Sprint Communications Co. v. APCC Services, Inc.

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2007 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

SPRINT COMMUNICATIONS CO., L. P., ET AL. v. APCC
SERVICES, INC., ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 07–552. Argued April 21, 2008—Decided June 23, 2008
A payphone customer making a long-distance call with an access code
or 1–800 number issued by a long-distance carrier pays the carrier
(which completes the call). The carrier then compensates the pay-
phone operator (which connects the call to the carrier in the first
place). The payphone operator can sue the long-distance carrier for
any compensation that the carrier fails to pay for these “dial-around”
calls. Many payphone operators assign their dial-around claims to
billing and collection firms (aggregators) so that, in effect, these ag-
gregators can bring suit on their behalf. A group of aggregators (re-
spondents here) were assigned legal title to the claims of approxi-
mately 1,400 payphone operators. The aggregators separately agreed
to remit all proceeds to those operators, who would then pay the ag-
gregators for their services. After entering into these agreements,
the aggregators filed federal-court lawsuits seeking compensation
from petitioner long-distance carriers. The District Court refused to
dismiss the claims, finding that the aggregators had standing, and
the D.C. Circuit ultimately affirmed.
Held: An assignee of a legal claim for money owed has standing to pur-
sue that claim in federal court, even when the assignee has promised
to remit the proceeds of the litigation to the assignor. Pp. 3–23.
(a) History and precedent show that, for centuries, courts have
found ways to allow assignees to bring suit; where assignment is at
issue, courts—both before and after the founding—have always per-
mitted the party with legal title alone to bring suit; and there is a
strong tradition specifically of suits by assignees for collection. And
while precedents of this Court, Waite v. Santa Cruz, 184 U. S. 302,
Spiller v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 253 U. S. 117, and Titus v. Wal-
2 SPRINT COMMUNICATIONS CO. v. APCC SERVICES, INC.

Syllabus

lick, 306 U. S. 282, do not conclusively resolve the standing question
here, they offer powerful support for the proposition that suits by as-
signees for collection have long been seen as “amenable” to resolution
by the judicial process, Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment,
523 U. S. 83, 102. Pp. 3–16.
(b) Petitioners offer no convincing reason to depart from the his-
torical tradition of suits by assignees, including assignees for collec-
tion. In any event, the aggregators satisfy the Article III standing
requirements articulated in this Court’s more modern decisions. Pe-
titioners argue that the aggregators have not themselves suffered an
injury and that assignments for collection do not transfer the pay-
phone operators’ injuries. But the operators assigned their claims
lock, stock, and barrel, and precedent makes clear that an assignee
can sue based on his assignor’s injuries. Vermont Agency of Natural
Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U. S. 765. In arguing
that the aggregators cannot satisfy the redressability requirement
because they will remit their recovery to the payphone operators, pe-
titioners misconstrue the nature of the redressability inquiry, which
focuses on whether the injury that a plaintiff alleges is likely to be
redressed through the litigation—not on what the plaintiff ultimately
intends to do with the money recovered. See, e.g., id., at 771. Peti-
tioners’ claim that the assignments constitute nothing more than a
contract for legal services is overstated. There is an important dis-
tinction between simply hiring a lawyer and assigning a claim to a
lawyer. The latter confers a property right (which creditors might at-
tach); the former does not. Finally, as a practical matter, it would be
particularly unwise to abandon history and precedent in resolving
the question here, for any such ruling could be overcome by, e.g., re-
writing the agreement to give the aggregator a tiny portion of the as-
signed claim itself, perhaps only a dollar or two. Pp. 16–20
(c) Petitioners’ reasons for denying prudential standing—that the
aggregators are seeking redress for third parties; that the litigation
represents an effort by the aggregators and payphone operators to
circumvent Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23’s class-action require-
ments; and that practical problems could arise because the aggrega-
tors are suing, e.g., payphone operators may not comply with discov-
ery requests or honor judgments—are unpersuasive. And because
there are no allegations that the assignments were made in bad faith
and because the assignments were made for ordinary business pur-
poses, any other prudential questions need not be considered here.
Pp. 20–23.
489 F. 3d 1249, affirmed.

BREYER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which STEVENS,
 Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 3

Syllabus

KENNEDY, SOUTER, and GINSBURG, JJ., joined. ROBERTS, C. J., filed a
dissenting opinion, in which SCALIA, THOMAS, and ALITO, JJ., joined.
 Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________

No. 07–552
_________________

SPRINT COMMUNICATIONS COMPANY, L. P., ET AL.,
PETITIONERS v. APCC SERVICES, INC., ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
[June 23, 2008]

JUSTICE BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question before us is whether an assignee of a legal
claim for money owed has standing to pursue that claim in
federal court, even when the assignee has promised to
remit the proceeds of the litigation to the assignor. Be-
cause history and precedent make clear that such an
assignee has long been permitted to bring suit, we con-
clude that the assignee does have standing.
I
When a payphone customer makes a long-distance call
with an access code or 1–800 number issued by a long-
distance communications carrier, the customer pays the
carrier (which completes that call), but not the payphone
operator (which connects that call to the carrier in the first
place). In these circumstances, the long-distance carrier is
required to compensate the payphone operator for the
customer’s call. See 47 U. S. C. §226; 47 CFR §64.1300
(2007). The payphone operator can sue the long-distance
carrier in court for any compensation that the carrier fails
to pay for these “dial-around” calls. And many have done
so. See Global Crossing Telecommunications, Inc. v.
2 SPRINT COMMUNICATIONS CO. v. APCC SERVICES, INC.

Opinion of the Court

Metrophones Telecommunications, Inc., 550 U. S. ___
(2007) (finding that the Communications Act of 1934
authorizes such suits).
Because litigation is expensive, because the evidentiary
demands of a single suit are often great, and because the
resulting monetary recovery is often small, many pay-
phone operators assign their dial-around claims to billing
and collection firms called “aggregators” so that, in effect,
these aggregators can bring suit on their behalf. See Brief
for Respondents 3. Typically, an individual aggregator
collects claims from different payphone operators; the
aggregator promises to remit to the relevant payphone
operator (i.e., the assignor of the claim) any dial-around
compensation that is recovered; the aggregator then pur-
sues the claims in court or through settlement negotia-
tions; and the aggregator is paid a fee for this service.
The present litigation involves a group of aggregators
who have taken claim assignments from approximately
1,400 payphone operators. Each payphone operator
signed an Assignment and Power of Attorney Agreement
(Agreement) in which the payphone operator “assigns,
transfers and sets over to [the aggregator] for purposes of
collection all rights, title and interest of the [payphone
operator] in the [payphone operator’s] claims, demands or
causes of action for ‘Dial-Around Compensation’ . . . due
the [payphone operator] for periods since October 1, 1997.”
App. to Pet. for Cert. 114a. The Agreement also “appoints”
the aggregator as the payphone operator’s “true and law-
ful attorney-in-fact.” Ibid. The Agreement provides that
the aggregator will litigate “in the [payphone operator’s]
interest.” Id., at 115a. And the Agreement further stipu-
lates that the assignment of the claims “may not be re-
voked without the written consent of the [aggregator].”
Ibid. The aggregator and payphone operator then sepa-
rately agreed that the aggregator would remit all proceeds
to the payphone operator and that the payphone operator
 Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 3

Opinion of the Court

would pay the aggregator for its services (typically via a
quarterly charge).
After signing the agreements, the aggregators (respon-
dents here) filed lawsuits in federal court seeking dial-
around compensation from Sprint, AT&T, and other long-
distance carriers (petitioners here). AT&T moved to dis-
miss the claims, arguing that the aggregators lack stand-
ing to sue under Article III of the Constitution. The Dis-
trict Court initially agreed to dismiss, APCC Servs., Inc. v.
AT&T Corp., 254 F. Supp. 2d 135, 140–141 (DC 2003), but
changed its mind in light of a “long line of cases and legal
treatises that recognize a well-established principle that
assignees for collection purposes are entitled to bring suit
where [as here] the assignments transfer absolute title to
the claims.” APCC Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Corp., 281 F.
Supp. 2d 41, 45 (DC 2003). After consolidating similar
cases, a divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit agreed that the aggregators
have standing to sue, but held that the relevant statutes
do not create a private right of action. APCC Servs., Inc.
v. Sprint Communications Co., 418 F. 3d 1238 (2005) (per
curiam). This Court granted the aggregators’ petition for
certiorari on the latter statutory question, vacated the
judgment, and remanded the case for reconsideration in
light of Global Crossing, supra. APPC Services, Inc. v.
Sprint Communications Co. 550 U. S. ___ (2007). On
remand, the Court of Appeals affirmed the orders of the
District Court allowing the litigation to go forward. 489
F. 3d 1249, 1250 (2007) (per curiam). The long-distance
carriers then asked us to consider the standing question.
We granted certiorari, and we now affirm.
II
We begin with the most basic doctrinal principles: Arti-
cle III, §2, of the Constitution restricts the federal “judicial
Power” to the resolution of “Cases” and “Controversies.”
4 SPRINT COMMUNICATIONS CO. v. APCC SERVICES, INC.

Opinion of the Court

That case-or-controversy requirement is satisfied only
where a plaintiff has standing. See, e.g., DaimlerChrysler
Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U. S. 332 (2006). And in order to have
Article III standing, a plaintiff must adequately establish:
(1) an injury in fact (i.e., a “concrete and particularized”
invasion of a “legally protected interest”); (2) causation
(i.e., a “ ‘fairly . . . trace[able]’ ” connection between the
alleged injury in fact and the alleged conduct of the defen-
dant); and (3) redressability (i.e., it is “ ‘likely’ ” and not
“merely ‘speculative’ ” that the plaintiff’s injury will be
remedied by the relief plaintiff seeks in bringing suit).
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 560–561
(1992) (calling these the “irreducible constitutional mini-
mum” requirements).
In some sense, the aggregators clearly meet these re-
quirements. They base their suit upon a concrete and
particularized “injury in fact,” namely, the carriers’ failure
to pay dial-around compensation. The carriers “caused”
that injury. And the litigation will “redress” that injury—
if the suits are successful, the long-distance carriers will
pay what they owe. The long-distance carriers argue,
however, that the aggregators lack standing because it
was the payphone operators (who are not plaintiffs), not
the aggregators (who are plaintiffs), who were “injured in
fact” and that it is the payphone operators, not the aggre-
gators, whose injuries a legal victory will truly “redress”:
The aggregators, after all, will remit all litigation proceeds
to the payphone operators. Brief for Petitioners 18. Thus,
the question before us is whether, under these circum-
stances, an assignee has standing to pursue the assignor’s
claims for money owed.
We have often said that history and tradition offer a
meaningful guide to the types of cases that Article III
empowers federal courts to consider. See, e.g., Steel Co. v.
Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U. S. 83, 102 (1998)
(“We have always taken [the case-or-controversy require-
 Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 5

Opinion of the Court

ment] to mean cases and controversies of the sort tradi-
tionally amenable to, and resolved by, the judicial process”
(emphasis added)); GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumers
Union of United States, Inc., 445 U. S. 375, 382 (1980)
(“The purpose of the case-or-controversy requirement is to
limit the business of federal courts to questions presented
in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed
as capable of resolution through the judicial process”
(emphasis added and internal quotation marks omitted));
cf. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U. S. 433, 460 (1939) (opinion of
Frankfurter, J.) (in crafting Article III, “the framers . . .
gave merely the outlines of what were to them the familiar
operations of the English judicial system and its manifes-
tations on this side of the ocean before the Union”). Con-
sequently, we here have carefully examined how courts
have historically treated suits by assignors and assignees.
And we have discovered that history and precedent are
clear on the question before us: Assignees of a claim,
including assignees for collection, have long been permit-
ted to bring suit. A clear historical answer at least de-
mands reasons for change. We can find no such reasons
here, and accordingly we conclude that the aggregators
have standing.
A
We must begin with a minor concession. Prior to the
17th century, English law would not have authorized a
suit like this one. But that is because, with only limited
exceptions, English courts refused to recognize assign-
ments at all. See, e.g., Lampet’s Case, 10 Co. Rep. 46b,
48a, 77 Eng. Rep. 994, 997 (K. B. 1612) (stating that “no
possibility, right, title, nor thing in action, shall be
granted or assigned to strangers” (footnote omitted));
Penson & Highbed’s Case, 4 Leo. 99, 74 Eng. Rep. 756
(K. B. 1590) (refusing to recognize the right of an assignee
of a right in contract); see also 9 J. Murray, Corbin on
6 SPRINT COMMUNICATIONS CO. v. APCC SERVICES, INC.

