(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2006 1
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
LOPEZ v. GONZALES, ATTORNEY GENERAL
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
No. 05–547. Argued October 3, 2006—Decided December 5, 2006
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) lists as an “aggravated
felony” “illicit trafficking in a controlled substance . . . including a
drug trafficking crime (as defined in section 924(c) of title 18),” 8
U. S. C. §1101(a)(43)(B), but does not define “illicit trafficking.” Title
18 U. S. C. §924(c)(2) defines “drug trafficking crime” to include “any
felony punishable under the Controlled Substances Act” (CSA). Peti
tioner Lopez, a legal permanent resident alien, pleaded guilty to
South Dakota charges of aiding and abetting another person’s pos
session of cocaine, which state law treated as the equivalent of pos
sessing the drug, a state felony. The Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) began removal proceedings on the ground, inter alia,
that Lopez’s state conviction was for an aggravated felony. The Im
migration Judge ultimately ruled that despite the CSA’s treatment of
Lopez’s crime as a misdemeanor, see 21 U. S. C. §844(a), it was an
aggravated felony under the INA owing to its being a felony under
state law. The judge ordered Lopez removed in light of 8 U. S. C.
§1229b(a)(3), which provides that the Attorney General’s discretion to
cancel the removal of a person otherwise deportable does not reach a
convict of an aggravated felony. The Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA) affirmed, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed the BIA.
Held: Conduct made a felony under state law but a misdemeanor under
the CSA is not a “felony punishable under the Controlled Substances
Act” for INA purposes. A state offense comes within the quoted
phrase only if it proscribes conduct punishable as a felony under the
CSA. The Government argues that possession’s felonious character
as a state crime is enough to turn it into an aggravated felony under
the INA because the CSA punishes possession, albeit as a misde
meanor, while §924(c)(2) requires only that the offense be punishable,
2 LOPEZ v. GONZALES
Syllabus
not that it be punishable as a federal felony, so that a prior conviction
in state court will satisfy the felony element because the State treats
possession that way. This argument is incoherent with any common
sense conception of “illicit trafficking,” the term ultimately being de
fined. Because the statutes in play do not define “trafficking,” the
Court looks to the term’s everyday meaning, FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U. S.
471, 476, which ordinarily connotes some sort of commercial dealing.
Commerce, however, was no part of Lopez’s South Dakota offense of
helping someone else to possess, and certainly it is no element of
simple possession, with which the State equates that crime. Nor is
the anomaly of the Government’s reading limited to South Dakota
cases: while federal law typically treats trafficking offenses as felo
nies and nontrafficking offenses as misdemeanors, several States de
viate significantly from this pattern. Reading §924(c) the Govern
ment’s way, then, would often turn simple possession into trafficking,
just what the English language counsels not to expect, and that re
sult makes the Court very wary of the Government’s position. Al
though the Government might still be right, there would have to be
some indication that Congress meant to define an aggravated felony
of illicit trafficking in an unorthodox and unexpected way. There are
good reasons to think it was doing no such thing here. First, an of
fense that necessarily counts as “illicit trafficking” under the INA is a
“drug trafficking crime” under §924(c), i.e., a “felony punishable un
der the Controlled Substances Act,” §924(c)(2). To determine what
felonies might qualify, the Court naturally looks to the definitions of
crimes punishable as felonies under the CSA. If Congress had meant
the Court to look to state law, it would have found a much less mis
leading way to make its point. The Government’s argument to the
contrary contravenes normal ways of speaking and writing, which
demonstrate that “felony punishable under the . . . Act” means “fel
ony punishable as such under the Act” or “felony as defined by the
Act,” and does not refer to state felonies, so long as they would be
punishable at all under the CSA. The Government’s argument is not
supported by the INA’s statement that the term “aggravated felony”
“applies to an offense described in this paragraph whether in viola
tion of Federal or State law.” 8 U. S. C. §1101(a)(43). Rather than
wrenching the expectations raised by normal English usage, this pro
vision has two perfectly straightforward jobs to do. First, it provides
that a generic description of “an offense . . . in this paragraph,” one
not specifically couched as a state offense or a federal one, covers ei
ther one, and, second, it confirms that a state offense whose elements
include the elements of a felony punishable under the CSA is an ag
gravated felony. Thus, if Lopez’s state crime actually fell within the
general term “illicit trafficking,” the state felony conviction would
Cite as: 549 U. S. ____ (2006) 3
Syllabus
count as an “aggravated felony,” regardless of the existence of a fed
eral felony counterpart; and a state offense of possessing more than
five grams of cocaine base is an aggravated felony because it is a fel
ony under the CSA, 21 U. S. C. §844(a). Nothing in the provision in
question suggests that Congress changed the meaning of “felony pun
ishable under the [CSA]” when it took that phrase from Title 18 of
the U. S. Code and incorporated it into Title 8’s definition of “aggra
vated felony.” Yet the Government admits that it has never begun a
prosecution under 18 U. S. C. §924(c)(1)(A) where the underlying
“drug trafficking crime” was a state felony but a federal misde
meanor. This telling failure in the very context in which the phrase
“felony punishable under the [CSA]” appears in the Code belies the
Government’s claim that its interpretation is the more natural one.
