701 et seq., to address the concern
that the “system of accounting with respect to royalties
and other payments due and owing on oil and gas pro
duced from such lease sites [was] archaic and inadequate.”
§1701(a)(2). FOGRMA ordered the Secretary of the Inte
rior to “audit and reconcile, to the extent practicable, all
current and past lease accounts for leases of oil or gas and
take appropriate actions to make additional collections or
refunds as warranted.” §1711(c)(1). The Secretary, in
turn, has assigned these duties to the MMS. 30 CFR
§201.100 (2006).
Under FOGRMA, lessees are responsible in the first
instance for the accurate calculation and payment of
royalties. 30 U. S. C. §1712(a). MMS, in turn, is author
ized to audit those payments to determine whether a
royalty has been overpaid or underpaid. §§1711(a) and (c);
30 CFR §§206.150(c), 206.170(d). In the event that an
audit suggests an underpayment, it is MMS’ 1 practice to
send the lessee a letter inquiring about the perceived
deficiency. If, after reviewing the lessee’s response, MMS
concludes that the lessee owes additional royalties, MMS
issues an order requiring payment of the amount due.
Failure to comply with such an order carries a stiff pen
alty: “Any person who—(1) knowingly or willfully fails to
make any royalty payment by the date as specified by [an]
order . . . shall be liable for a penalty of up to $10,000 per
violation for each day such violation continues.” 30
U. S. C. §1719(c). The Attorney General may enforce
these orders in federal court. 1722(a).
§
An MMS payment order may be appealed, first to the
——————
1 MMS is not always the auditing body, as MMS may delegate its

authority to the host State or an Indian tribe. 30 U. S. C. §§1732, 1735.
 Cite as: 549 U. S. ____ (2006) 3

Opinion of the Court

Director of MMS and then to the Interior Board of Land
Appeals or to an Assistant Secretary. 30 CFR §§290.105,
290.108. While filing an appeal does not generally stay
the payment order, §218.50(c), MMS will usually suspend
the order’s effect after the lessee complies with applicable
bonding or financial solvency requirements, §243.8.
Congress supplemented this scheme by enacting the
Federal Oil and Gas Royalty Simplification and Fairness
Act of 1996 (FOGRSFA), 110 Stat. 1700, as amended, 30
U. S. C. §1701 et seq. FOGRSFA adopted a prospective 7
year statute of limitations for any “judicial proceeding or
demand” for royalties arising under a federal oil or gas
lease. §1724(b)(1). The parties agree that this provision
applies both to judicial actions (“judicial proceeding[s]”)
and to MMS’ administrative payment orders (“demand[s]”)
arising on or after September 1, 1996. Ibid. This provi
sion does not, however, apply to judicial proceedings or
demands arising from leases of Indian land or underpay
ments of royalties on pre-September 1, 1996, production.
FOGRSFA §§9, 11, 110 Stat. 1717, notes following 30
U. S. C. §1701.
There is no dispute that a lawsuit in court to recover
royalties owed to the Government on pre-September 1,
1996, production is covered by 28 U. S. C. §2415(a), which
sets out a general 6-year statute of limitations for Gov
ernment contract actions. That section, which was en
acted in 1966, provides in relevant part:
“Subject to the provisions of section 2416 of this title,
and except as otherwise provided by Congress, every
action for money damages brought by the United
States or an officer or agency thereof which is founded
upon any contract express or implied in law or fact,
shall be barred unless the complaint is filed within six
years after the right of action accrues or within one
year after final decisions have been rendered in appli
4 BP AMERICA PRODUCTION CO. v. BURTON