Opinion of the Court

Contracts §47.3, p. 134 (rev. ed. 2007) (noting that the
King was excepted from the basic rule and could, as a
result, always receive assignments).
Courts then strictly adhered to the rule that a “chose in
action”—an interest in property not immediately reducible
to possession (which, over time, came to include a financial
interest such as a debt, a legal claim for money, or a con-
tractual right)—simply “could not be transferred to an-
other person by the strict rules of the ancient common
law.” See 2 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *442. To per-
mit transfer, the courts feared, would lead to the “multi-
plying of contentions and suits,” Lampet’s Case, supra, at
48a, 77 Eng. Rep., at 997, and would also promote “main-
tenance,” i.e., officious intermeddling with litigation, see
Holdsworth, History of the Treatment of Choses in Action
by the Common Law, 33 Harv. L. Rev. 997, 1006–1009
(1920).
As the 17th century began, however, strict anti-
assignment rules seemed inconsistent with growing com-
mercial needs. And as English commerce and trade ex-
panded, courts began to liberalize the rules that prevented
assignments of choses in action. See 9 Corbin, supra,
§47.3, at 134 (suggesting that the “pragmatic necessities of
trade” induced “evolution of the common law”); Holds-
worth, supra, at 1021–1022 (the “common law” was “in-
duced” to change because of “considerations of mercantile
convenience or necessity”); J. Ames, Lectures on Legal
History 214 (1913) (noting that the “objection of mainte-
nance” yielded to “the modern commercial spirit”). By the
beginning of the 18th century, courts routinely recognized
assignments of equitable (but not legal) interests in a
chose in action: Courts of equity permitted suits by an
assignee who had equitable (but not legal) title. And
courts of law effectively allowed suits either by the as-
signee (who had equitable, but not legal title) or the as-
signor (who had legal, but not equitable title).
 Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 7

Opinion of the Court

To be more specific, courts of equity would simply per-
mit an assignee with a beneficial interest in a chose in
action to sue in his own name. They might, however,
require the assignee to bring in the assignor as a party to
the action so as to bind him to whatever judgment was
reached. See, e.g., Warmstrey v. Tanfield, 1 Ch. Rep. 29,
21 Eng. Rep. 498 (1628–1629); Fashion v. Atwood, 2 Ch.
Cas. 36, 22 Eng. Rep. 835 (1688); Peters v. Soame, 2 Vern.
428, 428–429, 23 Eng. Rep. 874 (Ch. 1701); Squib v. Wyn,
1 P. Wms. 378, 381, 24 Eng. Rep. 432, 433 (Ch. 1717);
Lord Carteret v. Paschal, 3 P. Wms. 197, 199, 24 Eng. Rep.
1028, 1029 (Ch. 1733); Row v. Dawson, 1 Ves. sen. 331,
332–333, 27 Eng. Rep. 1064, 1064–1065 (Ch. 1749). See
also M. Smith, Law of Assignment: The Creation and
Transfer of Choses in Action 131 (2007) (by the beginning
of the 18th century, “it became settled that equity would
recognize the validity of the assignment of both debts and
of other things regarded by the common law as choses in
action”).
Courts of law, meanwhile, would permit the assignee
with an equitable interest to bring suit, but nonetheless
required the assignee to obtain a “power of attorney” from
the holder of the legal title, namely, the assignor, and
further required the assignee to bring suit in the name of
that assignor. See, e.g., Cook, Alienability of Choses in
Action, 29 Harv. L. Rev. 816, 822 (1916) (“[C]ommon law
lawyers were able, through the device of the ‘power of
attorney’ . . . to enable the assignee to obtain relief in
common law proceedings by suing in the name of the
assignor”); 29 R. Lord, Williston on Contracts §74.2, pp.
214–215 (4th ed. 2003). Compare, e.g., Barrow v. Gray,
Cro. Eliz. 551, 78 Eng. Rep. 797 (Q. B. 1653), and South &
Marsh’s Case, 3 Leo. 234, 74 Eng. Rep. 654 (Exch. 1686)
(limiting the use of a power of attorney to cases in which
the assignor owed the assignee a debt), with Holdsworth,
supra, at 1021 (noting that English courts abandoned that
8 SPRINT COMMUNICATIONS CO. v. APCC SERVICES, INC.

Opinion of the Court

limitation by the end of the 18th century). At the same
time, courts of law would permit an assignor to sue even
when he had transferred away his beneficial interest. And
they permitted the assignor to sue in such circumstances
precisely because the assignor retained legal title. See,
e.g., Winch v. Keeley, 1 T. R. 619, 99 Eng. Rep. 1284 (K. B.
1787) (allowing the bankrupt assignor of a chose in action
to sue a debtor for the benefit of the assignee because the
assignor possessed legal, though not equitable, title).
The upshot is that by the time Blackstone published
volume II of his Commentaries in 1766, he could dismiss
the “ancient common law” prohibition on assigning choses
in action as a “nicety . . . now disregarded.” 2 Blackstone,
supra, at *442.
B
Legal practice in the United States largely mirrored
that in England. In the latter half of the 18th century and
throughout the 19th century, American courts regularly
“exercised their powers in favor of the assignee,” both at
law and in equity. 9 Corbin on Contracts §47.3, at 137.
See, e.g., McCullum v. Coxe, 1 Dall. 139 (Pa. 1785) (pro-
tecting assignee of a debt against a collusive settlement by
the assignor); Dennie v. Chapman, 1 Root 113, 115 (Conn.
Super. 1789) (assignee of a nonnegotiable note can bring
suit “in the name of the original promisee or his adminis-
trator”); Andrews v. Beecker, 1 Johns. Cas. 411, 411–412,
n. (N. Y. Sup. 1800) (“Courts of law . . . are, in justice,
bound to protect the rights of the assignees, as much as a
court of equity, though they may still require the action to
be brought in the name of the assignor”); Riddle & Co. v.
Mandeville, 5 Cranch 322 (1809) (assignees of promissory
notes entitled to bring suit in equity). Indeed, §11 of the
Judiciary Act of 1789 specifically authorized federal courts
to take “cognizance of any suit to recover the contents of
any promissory note or other chose in action in favour of
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Opinion of the Court

an assignee” so long as federal jurisdiction would lie if the
assignor himself had brought suit. 1 Stat. 79.
Thus, in 1816, Justice Story, writing for a unanimous
Court, summarized the practice in American courts as
follows: “Courts of law, following in this respect the rules
of equity, now take notice of assignments of choses in
action, and exert themselves to afford them every support
and protection.” Welch v. Mandeville, 1 Wheat. 233, 236.
He added that courts of equity have “disregarded the rigid
strictness of the common law, and protected the rights of
the assignee of choses in action,” and noted that courts of
common law “now consider an assignment of a chose in
action as substantially valid, only preserving, in certain
cases, the form of an action commenced in the name of the
assignor.” Id., at 237, n.
It bears noting, however, that at the time of the found-
ing (and in some States well before then) the law did
permit the assignment of legal title to at least some choses
in action. In such cases, the assignee could bring suit on
the assigned claim in his own name, in a court of law. See,
e.g., 3 Va. Stat. at Large 378, Ch. XXXIV (W. Hening ed.
1823) (reprinted 1969) (Act of Oct. 1705) (permitting any
person to “assign or transfer any bond or bill for debt over
to any other person” and providing that “the asignee or
assignees, his and their executors and administrators by
virtue of such assignment shall and may have lawfull
power to commence and prosecute any suit at law in his or
their own name or names”); Act of May 28, 1715, Ch.
XXVIII, Gen. Laws of Penn. 60 (J. Dunlop 2d ed. 1849)
(permitting the assignment of “bonds, specialties, and
notes” and authorizing “the person or persons, to whom
the said bonds, specialties or notes, are . . . assigned” to
“commence and prosecute his, her, or their actions at
law”); Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, §4, 1 Stat. 322 (“[I]t shall
be lawful for any inventor, his executor or administrator to
assign the title and interest in the said invention, at any-
10 SPRINT COMMUNICATIONS CO. v. APCC SERVICES, INC.