Finally, the Government’s reading would render the law of alien re
moval, see 8 U. S. C. §1229b(a)(3), and the law of sentencing for ille
gal entry into the country, see United States Sentencing Commission,
Guidelines Manual §2L1.2, dependent on varying state criminal clas
sifications even when Congress has apparently pegged the immigra
tion statutes to the classifications Congress itself chose. Congress
would not have incorporated its own statutory scheme of felonies and
misdemeanors if it meant courts to ignore it whenever a State chose
to punish a given act more heavily. Pp. 4–12.
417 F. 3d 934, reversed and remanded.
SOUTER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
C. J., and STEVENS, SCALIA, KENNEDY, GINSBURG, BREYER, and ALITO,
JJ., joined. THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
Cite as: 549 U. S. ____ (2006) 1
Opinion of the Court
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 05–547
_________________
JOSE ANTONIO LOPEZ, PETITIONER v. ALBERTO
R. GONZALES, ATTORNEY GENERAL
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
[December 5, 2006]
JUSTICE SOUTER delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question raised is whether conduct made a felony
under state law but a misdemeanor under the Controlled
Substances Act is a “felony punishable under the Con
trolled Substances Act.” 18 U. S. C. §924(c)(2). We hold it
is not.
I
A
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) defines the
term “aggravated felony” by a list that mentions “illicit
trafficking in a controlled substance . . . including a drug
trafficking crime (as defined in section 924(c) of title 18).”
§101(a)(43)(B), as added by §7342, 102 Stat. 4469, and as
amended by §222(a), 108 Stat. 4320, 8 U. S. C.
§1101(a)(43)(B). The general phrase “illicit trafficking” is
left undefined, but §924(c)(2) of Title 18 identifies the
subcategory by defining “drug trafficking crime” as “any
felony punishable under the Controlled Substances Act” or
under either of two other federal statutes having no bear
ing on this case. Following the listing, §101(a)43 of the
INA provides in its penultimate sentence that “[t]he term
2 LOPEZ v. GONZALES
Opinion of the Court
[aggravated felony] applies to an offense described in this
paragraph whether in violation of Federal or State law” or,
in certain circumstances, “the law of a foreign country.” 8
U. S. C. §1101(a)(43).
An aggravated felony on a criminal record has worse
collateral effects than a felony conviction simple. Under
the immigration statutes, for example, the Attorney Gen
eral’s discretion to cancel the removal of a person other
wise deportable does not reach a convict of an aggravated
felony. §1229b(a)(3). Nor is an aggravated felon eligible
for asylum. §§1158(b)(2)(A)(ii), 1158(b)(2)(B)(i). And
under the sentencing law, the Federal Guidelines attach
special significance to the “aggravated felony” designation:
a conviction of unlawfully entering or remaining in the
United States receives an eight-level increase for a prior
aggravated felony conviction, but only four levels for “any
other felony.” United States Sentencing Commission,
Guidelines Manual §2L1.2 (Nov. 2005) (hereinafter
USSG); id., comment., n. 3 (adopting INA definition of
aggravated felony).
B
Although petitioner Jose Antonio Lopez entered the
United States illegally in 1986, in 1990 he became a legal
permanent resident. In 1997, he was arrested on state
charges in South Dakota, pleaded guilty to aiding and
abetting another person’s possession of cocaine, and was
sentenced to five years’ imprisonment. See S. D. Codified
Laws §22–42–5 (1988); §22–6–1 (Supp. 1997); §22–3–3
(1988). He was released for good conduct after 15 months.
After his release, the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS)1 began removal proceedings against Lopez,
——————
1 TheINS’s immigration-enforcement functions are now handled by
the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement in the Depart
ment of Homeland Security. See Clark v. Martinez, 543 U. S. 371, 374,
n. 1 (2005).
Cite as: 549 U. S. ____ (2006) 3
Opinion of the Court
on two grounds: that his state conviction was a controlled
substance violation, see 8 U. S. C. §1227(a)(2)(B)(i), and
was also for an aggravated felony, see §1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).
Lopez conceded the controlled substance violation but
contested the aggravated felony determination, which
would disqualify him from discretionary cancellation of
removal. See §1229b(a)(3). At first, the Immigration
Judge agreed with Lopez that his state offense was not an
aggravated felony because the conduct it proscribed was
no felony under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA). But
after the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) switched its
position on the issue, the same judge ruled that Lopez’s
drug crime was an aggravated felony after all, owing to its
being a felony under state law. See Matter of Yanez-
Garcia, 23 I. & N. Dec. 390 (2002) (announcing that BIA
decisions would conform to the applicable Circuit law);
United States v. Briones-Mata, 116 F. 3d 308 (CA8 1997)
(per curiam) (holding state felony possession offenses are
aggravated felonies). That left Lopez ineligible for cancel
lation of removal, and the judge ordered him removed.
The BIA affirmed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the
BIA, 417 F. 3d 934 (CA8 2005).2
We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict in the Circuits
about the proper understanding of conduct treated as a
felony by the State that convicted a defendant of commit
ting it, but as a misdemeanor under the CSA.3 547 U. S.
——————
2 Although the Government has deported Lopez, we agree with the
parties that the case is not moot. Lopez can benefit from relief in this
Court by pursuing his application for cancellation of removal, which the
Immigration Judge refused to consider after determining that Lopez
had committed an aggravated felony.