Opinion of the Court

cable administrative proceedings required by contract
or by law, whichever is later.” (Emphasis added.)
Whether this general 6-year statute of limitations also
governs MMS administrative payment orders concerning
pre-September 1, 1996, production is the question that we
must decide in this case.
B
Petitioner BP America Production Co. holds gas leases
from the Federal Government for lands in New Mexico’s
San Juan Basin. BP’s predecessor, Amoco Production Co.,
first entered into these leases nearly 50 years ago, and
these leases require the payment of the minimum 12.5
percent royalty prescribed by 30 U. S. C. §226(b)(1)(A).
For years, Amoco calculated the royalty as a percentage of
the value of the gas as of the moment it was produced at
the well. In 1996, MMS sent lessees a letter directing that
royalties should be calculated based not on the value of
the gas at the well, but on the value of the gas after it was
treated to meet the quality requirements for introduction
into the Nation’s mainline pipelines.2 Consistent with this
guidance, MMS in 1997 ordered Amoco to pay additional
royalties for the period from January 1989 through De
cember 1996 in order to cover the difference between the
value of the treated gas and its lesser value at the well.
Amoco appealed the order, disputing MMS’ interpreta
tion of its royalty obligations and arguing that the pay
ment order was in any event barred in part by the 6-year
statute of limitations in 28 U. S. C. §2415(a). The Assis
tant Secretary of the Interior denied the appeal and ruled
that the statute of limitations was inapplicable.

——————
2 MMS intended this letter to implement its regulations, which re
quired lessees “to place gas in marketable condition at no cost to the
Federal Government unless otherwise provided in the lease agree
ment.” 30 CFR §206.152(i) (1996).
 Cite as: 549 U. S. ____ (2006) 5

Opinion of the Court

Amoco, together with petitioner Atlantic Richfield Co.,
sought review in the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia, which agreed with the Assistant
Secretary that §2415(a) did not govern the administrative
order. Amoco Production Co. v. Baca, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1,
21 (2003). The Court of Appeals for the District of Colum
bia Circuit affirmed, Amoco Production Co. v. Watson, 410
F. 3d 722, 733 (2005), and we granted certiorari, 547 U. S.
___ (2006), in order to resolve the conflict between that
decision and the contrary holding of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in OXY USA, Inc. v.
Babbit, 268 F. 3d 1001, 1005 (2001) (en banc). We now
affirm.
II
A
We start, of course, with the statutory text. Central
Bank of Denver, N. A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver,
N. A., 511 U. S. 164, 173 (1994). Unless otherwise defined,
statutory terms are generally interpreted in accordance
with their ordinary meaning. Perrin v. United States, 444
U. S. 37, 42 (1979). Read in this way, the text of §2415(a)
is quite clear.
The statute of limitations imposed by §2415(a) applies
when the Government commences any “action for money
damages” by filing a “complaint” to enforce a contract, and
the statute runs from the point when “the right of action
accrues.” The key terms in this provision—“action” and
“complaint”—are ordinarily used in connection with judi
cial, not administrative, proceedings. In 1966, when
§2415(a) was enacted, a commonly used legal dictionary
defined the term “right of action” as “[t]he right to bring
suit; a legal right to maintain an action,” with “suit”
meaning “any proceeding . . . in a court of justice.” Black’s
Law Dictionary 1488, 1603 (4th ed. 1951) (hereinafter
Black’s). Likewise, “complaint” was defined as “the first or
6 BP AMERICA PRODUCTION CO. v. BURTON

Opinion of the Court

initiatory pleading on the part of the plaintiff in a civil
action.”3 Id., at 356. See also Unexcelled Chemical Corp.
v. United States, 345 U. S. 59, 66 (1953) (holding that
filing a complaint, in the ordinary sense of the term,
means filing a suit in court, not initiating an administra
tive proceeding; “Commencement of an action by the filing
of a complaint has too familiar a history . . . for us to
assume that Congress did not mean to use the words in
their ordinary sense”). The phrase “action for money
damages” reinforces this reading because the term “dam
ages” is generally used to mean “pecuniary compensation
or indemnity, which may be recovered in the courts.”
Black’s 466 (emphasis added).
Nothing in the language of §2415(a) suggests that Con
gress intended these terms to apply more broadly to ad
ministrative proceedings. On the contrary, §2415(a) dis
tinguishes between judicial and administrative
proceedings. Section 2415(a) provides that an “action”
must commence “within one year after final decisions have
been rendered in applicable administrative proceedings.”
Thus, Congress knew how to identify administrative
proceedings and manifestly had two separate concepts in
mind when it enacted §2415(a).4
B
In an effort to show that the term “action” is commonly
used to refer to administrative, as well as judicial, pro
ceedings, petitioners have cited numerous statutes and