Opinion of the Court

time, and the assignee . . . shall thereafter stand in
the place of the original inventor, both as to right and
responsibility”).
C
By the 19th century, courts began to consider the spe-
cific question presented here: whether an assignee of a
legal claim for money could sue when that assignee had
promised to give all litigation proceeds back to the as-
signor. During that century American law at the state
level became less formalistic through the merger of law
and equity, through statutes more generously permitting
an assignor to pass legal title to an assignee, and through
the adoption of rules that permitted any “real party in
interest” to bring suit. See 6A C. Wright, A. Miller, & M.
Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure §1541, pp. 320–321
(2d ed. 1990) (hereinafter Wright & Miller); see also 9
Corbin, supra, §47.3, at 137. The courts recognized that
pre-existing law permitted an assignor to bring suit on a
claim even though the assignor retained nothing more
than naked legal title. Since the law increasingly permit-
ted the transfer of legal title to an assignee, courts agreed
that assignor and assignee should be treated alike in this
respect. And rather than abolish the assignor’s well-
established right to sue on the basis of naked legal title
alone, many courts instead extended the same right to an
assignee. See, e.g., Clark & Hutchins, The Real Party in
Interest, 34 Yale L. J. 259, 264–265 (1925) (noting that the
changes in the law permitted both the assignee with “na-
ked legal title” and the assignee with an equitable interest
in a claim to bring suit).
Thus, during the 19th century, most state courts enter-
tained suits virtually identical to the litigation before us:
suits by individuals who were assignees for collection only,
i.e., assignees who brought suit to collect money owed to
their assignors but who promised to turn over to those
 Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 11

Opinion of the Court

assignors the proceeds secured through litigation. See,
e.g., Webb & Hepp v. Morgan, McClung & Co., 14 Mo. 428,
431 (1851) (holding that the assignees of a promissory note
for collection only can bring suit, even though they lack a
beneficial interest in the note, because the assignment
“creates in them such legal interest, that they thereby
become the persons to sue”); Meeker v. Claghorn, 44 N. Y.
349, 350, 353 (1871) (allowing suit by the assignee of a
cause of action even though the assignors “ ‘expected to
receive the amount recovered in the action,’ ” because the
assignee, as “legal holder of the claim,” was “the real party
in interest”); Searing v. Berry, 58 Iowa 20, 23, 24, 11 N. W.
708, 709 (1882) (where legal title to a judgment was as-
signed “merely for the purpose of enabling plaintiff to
enforce the collection” and the assignor in fact retained the
beneficial interest, the plaintiff-assignee could “prosecute
this suit to enforce the collection of the judgment”); Grant
v. Heverin, 77 Cal. 263, 265, 19 P. 493 (1888) (holding that
the assignee of a bond could bring suit, even though he
lacked a beneficial interest in the bond, and adopting the
rule that an assignee with legal title to an assigned claim
can bring suit even where the assignee must “account to
the assignor” for “a part of the proceeds” or “is to account
for the whole proceeds” (internal quotation marks omit-
ted)); McDaniel v. Pressler, 3 Wash. 636, 638, 637, 29 P.
209, 210 (1892) (holding that the assignee of promissory
notes was the real party in interest, even though the
assignment was “for the purpose of collection” and the
assignee had “no interest other than that of the legal
holder of said notes”); Wines v. Rio Grande W. R. Co., 9
Utah 228, 235, 33 P. 1042, 1044, 1045 (1893) (holding that
an assignee could bring suit based on causes of action
assigned to him “simply to enable him to sue” and who
“would turn over to the assignors all that was recovered in
the action, after deducting [the assignors’] proportion of
the expenses of the suit”); Gomer v. Stockdale, 5 Colo. App.
12 SPRINT COMMUNICATIONS CO. v. APCC SERVICES, INC.

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489, 492, 39 P. 355, 357, 356 (1895) (permitting suit by a
party who was assigned legal title to contractual rights,
where the assignor retained the beneficial interest, noting
that the doctrine that “prevails in Colorado” is that the
assignee may bring suit in his own name “although there
may be annexed to the transfer the condition that when
the sum is collected the whole or some part of it must be
paid over to the assignor”). See also Appendix, infra
(collecting cases from numerous other States approving of
suits by assignees for collection).
Of course, the dissent rightly notes, some States during
this period of time refused to recognize assignee-for-
collection suits, or otherwise equivocated on the matter.
See post, at 12–13. But so many States allowed these
suits that by 1876, the distinguished procedure and equity
scholar John Norton Pomeroy declared it “settled by a
great preponderance of authority, although there is some
conflict” that an assignee is “entitled to sue in his own
name” whenever the assignment vests “legal title” in the
assignee, and notwithstanding “any contemporaneous,
collateral agreement by virtue of which he is to receive a
part only of the proceeds . . . or even is to thus account [to
the assignor] for the whole proceeds.” Remedies and
Remedial Rights §132, p. 159 (internal quotation marks
omitted and emphasis added). Other contemporary schol-
ars reached the same basic conclusion. See, e.g., P. Bliss,
A Treatise upon the Law of Pleading §51, p. 69 (2d ed.
1887) (stating that “[m]ost of the courts have held that
where negotiable paper has been indorsed, or other choses
in action have been assigned, it does not concern the de-
fendant for what purpose the transfer has been made” and
giving examples of States permitting assignees to bring
suit even where they lacked a beneficial interest in the
assigned claims (emphasis added)). See also Clark &
Hutchins, supra, at 264 (“many, probably most, American
jurisdictions” have held that “an assignee who has no
 Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 13

Opinion of the Court

beneficial interest, like an assignee for collection only, may
prosecute an action in his own name” (emphasis added)).
Even Michael Ferguson’s California Law Review Com-
ment—which the dissent cites as support for its argument
about “the divergent practice” among the courts, post, at
14—recognizes that “[a] majority of courts has held that
an assignee for collection only is a real party in interest”
entitled to bring suit. See Comment, The Real Party in
Interest Rule Revitalized: Recognizing Defendant’s Inter-
est in the Determination of Proper Parties Plaintiff, 55
Cal. L. Rev. 1452, 1475 (1967) (emphasis added); see also
id., at 1476, n. 118 (noting that even “[t]he few courts that
have wavered on the question have always ended up in the
camp of the majority” (emphasis added)).
During this period, a number of federal courts similarly
indicated approval of suits by assignees for collection only.
See, e.g., Bradford v. Jenks, 3 F. Cas. 1132, 1134 (No.
1,769) (CC Ill. 1840) (stating that the plaintiff, the receiver
of a bank, could bring suit in federal court to collect on a
note owed to that bank if he sued as the bank’s assignee,
not its receiver, but ultimately holding that the plaintiff
could not sue as an assignee because there was no diver-
sity jurisdiction); Orr v. Lacy, 18 F. Cas. 834 (No. 10,589)
(CC Mich. 1847) (affirming judgment for the plaintiff, the
endorsee of a bill of exchange, on the ground that, as
endorsee, he had the “legal right” to bring suit notwith-
standing the fact that the proceeds of the litigation would
be turned over to the endorser); Murdock v. The Emma
Graham, 17 F. Cas. 1012, 1013 (No. 9,940) (DC SD Ohio
1878) (permitting the assignee of a claim for injury to a
“float or barge” to bring suit when, “under the assign-
ment,” the assignor’s creditors would benefit from the
litigation); The Rupert City, 213 F. 263, 266–267 (WD
Wash. 1914) (assignees of claims for collection only could
bring suit in maritime law because “an assignment for
collection . . . vest[s] such an interest in [an] assignee as to
14 SPRINT COMMUNICATIONS CO. v. APCC SERVICES, INC.

Opinion of the Court

entitle him to sue”).
Even this Court long ago indicated that assignees for
collection only can properly bring suit. For example, in
Waite v. Santa Cruz, 184 U. S. 302 (1902), the plaintiff
sued to collect on a number of municipal bonds and cou-
pons whose “legal title” had been vested in him but which
were transferred to him “for collection only.” Id., at 324.
The Court, in a unanimous decision, ultimately held that
the federal courts could not hear his suit because the
amount-in-controversy requirement of diversity jurisdic-
tion would not have been satisfied if the bondholders and
coupon holders had sued individually. See id., at 328–329.
However, before reaching this holding, the Court expressly
stated that the suit could properly be brought in federal
court “if the only objection to the jurisdiction of the Circuit
Court is that the plaintiff was invested with the legal title
to the bonds and coupons simply for purposes of collec-
tion.” Id., at 325.
Next, in Spiller v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 253 U. S.
117 (1920), a large number of cattle shippers assigned to
Spiller (the secretary of a Cattle Raiser’s Association) their
individual reparation claims against railroads they said
had charged them excessive rates. The Federal Court of
Appeals held that Spiller could not bring suit because, in
effect, he was an assignee for collection only and would be
passing back to the cattle shippers any money he recov-
ered from the litigation. In a unanimous decision, this
Court reversed. The Court wrote that the cattle shippers’
“assignments were absolute in form” and “plainly”
“vest[ed] the legal title in Spiller.” Id., at 134. The Court
conceded that the assignments did not pass “beneficial or
equitable title” to Spiller. Ibid. But the Court then said
that “this was not necessary to support the right of the
assignee to claim an award of reparation and enable him
to recover it by action at law brought in his own name but
for the benefit of the equitable owners of the claims.” Ibid.
 Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 15

Opinion of the Court

The Court thereby held that Spiller’s legal title alone was
sufficient to allow him to bring suit in federal court on the
aggregated claims of his assignors.
Similarly, in Titus v. Wallick, 306 U. S. 282 (1939), this
Court unanimously held that (under New York law) a
plaintiff, an assignee for collection, had “dominion over the
claim for purposes of suit” because the assignment pur-
ported to “ ‘sell, assign, transfer and set over’ the chose in
action” to the assignee. Id., at 289. More importantly for
present purposes, the Court said that the assignment’s
“legal effect was not curtailed by the recital that the as-
signment was for purposes of suit and that its proceeds
were to be turned over or accounted for to another.” Ibid.
To be clear, we do not suggest that the Court’s decisions
in Waite, Spiller, and Titus conclusively resolve the stand-
ing question before us. We cite them because they offer
additional and powerful support for the proposition that
suits by assignees for collection have long been seen as
“amenable” to resolution by the judicial process. Steel Co.,
523 U. S., at 102.
Finally, we note that there is also considerable, more
recent authority showing that an assignee for collection
may properly sue on the assigned claim in federal court.
See, e.g., 6A Wright & Miller §1545, at 346–348 (noting
that an assignee with legal title is considered to be a real
party in interest and that as a result “federal courts have
held that an assignee for purposes of collection who holds
legal title to the debt according to the governing substan-
tive law is the real party in interest even though the as-
signee must account to the assignor for whatever is recov-
ered in the action”); 6 Am. Jur. 2d, Assignments §184, pp.
262–263 (1999) (“An assignee for collection or security only
is within the meaning of the real party in interest statutes
and entitled to sue in his or her own name on an assigned
account or chose in action, although he or she must ac-
count to the assignor for the proceeds of the action, even
16 SPRINT COMMUNICATIONS CO. v. APCC SERVICES, INC.