3 Compare United States v. Wilson, 316 F. 3d 506 (CA4 2003) (state
law felony is an aggravated felony); United States v. Simon, 168 F. 3d
1271 (CA11 1999) (same); United States v. Hinojosa-Lopez, 130 F. 3d
691 (CA5 1997) (same); United States v. Briones-Mata, 116 F. 3d 308
(CA8 1997) (per curiam) (same); United States v. Cabrera-Sosa, 81 F. 3d
998 (CA10 1996) (same); United States v. Restrepo-Aguilar, 74 F. 3d
4 LOPEZ v. GONZALES
Opinion of the Court
___ (2006). We now reverse.
II
The INA makes Lopez guilty of an aggravated felony if
he has been convicted of “illicit trafficking in a controlled
substance . . . including,” but not limited to, “a drug traf
ficking crime (as defined in section 924(c) of title 18).” 8
U. S. C. §1101(a)(43)(B). Lopez’s state conviction was for
helping someone else possess cocaine in South Dakota,
which state law treated as the equivalent of possessing the
drug, S. D. Codified Laws §22–3–3, a state felony, §22–42–
5. Mere possession is not, however, a felony under the
federal CSA, see 21 U. S. C. §844(a), although possessing
more than what one person would have for himself will
support conviction for the federal felony of possession with
intent to distribute, see §841 (2000 ed. and Supp. III);
United States v. Kates, 174 F. 3d 580, 582 (CA5 1999) (per
curiam) (“Intent to distribute may be inferred from the
possession of a quantity of drugs too large to be used by
the defendant alone”).
Despite this federal misdemeanor treatment, the Gov
ernment argues that possession’s felonious character as a
state crime can turn it into an aggravated felony under
the INA. There, it says, illicit trafficking includes a drug
trafficking crime as defined in federal Title 18. Title 18
defines “drug trafficking crime” as “any felony punishable
——————
361 (CA1 1996) (same), with Gonzales-Gomez v. Achim, 441 F. 3d 532
(CA7 2006) (state-law felony is not an aggravated felony); United States
v. Palacios-Suarez, 418 F. 3d 692 (CA6 2005) (same); Gerbier v. Holmes,
280 F. 3d 297 (CA3 2002) (same). Two Circuits have construed the
aggravated felony definition one way in the sentencing context and
another in the immigration context. Compare United States v. Ibarra-
Galindo, 206 F. 3d 1337 (CA9 2000) (in sentencing case, state-law
felony is an aggravated felony); United States v. Pornes-Garcia, 171
F. 3d 142 (CA2 1999) (same), with Cazarez-Gutierrez v. Ashcroft, 382
F. 3d 905 (CA9 2004) (in immigration case, state-law felony is not an
aggravated felony); Aguirre v. INS, 79 F. 3d 315 (CA2 1996) (same).
Cite as: 549 U. S. ____ (2006) 5
Opinion of the Court
under the Controlled Substances Act (21 U. S. C. 801 et
seq.),” §924(c)(2), and the CSA punishes possession, albeit
as a misdemeanor, see §405(a), 102 Stat. 4384, as renum
bered and amended by §1002(g), 104 Stat. 4828, 21
U. S. C. §844(a). That is enough, says the Government,
because §924(c)(2) requires only that the offense be pun
ishable, not that it be punishable as a federal felony.
Hence, a prior conviction in state court will satisfy the
felony element because the State treats possession that
way.
There are a few things wrong with this argument, the
first being its incoherence with any commonsense concep
tion of “illicit trafficking,” the term ultimately being de
fined. The everyday understanding of “trafficking” should
count for a lot here, for the statutes in play do not define
the term, and so remit us to regular usage to see what
Congress probably meant. FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U. S. 471,
476 (1994). And ordinarily “trafficking” means some sort
of commercial dealing. See Black’s Law Dictionary 1534
(8th ed. 2004) (defining to “traffic” as to “trade or deal in
(goods, esp. illicit drugs or other contraband)”); see also
Urena-Ramirez v. Ashcroft, 341 F. 3d 51, 57 (CA1 2003)
(similar definition); State v. Ezell, 321 S. C. 421, 425, 468
S. E. 2d 679, 681 (App. 1996) (same). Commerce, however,
was no part of Lopez’s South Dakota offense of helping
someone else to possess, and certainly it is no element of
simple possession, with which the State equates that
crime. Nor is the anomaly of the Government’s reading
limited to South Dakota cases: while federal law typically
treats trafficking offenses as felonies and nontrafficking
offenses as misdemeanors, several States deviate signifi
cantly from this pattern.4
——————
4 Several States punish possession as a felony. See, e. g., S. D. Codi
fied Laws §§22–42–5 (2004), 22–6–1 (2005 Supp.); Tex. Health & Safety
Code Ann. §481.115 (West 2003); Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§12.32–12.35
6 LOPEZ v. GONZALES
Opinion of the Court
Reading §924(c) the Government’s way, then, would
often turn simple possession into trafficking, just what the
English language tells us not to expect, and that result
makes us very wary of the Government’s position. Cf.
Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U. S. 1, 11 (2004) (“[W]e cannot
forget that we ultimately are determining the meaning of
the term ‘crime of violence’ ”). Which is not to deny that
the Government might still be right; Humpty Dumpty
used a word to mean “ ‘just what [he chose] it to mean—
neither more nor less,’ ”5 and legislatures, too, are free to
be unorthodox. Congress can define an aggravated felony
of illicit trafficking in an unexpected way. But Congress
would need to tell us so, and there are good reasons to
think it was doing no such thing here.6
First, an offense that necessarily counts as “illicit traf
ficking” under the INA is a “drug trafficking crime” under
——————
(West 2003); see also n. 10, infra. In contrast, with a few exceptions,
the CSA punishes drug possession offenses as misdemeanors (that is,
by one year’s imprisonment or less, cf. 18 U. S. C. §3559(a)), see 21
U. S. C. §844(a) (providing for “a term of imprisonment of not more
than 1 year” for possession offenses except for repeat offenders, persons
who possess more than five grams of cocaine base, and persons who
possess flunitrazepam), and trafficking offenses as felonies, see §841
(2000 ed. and Supp. III).
5 L. Carroll, Alice in Wonderland and Through the Looking Glass 198
(Messner 1982).
6 Of course, we must acknowledge that Congress did counterintui
tively define some possession offenses as “illicit trafficking.” Those
state possession crimes that correspond to felony violations of one of the
three statutes enumerated in §924(c)(2), such as possession of cocaine
base and recidivist possession, see 21 U. S. C. §844(a), clearly fall
within the definitions used by Congress in 8 U. S. C. §1101(a)(43)(B)
and 18 U. S. C. §924(c)(2), regardless of whether these federal posses
sion felonies or their state counterparts constitute “illicit trafficking in
a controlled substance” or “drug trafficking” as those terms are used in
ordinary speech. But this coerced inclusion of a few possession offenses
in the definition of “illicit trafficking” does not call for reading the
statute to cover others for which there is no clear statutory command to
override ordinary meaning.
Cite as: 549 U. S. ____ (2006) 7
Opinion of the Court
§924(c), that is, a “felony punishable under the [CSA],”
§924(c)(2). And if we want to know what felonies might
qualify, the place to go is to the definitions of crimes pun
ishable as felonies under the Act; where else would one
naturally look? Although the Government would have us
look to state law, we suspect that if Congress had meant
us to do that it would have found a much less misleading
way to make its point. Indeed, other parts of §924 ex
pressly refer to guilt under state law, see §§924(g)(3),
(k)(2), and the implication confirms that the reference
solely to a “felony punishable under the [CSA]” in
§924(c)(2) is to a crime punishable as a felony under the
federal Act. See Russello v. United States, 464 U. S. 16, 23
(1983) (“[W]here Congress includes particular language in
one section of a statute but omits it in another section of
the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts
intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or
exclusion” (alteration in original; internal quotation marks
omitted)). Unless a state offense is punishable as a federal
felony it does not count.
The Government stresses that the text does not read
“punishable as a felony,” and that by saying simply “pun
ishable” Congress left the door open to counting state
felonies, so long as they would be punishable at all under
the CSA. But we do not normally speak or write the Gov
ernment’s way. We do not use a phrase like “felony pun
ishable under the [CSA]” when we mean to signal or allow
a break between the noun “felony” and the contiguous
modifier “punishable under the [CSA],” let alone a break
that would let us read the phrase as if it said “felony
punishable under the CSA whether or not as a felony.”
Regular usage points in the other direction, and when we
read “felony punishable under the . . . Act,” we instinc
tively understand “felony punishable as such under the
8 LOPEZ v. GONZALES
Opinion of the Court
Act” or “felony as defined by the Act.”7 Without some
further explanation, using the phrase to cover even a
misdemeanor punishable under the Act would be so much
trickery, violating “the cardinal rule that statutory lan
guage must be read in context.” General Dynamics Land
Systems, Inc. v. Cline, 540 U. S. 581, 596 (2004) (internal
quotation marks and brackets omitted). That is why our
interpretive regime reads whole sections of a statute
together to fix on the meaning of any one of them, and the
last thing this approach would do is divorce a noun from
the modifier next to it without some extraordinary reason.
The Government thinks it has a good enough reason for
doing just that, in the INA provision already mentioned,
that the term “aggravated felony” “applies to an offense
described in this paragraph whether in violation of Fed
eral or State law.” 8 U. S. C. §1101(a)(43). But before this
provision is given the Government’s expansive treatment,
it makes sense to ask whether it would have some use
short of wrenching the expectations raised by normal
English usage, and in fact it has two perfectly straightfor
ward jobs to do: it provides that a generic description of
“an offense . . . in this paragraph,” one not specifically
couched as a state offense or a federal one, covers either
one, and it confirms that a state offense whose elements
include the elements of a felony punishable under the CSA
is an aggravated felony. Thus, if Lopez’s state crime
actually fell within the general term “illicit trafficking,”
——————
7 With respect to this last possibility, for purposes of §924(c)(2) the
crimes the CSA defines as “felonies” are those crimes to which it
assigns a punishment exceeding one year’s imprisonment. As the
Government wisely concedes, see Brief for Respondent 25, although for
its own purposes the CSA defines the term “felony” standing alone as
“any Federal or State offense classified by applicable Federal or State
law as a felony,” 21 U. S. C. §802(13), that definition does not apply
here: §924(c)(2) refers to a felony “punishable under the [CSA],” not to
conduct punishable under some other law but defined as a felony by the
CSA.
Cite as: 549 U. S. ____ (2006) 9
Opinion of the Court
the state felony conviction would count as an “aggravated
felony,” regardless of the existence of a federal felony
counterpart; and a state offense of possessing more than
five grams of cocaine base is an aggravated felony because
it is a felony under the CSA, 21 U. S. C. §844(a).8
The Government’s reliance on the penultimate sentence
of 8 U. S. C. §1101(a)(43) is misplaced for a second reason.
