Greenlaw v. United States

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2007 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

GREENLAW v. UNITED STATES

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

No. 07–330. Argued April 15, 2008—Decided June 23, 2008
Petitioner Greenlaw was convicted of seven drug and firearms charges
and was sentenced to imprisonment for 442 months. In calculating
this sentence, the District Court made an error. Overlooking this
Court’s controlling decision in Deal v. United States, 508 U. S. 129,
132–137, interpreting 18 U. S. C. §924(c)(1)(C)(i), and over the Gov-
ernment’s objection, the District Court imposed a 10-year sentence on
a count that carried a 25-year mandatory minimum term. Greenlaw
appealed urging, inter alia, that the appropriate sentence for all his
convictions was 15 years. The Government neither appealed nor
cross-appealed. The Eighth Circuit found no merit in any of
Greenlaw’s arguments, but went on to consider whether his sentence
was too low. The court acknowledged that the Government, while it
had objected to the trial court’s error at sentencing, had elected not to
seek alteration of Greenlaw’s sentence on appeal. Nonetheless, rely-
ing on the “plain-error rule” stated in Federal Rule of Criminal Pro-
cedure 52(b), the Court of Appeals ordered the District Court to
enlarge Greenlaw’s sentence by 15 years, yielding a total prison term
of 662 months.
Held: Absent a Government appeal or cross-appeal, the Eighth Circuit
could not, on its own initiative, order an increase in Greenlaw’s sen-
tence. Pp. 5–17.
(a) In both civil and criminal cases, in the first instance and on ap-
peal, courts follow the principle of party presentation, i.e., the parties
frame the issues for decision and the courts generally serve as neu-
tral arbiters of matters the parties present. To the extent courts
have approved departures from the party presentation principle in
criminal cases, the justification has usually been to protect a pro se
litigant’s rights. See Castro v. United States, 540 U. S. 375, 381–383.
2 GREENLAW v. UNITED STATES

Syllabus

The cross-appeal rule, pivotal in this case, is both informed by, and il-
lustrative of, the party presentation principle. Under that rule, it
takes a cross-appeal to justify a remedy in favor of an appellee. See
McDonough v. Dannery, 3 Dall. 188. This Court has called the rule
“inveterate and certain,” Morley Constr. Co. v. Maryland Casualty
Co., 300 U. S. 185, 191, and has in no case ordered an exception to it,
El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 526 U. S. 473, 480. No excep-
tion is warranted here. Congress has specified that when a United
States Attorney files a notice of appeal with respect to a criminal sen-
tence, “[t]he Government may not further prosecute [the] appeal
without the personal approval of the Attorney General, the Solicitor
General, or a deputy solicitor general designated by the Solicitor
General.” 18 U. S. C. §3742(b). This provision gives the top repre-
sentatives of the United States in litigation the prerogative to seek or
forgo appellate correction of sentencing errors, however plain they
may be. Pp. 5–8.
(b) The Eighth Circuit held that the plain-error rule, Fed. Rule
Crim. Proc. 52(b), authorized it to order the sentence enhancement
sua sponte. Nothing in the text or history of Rule 52(b), or in this
Court’s decisions, suggests that the plain-error rule was meant to
override the cross-appeal requirement. In every case in which correc-
tion of a plain error would result in modifying a judgment to the ad-
vantage of a party who did not seek this Court’s review, the Court
has invoked the cross-appeal rule to bar the correction. See, e.g.,
Chittenden v. Brewster, 2 Wall. 191; Strunk v. United States, 412
U. S. 434. Even if it would be proper for an appeals court to initiate
plain-error review in some cases, sentencing errors that the Govern-
ment has refrained from pursuing would not fit the bill. In §3742(b),
Congress assigned to leading Department of Justice officers responsi-
bility for determining when Government pursuit of a sentencing ap-
peal is in order. Rule 52(b) does not invite appellate court interfer-
ence with the assessment of those officers. Pp. 8–10.
(c) Amicus curiae, invited by the Court to brief and argue the case
in support of the Court of Appeals’ judgment, links argument based
on Rule 52(b) to similar argument based on 28 U. S. C. §2106. For
substantially the same reasons that Rule 52(b) does not override the
cross-appeal rule, §2106 does not do so either. P. 10.
(d) Amicus also argues that 18 U. S. C. §3742, which governs appel-
late review of criminal sentences, overrides the cross-appeal rule for
sentences “imposed in violation of law,” §3742(e). Amicus’ construc-
tion of §3742 is novel and complex, but ultimately unpersuasive. At
the time §3742 was enacted, the cross-appeal rule was a solidly
grounded rule of appellate practice. Congress had crafted explicit ex-
ceptions to the cross-appeal rule in earlier statutes governing sen-
 Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 3

Syllabus

tencing appeals, i.e., the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 and
the Controlled Substances Act of 1970. When Congress repealed
those exceptions and enacted §3742, it did not similarly express in
the text of §3742 any exception to the cross-appeal rule. This draft-
ing history suggests that Congress was aware of the cross-appeal rule
and framed §3742 expecting that the new provision would operate in
harmony with it. Pp. 10–13.
(e) In increasing Greenlaw’s sentence sua sponte, the Eighth Cir-
cuit did not advert to the procedural rules setting firm deadlines for
launching appeals and cross-appeals. See Fed. Rules App. Proc.
3(a)(1), 4(b)(1)(B)(ii), 4(b)(4), 26(b). The strict time limits on notices
of appeal and cross-appeal serve, as the cross-appeal rule does, the
interests of the parties and the legal system in fair warning and fi-
nality. The time limits would be undermined if an appeals court
could modify a judgment in favor of a party who filed no notice of ap-
peal. In a criminal prosecution, moreover, the defendant would ap-
peal at his peril, with nothing to alert him that, on his own appeal,
his sentence would be increased until the appeals court so decreed.
Pp. 13–15.
(f) Nothing in this opinion requires courts to modify their current
practice in “sentencing package cases” involving multicount indict-
ments and a successful attack on some but not all of the counts of
conviction. The appeals court, in such cases, may vacate the entire
sentence on all counts so that the trial court can reconfigure the sen-
tencing plan. On remand, trial courts have imposed a sentence on
the remaining counts longer than the sentence originally imposed on
those particular counts, but yielding an aggregate sentence no longer
than the aggregate sentence initially imposed. This practice is not at
odds with the cross-appeal rule, which stops appellate judges from
adding years to a defendant’s sentence on their own initiative. In
any event, this is not a “sentencing package” case. Greenlaw was un-
successful on all his appellate issues. The Eighth Circuit, therefore,
had no occasion to vacate his sentence and no warrant, in the absence
of a cross-appeal, to order the addition of 15 years to his sentence.
Pp. 15–16.
481 F. 3d 601, vacated and remanded.

GINSBURG, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
C. J., and SCALIA, KENNEDY, SOUTER, and THOMAS, JJ., joined. BREYER,
J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. ALITO, J., filed a dis-
senting opinion, in which STEVENS, J., joined, and in which BREYER, J.,
joined as to Parts I, II, and III.
 Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________

No. 07–330
_________________

MICHAEL GREENLAW, AKA MIKEY, PETITIONER v.