——————
3 Theseprimary definitions have not changed in substance since
1966. Black’s (8th ed. 2004) now defines “action” as “[a] civil or crimi
nal judicial proceeding” and a “complaint” as “[t]he initial pleading that
starts a civil action and states the basis for the court’s jurisdiction, the
basis for the plaintiff’s claim, and the demand for relief.” Id., at 31, 303.
4 Moreover, it seems unlikely that Congress intended administrative

proceedings to commence within one year after the conclusion of admin
istrative proceedings.
 Cite as: 549 U. S. ____ (2006) 7

Opinion of the Court

regulations that, petitioners claim, document this usage.5
These examples, however, actually undermine petitioners’
argument, since none of them uses the term “action”
standing alone to refer to administrative proceedings.
Rather, each example includes a modifier of some sort,
referring to an “administrative action,” a “civil or adminis
trative action,” or “administrative enforcement actions.”
This pattern of usage buttresses the point that the term
“action,” standing alone, ordinarily refers to a judicial
proceeding.
Petitioners contend that their broader interpretation of
the statutory term “action” is supported by the reference
to “every action for money damages” founded upon “any
contract.” 28 U. S. C. §2415(a) (emphasis added). But the
broad terms “every” and “any” do not assist petitioners, as
they do not broaden the ordinary meaning of the key term
“action.”
Petitioners argue that their interpretation is supported

——————
5 See, e.g., 42 U. S. C. §5205(a)(1) (statute of limitations for “adminis

trative action[s] to recover any payment[s] made to a State or local
government for disaster or emergency assistance”); 12 U. S. C.
§1441a(b)(11)(G) (requiring Resolution Trust Corporation to maintain
staff to assist with certain “cases, civil claims, and administrative
enforcement actions”); 15 U. S. C. §78u(h)(9)(B) (Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 provision noting that certain “[f]inancial records . . . may be
disclosed or used only in an administrative, civil, or criminal action”).
See also 7 CFR §3018.400(c) (2006) (Department of Agriculture regula
tion regarding “administrative action[s] for the imposition of a civil
penalty” for failure to file disclosure forms); 71 Fed. Reg. 7407 (2006)
(to be codified in 12 CFR §1412.2(l)(1)) (Farm Credit System Insurance
Corporation regulation defining “prohibited indemnification payment”
to include reimbursement for a civil money penalty of judgment result
ing from any “administrative or civil action” instituted by the Farm
Credit Administration); 10 CFR pt. 820, App. A, IX–b (2006) (“Adminis
trative actions, such as determination of award fees where [Department
of Energy] contracts provide for such determinations, will be considered
separately from any civil penalties that may be imposed under this
Enforcement Policy”).
8 BP AMERICA PRODUCTION CO. v. BURTON

Opinion of the Court

by Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council for
Clean Air, 478 U. S. 546 (1986), and West v. Gibson, 527
U. S. 212 (1999), but this reliance is misplaced. In Dela
ware Valley Citizens’ Council, we construed the attorney’s
fee provision of the Clean Water Act (CWA), which author
izes a “court, in issuing any final order in any action
brought pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, [to]
award costs of litigation . . . to any party.” 42 U. S. C.
§7604(d). We permitted the recovery of fees both for work
done in court and in subsequent administrative proceed
ings. But the pertinent statutory provision in that case
did not employ the key terms that appear in the statute at
issue here. Specifically, the CWA provision referred to
“litigation,” not to an “action” commenced by the filing of a
“complaint.” Moreover, “the work done by counsel [in the
administrative phase of the case] was as necessary to the
attainment of adequate relief . . . as was all of their earlier
work in the courtroom . . . obtaining the consent decree.”
478 U. S., at 558. And we expressly reserved judgment on
the question “whether an award of attorney’s fees is ap
propriate . . . when there is no connected court action in
which fees are recoverable.” Id., at 560, n. 5.
West helps petitioners even less. There, we considered
whether the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) could order a federal agency to pay compensatory
damages in an administrative proceeding. Section 717(b)
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C.
§2000e–16(b), authorized the EEOC to employ “appropri
ate remedies,” but did not specifically authorize damages,
and §717(c) authorized a subsequent court action against
an employer agency, 42 U. S. C. §2000e–16(c). In 1991,
Congress added Rev. Stat. §1977A(a)(1), 42 U. S. C.
§1981a(a)(1), which provided that “[i]n an action brought
by a complaining party under section 706 or 717 . . . the
complaining party may recover compensatory . . . dam
ages.” In West, the defendant agency argued that the
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Opinion of the Court