The Government tries to justify its unusual reading of a
defined term in the criminal code on the basis of a single
sentence in the INA. But nothing in the penultimate
sentence of §1101(a)(43) suggests that Congress changed
the meaning of “felony punishable under the [CSA]” when
it took that phrase from Title 18 and incorporated it into
Title 8’s definition of “aggravated felony.” Yet the Gov
ernment admits it has never begun a prosecution under 18
U. S. C. §924(c)(1)(A) where the underlying “drug traffick
ing crime” was a state felony but a federal misdemeanor.
See Tr. of Oral Arg. 33–36. This is telling: the failure of
even a single eager Assistant United States Attorney to
act on the Government’s interpretation of “felony punish
able under the [CSA]” in the very context in which that
phrase appears in the United States Code belies the Gov
ernment’s claim that its interpretation is the more natural
one.9
——————
8 Although the parties agree that Congress added the provision that
both state and federal offenses qualify as aggravated felonies to codify
the BIA’s decision in Matter of Barrett, 20 I. & N. Dec. 171 (1990), see
also H. R. Rep. No. 101–681, pt. 1, p. 147 (1990) (noting that the provi
sion reflects congressional approval of Barrett), our enquiry requires
looking beyond Congress’s evident acceptance of Barrett. In Barrett,
the BIA held only that the phrase “ ‘drug trafficking crime’ ” includes
state “crimes analogous to offenses under the Controlled Substances
Act,” Barrett, supra, at 177, 178, without specifying whether a state
crime must be “analogous” to a CSA felony, as opposed to a CSA mis
demeanor, to count.
9 Contrary to the Government’s response at oral argument, such a
prosecution should be possible under the Government’s proffered
10 LOPEZ v. GONZALES
Opinion of the Court
Finally, the Government’s reading would render the law
of alien removal, see 8 U. S. C. §1229b(a)(3), and the law
of sentencing for illegal entry into the country, see USSG
§2L1.2, dependent on varying state criminal classifications
even when Congress has apparently pegged the immigra
tion statutes to the classifications Congress itself chose. It
may not be all that remarkable that federal consequences
of state crimes will vary according to state severity classi
fication when Congress describes an aggravated felony in
generic terms, without express reference to the definition
of a crime in a federal statute (as in the case of “illicit
trafficking in a controlled substance”). But it would have
been passing strange for Congress to intend any such
result when a state criminal classification is at odds with
a federal provision that the INA expressly provides as a
specific example of an “aggravated felony” (like the
§924(c)(2) definition of “drug trafficking crime”). We
cannot imagine that Congress took the trouble to incorpo
rate its own statutory scheme of felonies and misdemean
ors if it meant courts to ignore it whenever a State chose
to punish a given act more heavily.
Two examples show the untoward consequences of the
Government’s approach. Consider simple possession of
marijuana. Not only is it a misdemeanor under the CSA,
see 21 U. S. C. §844(a), but the INA expressly excludes “a
single offense involving possession for one’s own use of 30
grams or less” from the controlled substance violations
——————
interpretation because this subset of “drug trafficking crime[s]” still
“may be prosecuted in a court of the United States,” 18 U. S. C.
§924(c)(1)(A), albeit at the misdemeanor level. For the same reason,
the dissent’s argument that our reading renders superfluous the
requirement in §924(c)(1)(A) that the crime “may be prosecuted in a
court of the United States” misses the mark. Post, at 3 (opinion of
THOMAS, J.). That phrase would be no less superfluous under the
dissent’s preferred reading, which would still require that the offense
be “capable of punishment under the Controlled Substances Act,” post,
at 1, and therefore subject to prosecution in federal court.
Cite as: 549 U. S. ____ (2006) 11
Opinion of the Court
that are grounds for deportation, 8 U. S. C. §1227(a)
(2)(B)(i). Yet by the Government’s lights, if a State makes
it a felony to possess a gram of marijuana the congres
sional judgment is supplanted, and a state convict is
subject to mandatory deportation because the alien is
ineligible for cancellation of removal. See §1229b(a)(3).10
There is no hint in the statute’s text that Congress was
courting any such state-by-state disparity.
The situation in reverse flouts probability just as much.
Possessing more than five grams of cocaine base is a fel
ony under federal law. See 21 U. S. C. §844(a). If a State
drew the misdemeanor-felony line at six grams plus, a
person convicted in state court of possessing six grams
would not be guilty of an aggravated felony on the Gov
ernment’s reading, which makes the law of the convicting
jurisdiction dispositive. See Brief for Respondent 48.
Again, it is just not plausible that Congress meant to
authorize a State to overrule its judgment about the con
sequences of federal offenses to which its immigration law
expressly refers.
True, the argument is not all one-sided. The Govern
ment points out that some States graduate offenses of
drug possession from misdemeanor to felony depending on
quantity, whereas Congress generally treats possession
alone as a misdemeanor whatever the amount (but leaves
it open to charge the felony of possession with intent to
distribute when the amount is large). Thus, an alien
——————
10 Indeed, several States treat possession of less than 30 grams of
marijuana as a felony. See Fla. Stat. §§893.13(6)(a)–(b), 775.082(3)(d)
(2006) (punishing possession of over 20 grams of marijuana as a felony);
Nev. Rev. Stat. §§453.336(1)–(2) (2004), §§453.336(4), 193.130 (2003)
(punishing possession of more than one ounce, or 28.3 grams, of mari
juana as a felony); N. D. Cent. Code Ann. §§19–03.1–23(6) (Lexis Supp.
