(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2007 1
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
ALLISON ENGINE CO., INC., ET AL. v. UNITED
STATES EX REL. SANDERS ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
No. 07–214. Argued February 26, 2008—Decided June 9, 2008
The Navy contracted with two shipyards to build destroyers, each of
which needed generator sets (Gen-Sets) for electrical power. The
shipyards subcontracted with petitioner Allison Engine Company,
Inc. (Allison Engine), to build Gen-Sets, Allison Engine subcontracted
with petitioner General Tool Company (GTC) to assemble them, and
GTC subcontracted with petitioner Southern Ohio Fabricators, Inc.
(SOFCO), to manufacture Gen-Set bases and enclosures. The sub-
contracts required that each Gen-Set be accompanied by a certificate
of conformance (COC) certifying that the unit was manufactured ac-
cording to Navy specifications. All of the funds paid under the con-
tracts ultimately came from the U. S. Treasury.
Former GTC employees Sanders and Thacker (hereinafter respon-
dents) brought this qui tam suit seeking to recover damages from pe-
titioners under the False Claims Act (FCA), which, inter alia, im-
poses civil liability on any person who knowingly uses a “false . . .
statement to get a false or fraudulent claim paid or approved by the
Government,” 31 U. S. C. §3729(a)(2), or who “conspires to defraud
the Government by getting a false or fraudulent claim allowed or
paid,” §3729(a)(3). At trial, respondents introduced evidence that pe-
titioners had issued COCs falsely stating that their work was com-
pleted in compliance with Navy specifications and that they had pre-
sented invoices for payment to the shipyards. They did not, however,
introduce the invoices the shipyards submitted to the Navy. The Dis-
trict Court granted petitioners judgment as a matter of law, conclud-
ing that, absent proof that false claims were presented to the Gov-
ernment, respondents’ evidence was legally insufficient under the
FCA. The Sixth Circuit reversed in relevant part, holding, among
2 ALLISON ENGINE CO. v. UNITED STATES EX REL.
SANDERS
Syllabus
other things, that respondents’ §§3729(a)(2) and (3) claims did not
require proof of an intent to cause a false claim to be paid by the
Government; proof of an intent to cause such a claim to be paid by a
private entity using Government funds was sufficient.
Held:
1. It is insufficient for a plaintiff asserting a §3729(a)(2) claim to
show merely that the false statement’s use resulted in payment or
approval of the claim or that Government money was used to pay the
false or fraudulent claim. Instead, such a plaintiff must prove that
the defendant intended that the false statement be material to the
Government’s decision to pay or approve the false claim. Pp. 5–8.
(a) The Sixth Circuit’s interpretation of §3729(a)(2) impermissi-
bly deviates from the statute’s language, which requires the defen-
dant to make a false statement “to get” a false or fraudulent claim
“paid or approved by the Government.” Because “to get” denotes
purpose, a person must have the purpose of getting a false or fraudu-
lent claim “paid or approved by the Government” in order to be liable.
Moreover, getting such a claim “paid . . . by the Government” is not
the same as getting it paid using “government funds.” Under
§3729(a)(2), a defendant must intend for the Government itself to pay
the claim. Eliminating this element of intent would expand the FCA
well beyond its intended role of combating “fraud against the Gov-
ernment.” Rainwater v. United States, 356 U. S. 590, 592. Pp. 5–6.
(b) The Government’s contention that “paid . . . by the Govern-
ment” does not mean literal Government payment is unpersuasive.
The assertion that it is customary to say that the Government pays a
bill when a recipient of Government funds uses those funds to pay in-
volves a colloquial usage of the phrase “paid by” that is not customar-
ily employed in statutory drafting, where precision is important and
expected. Section 3729(c)’s definition of “claim” does not support the
Government’s argument. The definition allows a request to be a
“claim” even if it is not made directly to the Government, but, under
§3729(a)(2), it is necessary that the defendant intend that a claim be
“paid by the Government,” not by another entity. Pp. 6–7.
(c) This does not mean, however, that §3729(a)(2) requires proof
that a defendant’s false statement was submitted to the Government.