Opinion of the Court

when the assignment is without consideration” (footnote
omitted)). See also Rosenblum v. Dingfelder, 111 F. 2d
406, 407 (CA2 1940); Staggers v. Otto Gerdau Co., 359
F. 2d 292, 294 (CA2 1966); Dixie Portland Flour Mills, Inc.
v. Dixie Feed & Seed Co., 382 F. 2d 830, 833 (CA6 1967);
Klamath-Lake Pharmaceutical Assn. v. Klamath Medical
Serv. Bur., 701 F. 2d 1276, 1282 (CA9 1983).
D
The history and precedents that we have summarized
make clear that courts have long found ways to allow
assignees to bring suit; that where assignment is at issue,
courts—both before and after the founding— have always
permitted the party with legal title alone to bring suit; and
that there is a strong tradition specifically of suits by
assignees for collection. We find this history and prece-
dent “well nigh conclusive” in respect to the issue before
us: Lawsuits by assignees, including assignees for collec-
tion only, are “cases and controversies of the sort tradi-
tionally amenable to, and resolved by, the judicial proc-
ess.” Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United
States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U. S. 765, 777–778 (2000) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted).
III
Petitioners have not offered any convincing reason why
we should depart from the historical tradition of suits by
assignees, including assignees for collection. In any event,
we find that the assignees before us satisfy the Article III
standing requirements articulated in more modern deci-
sions of this Court.
Petitioners argue, for example, that the aggregators
have not themselves suffered any injury in fact and that
the assignments for collection “do not suffice to transfer
the payphone operators’ injuries.” Brief for Petitioners 18.
It is, of course, true that the aggregators did not originally
 Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 17

Opinion of the Court

suffer any injury caused by the long-distance carriers; the
payphone operators did. But the payphone operators
assigned their claims to the aggregators lock, stock, and
barrel. See APPC Servs., 418 F. 3d, at 1243 (there is “no
reason to believe the assignment is anything less than a
complete transfer to the aggregator” of the injury and
resulting claim); see also App. to Pet. for Cert. 114a
(Agreement provides that each payphone operator “as-
signs, transfers and sets over” to the aggregator “all
rights, title and interest” in dial-around compensation
claims). And within the past decade we have expressly
held that an assignee can sue based on his assignor’s
injuries. In Vermont Agency, supra, we considered
whether a qui tam relator possesses Article III standing to
bring suit under the False Claims Act, which authorizes a
private party to bring suit to remedy an injury (fraud) that
the United States, not the private party, suffered. We
held that such a relator does possess standing. And we
said that is because the Act “effect[s] a partial assignment
of the Government’s damages claim” and that assignment
of the “United States’ injury in fact suffices to confer
standing on [the relator].” Id., at 773, 774. Indeed, in
Vermont Agency we stated quite unequivocally that “the
assignee of a claim has standing to assert the injury in
fact suffered by the assignor.” Id., at 773.
Petitioners next argue that the aggregators cannot
satisfy the redressability requirement of standing because,
if successful in this litigation, the aggregators will simply
remit the litigation proceeds to the payphone operators.
But petitioners misconstrue the nature of our redressabil-
ity inquiry. That inquiry focuses, as it should, on whether
the injury that a plaintiff alleges is likely to be redressed
through the litigation—not on what the plaintiff ulti-
mately intends to do with the money he recovers. See,
e.g., id., at 771 (to demonstrate redressability, the plaintiff
must show a “substantial likelihood that the requested
18 SPRINT COMMUNICATIONS CO. v. APCC SERVICES, INC.

Opinion of the Court

relief will remedy the alleged injury in fact” (internal
quotation marks omitted and emphasis added)); Lujan,
504 U. S., at 561 (“[I]t must be likely . . . that the injury
will be redressed by a favorable decision” (internal quota-
tion marks omitted and emphasis added)). Here, a legal
victory would unquestionably redress the injuries for
which the aggregators bring suit. The aggregators’ inju-
ries relate to the failure to receive the required dial-
around compensation. And if the aggregators prevail in
this litigation, the long-distance carriers would write a
check to the aggregators for the amount of dial-around
compensation owed. What does it matter what the aggre-
gators do with the money afterward? The injuries would
be redressed whether the aggregators remit the litigation
proceeds to the payphone operators, donate them to char-
ity, or use them to build new corporate headquarters.
Moreover, the statements our prior cases made about the
need to show redress of the injury are consistent with
what numerous authorities have long held in the assign-
ment context, namely, that an assignee for collection may
properly bring suit to redress the injury originally suffered
by his assignor. Petitioners might disagree with those
authorities. But petitioners have not provided us with a
good reason to reconsider them.
The dissent argues that our redressability analysis
“could not be more wrong,” because “[w]e have never
approved federal-court jurisdiction over a claim where the
entire relief requested will run to a party not before the
court. Never.” Post, at 5 (opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.). But
federal courts routinely entertain suits which will result in
relief for parties that are not themselves directly bringing
suit. Trustees bring suits to benefit their trusts; guardi-
ans ad litem bring suits to benefit their wards; receivers
bring suit to benefit their receiverships; assignees in
bankruptcy bring suit to benefit bankrupt estates; execu-
tors bring suit to benefit testator estates; and so forth.
 Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 19

Opinion of the Court

The dissent’s view of redressability, if taken seriously,
would work a sea change in the law. Moreover, to the
extent that trustees, guardians ad litem, and the like have
some sort of “obligation” to the parties whose interests
they vindicate through litigation, see post, at 7–8, n. 2, the
same is true in respect to the aggregators here. The ag-
gregators have a contractual obligation to litigate “in the
[payphone operator’s] interest.” App. to Pet. for Cert.
115a. (And if the aggregators somehow violate that con-
tractual obligation, say, by agreeing to settle the claims
against the long-distance providers in exchange for a
kickback from those providers, each payphone operator
would be able to bring suit for breach of contract.)
Petitioners also make a further conceptual argument.
They point to cases in which this Court has said that a
party must possess a “personal stake” in a case in order to
have standing under Article III. See Baker v. Carr, 369
U. S. 186, 204 (1962). And petitioners add that, because
the aggregators will not actually benefit from a victory in
this case, they lack a “personal stake” in the litigation’s
outcome. The problem with this argument is that the
general “personal stake” requirement and the more spe-
cific standing requirements (injury in fact, redressability,
and causation) are flip sides of the same coin. They are
simply different descriptions of the same judicial effort to
assure, in every case or controversy, “that concrete ad-
verseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court so largely depends for illumination.” Ibid.
See also Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U. S. ___, ___ (2007)
(slip op., at 13) (“At bottom, the gist of the question of
standing is whether petitioners have such a personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Courts, during the past two centuries, appear to have
found that “concrete adverseness” where an assignee for
collection brings a lawsuit. And petitioners have provided
20 SPRINT COMMUNICATIONS CO. v. APCC SERVICES, INC.

Opinion of the Court

us with no grounds for reaching a contrary conclusion.
Petitioners make a purely functional argument, as well.
Read as a whole, they say, the assignments in this litiga-
tion constitute nothing more than a contract for legal
services. We think this argument is overstated. There is
an important distinction between simply hiring a lawyer
and assigning a claim to a lawyer (on the lawyer’s promise
to remit litigation proceeds). The latter confers a property
right (which creditors might attach); the former does not.
Finally, we note, as a practical matter, that it would be
particularly unwise for us to abandon history and prece-
dent in resolving the question before us. Were we to agree
with petitioners that the aggregators lack standing, our
holding could easily be overcome. For example, the
Agreement could be rewritten to give the aggregator a tiny
portion of the assigned claim itself, perhaps only a dollar
or two. Or the payphone operators might assign all of
their claims to a “Dial-Around Compensation Trust” and
then pay a trustee (perhaps the aggregator) to bring suit
on behalf of the trust. Accordingly, the far more sensible
course is to abide by the history and tradition of assignee
suits and find that the aggregators possess Article III
standing.
IV
Petitioners argue that, even if the aggregators have
standing under Article III, we should nonetheless deny
them standing for a number of prudential reasons. See
Elk Grove Unified School Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U. S. 1, 11
(2004) (prudential standing doctrine “embodies judicially
self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
First, petitioners invoke certain prudential limitations
that we have imposed in prior cases where a plaintiff has
sought to assert the legal claims of third parties. See, e.g.,
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 501 (1975) (expressing a
 Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 21

Opinion of the Court

“reluctance to exert judicial power when the plaintiff’s
claim to relief rests on the legal rights of third parties”);
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development
Corp., 429 U. S. 252, 263 (1977) (“In the ordinary case, a
party is denied standing to assert the rights of third per-
sons”); Secretary of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co.,
467 U. S. 947, 955 (1984) (a plaintiff ordinarily “ ‘cannot
rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of
third parties’ ”).
These third-party cases, however, are not on point.
They concern plaintiffs who seek to assert not their own
legal rights, but the legal rights of others. See, e.g.,
Warth, supra, at 499 (plaintiff “generally must assert his
own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to
relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties”
(emphasis added)); see also Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U. S.
125 (2004) (lawyers lack standing to assert the constitu-
tional rights of defendants deprived of appointed counsel
on appeal); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U. S. 400 (1991) (permit-
ting a criminal defendant to assert rights of juror dis-
criminated against because of race); Craig v. Boren, 429
U. S. 190 (1976) (permitting beer vendors to assert rights
of prospective male customers aged 18 to 21 who, unlike
females of the same ages, were barred from purchasing
beer). Here, the aggregators are suing based on injuries
originally suffered by third parties. But the payphone
operators assigned to the aggregators all “rights, title and
interest” in claims based on those injuries. Thus, in the
litigation before us, the aggregators assert what are, due
to that transfer, legal rights of their own. The aggrega-
tors, in other words, are asserting first-party, not third-
party, legal rights. Moreover, we add that none of the
third-party cases cited by petitioners involve assignments
or purport to overturn the longstanding doctrine permit-
ting an assignee to bring suit on an assigned claim.
Second, petitioners suggest that the litigation here
22 SPRINT COMMUNICATIONS CO. v. APCC SERVICES, INC.

Opinion of the Court

simply represents an effort by the aggregators and the
payphone operators to circumvent Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23’s class-action requirements. But we do not
understand how “circumvention” of Rule 23 could consti-
tute a basis for denying standing here. For one thing,
class actions are permissive, not mandatory. More impor-
tantly, class actions constitute but one of several methods
for bringing about aggregation of claims, i.e., they are but
one of several methods by which multiple similarly situ-
ated parties get similar claims resolved at one time and in
one federal forum. See Rule 20(a) (permitting joinder of
multiple plaintiffs); Rule 42 (permitting consolidation of
related cases filed in the same district court); 28 U. S. C.
§1407 (authorizing consolidation of pretrial proceedings
for related cases filed in multiple federal districts); §1404
(making it possible for related cases pending in different
federal courts to be transferred and consolidated in one
district court); D. Herr, Annotated Manual for Complex
Litigation §20.12, p. 279 (4th ed. 2007) (noting that
“[r]elated cases pending in different federal courts may be
consolidated in a single district” by transfer under 28
U. S. C. §1404(a)); J. Tidmarsh & R. Trangsrud, Complex
Litigation and the Adversary System 473–524 (1998)
(section on “Transfer Devices that Aggregate Cases in a
Single Venue”). Because the federal system permits ag-
gregation by other means, we do not think that the pay-
phone operators should be denied standing simply because
they chose one aggregation method over another.
Petitioners also point to various practical problems that
could arise because the aggregators, rather than the pay-
phone operators, are suing. In particular, they say that
the payphone operators may not comply with discovery
requests served on them, that the payphone operators may
not honor judgments reached in this case, and that peti-
tioners may not be able to bring, in this litigation, coun-
terclaims against the payphone operators. See Brief for
 Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 23

Opinion of the Court

Petitioners 46–48. Even assuming all that is so, courts
have long permitted assignee lawsuits notwithstanding
the fact that such problems could arise. Regardless,
courts are not helpless in the face of such problems. For
example, a district court can, if appropriate, compel a
party to collect and to produce whatever discovery-related
information is necessary. See Fed. Rules Civ. Proc.
26(b)(1), 30–31, 33–36. That court might grant a motion
to join the payphone operators to the case as “required”
parties. See Rule 19. Or the court might allow the carri-
ers to file a third-party complaint against the payphone
operators. See Rule 14(a). And the carriers could always
ask the Federal Communications Commission to find
administrative solutions to any remaining practical prob-
lems. Cf. 47 U. S. C. §276(b)(1)(A) (authorizing the FCC to
“prescribe regulations” that “ensure that all payphone
service providers are fairly compensated for each and
every completed [dial-around] call”). We do not say that
the litigation before us calls for the use of any such proce-
dural device. We mention them only to explain the lack of
any obvious need for the remedy that the carriers here
propose, namely, denial of standing.
Finally, we note that in this litigation, there has been no
allegation that the assignments were made in bad faith.
We note, as well, that the assignments were made for
ordinary business purposes. Were this not so, additional
prudential questions might perhaps arise. But these
questions are not before us, and we need not consider
them here.
V

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

It is so ordered.
24 SPRINT COMMUNICATIONS CO. v. APCC SERVICES, INC.