2005), 12.1–32–01(4) (Lexis 1997) (same); Ore. Rev. Stat. §161.605(3)
(2003), Act Relating to Controlled Substances, §33, 2005 Ore. Laws p.
2006 (same).
12 LOPEZ v. GONZALES
Opinion of the Court
convicted by a State of possessing large quantities of drugs
would escape the aggravated felony designation simply for
want of a federal felony defined as possessing a substan
tial amount. This is so, but we do not weigh it as heavily
as the anomalies just mentioned on the other side. After
all, Congress knows that any resort to state law will impli
cate some disuniformity in state misdemeanor-felony
classifications, but that is no reason to think Congress
meant to allow the States to supplant its own classifica
tions when it specifically constructed its immigration law
to turn on them.
In sum, we hold that a state offense constitutes a “felony
punishable under the Controlled Substances Act” only if it
proscribes conduct punishable as a felony under that
federal law. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Cite as: 549 U. S. ____ (2006) 1
THOMAS, J., dissenting
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 05–547
_________________
JOSE ANTONIO LOPEZ, PETITIONER v. ALBERTO
R. GONZALES, ATTORNEY GENERAL
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
[December 5, 2006]
JUSTICE THOMAS, dissenting.
Jose Antonio Lopez pleaded guilty to aiding and abet
ting the possession of cocaine, a felony under South Da
kota law. The Court holds that Lopez’s conviction does not
constitute an “aggravated felony” because federal law
would classify Lopez’s possession offense as a misde
meanor. I respectfully dissent.
I
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) provides
that “[a]ny alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony
at any time after admission is deportable.” 8 U. S. C.
§1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). As relevant to this case, the INA defines
an “aggravated felony” as “illicit trafficking in a controlled
substance . . . including a drug trafficking crime (as defined in
section 924(c) of title 18).” §1101(a)(43)(B). And “the term
‘drug trafficking crime’ means any felony punishable
under the Controlled Substances Act . . . .” 18 U. S. C.
§924(c)(2).
Lopez’s state felony offense qualifies as a “drug traffick
ing crime” as defined in §924(c)(2). A plain reading of this
definition identifies two elements: First, the offense must
be a felony; second, the offense must be capable of pun
ishment under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA). No
one disputes that South Dakota punishes Lopez’s crime as
2 LOPEZ v. GONZALES
THOMAS, J., dissenting
a felony. See S. D. Codified Laws §22–42–5 (1988). Like
wise, no one disputes that the offense was capable of
punishment under the CSA. See 21 U. S. C. §844(a).
Lopez’s possession offense therefore satisfies both ele
ments, and the inquiry should end there.
The Court, however, takes the inquiry further by rea
soning that only federal felonies qualify as drug trafficking
crimes. According to the Court, the definition of drug
trafficking crime contains an implied limitation: “any
felony punishable [as a felony] under the” CSA. The text
does not support this interpretation. Most obviously, the
language “as a felony” appears nowhere in §924(c)(2).
Without doubt, Congress could have written the definition
with this limitation, but it did not.
Furthermore, Lopez’s suggested addition conflicts with
the clear meaning of §924(c)(2), which extends to both
state and federal felonies. Specifically, the definition
broadly encompasses “any felony” capable of being pun
ished under the CSA. 18 U. S. C. §924(c)(2) (emphasis
added). “Read naturally, the word ‘any’ has an expansive
meaning . . . .” United States v. Gonzales, 520 U. S. 1, 5
(1997) (plurality opinion); see also Small v. United States,
544 U. S. 385, 397 (2005) (THOMAS, J., dissenting) (“The
broad phrase ‘any court’ unambiguously includes all judi
cial bodies with jurisdiction to impose the requisite convic
tion . . .” (footnote omitted)). The term “felony” takes its
meaning from Title 18, which classifies crimes as felonies
when punishable by death or greater than one year of
imprisonment. §3559(a). “[A]ny felony” therefore includes
both federal and state felonies: The classification depends
only on the authorized term of imprisonment. Accord
ingly, by the plain terms of §924(c)(2), conduct prohibited
by the CSA may qualify as a “drug trafficking crime” if
under either federal law or state law the conduct is pun
ishable by more than one year of imprisonment.
This interpretation finds support in other provisions in
Cite as: 549 U. S. ____ (2006) 3
THOMAS, J., dissenting
which Congress placed limits on the types of drug traffick
ing crimes eligible for consideration. In particular,
§924(c)(1)(A) proscribes the use or possession of a firearm
“during and in relation to any . . . drug trafficking crime
. . . for which the person may be prosecuted in a court of the
United States . . . .” (emphasis added); see also 18
U. S. C. A. §924(c)(5) (Supp. 2006) (using identical lan
guage in proscribing the use or possession of “armor pierc
ing ammunition”). The Court has previously interpreted
this language to limit “any . . . drug trafficking crime” to
federal crimes. Gonzales, supra, at 5. This language,
therefore, acts as a jurisdictional limitation, carving out
the subset of federal drug trafficking crimes and making
only those eligible for use in §§924(c)(1)(A) and 924(c)(5).
No similar federal-crime limitation appears in §924(c)(2).