Because the section requires only that the defendant make the false
statement for the purpose of getting “a false or fraudulent claim paid
or approved by the Government,” a subcontractor violates §3729(a)(2)
if it submits a false statement to the prime contractor intending that
contractor to use the statement to get the Government to pay its
claim. However, if a subcontractor makes a false statement to a pri-
vate entity but does not intend for the Government to rely on the
statement as a condition of payment, the direct link between the
Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008) 3
Syllabus
statement and the Government’s decision to pay or approve a false
claim is too attenuated to establish liability. The Court’s reading
gives effect to Congress’ efforts to protect the Government from loss
due to fraud but also ensures that “a defendant is not answerable for
anything beyond the natural, ordinary, and reasonable consequences
of his conduct.” Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U. S. 451, 470.
Pp. 7–9.
2. Similarly, it is not enough under §3729(a)(3) for a plaintiff to
show that the alleged conspirators agreed upon a fraud scheme that
had the effect of causing a private entity to make payments using
money obtained from the Government. Instead, it must be shown
that they intended “to defraud the Government.” Where their alleged
conduct involved the making of a false statement, it need not be
shown that they intended the statement to be presented directly to
the Government, but it must be established that they agreed that the
statement would have a material effect on the Government’s decision
to pay the false or fraudulent claim. Pp. 8–10.
471 F. 3d 610, vacated and remanded.
ALITO, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008) 1
Opinion of the Court
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 07–214
_________________
ALLISON ENGINE COMPANY, INC., ET AL.,
PETITIONERS v. UNITED STATES
EX REL. ROGER L. SANDERS AND
ROGER L. THACKER
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
[June 9, 2008]
JUSTICE ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court.
The False Claims Act (FCA) imposes civil liability on
any person who knowingly uses a “false record or state-
ment to get a false or fraudulent claim paid or approved by
the Government,” 31 U. S. C. §3729(a)(2), and any person
who “conspires to defraud the Government by getting a
false or fraudulent claim allowed or paid,” §3729(a)(3). We
granted review in this case to decide what a plaintiff
asserting a claim under these provisions must show re-
garding the relationship between the making of a “false
record or statement” and the payment or approval of “a
false or fraudulent claim . . . by the Government.”
Contrary to the decision of the Court of Appeals below,
we hold that it is insufficient for a plaintiff asserting a
§3729(a)(2) claim to show merely that “[t]he false state-
ment’s use . . . result[ed] in obtaining or getting payment
or approval of the claim,” 471 F. 3d 610, 621 (CA6 2006)
or that “government money was used to pay the false or
fraudulent claim,” id., at 622. Instead, a plaintiff assert-
2 ALLISON ENGINE CO. v. UNITED STATES EX REL.
SANDERS
Opinion of the Court
ing a §3729(a)(2) claim must prove that the defendant
intended that the false record or statement be material to
the Government’s decision to pay or approve the false
claim. Similarly, a plaintiff asserting a claim under
§3729(a)(3) must show that the conspirators agreed to
make use of the false record or statement to achieve this
end.
I
In 1985, the United States Navy entered into contracts
with two shipbuilders, Bath Iron Works and Ingalls Ship-
building (together the shipyards), to build a new fleet of
Arleigh Burke class guided missile destroyers. Each de-
stroyer required three generator sets (Gen-Sets) to supply
all of the electrical power for the ship. The shipyards
subcontracted with petitioner Allison Engine Company,
Inc. (Allison Engine), formerly a division of General Mo-
tors, to build 90 Gen-Sets to be used in over 50 destroyers.
Allison Engine in turn subcontracted with petitioner
General Tool Company (GTC) to assemble the Gen-Sets,
and GTC subcontracted with petitioner Southern Ohio
Fabricators, Inc. (SOFCO), to manufacture bases and
enclosures for the Gen-Sets. The Navy paid the shipyards
an aggregate total of $1 billion for each new destroyer. Of
that, Allison Engine was paid approximately $3 million
per Gen-Set; GTC was paid approximately $800,000 per
Gen-Set; and SOFCO was paid over $100,000 per Gen-Set.
All of the funds used to pay petitioners ultimately came
from the Federal Treasury.
The Navy’s contract with the shipyards specified that
every part of each destroyer be built in accordance with
the Navy’s baseline drawings and military standards.
These requirements were incorporated into each of
petitioners’ subcontracts. In addition, the contracts re-
quired that each delivered Gen-Set be accompanied
by a certificate of conformance (COC) certifying that the
Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008) 3
Opinion of the Court
unit was manufactured in accordance with the Navy’s
requirements.