Opinion of the Court
Appendix to opinion of the Court

APPENDIX
Examples of cases in which state courts entertained or
otherwise indicated approval of suits by assignees for
collection only. References to “Pomeroy’s rule” are refer-
ences to the statement of law set forth in J. Pomeroy,
Remedies and Remedial Rights §132, p. 159 (1876).
1. Webb & Hepp v. Morgan, McClung & Co., 14 Mo.
428, 431 (1851) (holding that the assignees of a promissory
note for collection only can bring suit, even though they
lack a beneficial interest in the note, because the assign-
ment “creates in them such legal interest, that they
thereby become the persons to sue”);
2. Castner v. Austin Sumner & Co., 2 Minn. 44, 47–48
(1858) (holding that the assignees of promissory notes
were proper plaintiffs, regardless of the arrangement they
and their assignor had made in respect to the proceeds of
the litigation, because the defendants “can only raise the
objection of a defect of parties to the suit, when it appears
that some other person or party than the Plaintiffs have
such a legal interest in the note that a recovery by the
Plaintiffs would not preclude it from being enforced, and
they be thereby subjected to the risk of another suit for the
same subject-matter” (emphasis added));
3. Cottle v. Cole, 20 Iowa 481, 485–486 (1866) (holding
that the assignee could sue, notwithstanding the possibil-
ity that the assignor was the party “beneficially interested
in the action,” because “[t]he course of decision in this
State establishes this rule, viz.: that the party holding the
legal title of a note or instrument may sue on it though he
be an agent or trustee, and liable to account to another for
the proceeds of the recovery”);
4. Alle n v. Brown, 44 N. Y. 228, 231, 234 (1870) (opinion
of Hunt, Comm’r) (holding that the assignee with legal
title to a cause of action was “legally the real party in
interest” “[e]ven if he be liable to another as a debtor upon
 Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 25

Opinion of the Court
Appendix to opinion of the Court

his contract for the collection he may thus make”);
5. Meeker v. Claghorn, 44 N. Y. 349, 350, 353 (1871)
(opinion of Earl, Comm’r) (allowing suit by the assignee of
a cause of action even though the assignors “ ‘expected to
receive the amount recovered in the action,’ ” because the
assignee, as “legal holder of the claim,” was “the real party
in interest”);
6. Hays v. Hathorn, 74 N. Y. 486, 490 (1878) (holding
that so long as an assignee has legal title to the assigned
commercial paper, the assignee may bring suit even if the
assignment was “merely for the purpose of collection” and
he acts merely as “equitable trustee” for the assignor, i.e.,
the assignor maintains the beneficial interest in the
paper);
7. Searing v. Berry, 58 Iowa 20, 23, 24, 11 N. W. 708,
709 (1882) (where legal title to a judgment was assigned
“merely for the purpose of enabling plaintiff to enforce the
collection” and the assignor in fact retained the beneficial
interest, the plaintiff-assignee could “prosecute this suit to
enforce the collection of the judgment”);
8. Haysler v. Dawson, 28 Mo. App. 531, 536 (1888) (hold-
ing, in light of the “recognized practice in this state,” that
the assignee could bring suit to recover on certain ac-
counts even where the assignment of the accounts had
been made “with the agreement that they were to [be]
[he]ld solely for the purpose of [the litigation],” i.e., the
assignor maintained the beneficial interest in the accounts
(emphasis added));
9. Grant v. Heverin, 77 Cal. 263, 265, 264, 19 P. 493
(1888) (holding that the assignee of a bond could bring
suit, even though he lacked a beneficial interest in the
bond, and endorsing Pomeroy’s rule as “a clear and correct
explication of the law”);
10. Young v. Hudson, 99 Mo. 102, 106, 12 S. W. 632, 633
(1889) (holding that an assignee could sue to collect on an
account for merchandise sold, even though the money
26 SPRINT COMMUNICATIONS CO. v. APCC SERVICES, INC.

Opinion of the Court
Appendix to opinion of the Court

would be remitted to the assignor, because “[a]n assignee
of a chose in action arising out of contract, may sue upon it
in his own name, though the title was passed to him only
for the purpose of collection”);
11. Jackson v. Hamm, 14 Colo. 58, 61, 23 P. 88, 88–89
(1890) (holding that the assignee of a judgment was “the
real party in interest” and was “entitled to sue in his own
name,” even though the beneficial interest in the judg-
ment was held by someone else);
12. Saulsbury v. Corwin, 40 Mo. App. 373, 376 (1890)
(permitting suit by an assignee of a note who “had no
interest in the note” on the theory that “[o]ne who holds
negotiable paper for collection merely may sue on it in his
own name”);
13. Anderson v. Reardon, 46 Minn. 185, 186, 48 N. W.
777 (1891) (where plaintiff had been assigned a claim on
the “understanding” that he would remit the proceeds to
the assignor less the “amount due him for services already
rendered, and to be thereafter rendered” to the assignor,
the plaintiff could bring suit, even though he had “already
collected on the demand enough to pay his own claim for
services up to that time,” because “[i]t is no concern of the
defendant whether the assignee of a claim receives the
money on it in his own right or as trustee of the assignor”);
14. McDaniel v. Pressler, 3 Wash. 636, 638, 637, 29 P.
209, 210 (1892) (holding that the assignee of promissory
notes was the real party in interest, even the assignment
was “for the purpose of collection” and the assignee had
“no interest other than that of the legal holder of said
notes”);
15. Minnesota Thresher Mfg. Co. v. Heipler, 49 Minn.
395, 396, 52 N. W. 33 (1892) (upholding the plaintiff-
assignee’s judgment where that assignee “held the legal
title to the demand” and notwithstanding the fact that
“there was an agreement between the [assignor] and the
plaintiff that the latter took the [assignment] only for
 Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 27

Opinion of the Court
Appendix to opinion of the Court

collection”);
16. Wines v. Rio Grande W. R. Co., 9 Utah 228, 235, 33
P. 1042, 1044, 1045 (1893) (adopting Pomeroy’s rule and
holding that an assignee could bring suit based on causes
of action assigned to him “simply to enable him to sue”
and who “would turn over to the assignors all that was
recovered in the action, after deducting their proportion of
the expenses of the suit”);
17. Greig v. Riordan, 99 Cal. 316, 323, 33 P. 913, 916
(1893) (holding that the plaintiff-assignee could sue on
claims assigned by multiple parties “for collection,” stating
that “[i]t is [a] matter of common knowledge that for the
purpose of saving expense commercial associations and
others resort to this method” and repeating the rule that
“[i]n such cases the assignee becomes the legal holder of a
chose in action, which is sufficient to entitle him to
recover”);
18. Gomer v. Stockdale, 5 Colo. App. 489, 492, 39 P. 355,
357, 356 (1895) (permitting suit by a party who was as-
signed legal title to contractual rights, where the assignor
retained the beneficial interest, noting that the doctrine
that “prevails in Colorado” is that the assignee may bring
suit in his own name “although there may be annexed to
the transfer the condition that when the sum is collected
the whole or some part of it must be paid over to the
assignor”);
19. Cox’s Executors v. Crockett & Co., 92 Va. 50, 58, 57,
22 S. E. 840, 843 (1895) (finding that suit by assignor
following an adverse judgment against assignee was
barred by res judicata but endorsing Pomeroy’s rule that
an assignee could bring suit as the “real party in interest”
even where the assignee must “account to the assignor, or
other person, for the residue, or even is to thus account for
the whole proceeds” of the litigation);
20. Sroufe v. Soto Bros. & Co., 5 Ariz. 10, 11, 12, 43 P.
221 (1896) (holding that state law permits “a party to
28 SPRINT COMMUNICATIONS CO. v. APCC SERVICES, INC.

Opinion of the Court
Appendix to opinion of the Court

maintain an action on an account which has been assigned
to him for the purpose of collection, only” because such
parties are “holders of the legal title of said accounts”);
21. Ingham v. Weed, 5 Cal. Unreported Cases, 645, 649,
48 P. 318, 320 (1897) (holding that the assignees of prom-
issory notes could bring suit where the assignors retained
part of the beneficial interest in the outcome, and ex-
pressly noting that the assignees could bring suit even if
the entire interest in the notes had been assigned to them
as “agents for collection” because, citing Pomeroy and
prior California cases “to the same effect,” an assignee can
bring suit where he has “legal title” to a claim, notwith-
standing “any contemporaneous collateral agreement” by
which he is to account to the assignor for part or even “the
whole proceeds”);
22. Citizens Bank v. Corkings 9 S. D. 614, 615, 616, 70
N. W. 1059, 1060, rev’d on other grounds, 10 S. D. 98, 72
N. W. 99 (1897) (holding that where the assignee “took a
formal written assignment absolute in terms, but with the
understanding that he would take the claim, collect what
he could, and turn over to the company the proceeds
thereof less the expenses of collection,” the assignee could
sue because the “rule is that a written or verbal assign-
ment, absolute in terms, and vesting in the assignee the
apparent legal title to a chose in action, is unaffected by a
collateral contemporaneous agreement respecting the
proceeds”);
23. Chase v. Dodge, 111 Wis. 70, 73, 86 N. W. 548, 549
(1901) (adopting New York’s rule that an assignee is the
real party in interest so long as he “holds the legal title” to
an assigned claim, regardless of the existence of “any
private or implied understanding” between the assignor
and assignee concerning the beneficial interest (internal
quotation marks omitted));
24. Roth v. Continental Wire Co., 94 Mo. App. 236, 262–
264, 68 S. W. 594, 602 (1902) (noting that Missouri has
 Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 29

Opinion of the Court
Appendix to opinion of the Court

adopted Pomeroy’s rule and holding that the trial court
did not err in excluding evidence that plaintiff was as-
signed the cause of action for collection only);
25. Manley v. Park, 68 Kan. 400, 402, 75 P. 557, 558
(1904) (overruling prior state cases and holding that
where the assignment of a bond or note vests legal title in
the assignee, the assignee can bring suit even where the
assignee promises to remit to the assignor “a part or all of
the proceeds” (emphasis added));
26. Eagle Mining & Improvement Co. v. Lund, 14 N. M.
417, 420–422, 94 P. 949, 950 (1908) (adopting the rule that
the assignee of a note can bring suit even where the as-
signor, not the assignee, maintains the beneficial interest
in the note);
27. Harrison v. Pearcy & Coleman, 174 Ky. 485, 488,
487, 192 S. W. 513, 514–515 (1917) (holding that the
assignee could bring suit to collect on a note, even though
he was “an assignee for the purpose of collection only” and
had “no financial interest in the note”).
28. James v. Lederer-Strauss & Co., 32 Wyo. 377, 233 P.
137, 139 (1925) (“By the clear weight of authority a person
to whom a chose in action has been assigned for the pur-
pose of collection may maintain an action thereon . . . and
as such is authorized by statute in this state to maintain
an action in his own name”).
 Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 1

