(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2007 1
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
REGALADO CUELLAR v. UNITED STATES
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 06–1456. Argued February 25, 2008—Decided June 2, 2008
Arrested after a search of the car he was driving through Texas toward
Mexico revealed nearly $81,000 bundled in plastic bags and covered
with animal hair in a secret compartment under the rear floorboard,
petitioner was charged with, and convicted of, attempting to trans-
port “funds from a place in the United States to . . . a place outside
the United States . . . knowing that the . . . funds . . . represent the
proceeds of . . . unlawful activity and . . . that such transportation . . .
is designed . . . to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the
source, the ownership, or the control of the proceeds of ” the money,
in violation of the federal money laundering statute, 18 U. S. C.
§1956(a)(2)(B)(i). Affirming, the Fifth Circuit rejected as inconsistent
with the statutory text petitioner’s argument that the Government
must prove that he attempted to create the appearance of legitimate
wealth, but held that his extensive efforts to prevent the funds’ detec-
tion during transportation showed that he sought to conceal or dis-
guise their nature, location, source, ownership, or control.
Held: Although §1956(a)(2)(B)(i) does not require proof that the defen-
dant attempted to create the appearance of legitimate wealth, neither
can it be satisfied solely by evidence that the funds were concealed
during transport. The statutory text makes clear that a conviction
requires proof that the transportation’s purpose—not merely its ef-
fect—was to conceal or disguise one of the listed attributes: the funds’
nature, location, source, ownership, or control. Pp. 5–17.
(a) The statute contains no “appearance of legitimate wealth” re-
quirement. Although petitioner is correct that taking steps to make
funds appear legitimate is the common meaning of “money launder-
ing,” this Court must be guided by a statute’s words, not by its title’s
common meaning, to the extent they are inconsistent, see Pennsyl-
2 REGALADO CUELLAR v. UNITED STATES
Syllabus
vania Dept. of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U. S. 206, 212. Here, Con-
gress used broad language that captures more than classic money
laundering: In addition to concealing or disguising the nature or
source of illegal funds, Congress also sought to reach transportation
designed to conceal or disguise the funds’ location, ownership, or con-
trol. Nor does the Court find persuasive petitioner’s attempt to in-
fuse a money-laundering requirement into the listed attributes. Only
the attribute “nature” is coextensive with the funds’ illegitimate
character, but that does not mean that Congress intended nature to
swallow the other attributes. The Court is likewise skeptical of peti-
tioner’s argument that violating the statute’s elements would neces-
sarily have the effect of making the funds appear more legitimate
than they did before. It is not necessarily true that concealing or dis-
guising any one of the listed attributes may have the effect of making
the funds appear more legitimate by impeding law enforcement’s
ability to identify illegitimate funds. Finally, the Court disagrees
with petitioner’s argument that §1956(a)(2) must be aimed at some-
thing other than merely secretive transportation of illicit funds be-
cause that conduct is already punished by the bulk cash smuggling
statute, 31 U. S. C. §5332. Even if §1956(a)(2)(B)(i) has no “appear-
ance of legitimate wealth” requirement, the two statutes nonetheless
target distinct conduct, in that §5332(a)(1) encompasses, inter alios, a
defendant who, “with the intent to evade a currency reporting re-
quirement . . . , knowingly conceals more than $10,000 . . . and trans-
ports [it] from . . . the United States to a place outside” the country.
Pp. 6–9.