UNITED STATES

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

[June 23, 2008]

JUSTICE GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case concerns the role of courts in our adversarial
system. The specific question presented: May a United
States Court of Appeals, acting on its own initiative, order
an increase in a defendant’s sentence? Petitioner Michael
J. Greenlaw was convicted of various offenses relating to
drugs and firearms, and was sentenced to imprisonment
for 442 months. He appealed urging, inter alia, that his
sentence was unreasonably long. After rejecting all of
Greenlaw’s arguments, the Court of Appeals determined,
without Government invitation, that the applicable law
plainly required a prison sentence 15 years longer than
the term the trial court had imposed. Accordingly, the
appeals court instructed the trial court to increase
Greenlaw’s sentence to 622 months. We hold that, absent
a Government appeal or cross-appeal, the sentence
Greenlaw received should not have been increased. We
therefore vacate the Court of Appeals’ judgment.
I
Greenlaw was a member of a gang that, for years, con-
trolled the sale of crack cocaine in a southside Minneapolis
2 GREENLAW v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

neighborhood. See United States v. Carter, 481 F. 3d 601,
604 (CA8 2007) (case below). To protect their drug stash
and to prevent rival dealers from moving into their terri-
tory, gang members carried and concealed numerous
weapons. See id., at 605. For his part in the operation,
Greenlaw was charged, in the United States District Court
for the District of Minnesota, with eight offenses; after
trial, he was found guilty on seven of the charges. App. to
Pet. for Cert. 16a–17a.
Among Greenlaw’s convictions were two for violating 18
U. S. C. §924(c)(1)(A), which prohibits carrying a firearm
during and in relation to a crime of violence or a drug
trafficking crime: His first §924(c) conviction was for
carrying a firearm in connection with a crime committed
in 1998; his second, for both carrying and discharging a
firearm in connection with a crime committed in 1999.
App. to Pet. for Cert. 17a. A first conviction for violating
§924(c) carries a mandatory minimum term of 5 years, if
the firearm is simply carried. §924(c)(1)(A)(i). If the
firearm is also discharged, the mandatory minimum in-
creases to 10 years. §924(c)(1)(A)(iii). For “a second or
subsequent conviction,” however, whether the weapon is
only carried or discharged as well, the mandatory mini-
mum jumps to 25 years. §924(c)(1)(C)(i). Any sentence for
violating §924(c), moreover, must run consecutively to
“any other term of imprisonment,” including any other
conviction under §924(c). §924(c)(1)(D)(ii).
At sentencing, the District Court made an error. Over
the Government’s objection, the court held that a §924(c)
conviction does not count as “second or subsequent” when
it is “charged in the same indictment” as the defendant’s
first §924(c) conviction. App. 59, 61–62. The error was
plain because this Court had held, in Deal v. United
States, 508 U. S. 129 (1993), that when a defendant is
charged in the same indictment with more than one of-
fense qualifying for punishment under §924(c), all convic-
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Opinion of the Court

tions after the first rank as “second or subsequent,” see
id., at 132–137.
As determined by the District Court, Greenlaw’s sen-
tence included 262 months (without separately counting
sentences that ran concurrently) for all his convictions
other than the two under §924(c). For the first §924(c)
offense, the court imposed a 5-year sentence in accord with
§924(c)(1)(A)(i). As to the second §924(c) conviction, the
District Court rejected the Government’s request for the
25-year minimum prescribed in §924(c)(1)(C) for “second
or subsequent” offenses; instead, it imposed the 10-year
term prescribed in §924(c)(1)(A)(iii) for first-time offenses.1
The total sentence thus calculated came to 442 months.
Greenlaw appealed to the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Eighth Circuit, urging, inter alia, that the
appropriate total sentence for all his crimes was 15 years.
See 481 F. 3d, at 607. The Court of Appeals found no
merit in any of Greenlaw’s arguments. Id., at 606–607.
Although the Government did not appeal or cross-appeal,
id., at 608, it did note, on brief and at oral argument, the
District Court’s error: Greenlaw’s sentence should have
been 15 years longer than the 442 months imposed by the
District Court, the Government observed, because his
second §924(c) conviction called for a 25-year (not a 10-
year) mandatory minimum consecutive sentence.
The Government made the observation that the sen-
tence was 15 years too short only to counter Greenlaw’s
argument that it was unreasonably long. See App. 84–86;
Recording of Oral Arg. in United States v. Carter, No. 05–
3391, (CA8, Sept. 26, 2006), at 16:53–19:04, available at
http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/oralargs/oaFrame.html (as
visited June 13, 2008). Having refrained from seeking
——————
1 The court added 10 years rather than 5 based on the jury’s finding

that the firearm Greenlaw carried in connection with the second §924(c)
offense had been discharged. See App. 44–45, 59–60.
4 GREENLAW v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

correction of the District Court’s error by pursuing its own
appeal, the Government simply urged that Greenlaw’s
sentence should be affirmed.
The Court of Appeals acknowledged that the Govern-
ment, while objecting at sentencing to the trial court’s
erroneous reading of §924(c)(1)(C), had elected to seek no
appellate court alteration of Greenlaw’s sentence. 481
F. 3d, at 608. Relying on the “plain-error rule” stated in
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b), however, the
appeals court held that it had discretion to raise and
correct the District Court’s error on its own initiative. 481
F. 3d, at 608–609. The Court of Appeals therefore vacated
the sentence and instructed the District Court “to impose
the [statutorily mandated] consecutive minimum sentence
of 25 years.” Id., at 611.
Petitioning for rehearing and rehearing en banc,
Greenlaw asked the Eighth Circuit to adopt the position
advanced by the Seventh Circuit in United States v.
Rivera, 411 F. 3d 864 (2005). App. 95. “By deciding not to
take a cross-appeal,” the Seventh Circuit stated, “the
United States has ensured that [the defendant’s] sentence
cannot be increased.” 411 F. 3d, at 867. The Eighth Cir-
cuit denied rehearing without an opinion. App. to Pet. for
Cert. 28a. On remand, as instructed by the Court of Ap-
peals, the District Court increased Greenlaw’s sentence by
15 years, yielding a total prison term of 622 months. App.
103–104, 109.
Greenlaw petitioned for certiorari noting a division
among the Circuits on this question: When a defendant
unsuccessfully challenges his sentence as too high, may a
court of appeals, on its own initiative, increase the sen-
tence absent a cross-appeal by the Government? In re-
sponse, the Government “agree[d] with [Greenlaw] that
the court of appeals erred in sua sponte remanding the
case with directions to enhance petitioner’s sentence.”
Brief in Opposition 12. We granted review and invited Jay
 Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 5

Opinion of the Court

T. Jorgensen to brief and argue this case, as amicus cu-
riae, in support of the Court of Appeals’ judgment. 552
U. S. ___ (2008). Mr. Jorgensen accepted the appointment
and has well fulfilled his assigned responsibility.
II
In our adversary system, in both civil and criminal
cases, in the first instance and on appeal, we follow the
principle of party presentation. That is, we rely on the
parties to frame the issues for decision and assign to
courts the role of neutral arbiter of matters the parties
present. To the extent courts have approved departures
from the party presentation principle in criminal cases,
the justification has usually been to protect a pro se liti-
gant’s rights. See Castro v. United States, 540 U. S. 375,
381–383 (2003).2 But as a general rule, “[o]ur adversary
system is designed around the premise that the parties
know what is best for them, and are responsible for ad-
vancing the facts and arguments entitling them to relief.”
Id., at 386 (SCALIA, J., concurring in part and concurring
in judgment).3 As cogently explained:
“[Courts] do not, or should not, sally forth each day
looking for wrongs to right. We wait for cases to come
to us, and when they do we normally decide only ques-
tions presented by the parties. Counsel almost always
know a great deal more about their cases than we do,
and this must be particularly true of counsel for the
——————
2 Because this case does not present the issue, we take no position on

whether correction of an error prejudicial to a nonappealing criminal
defendant might be justified as a measure to obviate the need for a
collateral attack. See post, at 6–7.
3 Cf. Kaplan, Civil Procedure—Reflections on the Comparison of Sys-

tems, 9 Buffalo L. Rev. 409, 431–432 (1960) (U. S. system “exploits the
free-wheeling energies of counsel and places them in adversary confron-
tation before a detached judge”; “German system puts its trust in a
judge of paternalistic bent acting in cooperation with counsel of some-
what muted adversary zeal”).
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Opinion of the Court