enactment of §1981a(a)(1) showed that Congress did not
consider compensatory damages to be “appropriate reme
dies” in an EEOC proceeding, as opposed to an action
brought by an aggrieved employee. If Congress had
wished to authorize the award of compensatory damages
in an EEOC proceeding, the defendant agency reasoned,
Congress would have so provided in §1981a(a)(l), by ex
pressly cross-referencing §717(c). We rejected this argu
ment, but in doing so we did not hold that an EEOC pro
ceeding is an “action” under §1981a(a)(1). Rather, we
simply concluded that the EEOC’s authorization under
§717(b) to award “appropriate remedies” was broad
enough to encompass compensatory damages. 527 U. S.,
at 220–221.
For these reasons, we are not persuaded by petitioners’
argument that the term “action” in §2415(a) applies to the
administrative proceedings that follow the issuance of an
MMS payment order.
C
We similarly reject petitioners’ suggestion that an MMS
letter or payment order constitutes a “complaint” within
the meaning of §2415(a). Petitioners point to examples of
statutes and regulations that employ the term “complaint”
in the administrative context. See, e.g., 15 U. S. C. §45(b)
(requiring the Federal Trade Commission to serve a “com
plaint” on a party suspected of engaging in an unfair
method of competition); 29 CFR §102.15 (2006) (a “com
plaint” initiates unfair labor practice proceedings before
the National Labor Relations Board). But the occasional
use of the term to describe certain administrative filings
does not alter its primary meaning, which concerns the
initiation of “a civil action.” Black’s 356. Moreover, even
if the distinction between administrative and judicial
proceedings is put aside, an MMS payment order lacks the
essential attributes of a complaint. While a complaint is a
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Opinion of the Court

filing that commences a proceeding that may in the end
result in a legally binding order providing relief, an MMS
payment order in and of itself imposes a legal obligation
on the party to which it is issued. As noted, the failure to
comply with such an order can result in fines of up to
$10,000 a day. An MMS payment order, therefore, plays
an entirely different role from that of a “complaint.”6
D
To the extent that any doubts remain regarding the
meaning of §2415(a), they are erased by the rule that
statutes of limitations are construed narrowly against the
government. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Davis, 264
U. S. 456 (1924). This canon is rooted in the traditional
rule quod nullum tempus occurrit regi—time does not run
against the King. Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States,
304 U. S. 126, 132 (1938). A corollary of this rule is that
when the sovereign elects to subject itself to a statute of
limitations, the sovereign is given the benefit of the doubt
if the scope of the statute is ambiguous.
Bowers v. New York & Albany Lighterage Co., 273 U. S.
346 (1927), cited by petitioners, is not to the contrary.
There, as here, the issue was the scope of a statute of
limitations. The provision in that case, however, provided
that “ ‘[n]o suit or proceeding for the collection of any such
taxes’ ” shall commence more than five years after the
filing of the return. Id., at 348–349. The Government
argued that the terms “proceeding” and “suit” were coter
minous, and urged further that any ambiguity should be
——————
6 There was some question at oral argument whether MMS’ initial
letter might constitute a “complaint” within the meaning of §2415(a).
Petitioners did not advance this argument, and recognized at oral
argument that neither the statute nor the regulations require the
issuance of such a letter. Tr. of Oral Arg. 7–9. The Government, for its
part, observed that all such a letter does is request information, as the
agency has not yet decided whether to assert a claim. Id., at 28. This
is not a complaint.
 Cite as: 549 U. S. ____ (2006) 11