In 1995, Roger L. Sanders and Roger L. Thacker (here-
inafter respondents), former employees of GTC, brought
suit in the District Court for the Southern District of Ohio
as qui tam relators seeking to recover damages pursuant
to §3729, which renders liable any person who “knowingly
presents, or causes to be presented, to an officer or em-
ployee of the United States Government . . . a false or
fraudulent claim for payment or approval,” §3729(a)(1);
any person who “knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be
made or used, a false record or statement to get a false or
fraudulent claim paid or approved by the Government,”
§3729(a)(2); and any person who “conspires to defraud the
Government by getting a false or fraudulent claim allowed
or paid,” §3729(a)(3).
Respondents alleged that the invoices submitted to the
shipyards by Allison Engine, GTC, and SOFCO fraudu-
lently sought payment for work that had not been done in
accordance with contract specifications. Specifically,
respondents claimed that the gearboxes installed by Alli-
son Engine in the first 52 Gen-Sets were defective and
leaked oil; that GTC never conducted a required final
quality inspection for approximately half of the first 67
Gen-Sets; and that the SOFCO welders who worked on the
first 67 Gen-Sets did not meet military standards. Re-
spondents also claimed that petitioners issued COCs
claiming falsely that the Gen-Sets had been built to the
contractually required specifications even though petition-
ers knew that those specifications had not been met.
The case was tried to a jury. At trial, respondents in-
troduced evidence that petitioners had issued COCs that
falsely stated that their work was completed in compliance
with the Navy’s requirements and that they had presented
invoices for payment to the shipyards. Respondents did
not, however, introduce the invoices submitted by the
4 ALLISON ENGINE CO. v. UNITED STATES EX REL.
SANDERS
Opinion of the Court
shipyards to the Navy. At the close of respondents’ case,
petitioners moved for judgment as a matter of law pursu-
ant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a). Petitioners
asserted that no reasonable jury could find a violation
under §3729 because respondents had failed to adduce any
evidence that a false or fraudulent claim had ever been
presented to the Navy. The District Court granted peti-
tioners’ motion. No. 1–:95–cv–970, 2005 WL 713569 (SD
Ohio, Mar. 11, 2005). The court rejected respondents’
argument that they did not have to present evidence that
a claim had been submitted to the Navy because they
showed that Government funds had been used to pay the
invoices that were presented to the shipyards. The Dis-
trict Court concluded that, absent proof that false claims
were presented to the Government, respondents’ evidence
was legally insufficient under the FCA. Id., at *10.
On appeal, a divided panel of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the District Court
in relevant part. 471 F. 3d 610 (2006). The majority
agreed with the District Court that liability under
§3729(a)(1) requires proof that a false claim was presented
to the Government. However, the Court of Appeals held
that the District Court erred in granting petitioners’ mo-
tion for judgment as a matter of law with respect to re-
spondents’ §§3729(a)(2) and (3) claims. The Court of
Appeals held that such claims do not require proof of an
intent to cause a false claim to be paid by the Government.
Rather, it determined that proof of an intent to cause a
false claim to be paid by a private entity using Govern-
ment funds was sufficient. In so holding, the Court of
Appeals recognized that its decision conflicted with United
States ex rel. Totten v. Bombardier Corp., 380 F. 3d 488
(CADC 2004) (Totten), cert denied, 544 U. S. 1032 (2005).
We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict over the
proper interpretation of §§3729(a)(2) and (a)(3). 552 U. S.
___ (2007).
Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008) 5
Opinion of the Court
II
A
We turn first to §3729(a)(2), and “[w]e start, as always,
with the language of the statute.” Williams v. Taylor, 529
U. S. 420, 431 (2000). Section 3729(a)(2) imposes civil
liability on any person who “knowingly makes, uses, or
causes to be made or used, a false record or statement to
get a false or fraudulent claim paid or approved by the
Government.”
The interpretation of §3729(a)(2) that was adopted by
the Court of Appeals—and that is endorsed by the respon-
dents and the Government—impermissibly deviates from
the statute’s language. In the view of the Court of Ap-
peals, it is sufficient for a §3729(a)(2) plaintiff to show that
a false statement resulted in the use of Government funds
to pay a false or fraudulent claim. 471 F. 3d, at 621–622.
Under subsection (a)(2), however, the defendant must
make the false record or statement “to get” a false or
fraudulent claim “paid or approved by the Government.”