United States, the richest, most powerful, and best
represented litigant to appear before us.” United
States v. Samuels, 808 F. 2d 1298, 1301 (CA8 1987)
(R. Arnold, J., concurring in denial of reh’g en banc).
The cross-appeal rule, pivotal in this case, is both in-
formed by, and illustrative of, the party presentation
principle. Under that unwritten but longstanding rule, an
appellate court may not alter a judgment to benefit a
nonappealing party. This Court, from its earliest years,
has recognized that it takes a cross-appeal to justify a
remedy in favor of an appellee. See McDonough v.
Dannery, 3 Dall. 188, 198 (1796). We have called the rule
“inveterate and certain.” Morley Constr. Co. v. Maryland
Casualty Co., 300 U. S. 185, 191 (1937).
Courts of Appeals have disagreed, however, on the
proper characterization of the cross-appeal rule: Is it
“jurisdictional,” and therefore exceptionless, or a “rule of
practice,” and thus potentially subject to judicially created
exceptions? Compare, e.g., Johnson v. Teamsters Local
559, 102 F. 3d 21, 28–29 (CA1 1996) (cross-appeal rule “is
mandatory and jurisdictional”), with, e.g., American Roll-
On Roll-Off Carrier, LLC v. P & O Ports Baltimore, Inc.,
479 F. 3d 288, 295–296 (CA4 2007) (“cross-appeal re-
quirement [is] one of practice, [not] a strict jurisdictional
requirement”). Our own opinions contain statements
supporting both characterizations. Compare, e.g., Morley
Constr. Co., 300 U. S., at 187 (cross-appeal rule defines
“[t]he power of an appellate court to modify a decree”
(emphasis added)), with, e.g., Langnes v. Green, 282 U. S.
531, 538 (1931) (cross-appeal requirement is “a rule of
practice which generally has been followed”).
In El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 526 U. S. 473,
480 (1999), we declined to decide “the theoretical status” of
the cross-appeal rule. It sufficed to point out that the rule
was “firmly entrenched” and served to advance “institu-
 Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 7

Opinion of the Court

tional interests in fair notice and repose.” Ibid. “Indeed,”
we noted, “in more than two centuries of repeatedly en-
dorsing the cross-appeal requirement, not a single one of
our holdings has ever recognized an exception to the rule.”
Ibid. Following the approach taken in Neztsosie, we again
need not type the rule “jurisdictional” in order to decide
this case.
Congress has eased our decision by specifying the in-
stances in which the Government may seek appellate
review of a sentence, and then adding this clear instruc-
tion: Even when a United States Attorney files a notice of
appeal with respect to a sentence qualifying for review,
“[t]he Government may not further prosecute [the] appeal
without the personal approval of the Attorney General,
the Solicitor General, or a deputy solicitor general desig-
nated by the Solicitor General.” 18 U. S. C. §3742(b).
Congress thus entrusted to named high-ranking officials
within the Department of Justice responsibility for deter-
mining whether the Government, on behalf of the public,
should seek a sentence higher than the one imposed. It
would severely undermine Congress’ instruction were
appellate judges to “sally forth” on their own motion, cf.
supra, at 5, to take up errors adverse to the Government
when the designated Department of Justice officials have
not authorized an appeal from the sentence the trial court
imposed.4
——————
4 The dissent reads §3742(b) not as a restraint on sua sponte error
correction by appellate courts, but simply as apportioning “authority
within an executive department.” Post, at 11; see post, at 13
(“[P]erhaps Congress wanted to . . . giv[e] high-level officials the author-
ity to nix meritless or marginal [sentencing appeals].”). A statute is
hardly needed to establish the authority of the Attorney General and
Solicitor General over local U. S. Attorneys on matters relating to the
prosecution of criminal cases, including appeals of sentences. It seems
unlikely, moreover, that Congress, having lodged discretion in top-
ranking Department of Justice officers, meant that discretion to be
shared with more than 200 appellate judges.
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Opinion of the Court

This Court has recognized that “the Executive Branch
has exclusive authority and absolute discretion to decide
whether to prosecute a case.” United States v. Nixon, 418
U. S. 683, 693 (1974). We need not decide whether compa-
rable authority and discretion are lodged in the Executive
Branch with respect to the pursuit of issues on appeal.
We need only recognize that Congress, in §3742(b), has
accorded to the top representatives of the United States in
litigation the prerogative to seek or forgo appellate correc-
tion of sentencing errors, however plain they may be.
That measure should garner the Judiciary’s full respect.
III

A

In ordering the District Court to add 15 years to
Greenlaw’s sentence, despite the absence of a cross-appeal
by the Government, the Court of Appeals identified Fed-
eral Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b) as the source of its
authority. See 481 F. 3d, at 608–609, and n. 5. Rule 52(b)
reads: “A plain error that affects substantial rights may be
considered even though it was not brought to the court’s
attention.” Nothing in the text or history of Rule 52(b)
suggests that the rulemakers, in codifying the plain-error
doctrine, meant to override the cross-appeal requirement.
See Advisory Committee’s Notes on Fed. Rule Crim. Proc.
52, 18 U. S. C. App., p. 1664 (describing Rule 52(b) as “a
restatement of existing law”).
Nor do our opinions support a plain-error exception to
the cross-appeal rule. This Court has indeed noticed, and
ordered correction of, plain errors not raised by defen-
dants, but we have done so only to benefit a defendant
who had himself petitioned the Court for review on other
grounds. See, e.g., Silber v. United States, 370 U. S. 717
(1962) (per curiam). In no case have we applied plain-
error doctrine to the detriment of a petitioning party.
Rather, in every case in which correction of a plain error
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Opinion of the Court

would result in modification of a judgment to the advan-
tage of a party who did not seek this Court’s review, we
have invoked the cross-appeal rule to bar the correction.
In Chittenden v. Brewster, 2 Wall. 191 (1865), for exam-
ple, the appellants asserted that an award entered in their
favor was too small. A prior decision of this Court, how-
ever, made it plain that they were entitled to no award at
all. See id., at 195–196 (citing Jones v. Green, 1 Wall. 330
(1864)). But because the appellee had not filed a cross-
appeal, the Court left the award undisturbed. See 2 Wall.,
at 196. Strunk v. United States, 412 U. S. 434 (1973),
decided over a century later, is similarly illustrative.
There, the Court of Appeals had determined that the
defendant was denied his right to a speedy trial, but held
that the proper remedy was reduction of his sentence as
compensation for the delay, not dismissal of the charges
against him. As petitioner in this Court, the defendant
sought review of the remedial order. See id., at 435. The
Court suggested that there may have been no speedy trial
violation, as “it seem[ed] clear that [the defendant] was
responsible for a large part of the . . . delay.” Id., at 436.
But because the Government had not raised the issue by
cross-petition, we considered the case on the premise that
the defendant had been deprived of his Sixth Amendment
right, id., at 437, and ruled that dismissal of the indict-
ment was the proper remedy, id., at 439–440.
Even if there might be circumstances in which it would
be proper for an appellate court to initiate plain-error
review, sentencing errors that the Government refrained
from pursuing would not fit the bill. Heightening the
generally applicable party presentation principle, Con-
gress has provided a dispositive direction regarding sen-
tencing errors that aggrieve the Government. In §3742(b),
as earlier explained, see supra, at 7, Congress designated
leading Department of Justice officers as the decisionmak-
ers responsible for determining when Government pursuit
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Opinion of the Court