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________

No. 07–552
_________________

SPRINT COMMUNICATIONS COMPANY, L. P., ET AL.,
PETITIONERS v. APCC SERVICES, INC., ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
[June 23, 2008]

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS, with whom JUSTICE SCALIA,
JUSTICE THOMAS, and JUSTICE ALITO join, dissenting.
The majority concludes that a private litigant may sue
in federal court despite having to “pass back . . . all pro-
ceeds of the litigation,” Brief for Respondents 9, thus
depriving that party of any stake in the outcome of the
litigation. The majority reaches this conclusion, in flat
contravention of our cases interpreting the case-or-
controversy requirement of Article III, by reference to a
historical tradition that is, at best, equivocal. That history
does not contradict what common sense should tell us:
There is a legal difference between something and noth-
ing. Respondents have nothing to gain from their lawsuit.
Under settled principles of standing, that fact requires
dismissal of their complaint.1
I
Article III of the Constitution confines the judicial power
of the federal courts to actual “Cases” and “Controversies.”
§2. As we have recently reaffirmed, “[n]o principle is more
fundamental to the judiciary’s proper role in our system of
government than the constitutional limitation of federal-
——————
1 Because respondents have failed to demonstrate that they have

Article III standing to bring their claims, I do not reach the question
whether prudential considerations would also bar their suit.
2 SPRINT COMMUNICATIONS CO. v. APCC SERVICES, INC.

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

court jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies.” Daim-
lerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U. S. 332, 341 (2006) (quot-
ing Raines v. Byrd, 521 U. S. 811, 818 (1997); internal
quotation marks omitted). Unlike the political branches,
directly elected by the people, the courts derive their
authority under Article III, including the power of judicial
review, from “the necessity . . . of carrying out the judicial
function of deciding cases.” Cuno, supra, at 340. That is
why Article III courts “may exercise power only . . . ‘as a
necessity,’ ” that is, only when they are sure they have an
actual case before them. Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S. 737,
752 (1984) (quoting Chicago & Grand Trunk R. Co. v.
Wellman, 143 U. S. 339, 345 (1892)). “If a dispute is not a
proper case or controversy, the courts have no business
deciding it, or expounding the law in the course of doing
so.” Cuno, supra, at 341.
Given the importance of assuring a court’s jurisdiction
before deciding the merits of a case, “[w]e have always
insisted on strict compliance with th[e] jurisdictional
standing requirement.” Raines, supra, at 819. And until
today, it has always been clear that a party lacking a
direct, personal stake in the litigation could not invoke the
power of the federal courts. See Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 573 (1992) (plaintiff must demon-
strate a “concrete private interest in the outcome of [the]
suit”); Lance v. Coffman, 549 U. S. ___, ___ (2007) (per
curiam) (slip op., at 3) (plaintiff must seek relief that
“directly and tangibly benefits him” (quoting Lujan, supra,
at 574; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omit-
ted)); Larson v. Valente, 456 U. S. 228, 244, n. 15 (1982)
(Article III requires a litigant to show that a favorable
decision “will relieve a discrete injury to himself” (empha-
sis added)); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 499 (1975)
(“The Art. III judicial power exists only to redress or oth-
erwise to protect against injury to the complaining party”
(emphasis added)).
 Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 3

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

In recent years, we have elaborated the standing re-
quirements of Article III in terms of a three-part test—
whether the plaintiff can demonstrate an injury in fact
that is fairly traceable to the challenged actions of the
defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judi-
cial decision. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environ-
ment, 523 U. S. 83, 102–103 (1998). But regardless of how
the test is articulated, “the point has always been the
same: whether a plaintiff ‘personally would benefit in a
tangible way from the court’s intervention.’ ” Id., at 103,
n. 5 (quoting Warth, supra, at 508; emphasis added). An
assignee who has acquired the bare legal right to prose-
cute a claim but no right to the substantive recovery can-
not show that he has a personal stake in the litigation.
The Court’s decision today is unprecedented. Vermont
Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Ste-
vens, 529 U. S. 765 (2000), does not support it. Vermont
Agency, in recognizing that a qui tam relator as assignee
of the United States had standing to sue, did not dispense
with the essential requirement of Article III standing that
the plaintiff have a “concrete private interest in the out-
come of [the] suit.” Id., at 772 (quoting Lujan, supra, at
573; internal quotation marks omitted). In Vermont
Agency, the qui tam relator’s bounty was sufficient to
establish standing because it represented a “partial as-
signment of the Government’s damages claim,” encom-
passing both a legal right to assert the claim and a stake
in the recovery. 529 U. S., at 773. Thus, it was clear that
the False Claims Act gave the “relator himself an interest
in the lawsuit,” in addition to “the right to retain a fee out
of the recovery.” Id., at 772.
Here, respondents are authorized to bring suit on behalf
of the payphone operators, but they have no claim to the
recovery. Indeed, their take is not tied to the recovery in
any way. Respondents receive their compensation based
on the number of payphones and telephone lines operated
4 SPRINT COMMUNICATIONS CO. v. APCC SERVICES, INC.

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

by their clients, see App. 198, not based on the measure of
damages ultimately awarded by a court or paid by peti-
tioners as part of a settlement. Respondents received the
assignments only as a result of their willingness to as-
sume the obligation of remitting any recovery to the as-
signors, the payphone operators. That is, after all, the
entire point of the arrangement. The payphone operators
assigned their claims to respondents “for purposes of
collection,” App. to Pet. for Cert. 114a; respondents never
had any share in the amount collected. The absence of
any right to the substantive recovery means that respon-
dents cannot benefit from the judgment they seek and
thus lack Article III standing. “When you got nothing, you
got nothing to lose.” Bob Dylan, Like A Rolling Stone, on
Highway 61 Revisited (Columbia Records 1965).
To be sure, respondents doubtless have more than just a
passing interest in the litigation. As collection agencies,
respondents must demonstrate that they are willing to
make good on their threat to pursue their clients’ claims in
litigation. Even so, “an interest that is merely a ‘byprod-
uct’ of the suit itself cannot give rise to a cognizable injury
in fact for Article III standing purposes.” Vermont Agency,
supra, at 773. The benefit respondents would receive—the
general business goodwill that would result from a suc-
cessful verdict, the ability to collect dial-around compensa-
tion for their clients more effectively—is nothing more
than a byproduct of the current litigation. Such an inter-
est cannot support their standing to sue in federal court.
Cf. Steel Co., supra, at 107 (the costs of investigating and
prosecuting a substantive claim do not give rise to stand-
ing to assert the claim); Diamond v. Charles, 476 U. S. 54,
70 (1986) (an interest in recovering attorney’s fees does
not confer standing to litigate the underlying claim).
The undeniable consequence of today’s decision is that a
plaintiff need no longer demonstrate a personal stake in
the outcome of the litigation. Instead, the majority has
 Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 5

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

replaced the personal stake requirement with a completely
impersonal one. The right to sue is now the exact opposite
of a personal claim—it is a marketable commodity. By
severing the right to recover from the right to prosecute a
claim, the Court empowers anyone to bring suit on any
claim, whether it be the first assignee, the second, the
third, or so on. But, as we have said in another context,
standing is not “commutative.” Cuno, 547 U. S., at 352.
Legal claims, at least those brought in federal court, are
not fungible commodities.
The source of the Court’s mistake is easy to identify.
The Court goes awry when it asserts that the standing
inquiry focuses on whether the injury is likely to be re-
dressed, not whether the complaining party’s injury is
likely to be redressed. See ante, at 17–18. That could not
be more wrong. We have never approved federal-court
jurisdiction over a claim where the entire relief requested
will run to a party not before the court. Never. The Court
commits this mistake by treating the elements of standing
as separate strands rather than as interlocking and re-
lated elements meant to ensure a personal stake. Our
cases do not condone this approach.
The Court expressly rejected such an argument in Ver-
mont Agency, where the relator argued that he was “suing
to remedy an injury in fact suffered by the United States.”
529 U. S., at 771. We dismissed the argument out of hand,
noting that “[t]he Art. III judicial power exists only to
redress or otherwise to protect against injury to the com-
plaining party.” Id., at 771–772 (quoting Warth, 422 U. S.,
at 499; emphasis in Vermont Agency; internal quotation
marks omitted). Although the Court’s analysis in that
section of the opinion concerned the right of the relator to
assert the United States’ injury, the Court treated it as
axiomatic that any “redress” must also redound to the
benefit of the relator.
In Steel Co., the Court similarly rejected a basis for
6 SPRINT COMMUNICATIONS CO. v. APCC SERVICES, INC.

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

standing that turned on relief sought—the imposition of
civil penalties—that was “payable to the United States
Treasury,” but not to the plaintiff. 523 U. S., at 106. We
observed that the plaintiff sought “not remediation of its
own injury,” but merely the “vindication of the rule of
law.” Ibid. (emphasis added). Importantly, the Court
recognized that “[r]elief that does not remedy the injury
suffered cannot bootstrap a plaintiff into federal court;
that is the very essence of the redressability requirement.”
Id., at 107. Again, the Court’s emphasis on the party’s
injury makes clear that the basis for rejecting standing in
Steel Co. was the fact that the remedy sought would not
benefit the party before the Court.
The majority’s view of the Article III redressability
requirement is also incompatible with what we said in
Raines, 521 U. S. 811. In that case, we held that individ-
ual Members of Congress lacked standing to contest the
constitutionality of the Line Item Veto Act. We observed
that the Congressmen “do not claim that they have been
deprived of something to which they personally are enti-
tled.” Id., at 821. Rather, the Members sought to enforce
a right that ran to their office, not to their person. “If one
of the Members were to retire tomorrow, he would no
longer have a claim; the claim would be possessed by his
successor instead. The claimed injury thus runs (in a
sense) with the Member’s seat, a seat which the Member
holds . . . as trustee for his constituents, not as a preroga-
tive of personal power.” Ibid. We therefore held that the
individual Members did “not have a sufficient ‘personal
stake’ in th[e] dispute” to maintain their challenge. Id., at
830. See also Warth, supra, at 506 (denying standing
where “the record is devoid of any indication” that the
requested “relief would benefit petitioners”); Simon v.
Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U. S. 26, 39,
42 (1976) (denying standing to plaintiffs who did not
“stand to profit in some personal interest” because it was
 Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 7

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

“purely speculative” whether the relief sought “would
result in these respondents’ receiving the hospital services
they desire” (emphasis added)).
The majority finds that respondents have a sufficient
stake in this litigation because the substantive recovery
will initially go to them, and “[w]hat does it matter what
the aggregators do with the money afterward?” Ante, at
18. The majority’s assertion implies, incorrectly, that
respondents have, or ever had, a choice of what to do with
the recovery. It may be true that a plaintiff’s independent
decision to pledge his recovery to another, as in respon-
dents’ hypothetical of an “original owner of a claim who
signs a collateral agreement with a charity obligating
herself to donate every penny she recovers in [the] litiga-
tion,” Brief for Respondents 21, would not divest the plain-
tiff of Article III standing. But respondents never had the
right to direct the disposition of the recovery; they have
only the right to sue. The hypothetical plaintiff who
chooses to pledge her recovery to charity, by contrast, will
secure a personal benefit from the recovery. Unlike re-
spondents’ claims, the hypothetical plaintiff’s pre-existing
claim is not tied in any way to her separate agreement to
direct her recovery to charity. She has more than the
right to sue; she has the right to exercise her independent
authority to direct the proceeds as she sees fit. In that
situation, the Article III requirement that a plaintiff
demonstrate a personal stake in the outcome of the litiga-
tion is satisfied.2
——————
2 The majority believes that the examples of trustees, guardians ad
litem, receivers, and executors show that “federal courts routinely
entertain suits which will result in relief for parties that are not them-
selves directly bringing suit.” Ante, at 18. None of these examples is
pertinent to the question here. “A guardian ad litem or next friend . . .
is a nominal party only; the ward is the real party in interest . . . .” 6A
C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure §1548,
pp. 373–374 (2d ed. 1990). A receiver “is considered to be an officer of
8 SPRINT COMMUNICATIONS CO. v. APCC SERVICES, INC.