Interpreting the term “drug trafficking crime,” as defined
in §924(c)(2), to reach only federal felonies would render
superfluous the federal-crime limitations in these other
provisions. See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U. S. 167, 174
(2001) (plurality opinion) (counseling against interpreta
tions that result in surplus language).1
This interpretation also finds support in the INA, which
lists “illicit trafficking” and its subset of “drug trafficking
crime[s]” as aggravated felonies. 8 U. S. C. §1101(a)(43)(B).
The INA considers these offenses aggravated felonies
“whether in violation of Federal or State law . . . .”
§1101(a)(43) (penultimate sentence). Thus, by incorporat
ing §924(c)(2)’s definition of “drug trafficking crime,” the
——————
1 The majority mistakenly contends that my interpretation also ren
ders this language superfluous. Ante, at 10 n. 9. As I have stated, the
plain meaning of “drug trafficking crime” includes two categories of
felonies—state and federal. For the limiting language in §924(c)(1)(A)
to have meaning, it must exclude one of those categories. As a state
felony, Lopez’s possession offense does not fall within the category of
federal drug trafficking crimes. Consequently, it is not eligible for use
under §924(c)(1)(A).
4 LOPEZ v. GONZALES
THOMAS, J., dissenting
INA supports and confirms the conclusion that the defini
tion of “drug trafficking crime” applies to both federal and
state felonies.
Moreover, the INA isolates the relevant inquiry to the
prosecuting jurisdiction. Section 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) of Title
8 makes an alien eligible for deportation only upon a
conviction for an “aggravated felony.” The conviction
requirement suggests that the jurisdiction issuing the
conviction determines whether the offense is a felony.
This result makes sense. When faced with an actual
conviction, it would be unusual to ask, hypothetically,
whether that conviction would have been a felony in a
different jurisdiction. Furthermore, that hypothetical
inquiry could cause significant inconsistencies. For in
stance, where a State convicts an alien of a misdemeanor
drug crime, but federal law classifies the crime as a felony,
the misdemeanor conviction would constitute an aggra
vated felony. This anomaly does not arise when relying on
the prosecuting jurisdiction’s classification of the crime.
II
The Court’s approach is unpersuasive. At the outset of
its analysis, the Court avers that it must look to the ordi
nary meaning of “illicit trafficking” because “the statutes
in play do not define the term.” Ante, at 5. That state
ment is incorrect. Section 1101(a)(43)(B) of Title 8 clearly
defines “illicit trafficking in a controlled substance,” at
least in part, as “a drug trafficking crime (as defined in
section 924(c) of title 18).” (Emphasis added.) Therefore,
whatever else “illicit trafficking” might mean, it must
include anything defined as a “drug trafficking crime” in
§924(c)(2). Rather than grappling with this definition of
the relevant term, the Court instead sets up a conflicting
strawman definition.
The majority states that the ordinary meaning of “illicit
trafficking” involves “some sort of commercial dealing.”
Cite as: 549 U. S. ____ (2006) 5
THOMAS, J., dissenting
Ante, at 5. Because mere possession does not constitute
commercial dealing, the Court concludes that Lopez’s
possession offense cannot qualify as an “illicit trafficking”
offense—or, by implication, a “drug trafficking crime.” Yet
even the Court admits that the term “drug trafficking
crime” includes federal drug felonies, several of which are
mere possession offenses. See 21 U. S. C. §844(a) (posses
sion of more than five grams of cocaine base, possession of
flunitrazepam, and repeat possession offenses). If the
Court recognizes, in light of §924(c)(2), some mere posses
sion offenses under the umbrella of “illicit trafficking,” it
cannot reject Lopez’s conviction out of hand. Yet the
Court downplays these “few exceptions” in two footnotes,
concluding that “this coerced inclusion of a few possession
offenses” gives no reason to “override [the] ordinary mean
ing” of “illicit trafficking.” Ante, at 6, nn. 4 and 6.
The inconsistency deserves more than the Court’s pass
ing reference. By encompassing repeat possession of
fenses, the term “illicit trafficking” includes far more than
“a few” offenses outside of its ordinary meaning. It must
include every type of possession offense under the CSA, so
long as the offender has had a previous possession offense.
If defining “illicit trafficking” to include the entire range of
unlawful possession does not provide a “clear statutory
command to override ordinary meaning,” I do not know
what would.2
——————
2 Inits discussion of whether possession may constitute “trafficking,”
the Court takes its own trip “through the looking glass.” See ante, at 6.
“Commerce,” according to the Court, “certainly . . . is no element of
simple possession . . . .” Ante, at 5. Not long ago, the Court found the
opposite to be true when interpreting the scope of Congress’ power
under the Commerce Clause. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U. S. 1, 22
(2005) (plurality opinion) (concluding that Congress may regulate the
mere possession of marijuana as affecting “commerce”). In Raich, the
Court fell into the very trap it purports to identify today by “turn[ing]
simple possession into [commerce], just what the English language tells
us not to expect.” Ante, at 6; see also Raich, supra, at 57–58 (THOMAS,
6 LOPEZ v. GONZALES
THOMAS, J., dissenting
The Court, however, gives only fleeting consideration to
the text of §924(c)(2) itself. After referencing the phrase
“felony punishable under” the CSA, the Court asks “where
else would one naturally look” other than the CSA to
determine whether a felony qualifies as a drug trafficking
crime. Ante, at 7. In response to the Court’s rhetorical
question, I suggest that one might naturally look to the
conviction itself to determine whether it is a felony. When
presented with an actual conviction, one would not expect
to look to a hypothetical prosecution to determine whether
an offender has committed a felony.