of a sentencing appeal is in order. Those high officers,
Congress recognized, are best equipped to determine
where the Government’s interest lies. Rule 52(b) does not
invite appellate court interference with their assessment.
B
Amicus supporting the Eighth Circuit’s judgment links
the argument based on Rule 52(b) to a similar argument
based on 28 U. S. C. §2106. See Brief for Amicus Curiae
by Invitation of the Court 40–43 (hereinafter Jorgensen
Brief). Section 2106 states that federal appellate courts
“may affirm, modify, vacate, set aside or reverse any
judgment . . . lawfully brought before it for review.” For
substantially the same reasons that Rule 52(b) does not
override the cross-appeal requirement, §2106 does not do
so either. Section 2106 is not limited to plain errors, much
less to sentencing errors in criminal cases—it applies to all
cases, civil and criminal, and to all errors. Were the con-
struction amicus offers correct, §2106 would displace the
cross-appeal rule cross-the-board. The authority described
in §2106, we have observed, “must be exercised consistent
with the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure as interpreted by this Court.” Unitherm Food Sys-
tems, Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 546 U. S. 394, 402–403,
n. 4 (2006). No different conclusion is warranted with
respect to the “inveterate and certain” cross-appeal rule.
Morley Constr. Co., 300 U. S., at 191.
C
In defending the Court of Appeals judgment, amicus
places heavy weight on an argument pinned not to
Rule 52(b) or 28 U. S. C. §2106, but to the text of 18
U. S. C. §3742, the Criminal Code provision governing
appellate review of criminal sentences. As amicus reads
§3742, once either party appeals a sentence, the Court of
Appeals must remand “any illegal sentence regardless of
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Opinion of the Court

whether the remand hurts or helps the appealing party.”
Jorgensen Brief 9. Congress so directed, amicus argues,
by instructing that, upon review of the record, a court of
appeals “shall determine . . . whether the sentence was
imposed in violation of law,” §3742(e) (emphasis added),
and “shall remand” if it so determines, §3742(f)(1) (2000
ed., Supp. V) (emphasis added). See Jorgensen Brief 10–
11, and n. 3.
Amicus makes a further text-based observation. He
notes that §3742(f)(2)—the provision covering sentences
“outside the applicable [G]uideline range”—calls for a
remand only where a departure from the Federal Sentenc-
ing Guidelines harms the appellant. In contrast, amicus
emphasizes, §3742(f)(1)—the provision controlling sen-
tences imposed “in violation of law” and Guideline applica-
tion errors—contains no such appellant-linked limitation.
The inference amicus draws from this distinction is that
Congress intended to override the cross-appeal rule for
sentences controlled by §3742(f)(1), i.e., those imposed “in
violation of law” (or incorrectly applying the Guidelines),
but not for Guideline departure errors, the category cov-
ered by §3742(f)(2). See id., at 14–15.
This novel construction of §3742, presented for the first
time in the brief amicus filed in this Court,5 is clever and
complex, but ultimately unpersuasive. Congress enacted
§3742 in 1984. See Sentencing Reform Act, §213(a), 98
Stat. 2011. At that time, the cross-appeal requirement
was a solidly grounded rule of appellate practice. See
supra, at 6. The inference properly drawn, we think, is
that Congress was aware of the cross-appeal rule, and
framed §3742 expecting that the new provision would
——————
5 An appellee or respondent may defend the judgment below on a

ground not earlier aired. See United States v. American Railway
Express Co., 265 U. S. 425, 435 (1924) (“[T]he appellee may, without
taking a cross-appeal, urge in support of a decree any matter appearing
in the record[.]”).
12 GREENLAW v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

operate in harmony with the “inveterate and certain” bar
to enlarging judgments in favor of an appellee who filed no
cross-appeal. Cf. Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v.
Solimino, 501 U. S. 104, 108 (1991) (“Congress is under-
stood to legislate against a background of common-law
adjudicatory principles.”).
Congress indicated awareness of the cross-appeal rule in
an earlier measure, the Organized Crime Control Act of
1970 (OCCA), Pub. L. 91–452, 84 Stat. 922, which pro-
vided for review of sentences of “dangerous special offend-
ers.” See §1001(a), id., at 948–951. For that Act, Con-
gress crafted an explicit exception to the cross-appeal rule.
It ordered that an appeal of a sentence taken by the Gov-
ernment “shall be deemed the taking of [an appeal] by the
defendant.” Id., at 950. But the “deeming” ran in only one
direction: “[A] sentence may be made more severe” OCCA
provided, “only on review . . . taken by the United States.”
Id., at 950–951.6 When Congress repealed this provision
and, in §3742, broadly provided for appellate review of
sentences, it did not similarly express in the new text any
exception to the cross-appeal rule. In short, Congress
formulated a precise exception to the cross-appeal rule
when that was its intention. Notably, the exception Con-
gress legislated did not expose a defendant to a higher
sentence in response to his own appeal. Congress spoke
plainly in the 1970 legislation, leaving nothing for a court
to infer. We therefore see no reason to read the current
statute in the inventive manner amicus proposes, infer-
ring so much from so little.
Amicus’ reading of §3742, moreover, would yield some
strange results. We note two, in particular. Under his
——————
6 The Controlled Substances Act of 1970, §409(h), 84 Stat. 1268–1269,

contained matching instructions applicable to “dangerous special drug
offender[s].” The prescriptions in both Acts were replaced by §3742.
See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, §§212(2), 213(a), 219, 98 Stat. 1987,
2011, 2027.
 Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 13

Opinion of the Court

construction, §3742 would give with one hand what it
takes away with the other: §3742(b) entrusts to certain
Government officials the decision whether to appeal an
illegally low sentence, see supra, at 7; but according to
amicus, §§3742(e) and (f) would instruct appellate courts
to correct an error of that order on their own initiative,
thereby trumping the officials’ decision. We resist attrib-
uting to Congress an intention to render a statute so
internally inconsistent. Cf. Western Air Lines, Inc. v.
Board of Equalization of S. D., 480 U. S. 123, 133 (1987)
(“The illogical results of applying [a proffered] interpreta-
tion . . . argue strongly against the conclusion that Con-
gress intended th[o]se results[.]”). Further, the construc-
tion proposed by amicus would draw a puzzling distinction
between incorrect applications of the Sentencing Guide-
lines, controlled by §3742(f)(1), and erroneous departures
from the Guidelines, covered by §3742(f)(2). The latter
would be subject to the cross-appeal rule, the former
would not. We do not see why Congress would want to
differentiate Guidelines decisions this way.7
D
In increasing Greenlaw’s sentence by 15 years on its
own initiative, the Eighth Circuit did not advert to the
procedural rules setting deadlines for launching appeals
and cross-appeals. Unyielding in character, these rules
——————
7 In rejecting the interpretation of §§3742(e) and (f) proffered by
amicus, we take no position on the extent to which the remedial opinion
in United States v. Booker, 543 U. S. 220 (2005), excised those provi-
sions. Compare Rita v. United States, 551 U. S. ___, ___ (2007) (slip op.,
at 2) (STEVENS, J., concurring) (Booker excised only the portions of
§3742(e) that required de novo review by courts of appeals), with 551
U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 17) (SCALIA, J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in judgment) (Booker excised all of §§3742(e) and (f)). See also
Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U. S. ___, ___ (2007) (slip op., at 3)
(THOMAS, J., dissenting) (the Booker remedial opinion, whatever it held,
cannot be followed).
14 GREENLAW v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