Opinion of the Court

resolved in its favor.
The Court recognized the canon, restating it much as we
have above. Id., at 349. But the Court concluded that the
canon had no application in that case because the text of
the relevant statute, unlike §2415(a), applied clearly and
separately to “suits” and “proceedings,” and the Court saw
no reason to give these different terms the same meaning.
Id., at 349–350.
E
We come now to petitioners’ argument that interpreting
§2415(a) as applying only to judicial actions would render
subsection (i) of the same statute superfluous. Subsection
(i) provides as follows:
“The provisions of this section shall not prevent the
United States or an officer or agency thereof from col
lecting any claim of the United States by means of
administrative offset, in accordance with section 3716
of title 31.” 28 U. S. C. §2415(i).
An administrative offset is a mechanism by which the
Government withholds payment of a debt that it owes
another party in order to recoup a payment that this party
owes the Government. 31 U. S. C. §3701(a)(1). Thus,
under subsection (i), the Government may recover a debt
via an administrative offset even if the Government would
be time barred under subsection (a) from pursuing the
debt in court.
Petitioners argue that, if §2415(a) applies only to judi
cial proceedings and not to administrative proceedings,
there is no need for §2415(i)’s rule protecting a particular
administrative mechanism (i.e., an administrative offset)
from the statute of limitations set out in subsection (a).
Invoking the canon against reading a statute in a way that
makes part of the statute redundant, see, e.g., TRW Inc. v.
Andrews, 534 U. S. 19, 31 (2001), petitioners contend that
12 BP AMERICA PRODUCTION CO. v. BURTON

Opinion of the Court

subsection (i) shows that subsection (a) was meant to
apply to administrative, as well as judicial, proceedings.
We disagree.
As the Court of Appeals noted, subsection (i) was not
enacted at the same time as subsection (a) but rather was
added 16 years later by the Debt Collection Act of 1982.
96 Stat. 1749. This enactment followed a dispute between
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and
the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC)
over whether an administrative offset could be used to
recoup a debt where a judicial recoupment action was
already time barred.
In 1978, in response to a question from the United
States Civil Service Commission, OLC opined that an
administrative offset could not be used to recoup a debt as
to which a judicial action was already time barred. OLC
reached this conclusion not because it believed that
§2415(a) reached administrative proceedings generally,7
but rather because of the particular purpose of an admin
istrative offset. “Where [a] debt has not been reduced to
judgment,” OLC stated, “an administrative offset is merely
a pre-judgment attachment device.” Memorandum from
John M. Harmon, Assistant Attorney General, OLC, to
Alan K. Campbell, Chairman, U. S. Civil Service Commis
sion Re: Effect of Statute of Limitations on Administrative
Collection of United States Claims 3 (Sept. 29, 1978), Joint
Lodging. OLC opined that a prejudgment attachment
device such as this exists only to preserve funds to satisfy
any judgment the creditor subsequently obtains. Id., at 4
(citing cases). OLC therefore concluded that, where a
lawsuit is already foreclosed by §2415(a), an administra

——————
7 Indeed, what emerges strikingly from OLC’s 1978 opinion is that no
one at the time—neither OLC nor OCC—even contemplated that
§2415(a) applied to administrative procedures in the first instance. Nor
have petitioners pointed to any source demonstrating otherwise.
 Cite as: 549 U. S. ____ (2006) 13

Opinion of the Court

tive offset that is the functional equivalent of a pretrial
attachment is also unavailable. Id., at 3.
The OCC disagreed. See In the Matter of Collection of
Debts—Statute of Limitations on Administrative Setoff, 58
Comp. Gen. 501, 504–505 (1979). In its view, the question
was answered by
“[t]he general rule . . . that statutes of limitations ap
plicable to suits for debts or money demands bar or
run only against the remedy (the right to bring suit)
to which they apply and do not discharge the debt or
extinguish, or even impair, the right or obligation, ei
ther in law or in fact, and the creditor may avail him
self of every other lawful means of realizing on the
debt or obligation. See Mascot Oil Co. v. United
States, 42 F. 2d 309 (Ct. Cl. 1930), affirmed 282 U. S.
434; and 33 Comp. Gen. 66 (1953). See also Ready-
Mix Concrete Co. v. United States, 130 F. Supp. 390
(Ct. Cl. 1955).” Ibid.
That Congress had time-barred the judicial remedy, OCC
reasoned, imposed no limit on the administrative remedy.
The OLC–OCC dispute reveals that, even under the
interpretation of subsection (a)—the one we are adopt
ing—that considers it applicable only to court proceedings,
subsection (i) is not mere surplusage. It clarifies that
administrative offsets are not covered by subsection (a)
even if they are viewed as an adjunct of a court action.
To accept petitioners’ argument, on the other hand, we
would have to hold either that §2415(a) applied to admin
istrative actions when it was enacted in 1966 or that it
was extended to reach administrative actions when sub
section (i) was added in 1982. The clear meaning of the
text of §2415(a), which has not been amended, refutes the
first of these propositions, and accepting the latter would
require us to conclude that in 1982 Congress elected to
enlarge §2415 to cover administrative proceedings by
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Opinion of the Court