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

The Court believes that these standing principles, em-
bodying a “core component derived directly from the Con-
stitution,” Allen, 468 U. S., at 751, that is of “particular
importance in ensuring that the Federal Judiciary re-
spects the proper—and properly limited—role of the courts
in a democratic society,” and that is “crucial in maintain-
ing the tripartite allocation of power set forth in the Con-
stitution,” Cuno, 547 U. S., at 341 (internal quotation
marks omitted), should yield “as a practical matter” to the
prospect that a contrary “holding could easily be over-
come,” ante, at 20. The Court chooses to elevate expedi-
ency above the strictures imposed by the Constitution.
That is a tradeoff the Constitution does not allow. Cf.
Raines, supra, at 820 (“[W]e must put aside the natural
urge to proceed directly to the merits of this important
dispute and to ‘settle’ it for the sake of convenience and
efficiency”). Perhaps it is true that a “dollar or two,” ante,
at 20, would give respondents a sufficient stake in the

——————
the court, and therefore not an agent of the parties, whose appointment
is incident to other proceedings in which some form of primary relief is
sought.” 12 id., §2981, at 9–10 (2d ed. 1997) (footnote omitted). Trus-
tees hold legal title to the assets in the trust estate and have an inde-
pendent fiduciary obligation to sue to preserve those assets. The
trustee’s discharge of its legal obligation is an independent, personal
benefit that supports the trustee’s standing to sue in federal court. The
majority’s response that assignees for collection only have a “contrac-
tual obligation to litigate,” ante, at 19, is unavailing, because the
contractual obligation to sue and remit the proceeds of any recovery
was a condition of the assignment of the claim in the first place. The
majority’s reasoning is perfectly circular: A suit pursuant to a contract
to remit proceeds satisfies Article III because there is a contract to
remit proceeds.
In any event, the majority cannot dispute the point that suits by
trustees, guardians ad litem, executors, and the like make up a settled,
continuous practice “of the sort traditionally amenable to, and resolved
by, the judicial process.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment,
523 U. S. 83, 102 (1998). As shown below, the same cannot be said for
suits by assignees for collection only. See infra, at 12–15.
 Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 9

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

litigation. Article III is worth a dollar. And in any case,
the ease with which respondents can comply with the
requirements of Article III is not a reason to abandon our
precedents; it is a reason to adhere to them.
II
Given all this, it is understandable that the majority
opts to minimize its reliance on modern standing princi-
ples and to retreat to a broad, generalized reading of the
historical tradition of assignments. But that history does
not support the majority’s conclusion.
The first problem lies in identifying the relevant tradi-
tion. Much of the majority’s historical analysis focuses on
the generic (and undisputed) point that common law and
equity courts eventually permitted assignees to sue on
their assigned claims. See ante, at 5–10. I would treat
that point as settled as much by stare decisis, see Vermont
Agency, 529 U. S., at 773, as by the historic practice of the
King’s Bench and Chancery. But the general history of
assignments says nothing about the particular aspect of
suits brought on assigned claims that is relevant to this
case: whether an assignee who has acquired the legal right
to sue, but no right to any substantive recovery, can main-
tain an action in court. On that precise question, the
historical sources are either nonexistent or equivocal.
A
None of the English common-law sources on which the
majority relies establishes that assignments of this sort
would be permitted either at law or in equity. As the
majority’s discussion makes clear, both systems permitted
suits brought on assignments—either in equity by an
assignee having a beneficial interest in the litigation, or at
law by an assignee who had a power of attorney and sued
in the name of the assignor. See ante, at 6–8. But at all
times, suits based on assignments remained subject to the
10 SPRINT COMMUNICATIONS CO. v. APCC SERVICES, INC.

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

prohibition on champerty and maintenance. See 7 W.
Holdsworth, History of English Law 535–536 (1926).3 By
the 18th century, an assignment no longer constituted
maintenance per se, see id., at 536, but it appears to have
been an open question whether an assignment of the
“[b]are [r]igh[t] to [l]itigate” would fail as “[s]avouring” of
champerty and maintenance, see M. Smith, Law of As-
signment: The Creation and Transfer of Choses in Action
318, 321 (2007). In order to sustain an assignment of the
right to sue, the assignment had to include the transfer of
a property interest to which the right of action was inci-
dent or subsidiary. Id., at 321–322; see also Prosser v.
Edmonds, 1 Y. & C. Exch. 481, 160 Eng. Rep. 196 (1835);
Dickinson v. Burrell, 35 Beav. 257, 55 Eng. Rep. 894
(1866); 2 J. Story, Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence
§1040h, pp. 234–235 (8th ed. 1861); R. Megarry & P.
Baker, Snell’s Principles of Equity 82 (25th ed. 1960).
American courts as well understood the common-law
rule to require a transfer of interest to the assignee—over
and above the “naked right to bring a suit”—that gave the
assignee a “valuable right of property.” Traer v. Clews,
115 U. S. 528, 541 (1885). A New York court, surveying
the English sources, concluded that “an assignment to the
plaintiff of the assignor’s right to maintain and prosecute
an action for the specific performance of defendants’
agreement, amounts to nothing more than an assertion
that the assignor has undertaken to assign to the plaintiff
——————
3 Blackstone defined maintenance as the “officious intermeddling in a

suit that no way belongs to one, by maintaining or assisting either
party with money or otherwise, to prosecute or defend it . . . . This is an
offense against public justice, as it keeps alive strife and contention,
and perverts the remedial process of the law into an engine of oppres-
sion.” 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *134–*135. Champerty “is a
species of maintenance, . . . being a bargain with a plaintiff or defen-
dant campum partire, to divide the land or other matter sued for
between them, if they prevail at law; whereupon the champertor is to
carry on the party’s suit at his own expense.” Id., at *135.
 Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 11

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

a bare right to litigate for the former’s benefit exclusively.”
Williams v. Boyle, 1 Misc. 364, 367, 20 N. Y. S. 720, 722
(Ct. Common Pleas 1892). To secure standing in a court of
equity, the court held, “it must appear that the assignee’s
successful prosecution of the action is susceptible of per-
sonal enjoyment by him . . . .” Ibid. (emphasis added).
So while there is no doubt that at common law, courts of
law and equity sought ways of protecting the rights of
assignees, they did not do so to the exclusion of the age-
long objection to maintenance, which could be found when
the assignee lacked a sufficient interest in the subject
matter of the litigation. During the common-law period at
least, it remained an open question whether an assignee
for collection, who by agreement took nothing from the
suit, had a sufficient interest in the assigned debt to sup-
port his right to sue.
To be sure, the assignments at issue here purport to
give respondents “all rights, title and interest” in the
payphone operators’ claims for dial-around compensation.
App. to Pet. for Cert. 114a. But when severed from the
right to retain any of the substantive recovery, it is not
clear that common-law courts of law or equity would have
treated the assigned right to litigate as incidental or sub-
sidiary to the interest represented by the claim itself. Cf.
7 Holdsworth, supra, at 538 (“[I]t was not till certain
classes of rights . . . became more freely assignable in
equity, that it became necessary to distinguish between
the cases in which assignment was permitted and cases in
which it was not; and it is for this reason that we find very
little clear authority on these questions till quite modern
times”).4
——————
4 The fact that a bankrupt assignor could sue at law to recover debts

for the benefit of an assignee creditor, see ante, at 8 (citing Winch v.
Keeley, 1 T. R. 619, 99 Eng. Rep. 1284 (K. B. 1787)), says nothing about
the issue in this case. It is of course true that one has standing to sue
when the result of a favorable judgment will be the discharge of a debt
12 SPRINT COMMUNICATIONS CO. v. APCC SERVICES, INC.

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

I do not take the majority’s point to be that the common-
law tradition supplies the answer to this question. As the
majority concedes, it was not until the 19th century that
“courts began to consider the specific question presented
here.” Ante, at 10. But even granting this starting point,
the Court’s recitation of the 19th-century tradition fails to
account for the deep divergence in practice regarding the
right of assignees with no stake in the substantive recov-
ery to maintain an action in court.
The majority concedes that “some States during this
period of time refused to recognize assignee-for-collection
suits,” ante, at 12, but that refusal was substantially more
widespread than the majority acknowledges. See Robbins
v. Deverill, 20 Wis. 142 (1865); Bostwick v. Bryant, 113
Ind. 448, 16 N. E. 378 (1888); Moses v. Ingram, 99 Ala.
483, 12 So. 374 (1893); Brown v. Ginn, 66 Ohio St. 316, 64
N. E. 123 (1902); Coombs v. Harford, 99 Me. 426, 59 A.
529 (1904); Martin v. Mask, 158 N. C. 436, 74 S. E. 343
(1912). These courts concluded that assignees having no
legal or beneficial interest to vindicate could not sue on
the assigned claims.
Several more States, including some enlisted by the
majority, only eventually recognized the right of assignees
for collection to sue after taking inconsistent positions on
the issue. In fact, the rule regarding assignees for collec-
tion only was so unsettled that the Kansas Supreme Court
reversed itself twice in the span of 19 years. Compare
Krapp v. Eldridge, 33 Kan. 106, 5 P. 372 (1885) (assignees
for collection only may sue as the real party in interest),
with Stewart v. Price, 64 Kan. 191, 67 P. 553 (1902) (as-
——————
or other legal obligation. The only legal obligation respondents seek to
discharge is the obligation to remit the proceeds of the litigation to the
payphone operators. But as explained above, a party lacking the
independent right to direct the disposition of the proceeds cannot
demonstrate the personal stake required to invoke the authority of an
Article III court. See supra, at 7.
 Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 13