may be seen as auxiliary to the cross-appeal rule and the
party presentation principle served by that rule. Federal
Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(a)(1) provides that “[a]n
appeal permitted by law . . . may be taken only by filing a
notice of appeal . . . within the [prescribed] time.” (Em-
phasis added.) Complementing Rule 3(a)(1), Rule
4(b)(1)(B)(ii) instructs that, when the Government has the
right to cross-appeal in a criminal case, its notice “must be
filed . . . within 30 days after . . . the filing of a notice of
appeal by any defendant.” (Emphasis added.) The filing
time for a notice of appeal or cross-appeal, Rule 4(b)(4)
states, may be extended “for a period not to exceed 30
days.” Rule 26(b) bars any extension beyond that time.
The firm deadlines set by the Appellate Rules advance
the interests of the parties and the legal system in fair
notice and finality. Thus a defendant who appeals but
faces no cross-appeal can proceed anticipating that the
appellate court will not enlarge his sentence. And if the
Government files a cross-appeal, the defendant will have
fair warning, well in advance of briefing and argument,
that pursuit of his appeal exposes him to the risk of a
higher sentence. Given early warning, he can tailor his
arguments to take account of that risk. Or he can seek the
Government’s agreement to voluntary dismissal of the
competing appeals, see Fed. Rule App. Proc. 42(b), before
positions become hardened during the hours invested in
preparing the case for appellate court consideration.
The strict time limits on notices of appeal and cross-
appeal would be undermined, in both civil and criminal
cases, if an appeals court could modify a judgment in favor
of a party who filed no notice of appeal. In a criminal
prosecution, moreover, the defendant would appeal at his
peril, with nothing to alert him that, on his own appeal,
his sentence would be increased until the appeals court so
decreed. In this very case, Greenlaw might have made
different strategic decisions had he known soon after filing
 Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 15

Opinion of the Court

his notice of appeal that he risked a 15-year increase in an
already lengthy sentence.
E
We note that nothing we have said in this opinion re-
quires courts to modify their current practice in so-called
“sentencing package cases.” Those cases typically involve
multicount indictments and a successful attack by a de-
fendant on some but not all of the counts of conviction.
The appeals court, in such instances, may vacate the
entire sentence on all counts so that, on remand, the trial
court can reconfigure the sentencing plan to assure that it
remains adequate to satisfy the sentencing factors in 18
U. S. C. §3553(a) (2000 ed. and Supp. V). In remanded
cases, the Government relates, trial courts have imposed a
sentence on the remaining counts longer than the sen-
tence originally imposed on those particular counts, but
yielding an aggregate sentence no longer than the aggre-
gate sentence initially imposed. See Brief for United
States 23, n. 11 (citing, inter alia, United States v. Pi-
mienta-Redondo, 874 F. 2d 9 (CA1 1989) (en banc)). Thus
the defendant ultimately may gain nothing from his lim-
ited success on appeal, but he will also lose nothing, as he
will serve no more time than the trial court originally
ordered.
The practice the Government describes is not at odds
with the cross-appeal rule, which stops appellate judges
from adding years to a defendant’s sentence on their own
initiative. It simply ensures that the sentence “ ‘will suit
not merely the offense but the individual defendant.’ ”
Pimienta-Redondo, 874 F. 2d, at 14 (quoting Wasman v.
United States, 468 U. S. 559, 564 (1984)). And the as-
sessment will be made by the sentencing judge exercising
16 GREENLAW v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

discretion, not by an appellate panel ruling on an issue of
law no party tendered to the court.8
This is not a “sentencing package” case. Greenlaw was
unsuccessful on all his appellate issues. There was no
occasion for the Court of Appeals to vacate his sentence
and no warrant, in the absence of a cross-appeal, to order
the addition of 15 years to his sentence.9
——————
8 The dissent suggests that our reading of the cross-appeal rule is

anomalous because it could bar a court of appeals from correcting an
error that would increase a defendant’s sentence, but after a “success-
ful” appeal the district court itself could rely on that same error to
increase the sentence. See post, at 10–11, and n. 2. The cross-appeal
rule, we of course agree, does not confine the trial court. But default
and forfeiture doctrines do. It would therefore be hard to imagine a
case in which a district court, after a court of appeals vacated a crimi-
nal sentence, could properly increase the sentence based on an error the
appeals court left uncorrected because of the cross-appeal rule. What of
cases remanded post-Booker on defendants’ appeals, the dissent asks?
Post, at 10–11, n. 2. In those cases, defendants invited and received
precisely the relief they sought, and the Sixth Amendment required.
Neither the cross-appeal rule nor default and forfeiture had any role to
play.
9 For all its spirited argument, the dissent recognizes the narrow gap

between its core position and the Court’s. The cross-appeal rule, rooted
in the principle of party presentation, the dissent concedes, should hold
sway in the “vast majority of cases.” Post, at 4. Does this case qualify
as the “rare” exception to the “strong rule of practice” the dissent
advocates? See ibid. Greenlaw was sentenced to imprisonment for 442
months. The Government might have chosen to insist on 180 months
more, but it elected not to do so. Was the error so “grossly prejudicial,”
post, at 7, 9, so harmful to our system of justice, see post, at 7–8, as to
warrant sua sponte correction? By what standard is the Court of
Appeals to make such an assessment? Without venturing to answer
these questions, see post, at 13, n. 3, the dissent would simply “entrust
the decision to initiate error correction to the sound discretion of the
courts of appeals,” post, at 1. The “strong rule” thus may be broken
whenever the particular three judges composing the appellate panel see
the sentence as a “wron[g] to right.” See supra, at 5 (internal quotation
marks omitted). The better answer, consistent with our jurisprudence,
as reinforced by Congress, entrusts “the decision [whether] to initiate
error correction” in this matter to top counsel for the United States.
See supra, at 7.
 Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 17

Opinion of the Court

* * *
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit is vacated,
and the case is remanded for further proceedings consis-
tent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
 Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 1

BREYER, J., concurring in judgment

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________

No. 07–330
_________________

MICHAEL GREENLAW, AKA MIKEY, PETITIONER v.

UNITED STATES

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

[June 23, 2008]

JUSTICE BREYER, concurring in the judgment.
I agree with JUSTICE ALITO that the cross-appeal re-
quirement is simply a rule of practice for appellate courts,
rather than a limitation on their power, and I therefore
join Parts I–III of his opinion. Moreover, as a general
matter, I would leave application of the rule to the courts
of appeals, with our power to review their discretion “sel-
dom to be called into action.” Universal Camera Corp. v.
NLRB, 340 U. S. 474, 490 (1951). But since this case is
now before us, I would consider whether the Court of
Appeals here acted properly. Primarily for the reasons
stated by the majority in footnote 9 of its opinion, I believe
that the court abused its discretion in sua sponte increas-
ing petitioner’s sentence. Our precedent precludes the
creation of an exception to the cross-appeal requirement
based solely on the obviousness of the lower court’s error.
See, e.g., Chittenden v. Brewster, 2 Wall. 191, 195–196
(1865). And I cannot see how the interests of justice are
significantly disserved by permitting petitioner’s release
from prison at roughly age 62, after almost 37 years be-
hind bars, as opposed to age 77.
 Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 1

ALITO, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________

No. 07–330
_________________

MICHAEL GREENLAW, AKA MIKEY, PETITIONER v.