“To get” denotes purpose, and thus a person must have the
purpose of getting a false or fraudulent claim “paid or
approved by the Government” in order to be liable under
§3729(a)(2). Additionally, getting a false or fraudulent
claim “paid . . . by the Government” is not the same as
getting a false or fraudulent claim paid using “government
funds.” Id., at 622. Under §3729(a)(2), a defendant must
intend that the Government itself pay the claim.
Eliminating this element of intent, as the Court of
Appeals did, would expand the FCA well beyond its in-
tended role of combating “fraud against the Government.”
See Rainwater v. United States, 356 U. S. 590, 592 (1958)
(emphasis added). As the District of Columbia Circuit
pointed out, the reach of §3729(a)(2) would then be “al-
most boundless: for example, liability could attach for any
false claim made to any college or university, so long as
the institution has received some federal grants—as most
6 ALLISON ENGINE CO. v. UNITED STATES EX REL.
SANDERS
Opinion of the Court
of them do.” Totten, supra, at 496.
B
Defending the Court of Appeals’ interpretation of
§3729(a)(2), the Government contends that the phrase
“paid . . . by the Government” does not mean that the
Government must literally pay the bill. The Govern-
ment maintains that it is customary to say that the Gov-
ernment pays a bill when a person who has received
Government funds uses those funds to pay a bill. The
Government provides this example: “ ‘[W]hen a student
says his college living expenses are “paid by” his parents,
he typically does not mean that his parents send checks
directly to his creditors. Rather, he means that his
parents are the ultimate source of the funds he uses to
pay those expenses.’ ” Brief for United States as Ami-
cus Curiae 9 (quoting Totten, supra, at 506 (Garland, J.,
dissenting)).
This example is unpersuasive because it involves a
colloquial usage of the phrase “paid by”—a usage that is
not customarily employed in more formal contexts. For
example, if a federal employee who receives all of his
income from the Government were asked in a formal
inquiry to reveal who paid for, say, his new car or a vaca-
tion, the employee would not say that the Federal Gov-
ernment had footed the bill. In statutory drafting, where
precision is both important and expected, the sort of col-
loquial usage on which the Government relies is not
customary.
The Government is also wrong in arguing that the
definition of the term “claim” in §3729(c) means that
§3729(a)(2)’s use of the phrase “paid by the government”
should not be read literally. Under this definition, a re-
quest for money or property need not be made directly to
the Government in order to constitute a “claim.” Instead,
a “claim” may include a request or demand that is made to
Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008) 7
Opinion of the Court
“a contractor, grantee, or other recipient if the United
States Government provides any portion of the money or
property which is requested or demanded, or if the Gov-
ernment will reimburse such contractor, grantee, or other
recipient for any portion of the money or property which is
requested or demanded.” §3729(c). This definition of the
word “claim” does not support the Government’s argument
because it does not alter the meaning of the phrase “by the
Government” in §3729(a)(2). Under §3729(c)’s definition of
“claim,” a request or demand may constitute a “claim”
even if the request is not made directly to the Govern-
ment, but under §3729(a)(2) it is still necessary for the
defendant to intend that a claim be “paid . . . by the Gov-
ernment” and not by another entity.1
C
This does not mean, however, as petitioners suggest, see
Reply Brief 1, that §3729(a)(2) requires proof that a defen-
dant’s false record or statement was submitted to the
Government. While §3729(a)(1) requires a plaintiff to
prove that the defendant “present[ed]” a false or fraudu-
lent claim to the Government, the concept of presentment
is not mentioned in §3729(a)(2). The inclusion of an ex-
press presentment requirement in subsection (a)(1), com-
bined with the absence of anything similar in subsection
(a)(2), suggests that Congress did not intend to include a
presentment requirement in subsection (a)(2). “[W]hen
——————
1 This interpretation of §3729(a)(2) does not render superfluous the
portion of §3729(c) providing that a “claim” may be made to a contrac-
tor, grantee, or other recipient of Government funding. This language
makes it clear that there can be liability under §§3729(a)(1) and (2)
where the request or demand for money or property that a defendant
presents to a federal officer for payment or approval, §3729(a)(1), or
that a defendant intends “to get . . . paid or approved by the Govern-
ment”, §3729(a)(2), may be a request or demand that was originally
“made to” a contractor, grantee, or other recipient of federal funds and
then forwarded to the Government.