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

signees for collection only may not sue), with Manley v.
Park, 68 Kan. 400, 75 P. 557 (1904) (assignees for collec-
tion only may sue again). During this period, many other
courts reversed course on the flinty problem posed by
assignees for collection only. See Hoagland v. Van Etten,
23 Neb. 462, 36 N. W. 755 (1888), overruled by Archer v.
Musick, 147 Neb. 1018, 25 N. W. 2d 908 (1947); State ex
rel. Freebourn v. Merchant’s Credit Serv., Inc., 104 Mont.
76, 66 P. 2d 337 (1937), overruled by Rae v. Cameron, 112
Mont. 159, 114 P. 2d 1060 (1941).
The majority’s survey of 19th-century judicial practice
thus ignores a substantial contrary tradition during this
period. That tradition makes clear that state courts did
not regularly “entertai[n] suits virtually identical to the
litigation before us.” Ante, at 10. In reality, all that the
majority’s cases show is that the question whether assign-
ees for collection could maintain an action in court was
hotly contested—a live issue that spawned much litigation
and diverse published decisions. The confusion was much
remarked on by courts of this period, even those that
ultimately sided with the Court’s understanding of the
prevailing practice. See, e.g., Gomer v. Stockdale, 5 Colo.
App. 489, 492, 39 P. 355, 356 (1895) (“There is much con-
troversy in the various states respecting that almost uni-
versal code provision, that a suit must be prosecuted in
the name of the real party in interest”); Compton v. Atwell,
207 F. 2d 139, 140–141 (CADC 1953) (“[W]hether an
assignee for collection only is the real party in interest . . .
has produced a variance of judicial opinion” and “has so
divided other courts”).
Commentators have also called attention to the diver-
gent practice. As the majority notes, John Norton
Pomeroy observed that “there is some conflict” on the
question whether an assignee for collection obligated to
“account for the whole proceeds . . . is entitled to sue in his
own name.” Remedies and Remedial Rights §132, p. 159
14 SPRINT COMMUNICATIONS CO. v. APCC SERVICES, INC.

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

(1876) (internal quotation marks omitted). See also M.
Ferguson, Comment, The Real Party in Interest Rule
Revitalized: Recognizing Defendant’s Interest in the De-
termination of Proper Parties Plaintiff, 55 Cal. L. Rev.
1452, 1475 (1967) (“Nowhere do the courts manifest more
confusion than in deciding whether an assignee for collec-
tion only is a real party in interest”); Note, 51 Mich. L.
Rev. 587, 588 (1953) (observing that “[t]here is, however,
little agreement among the courts as to the meaning and
purpose of [real party in interest] provisions” and noting
that they have been construed “to prevent the owner of the
bare legal title to a chose in action from suing”). Indeed,
notable legal commentators of the period argued against
permitting suits by assignees for collection. See, e.g., 1 J.
Kerr, Law of Pleading and Practice §586, pp. 791–792
(1919) (“[T]he party in whom the legal interest is vested is
not always the real party in interest. ‘The ‘real party in
interest’ is the party who would be benefited or injured by
the judgment in the cause . . . . The rule should be re-
stricted to parties whose interests are in issue, and are to
be affected by the decree”).
This unsettled and conflicting state of affairs is under-
standable given the transformation in the understanding
of the common-law prohibition on suits by assignees with
no beneficial interest. The immediate cause for this trans-
formation was the merger of law and equity, and the
creation of real party in interest provisions intended to
reconcile the two forms of actions. Allen v. Brown, 44
N. Y. 228, 231 (1870) (noting that New York code provision
allowing assignees to sue as the real party in interest
“abolishe[d] the distinction between actions at law and
suits in equity”); see ante, at 10. The fusion of law and
equity forced courts to confront the novel question of what
to do with assignees for collection only, who could not sue
at law in their own name, and who could not recover on a
bill in equity for the lack of any beneficial interest to
 Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 15

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

enforce. Were such assignees, under the new system, real
parties in interest who could bring suit? It is not surpris-
ing that courts took conflicting positions on this question,
a question for which the historical tradition did not pro-
vide an answer. Given this, it is difficult to characterize a
practice as showing what sort of cases and controversies
were “traditionally amenable to . . . the judicial process,”
Steel Co., 523 U. S., at 102 (emphasis added), when the
practice was a self-conscious break in tradition.
In Vermont Agency, by contrast, the Court relied on a
long and unbroken tradition of informer statutes that
reached back to the 14th century and prevailed up to the
“period immediately before and after the framing of the
Constitution.” 529 U. S., at 776. The Court noted that the
American Colonies “pass[ed] several informer statutes
expressly authorizing qui tam suits,” and that the First
Congress itself “enacted a considerable number of in-
former statutes.” Ibid. This tradition provided relevant
evidence of what the Framers in 1787 would have under-
stood the terms “case” and “controversy” to mean. See
Coleman v. Miller, 307 U. S. 433, 460 (1939) (opinion of
Frankfurter, J.) (the Article III “[j]udicial power could
come into play only in matters that were the traditional
concern of the courts at Westminster and only if they
arose in ways that to the expert feel of lawyers constituted
‘Cases’ or ‘Controversies’ ”).5
——————
5 The statutes from the American Colonies add nothing to the major-
ity’s historical argument. See ante, at 9–10. Exceptions (some created
by statute) to the general rule against assignments at law arose early
in the common-law period, including exceptions for executors and
administrators of estates, assignees in bankruptcy, negotiable instru-
ments, and assignments involving the sovereign. See 29 R. Lord,
Williston on Contracts §74.2, pp. 214–215 (4th ed. 2003). What none of
these exceptions provides for, however, are suits brought by assignees
for collection only—i.e., assignees who have no share in the substantive
recovery. Such assignees, as the majority acknowledges, did not attract
the attention of courts until the 19th century. See ante, at 10.
16 SPRINT COMMUNICATIONS CO. v. APCC SERVICES, INC.

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

There is certainly no comparable tradition here. The
belated innovations of the mid- to late-19th-century courts
come too late to provide insight into the meaning of Article
III. Although we have sometimes looked to cases postdat-
ing the founding era as evidence of common-law tradi-
tions, we have never done so when the courts self-
consciously confronted novel questions arising from a
break in the received tradition, or where the practice of
later courts was so divergent. A belated and equivocal
tradition cannot fill in for the fundamental requirements
of Article III where, as here, those requirements are so
plainly lacking.
B
Nor do our own cases establish that we “long ago indi-
cated that assignees for collection only can properly bring
suit.” Ante, at 14. (If the majority truly believed that, one
would expect the cases to be placed front and center in the
Court’s analysis, rather than as an afterthought.) None
addressed the requirements of Article III, and so none
constitutes binding precedent. See Steel Co., supra, at 91
(“[D]rive-by jurisdictional rulings of this sort . . . have no
precedential effect”); Lewis v. Casey, 518 U. S. 343, 352, n.
2 (1996) (“[W]e have repeatedly held that the existence of
unaddressed jurisdictional defects has no precedential
effect”).
In Waite v. Santa Cruz, 184 U. S. 302 (1902), we ad-
dressed the then-existing statutory provision that barred
jurisdiction over suits “improperly or collusively made or
joined . . . for the purpose of creating a case cognizable or
removable under this act.” Id., at 325. We held that a
plaintiff who took legal title of multiple bonds “for pur-
poses of collection” could not satisfy the statute when the
bonds individually did not meet the amount in controversy
requirement. Ibid. The Court did not say that the “suit
could properly be brought in federal court,” ante, at 14, if
 Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 17

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

the only objection was the limitation placed on the plain-
tiff’s assignment; instead, the Court remarked that such a
limited assignment would not violate the statutory prohi-
bition on suits that are “improperly or collusively made or
joined,” Waite, supra, at 325.
In Spiller v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 253 U. S. 117
(1920), the plaintiff, secretary of the Cattle Raisers’ Asso-
ciation, sued to enforce an order of reparations issued by
the Interstate Commerce Commission, which found that
the defendant railroads had charged excessive shipping
rates to the members of the association. The question
before the Court was the validity of the lower court’s
ruling that the assignments to the plaintiff—which re-
served a beneficial interest in the assignors, the individual
members of the association—did not vest legal title in the
secretary “so as [to] authorize the commission to make the
award of damages in his name.” Id., at 134. We concluded
that the agency was authorized to issue the reparations
order in the name of the plaintiff because the assignments
were “absolute in form.” Ibid. We then concluded that
“beneficial or equitable title” was not necessary for the
plaintiff “to claim an award of reparation” and enforce
that award in his own name in court. Ibid. In other
words, the Court addressed merely the question whether
it was appropriate for a federal agency (not bound by the
constraints of Article III) to enter an award in the plain-
tiff’s name. In no way did the Court endorse the right of
an assignee for collection to sue as an initial matter in
federal court.
Nor did the Court address Article III standing require-
ments in Titus v. Wallick, 306 U. S. 282 (1939). There, we
found that an assignment “for purposes of suit,” where the
assignee had an obligation to account for the proceeds (in
part) to another, did not render the assignment invalid
under New York state law. Id., at 289. Thus, we held that
the Ohio courts had failed to give full faith and credit to
18 SPRINT COMMUNICATIONS CO. v. APCC SERVICES, INC.

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

an earlier, valid New York court judgment. Id., at 292. If
we had been presented with the Article III question, we
would likely have found it significant that the plaintiff-
assignee stood to take the balance of any recovery after
the proceeds were used to discharge the debts of the as-
signor (plaintiff’s brother) and the plaintiff’s wife. Id., at
286. But in any event, the Court’s conclusion that the
assignment was valid under New York law, where the
restrictions of Article III do not operate, does not support
the view that suits by assignees for collection are permis-
sible in federal courts.
C
When we have looked to history to confirm our own
Article III jurisdiction, we have relied on a firmly en-
trenched historical tradition that served to confirm the
application of modern standing principles. See Vermont
Agency, 529 U. S., at 774–778. The Court’s decision today
illustrates the converse approach. It relies on an equivo-
cal and contradictory tradition to override the clear appli-
cation of the case-or-controversy requirement that would
otherwise bar respondents’ suit.
But perhaps we should heed the counsels of hope rather
than despair. The majority, after all, purports to comply
with our Article III precedents, see ante, at 16–18, so those
precedents at least live to give meaning to “the judiciary’s
proper role in our system of government” another day.
Raines, 521 U. S., at 818. What is more, the majority
expressly and repeatedly grounds its finding of standing
on its conclusion that “history and precedent are clear”
that these types of suits “have long been permitted,” ante,
at 5, and that there is “a strong tradition” of such suits
“during the past two centuries,” ante, at 16, 19. This
conclusion is, for the reasons we have set forth, achingly
wrong—but at least the articulated test is clear and
daunting.
 Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 19

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

Finally, there is the majority’s point that all this fuss
could have been avoided for a dollar, see ante, at 20—a
price, by this point, that most readers would probably be
happy to contribute. The price will be higher in future
standing cases. And when it is—when standing really
matters—it would be surprising if the Court were to look
to a case in which it did not.
I would vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals and
remand for further proceedings.