UNITED STATES

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

[June 23, 2008]

JUSTICE ALITO, with whom JUSTICE STEVENS joins, and
with whom JUSTICE BREYER joins as to Parts I, II, and III,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent because I view the cross-appeal
requirement as a rule of appellate practice. It is akin to
the rule that courts invoke when they decline to consider
arguments that the parties have not raised. Both rules
rest on premises about the efficient use of judicial re-
sources and the proper role of the tribunal in an adversary
system. Both are sound and should generally be followed.
But just as the courts have made them, the courts may
make exceptions to them, and I do not understand why a
reviewing court should enjoy less discretion to correct an
error sua sponte than it enjoys to raise and address an
argument sua sponte. Absent congressional direction to
the contrary, and subject to our limited oversight as a
supervisory court, we should entrust the decision to initi-
ate error correction to the sound discretion of the courts of
appeals.
I
Before laying out my view in more detail, I must first
address the question whether federal courts have subject-
matter jurisdiction to enlarge an appellee’s judgment in
the absence of a cross-appeal. Because the Court would
2 GREENLAW v. UNITED STATES

ALITO, J., dissenting

not recognize any exceptions to the cross-appeal require-
ment when the defendant appeals his sentence, it does not
decide that question. See ante, at 7. I must confront it,
though I do not regard it as a substantial question. The
cross-appeal requirement seems to me a prime example of
a “ ‘rule of practice,’ subject to exceptions, not an unquali-
fied limit on the power of appellate courts.” El Paso Natu-
ral Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 526 U. S. 473, 480 (1999). While
a court should generally enforce the cross-appeal require-
ment, a departure from it would not divest the court of
jurisdiction.
This Court has never addressed whether an appellate
court’s jurisdiction to enlarge a judgment in favor of an
appellee is contingent on a duly filed cross-appeal. The
majority’s contention that “[o]ur own opinions contain
statements supporting” the “ ‘jurisdictional’ ” characteriza-
tion of the requirement, ante, at 6, relies on a misreading
of that precedent. The Court may have previously charac-
terized the cross-appeal requirement as limiting “ ‘[t]he
power of an appellate court to modify a decree,’ ” ibid.
(quoting Morley Constr. Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 300
U. S. 185, 187 (1937)), but it does not follow that jurisdic-
tion is conditioned on a properly filed cross-appeal. A
court may lack the power to do something for reasons
other than want of jurisdiction, and a rule can be inflexi-
ble without being jurisdictional. See Eberhart v. United
States, 546 U. S. 12, 19 (2005) (per curiam).
The jurisdiction of the courts of appeals is fixed by
Congress. See Bowles v. Russell, 551 U. S. ___, ___ (2007)
(slip op., at 6); Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U. S. 689,
698 (1992) (“ ‘[T]he judicial power of the United States . . .
is (except in enumerated instances, applicable exclusively
to this Court) dependent for its distribution and organiza-
tion, and for the modes of its exercise, entirely upon the
action of Congress’ ” (quoting Cary v. Curtis, 3 How. 236,
245 (1845))). If Congress wants to withhold from the
 Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 3

ALITO, J., dissenting

courts of appeals the power to decide questions that ex-
pand the rights of nonappealing parties, it may do so. See
U. S. Const., Art. III, §1 (authorizing Congress to establish
the lower courts and, by corollary, to fix their jurisdiction);
Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U. S. 443, 452 (2004) (“Only Con-
gress may determine a lower federal court’s subject-matter
jurisdiction”). The jurisdictional question thus reduces to
whether Congress intended to make a cross-appeal a
condition precedent to the appellate court’s jurisdiction to
enlarge a judgment in favor of a nonappealing party.
As always with such questions, the text of the relevant
statute provides the best evidence of congressional intent.
The relevant statute in this case is 18 U. S. C. §3742 (2000
ed. and Supp. V). Section 3742(a) authorizes a criminal
defendant to “file a notice of appeal” to review a sentence
that was, among other possibilities, “imposed in violation
of law.” E.g., §3742(a)(1). Section 3742(b) provides paral-
lel authority for the Government to “file a notice of appeal”
to review unlawful sentences. E.g., §3742(b)(1). The
statute conditions the Government’s authority to further
prosecute its appeal on “the personal approval of the
Attorney General, the Solicitor General, or a deputy solici-
tor general designated by the Solicitor General.” §3742(b).
Nothing in this language remotely suggests that a court
of appeals lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to increase a
defendant’s sentence in the absence of a cross-appeal by
the Government. In fact, the statute does not even men-
tion cross-appeals. It separately authorizes either party to
“file a notice of appeal,” but it never suggests that the
reviewing court’s power is limited to correcting errors for
the benefit of the appealing party. If anything, it suggests
the opposite. Without qualifying the appellate court’s
power in any way, §3742(e) instructs the court to deter-
mine, among other things, whether the sentence was
“imposed in violation of law.” §3742(e)(1). And while
§3742(f)(2) limits the action that a court of appeals can
4 GREENLAW v. UNITED STATES

ALITO, J., dissenting

take depending on which party filed the appeal, compare
§3742(f)(2)(A) (sentences set aside as “too high” if defen-
dant filed) with §3742(f)(2)(B) (sentences set aside as “too
low” if Government filed), no such limitation appears in
§3742(f)(1). That paragraph requires a court of appeals
simply to set aside any sentence “imposed in violation of
law or imposed as a result of an incorrect application of
the sentencing guidelines.”
II
Since a cross-appeal has no effect on the appellate
court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, the cross-appeal re-
quirement is best characterized as a rule of practice. It is
a rule created by the courts to serve interests that are
important to the Judiciary. The Court identifies two of
these interests: notice to litigants and finality. Ante, at
14; see also Neztsosie, supra, at 480. One might add that
the cross-appeal requirement also serves a third interest:
the appellate court’s interest in being adequately briefed
on the issues that it decides. See Fed. Rule App.
Proc. 28.1(c) and Advisory Committee’s Notes, 28 U. S. C.
App., pp. 615–616. Although these are substantial inter-
ests in the abstract, I question how well an inflexible
cross-appeal requirement serves them.
Notice. With respect to notice, the benefits of an un-
yielding cross-appeal requirement are insubstantial.
When the Government files a notice of cross-appeal, the
defendant is alerted to the possibility that his or her sen-
tence may be increased as a result of the appellate deci-
sion. But if the cross-appeal rule is, as I would hold, a
strong rule of practice that should be followed in all but
exceptional instances, the Government’s failure to file a
notice of cross-appeal would mean in the vast majority of
cases that the defendant thereafter ran little risk of an
increased sentence. And the rare cases where that possi-
bility arose would generally involve errors so plain that no
 Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 5