Continuing to avoid the text of §924(c)(2), the Court
instead focuses on what the statute does not say. It con
cludes that Congress could have expressly referenced state
law as in §924(g)(3) and (k)(2). Ante, at 7. The response,
of course, is that Congress could just as well have defined
a “drug trafficking crime” as “any felony punishable as a
felony under the CSA.” Rejoining, the Court resorts to an
“instinctiv[e] understand[ing]” that the statutory defini
tion actually means “felony as defined by the Act.” Ibid.
Instinct notwithstanding, we must interpret what Con
gress actually wrote, not what it could have written.
Furthermore, the Court’s “instinct” to interpret §924(c)(2)
to mean “felony as defined by” the CSA creates an unnec
essary ambiguity in the meaning of “felony.” The CSA
defines “felony” as “any Federal or State offense classified
by applicable Federal or State law as a felony.” 21 U. S. C.
§802(13).3 Under the Court’s interpretation, that defini
——————
J., dissenting). The Court’s broadening of the Commerce Clause stands
in tension with its present narrow interpretation of “trafficking,” which
8 U. S. C. §1101(a)(43)(B) explicitly alters to include at least some
possession offenses.
3 Several Courts of Appeals looked to this definition of “felony” when
construing the meaning of “drug trafficking crime.” See, e.g., United
States v. Wilson, 316 F. 3d 506, 512 (CA4 2003). Although the Govern
ment would clearly prevail under 21 U. S. C. §802(13), it has conceded
Cite as: 549 U. S. ____ (2006) 7
THOMAS, J., dissenting
tion seemingly should apply. The Court concludes other
wise but never resolves the ambiguity it creates: It instead
explains that “felony” is defined by the CSA as something
other than the CSA’s definition of “felony.” Ante, at 8, n. 7.
That explanation is, at best, unsatisfying.
After gliding past the statutory text, the Court ex
presses concern over the fact that the Government’s inter
pretation allows federal immigration law to turn on vary
ing state criminal classifications. Congress apparently did
not share this concern because some definitions of “aggra
vated felony” explicitly turn on the State’s authorized term
of imprisonment, not a uniform federal classification. See
8 U. S. C. §1101(a)(43)(F), (G), (J), (P)–(T). Even the Court
finds this variance “not . . . all that remarkable.” Ante, at
10. The Court’s real concern therefore has little to do with
variations in state law. Rather, it worries that “a state
criminal classification [may be] at odds with a federal
provision.” Ibid. But, obviously, if a state offense does not
qualify under the definitions in §1101(a)(43), then the
offense cannot be an “aggravated felony.” As shown in
Part I, though, nothing about Lopez’s offense conflicts with
the plain language of §924(c)(2) as incorporated into
§1101(a)(43)(B). He was convicted of a “felony,” and his
offense was “punishable under the” CSA.
The Court also notes apparent anomalies in the Gov
ernment’s approach. It asserts that, under the Govern
ment’s interpretation, a state felony conviction for simple
possession of less than 30 grams of marijuana could be an
“aggravated felony” even though the INA expressly ex
cludes such an offense as grounds for deportation under 8
U. S. C. §1227(a)(2)(B)(i). Ante, at 10–11. The Court’s
——————
that this definition does not apply. This concession makes good sense:
The definition of “drug trafficking crime” resides in Title 18, and it is
therefore most natural to construe “felony” as used in that title. See,
n. 1, supra. As discussed above, that definition as well requires that a
crime be considered a felony if the State defines it as a felony.
8 LOPEZ v. GONZALES
THOMAS, J., dissenting
concern has little basis in reality. Only one State author
izes more than one year of imprisonment for possession of
over 20 grams. See Fla. Stat. §§893.13(6)(a)–(b),
775.082(3)(a)(3) (2006). A few others classify possession of
one ounce (or 28.3 grams) as a felony. See, e.g., Nev. Rev.
Stat. §§453.336(1)–(2) (2004), (4), 193.130 (2003). The
mere possibility that a case could fall into this small gap
and lead to removal provides no ground for the Court to
depart from the plain meaning of §924(c)(2).
In fact, it is the Court’s interpretation that will have a
significant effect on removal proceedings involving state
possession offenses. Federal law treats possession of large
quantities of controlled substances as felonious possession
with intent to distribute. States frequently treat the same
conduct as simple possession offenses, which would escape
classification as aggravated felonies under the Court’s
interpretation. Thus, the Court’s interpretation will result
in a large disparity between the treatment of federal and
state convictions for possession of large amounts of drugs.
And it is difficult to see why Congress would “authorize a
State to overrule its judgment” about possession of large
quantities of drugs any more than it would about other
possession offenses. Ante, at 11.
Finally, the Court admits that its reading will subject
an alien defendant convicted of a state misdemeanor to
deportation if his conduct was punishable as a felony
under the CSA. Accordingly, even if never convicted of an
actual felony, an alien defendant becomes eligible for
deportation based on a hypothetical federal prosecution.
It is at least anomalous, if not inconsistent, that an actual
misdemeanor may be considered an “aggravated felony.”
III
Because a plain reading of the statute would avoid the
ambiguities and anomalies created by today’s majority
opinion, I respectfully dissent.