inserting text expressly excluding a single administrative
vehicle from the statute’s reach. It is entirely unrealistic
to suggest that Congress would proceed by such an oblique
and cryptic route.
III
Petitioners contend that interpreting §2415(a) as apply
ing only to judicial actions results in a statutory scheme
with peculiarities that Congress could not have intended.
For example, petitioners note that while they are required
by statute to preserve their records regarding royalty
obligations for only seven years, 30 U. S. C. §1724(f), the
interpretation of §2415(a) adopted by the Court of Appeals
permits MMS to issue payment orders that reach back
much farther.
We are mindful of the fact that a statute should be read
where possible as effecting a “ ‘symmetrical and coherent
regulatory scheme,’ ” FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 529 U. S. 120, 133 (2000), but here petitioners’
alternative interpretation of §2415(a) would itself result in
disharmony. For instance, under FOGRSFA, MMS pay
ment orders regarding oil and gas leases are now prospec
tively subject to a 7-year statute of limitations except with
respect to obligations arising out of leases of Indian land.
Consequently, if we agreed with petitioners that §2415(a)
applies generally to administrative proceedings, payment
orders relating to oil and gas royalties owed under leases
of Indian land would be subject to a shorter (i.e., 6-year)
statute of limitations than similar payment orders relat
ing to leases of other public-domain lands (which would be
governed by FOGRSFA’s new 7-year statute). Particularly
in light of Congress’ exhortation that the Secretary of the
Interior “aggressively carry out his trust responsibility in
the administration of Indian oil and gas,” 30 U. S. C.
§1701(a)(4), it seems unlikely that Congress intended to
impose a shorter statute of limitations for payment orders
 Cite as: 549 U. S. ____ (2006) 15

Opinion of the Court

regarding Indian lands.
Petitioners contend, finally, that interpreting §2415(a)
as applying only to judicial actions would frustrate the
statute’s purposes of providing repose, ensuring that
actions are brought while evidence is fresh, lightening
recordkeeping burdens, and pressuring federal agencies to
assert federal rights promptly. These are certainly cogent
policy arguments, but they must be viewed in perspective.
For one thing, petitioners overstate the scope of the
problem, since Congress of course can enact and has en
acted specific statutes of limitations to govern specific
administrative actions. See, e.g., 42 U. S. C. §5205(a)(1)
(statute of limitations for an administrative action to
recover payments made to state governments for disaster
or emergency assistance). Indeed, in 1996, FOGRSFA
imposed just such a limitation prospectively on all non-
Indian land, oil, and gas lease claims.
Second, and more fundamentally, the consequences of
interpreting §2415(a) as limited to court actions must be
considered in light of the traditional rule exempting pro
ceedings brought by the sovereign from any time bar.
There are always policy arguments against affording the
sovereign this special treatment, and therefore in a case
like this, where the issue is how far Congress meant to go
when it enacted a statute of limitations applicable to the
Government, arguing that an expansive interpretation
would serve the general purposes of statutes of limitations
is somewhat beside the point. The relevant inquiry, in
stead, is simply how far Congress meant to go when it
enacted the statute of limitations in question. Here prior
to the enactment of §2415(a) in 1966, contract actions
brought by the Government were not subject to any stat
ute of limitations. See Guaranty Trust Co., 304 U. S., at
132. Absent congressional action changing this rule, it
remains the law, and the text of §2415(a) betrays no intent
to change this rule as it applies to administrative proceed
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Opinion of the Court

ings.
In the final analysis, while we appreciate petitioners’
arguments, they are insufficient to overcome the plain
meaning of the statutory text. We therefore hold that the
6-year statute of limitations in §2415(a) applies only to
court actions and not to the administrative proceedings
involved in this case.
* * *
For these reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit is affirmed.

It is so ordered.

THE CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE BREYER took no part
in the consideration or decision of this case.