ALITO, J., dissenting

conceivable response by the defendant could alter the
result. It is not unreasonable to consider an appealing
party to be on notice as to such serious errors of law in his
favor. And while there may be rare cases in which the
existence of such a legal error would come as a complete
surprise to the defendant or in which argument from the
parties would be of assistance to the court, the solution to
such a problem is not to eliminate the courts of appeals’
authority to correct egregious errors. Rather, the appro-
priate response is for the court of appeals to request sup-
plemental briefing or—if it deems that insufficient—
simply to refuse to exercise its authority. Cf. Irizarry v.
United States, 553 U. S. ___, ___ (2008) (slip op., at 9). In
short, the Court’s holding does not increase the substance
of the notice that a defendant receives; it merely acceler-
ates that notice by at most a few weeks in a very small
number of cases.
The Court contends that “[g]iven early warning, [the
defendant] can tailor his arguments to take account of [the
risk of a higher sentence] . . . [o]r he can seek the Govern-
ment’s agreement to voluntary dismissal of the competing
appeals.” Ante, at 14 (citing Fed. Rule App. Proc. 42(b)).
But the Court does not explain how a notice of cross-
appeal, a boilerplate document, helps the defendant “tailor
his arguments.” Whether the cross-appeal rule is ironclad,
as the Court believes, or simply a strong rule of practice, a
defendant who wishes to appeal his or her sentence is
always free to seek the Government’s commitment not to
cross-appeal or to terminate a cross-appeal that the Gov-
ernment has already taken. Fed. Rule App. Proc. 42(b).
Finality. An inflexible cross-appeal rule also does little
to further the interest of the parties and the Judiciary in
the finality of decisions. An appellate court’s decision to
grant a nonappealing party additional relief does not
interrupt a long, undisturbed slumber. The error’s repose
begins no earlier than the deadline for filing a cross-
6 GREENLAW v. UNITED STATES

ALITO, J., dissenting

appeal, and it ends as soon as the reviewing court issues
its opinion—and often much sooner. Here, for example,
the slumber was broken when the Government identified
the error in its brief as appellee. See Brief for United
States 5.
Orderly Briefing. I do not doubt that adversarial brief-
ing improves the quality of appellate decisionmaking, but
it hardly follows that appellate courts should be denied the
authority to correct errors that seriously prejudice nonap-
pealing parties. Under my interpretation of the cross-
appeal rule, a court of appeals would not be obligated to
address errors that are prejudicial to a nonappealing
party; a court of appeals would merely have the authority
to do so in appropriate cases. If a court of appeals noticed
such an error and concluded that it was appropriate to
address the issue, the court could, if it wished, order addi-
tional briefing. If, on the other hand, the court concluded
that the issue was not adequately addressed by the briefs
filed by the parties in the ordinary course and that addi-
tional briefing would interfere with the efficient admini-
stration of the court’s work, the court would not be re-
quired to decide the issue. Therefore, I do not see how the
courts of appeals’ interest in orderly briefing is furthered
by denying those courts the discretionary authority to
address important issues that they find it appropriate to
decide.
Indeed, the inflexible cross-appeal rule that the Court
adopts may disserve the interest in judicial efficiency in
some cases. For example, correcting an error that preju-
diced a nonappealing defendant on direct review might
obviate the need for a collateral attack. Cf. Granberry v.
Greer, 481 U. S. 129, 134 (1987) (allowing the Court of
Appeals to address the merits of an unexhausted habeas
corpus petition if “the interests of comity and federalism
will be better served by addressing the merits forthwith
[than] by requiring a series of additional state and district
 Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 7

ALITO, J., dissenting

court proceedings before reviewing the merits of the peti-
tioner’s claim”); Munaf v. Geren, 553 U. S. ___, ___ (2008)
(slip op., at 13) (recognizing “occasions . . . when it is ap-
propriate to proceed further and address the merits” of a
habeas corpus petition rather than reverse and remand on
threshold matters). Because the reviewing court is in the
best position to decide whether a departure from the cross-
appeal rule would be efficient, rigid enforcement of that
rule is more likely to waste judicial resources than to
conserve them.
In sum, the Court exaggerates the interests served by
the cross-appeal requirement. At the same time, it over-
looks an important interest that the rule disserves: the
interest of the Judiciary and the public in correcting
grossly prejudicial errors of law that undermine confi-
dence in our legal system. We have repeatedly stressed
the importance of that interest, see, e.g., United States v.
Olano, 507 U. S. 725, 736–737 (1993); Press-Enterprise Co.
v. Superior Court of Cal., Riverside Cty., 464 U. S. 501,
507 (1984); New York Central R. Co. v. Johnson, 279 U. S.
310, 318 (1929), and it has justified departures from our
traditional adversary framework in other contexts. The
Court mentions one of those contexts, see ante, at 5 (pro se
litigation), but there are others that deserve mention.
The most well-known is plain-error review. Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b) authorizes reviewing
courts to correct “[a] plain error that affects substantial
rights . . . even though it was not brought to the court’s
attention.” Although I agree with the Court that this Rule
does not independently justify the Eighth Circuit’s deci-
sion, see ante, at 8–9, I believe that the Rule’s underlying
policy sheds some light on the issue before us. We have
explained that courts may rely on Rule 52(b) to correct only
those plain errors that “ ‘seriously affec[t] the fairness,
integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’ ”
Olano, supra, at 736 (quoting United States v. Atkinson,
8 GREENLAW v. UNITED STATES

ALITO, J., dissenting

297 U. S. 157, 160 (1936)). We have thus recognized that
preservation of the “fairness, integrity or public reputation
of judicial proceedings” may sometimes justify a departure
from the traditional adversarial framework of issue
presentation.
Perhaps the closest analogue to the cross-appeal re-
quirement is the rule of appellate practice that restrains
reviewing courts from addressing arguments that the
parties have not made. Courts typically invoke this rule to
avoid resolving a case based on an unaired argument, even
if the argument could change the outcome. See, e.g.,
Santiago v. Rumsfeld, 425 F. 3d 549, 552, n. 1 (CA9 2005);
United States v. Cervini, 379 F. 3d 987, 994, n. 5 (CA10
2004). But courts also recognize that the rule is not in-
flexible, see, e.g., Santiago, supra, at 552, n. 1, and some-
times they depart from it, see, e.g., United States Nat.
Bank of Ore. v. Independent Ins. Agents of America, Inc.,
508 U. S. 439, 448 (1993) (“After giving the parties ample
opportunity to address the issue, the Court of Appeals
acted without any impropriety in refusing to accept what
in effect was a stipulation on a question of law” (citing
Swift & Co. v. Hocking Valley R. Co., 243 U. S. 281, 289
(1917))); United States v. Moyer, 282 F. 3d 1311, 1317–
1318 (CA10 2002); Dorris v. Absher, 179 F. 3d 420, 425–
426 (CA6 1999).
A reviewing court will generally address an argument
sua sponte only to correct the most patent and serious
errors. See, e.g., id., at 426 (concluding that the error, if
overlooked, would result in “a miscarriage of justice”);
Consumers Union of U. S., Inc. v. Federal Power Comm’n,
510 F. 2d 656, 662 (CADC 1974) (balancing “considera-
tions of judicial orderliness and efficiency against the need
for the greatest possible accuracy in judicial decisionmak-
ing”). Because the prejudicial effect of the error and the
impact of error correction on judicial resources are matters
best determined by the reviewing court, the court’s deci-
 Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 9

ALITO, J., dissenting

sion to go beyond the arguments made by the parties is
committed to its sound discretion. See United States Nat.
Bank of Ore., supra, at 448 (reviewing an appellate court’s
decision to address an argument sua sponte for abuse of
discretion).
This authority provides a good model for our decision in
this case. The Court has not persuaded me that the inter-
ests at stake when a reviewing court awards a nonappeal-
ing party additional relief are qualitatively different from
the interests at stake when a reviewing court raises an
issue sua sponte. Authority on the latter point recognizes
that the interest of the public and the Judiciary in correct-
ing grossly prejudicial errors of law may sometimes out-
weigh other interests normally furthered by fidelity to our
adversarial tradition. I would recognize the same possibil-
ity here. And just as reviewing courts enjoy discretion to
decide for themselves when to raise and decide arguments
sua sponte, I would grant them substantial latitude to
decide when to enlarge an appellee’s judgment in the
absence of a cross-appeal.1
III
The approach I advocate is not out of step with our
precedent. The Court has never decided whether the
cross-appeal requirement is “subject to exceptions [or] an
unqualified limit on the power of appellate courts.”
Neztsosie, 526 U. S., at 480. That question was reserved
in Neztsosie, ibid., even as the Court recognized that lower
courts had reached different conclusions, see id., at 480,
——————
1 The Court argues that petitioner’s original sentence was neither so
fundamentally unfair nor so harmful to our system of justice as to
warrant sua sponte correction by the Court of Appeals. Ante, at 16,
n. 9. But these considerations, which may well support a conclusion
that the Court of Appeals should not have exercised its authority in this
case, cf. n. 3, infra, surely do not justify the Court’s broad rule that
sua sponte error correction on behalf of the Government is inappropri-
ate in all cases.
10 GREENLAW v. UNITED STATES