8 ALLISON ENGINE CO. v. UNITED STATES EX REL.
SANDERS
Opinion of the Court
Congress includes particular language in one section of a
statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it
is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally
and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.”
Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U. S. 438, 452 (2002)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
What §3729(a)(2) demands is not proof that the defen-
dant caused a false record or statement to be presented or
submitted to the Government but that the defendant made
a false record or statement for the purpose of getting “a
false or fraudulent claim paid or approved by the Govern-
ment.” Therefore, a subcontractor violates §3729(a)(2) if
the subcontractor submits a false statement to the prime
contractor intending for the statement to be used by the
prime contractor to get the Government to pay its claim.2
If a subcontractor or another defendant makes a false
statement to a private entity and does not intend the
Government to rely on that false statement as a condition
of payment, the statement is not made with the purpose of
inducing payment of a false claim “by the Government.”
In such a situation, the direct link between the false
statement and the Government’s decision to pay or ap-
prove a false claim is too attenuated to establish liability.
Recognizing a cause of action under the FCA for fraud
directed at private entities would threaten to transform
——————
2 Section 3729(b) provides that the terms “knowing” and “knowingly”
“mean that a person, with respect to information—(1) has actual
knowledge of the information; (2) acts in deliberate ignorance of the
truth or falsity of the information; or (3) acts in reckless disregard of
the truth or falsity of the information, and no proof of specific intent to
defraud is required.” The statutory definition of these terms is easily
reconcilable with our holding in this case for two reasons. First, the
intent requirement we discern in §3729(a)(2) derives not from the term
“knowingly,” but rather from the infinitive phrase “to get.” Second,
§3729(b) refers to specific intent with regard to the truth or falsity of
the “information,” while our holding refers to a defendant’s purpose in
making or using a false record or statement.
Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008) 9
Opinion of the Court
the FCA into an all-purpose antifraud statute. Our read-
ing of §3729(a)(2), based on the language of the statute,
gives effect to Congress’ efforts to protect the Government
from loss due to fraud but also ensures that “a defendant
is not answerable for anything beyond the natural, ordi-
nary and reasonable consequences of his conduct.” Anza v.
Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U. S. 451, 470 (2006) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).
III
Respondents also brought suit under §3729(a)(3), which
makes liable any person who “conspires to defraud the
Government by getting a false or fraudulent claim allowed
or paid.” Our interpretation of this language is similar to
our interpretation of the language of §3729(a)(2). Under
§3729(a)(3), it is not enough for a plaintiff to show that the
alleged conspirators agreed upon a fraud scheme that had
the effect of causing a private entity to make payments
using money obtained from the Government. Instead, it
must be shown that the conspirators intended “to defraud
the Government.” Where the conduct that the conspira-
tors are alleged to have agreed upon involved the making
of a false record or statement, it must be shown that the
conspirators had the purpose of “getting” the false record
or statement to bring about the Government’s payment of
a false or fraudulent claim. It is not necessary to show
that the conspirators intended the false record or state-
ment to be presented directly to the Government, but it
must be established that they agreed that the false record
or statement would have a material effect on the Govern-
ment’s decision to pay the false or fraudulent claim.
This reading of subsection (a)(3) is in accord with our
decision in Tanner v. United States, 483 U. S. 107 (1987),
where we held that a conspiracy to defraud a federally
funded private entity does not constitute a “conspiracy to
defraud the United States” under 18 U. S. C. §371. Id., at
10 ALLISON ENGINE CO. v. UNITED STATES EX REL.
SANDERS
Opinion of the Court
129. In Tanner, the Government argued that a recipient
of federal financial assistance and the subject of federal
supervision may itself be treated as “the United States.”
We rejected this reading of §371 as having “not even an
arguable basis in the plain language of §371.” Id., at 131.
Indeed, we concluded that such an interpretation “would
have, in effect, substituted ‘anyone receiving federal finan-
cial assistance and supervision’ for the phrase ‘the United
States.’ ” Id., at 132. Likewise, the interpretation urged
on us by respondents would in effect substitute “paid or
approved by the Government” for the phrase “paid by
Government funds.” Had Congress intended subsection
(a)(3) to apply to anyone who conspired to defraud a re-
cipient of Government funds, it would have so provided.
* * *
Because the decision of the Court of Appeals was based
on an incorrect interpretation of §§3729(a)(2) and (3), we
vacate its judgment and remand the case for further pro-
ceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.