(b) The evidence that petitioner concealed the money during trans-
portation is not sufficient to sustain his conviction. In determining
whether he knew that “such transportation,” §1956(a)(2)(B)(i), was
designed to conceal or disguise the specified attributes of the illegally
obtained funds, the critical transportation was not the transportation
of the funds within this country on the way to the border, but trans-
portation “from a place in the United States to . . . a place outside the
United States,” ibid.—here, from this country to Mexico. Therefore,
what the Government had to prove was that petitioner knew that
taking the funds to Mexico was “designed,” at least in part, to conceal
or disguise their “nature,” “location,” “source,” “ownership,” or “con-
trol.” The Court agrees with petitioner that merely hiding funds dur-
ing transportation is not sufficient to violate the statute, even if sub-
stantial efforts have been expended to conceal the money. This
conclusion turns on §1956(a)(2)(B)(i)’s text, particularly the term “de-
sign,” which the dictionaries show means purpose or plan; i.e., the
transportation’s intended aim. Congress wrote “knowing that such
transportation is designed . . . to conceal or disguise” a listed attrib-
Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008) 3
Syllabus
ute, and when an act is “designed to” do something, the most natural
reading is that it has that something as its purpose. Because the
Fifth Circuit used “design” to refer not to the transportation’s pur-
pose but to the manner in which it was carried out, its use of the
term in this context was consistent with the alternate meaning of
“design” as structure or arrangement. It is implausible, however,
that Congress intended this meaning. If it had, it could have ex-
pressed its intention simply by writing “knowing that such transpor-
tation conceals or disguises,” rather than the more complex formula-
tion “knowing that such transportation . . . is designed . . . to conceal
or disguise.” §1956(a)(2)(B)(i). It seems far more likely that Con-
gress intended courts to apply the familiar criminal law concepts of
purpose and intent than to focus exclusively on how a defendant
“structured” the transportation. In addition, the structural meaning
of “design” is both overinclusive and underinclusive: It would capture
individuals who structured transportation in a secretive way but
lacked any criminal intent (such as a person who hid illicit funds en
route to turn them over to law enforcement); yet it would exclude in-
dividuals who fully intended to move the funds in order to impede de-
tection by law enforcement but failed to hide them during transport.
In this case, evidence that petitioner transported the cash bundled
in plastic bags and hidden in a secret compartment covered with
animal hair was plainly probative of an underlying goal to prevent
the funds’ detection during the drive into Mexico. However, even
with the abundant evidence that petitioner had concealed the money
in order to transport it, the Government’s own expert testified that
the transportation’s purpose was to compensate the Mexican leaders
of the operation. Thus, the evidence suggested that the transporta-
tion’s secretive aspects were employed to facilitate it, but not neces-
sarily that secrecy was its purpose. Because petitioner’s extensive ef-
forts to conceal the funds en route to Mexico was the only evidence
the Government introduced to prove that the transportation was “de-
signed in whole or in part to conceal or disguise the [funds’] nature,
. . . location, . . . source, . . . ownership, or . . . control,” petitioner’s
conviction cannot stand. Pp. 10–17.
478 F. 3d 282, reversed.
THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. ALITO, J.,
filed a concurring opinion, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and KENNEDY, J.,
joined.
Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008) 1
Opinion of the Court
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 06–1456
_________________
HUMBERTO FIDEL REGALADO CUELLAR,
PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
[June 2, 2008]
JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case involves the provision of the federal money
laundering statute that prohibits international transpor
tation of the proceeds of unlawful activity. Petitioner
argues that his conviction cannot stand because, while the
evidence demonstrates that he took steps to hide illicit
funds en route to Mexico, it does not show that the cross-
border transport of those funds was designed to create the
appearance of legitimate wealth. Although we agree with
the Government that the statute does not require proof
that the defendant attempted to “legitimize” tainted
funds, we agree with petitioner that the Government must
demonstrate that the defendant did more than merely
hide the money during its transport. We therefore reverse
the judgment of the Fifth Circuit.
I
On July 14, 2004, petitioner Humberto Fidel Regalado
Cuellar was stopped in southern Texas for driving errati
cally. Driving south toward the Mexican border, about
114 miles away, petitioner had just passed the town of
Eldorado. In response to the officer’s questions, petitioner,
2 REGALADO CUELLAR v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
who spoke no English, handed the officer a stack of pa
pers. Included were bus tickets showing travel from a
Texas border town to San Antonio on July 13 and, in the
other direction, from San Antonio to Big Spring, Texas, on
July 14. A Spanish-speaking officer, Trooper Danny Nu
ñez, was called to the scene and began questioning peti
tioner. Trooper Nuñez soon became suspicious because
petitioner was avoiding eye contact and seemed very
nervous. Petitioner claimed to be on a 3-day business trip,
but he had no luggage or extra clothing with him, and he
gave conflicting accounts of his itinerary. When Trooper
Nuñez asked petitioner about a bulge in his shirt pocket,
petitioner produced a wad of cash that smelled of
marijuana.
Petitioner consented to a search of the Volkswagen
Beetle that he was driving. While the officers were
searching the vehicle, Trooper Nuñez observed petitioner
standing on the side of the road making the sign of the
cross, which he interpreted to mean that petitioner knew
he was in trouble. A drug detection dog alerted on the
cash from petitioner’s shirt pocket and on the rear area of
the car. Further scrutiny uncovered a secret compartment
under the rear floorboard, and inside the compartment the
officers found approximately $81,000 in cash. The money
was bundled in plastic bags and duct tape, and animal
hair was spread in the rear of the vehicle. Petitioner
claimed that he had previously transported goats in the
vehicle, but Trooper Nuñez doubted that goats could fit in
such a small space and suspected that the hair had been
spread in an attempt to mask the smell of marijuana.