ALITO, J., dissenting

n. 2. I would simply confirm what our precedent had
assumed: that there are exceptional circumstances when it
is appropriate for a reviewing court to correct an error for
the benefit of a party that has not cross-appealed the
decision below.
Indeed, the Court has already reached the very result
that it claims to disavow today. We have long held that a
sentencing court confronted with new circumstances may
impose a stiffer sentence on remand than the defendant
received prior to a successful appeal. See Chaffin v.
Stynchcombe, 412 U. S. 17, 23 (1973); North Carolina v.
Pearce, 395 U. S. 711, 719–720 (1969), overruled on other
grounds, Alabama v. Smith, 490 U. S. 794 (1989). The
Court makes no effort to explain the analytical difference
between those cases and this one. If a sentencing court
may rely on new circumstances to justify a longer sentence
on remand, why cannot one of the new circumstances be
the court’s discovery (by dint of appellate review) that its
first sentence was based on an error of law?2
——————
2 The Court finds it “hard to imagine a case in which a district court,

after a court of appeals vacated a criminal sentence, could properly
increase the sentence based on an error the appeals court left uncor-
rected because of the cross-appeal rule.” Ante, at 16, n. 8. Happily, we
need not imagine such cases, since they come before our courts every
day.
For examples, we have no further to look than the sentencing cases
remanded en masse following our recent decision in United States v.
Booker, 543 U. S. 220 (2005). In Booker’s wake, it was common for
newly convicted defendants to appeal their sentences, claiming that
they received enhancements that they would not have received under
the advisory guidelines. Many of those cases were remanded for
resentencing, and some defendants wound up with even longer sen-
tences on remand. See, e.g., United States v. Singletary, 458 F. 3d 72,
77 (CA2) (affirming a sentence lengthened by 12 months following a
Booker remand), cert. denied, 549 U. S. 1047 (2006); United States v.
Reinhart, 442 F. 3d 857, 860–861 (CA5 2006) (affirming a sentence
lengthened from 210 months to 235 months following a Booker
remand).
 Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 11

ALITO, J., dissenting

Even today, the Court refuses to decide whether the
cross-appeal requirement admits of exceptions in appro-
priate cases. While calling the rule “ ‘inveterate and cer-
tain,’ ” ante, at 6 (quoting Morley Constr. Co., 300 U. S., at
191), the Court allows that “there might be circumstances
in which it would be proper for an appellate court to initi-
ate plain-error review,” ante, at 9; see also ante, at 5, n. 2.
The Court’s mandate is limited to a single class of cases—
sentencing appeals, and then only when the appeal is
brought by the Government.
The Court justifies the asymmetry in its decision by
pointing to 18 U. S. C. §3742(b), which provides that “[t]he
Government may not further prosecute [the] appeal with-
out the personal approval of the Attorney General, the
Solicitor General, or a deputy solicitor general designated
by the Solicitor General.” According to the majority, “[i]t
would severely undermine Congress’ instruction were
appellate judges to ‘sally forth’ on their own motion to take
up errors adverse to the Government when the designated
Department of Justice officials have not authorized an
appeal from the sentence the trial court imposed.” Ante,
at 7 (citation omitted).
The problem with this argument is that §3742(b) does
not apportion authority over sentencing appeals between
the Executive and Judicial Branches. By its terms,
§3742(b) simply apportions that authority within an ex-
ecutive department. It provides that the “[t]he Govern-
ment” may not “prosecute” the appeal without approval
——————
These cases represent straightforward applications of the cross-
appeal rule: The Government had not cross-appealed the sentence, so
the reviewing court did not order the defendant’s sentence lengthened.
And yet the sentence was ultimately lengthened when the error was
corrected on remand. The Court fails to explain the conceptual distinc-
tion between those cases and this one. If the Court permits sentencing
courts to correct unappealed errors on remand, why does it not permit
the courts of appeals to do the same on appeal?
12 GREENLAW v. UNITED STATES

ALITO, J., dissenting

from one of the listed officials. It says nothing about the
power of the courts to correct error in the absence of a
Government appeal. Had Congress intended to restrict
the power of the courts, the statute would not stop “[t]he
Government” from “prosecut[ing]” unauthorized appeals;
instead, it would stop “the Court of Appeals” from “decid-
ing” them.
The design that the Court imputes to the drafters of
§3742(b) is inconsistent with the text in another important
respect. Suppose that the District Court imposes a sen-
tence below the range set forth in the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, and the Government files an authorized ap-
peal on the ground that the sentence is unreasonable.
Suppose further that the reviewing court discovers, to the
surprise of both parties, that the District Court made a
further error by overlooking a mandatory minimum to
which the defendant was subject. The mandatory mini-
mum would raise the defendant’s sentence beyond what
even the Government had wanted. Under the majority’s
theory, see ante, at 7, the reviewing court should not
remand for imposition of the mandatory minimum, since
the decision to seek the higher sentence belonged to the
Government alone. But that conclusion is plainly at odds
with the text of the statute, which imposes no limits on
sentencing review once the named officials have signed off
on the appeal.
Section 3742(b)’s limited effect on sentencing review
implies that the statute was not designed to prevent judi-
cial encroachment on the prerogatives of the Executive. It
is more likely that Congress wanted to withhold from the
Executive the power to force the courts of appeals to enter-
tain Government appeals that are not regarded as suffi-
ciently important by the leadership of the Department of
Justice. Allowing the courts of appeals, in their discretion,
to remedy errors not raised in a cross-appeal in no way
trenches on the authority of the Executive. Sec-
 Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 13

ALITO, J., dissenting

tion 3742(b) may have also been designed to serve the
Executive’s institutional interests. Congress may have
wanted to ensure that the Government maintained a
consistent legal position across different sentencing ap-
peals. Or perhaps Congress wanted to maximize the
impact of the Government’s sentencing appeals by giving
high-level officials the authority to nix meritless or mar-
ginal ones. These institutional interests of the Executive
do not undermine the Judiciary’s authority to correct
unlawful sentences in the absence of a Government ap-
peal, and they do not justify the Court’s decision today.
IV
For the reasons given above, I would hold that the
courts of appeals enjoy the discretion to correct error
sua sponte for the benefit of nonappealing parties. The
Court errs in vacating the judgment of the Eighth Circuit,
and I respectfully dissent.3

——————
3 Neither the parties nor our amicus have addressed whether, under

the assumption that the Court of Appeals enjoys discretion to initiate
error correction for the benefit of a nonappealing party, the Eighth
Circuit abused that discretion in this case. As framed by petitioner, the
question presented asked only whether the cross-appeal requirement is
subject to exceptions. Because the parties have not addressed the fact-
bound subsidiary question, I would affirm without reaching it. See
United States v. International Business Machines Corp., 517 U. S. 843,
855, n. 3 (1996).