There were signs that the compartment had been re
cently created and that someone had attempted to cover
up the bodywork: The Beetle’s carpeting appeared newer
than the rest of the interior, and the exterior of the vehicle
appeared to have been purposely splashed with mud to
cover up toolmarks, fresh paint, or other work. In the
Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008) 3
Opinion of the Court
backseat, officers found a fast-food restaurant receipt
dated the same day from a city farther north than peti
tioner claimed to have traveled. After a check of peti
tioner’s last border crossing also proved inconsistent with
his story, petitioner was arrested and interrogated. He
continued to tell conflicting stories about his travels. At
one point, before he knew that the officers had found the
cash, he remarked to Trooper Nuñez that he had to have
the car in Mexico by midnight or else his family would be
“floating down the river.” App. 50.
Petitioner was charged with attempting to transport the
proceeds of unlawful activity across the border, knowing
that the transportation was designed “to conceal or dis
guise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership,
or the control” of the money. 18 U. S. C. §1956(a)(2)(B)(i).
After a 2-day trial, the jury found petitioner guilty. The
District Court denied petitioner’s motion for judgment of
acquittal based on insufficient evidence and sentenced
petitioner to 78 months in prison, followed by three years
of supervised release.
On appeal, a divided panel of the Fifth Circuit reversed
and rendered a judgment of acquittal. 441 F. 3d 329
(2006). Judge Smith’s majority opinion held that, al
though the evidence showed that petitioner concealed the
money for the purpose of transporting it, the statute re
quires that the purpose of the transportation itself must
be to conceal or disguise the unlawful proceeds. Id., at
333–334. Analogizing from cases interpreting another
provision of the money laundering statute, the court held
that the transportation must be undertaken in an attempt
to create the appearance of legitimate wealth.1 See id., at
——————
1 Several Courts of Appeals have considered this requirement as
relevant, or even necessary, in the context of 18 U. S. C.
§1956(a)(1)(B)(i), which prohibits, inter alia, engaging in financial
transactions “involv[ing] the proceeds of specified unlawful activity . . .
knowing that the transaction is designed in whole or in part . . . to
4 REGALADO CUELLAR v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
334. Although the evidence showed intent to avoid detec
tion while driving the funds to Mexico, it did not show that
petitioner intended to create the appearance of legitimate
wealth, and accordingly no rational trier of fact could have
found petitioner guilty. Ibid. Judge Davis dissented,
arguing that concealment during transportation is suffi
cient to violate §1956(a)(2)(B)(i). Id., at 334–336.
The Fifth Circuit granted rehearing en banc and af
firmed petitioner’s conviction. 478 F. 3d 282 (2007). The
court rejected as inconsistent with the statutory text
petitioner’s argument that the Government must prove
that he attempted to create the appearance of legitimate
wealth. Id., at 290. But it held that petitioner’s extensive
efforts to prevent detection of the funds during transporta
tion showed that petitioner sought to conceal or disguise
the nature, location, and source, ownership, or control of
the funds. Id., at 289–290. Judge Smith dissented for
largely the same reasons set forth in his opinion for the
original panel majority. He emphasized the distinction
——————
conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership,
or the control of the proceeds of some specified unlawful activity.” See
United States v. Morales-Rodriguez, 467 F. 3d 1, 13 (CA1 2006); United
States v. Esterman, 324 F. 3d 565, 572–573 (CA7 2003); United States
v. Abbell, 271 F. 3d 1286, 1298 (CA11 2001); United States v. McGahee,
257 F. 3d 520, 527–528 (CA6 2001); United States v. Dobbs, 63 F. 3d
391, 397 (CA5 1995); United States v. Dimeck, 24 F. 3d 1239, 1247
(CA10 1994).
In construing the provision under which petitioner was convicted,
four Courts of Appeals, including the Fifth Circuit, have implicitly or
explicitly rejected the requirement. See United States v. Garcia-
Jaimes, 484 F. 3d 1311, 1322 (CA11 2007) (upholding convictions for
conspiracy to commit transportation money laundering without ad
dressing the requirement); United States v. Ness, 466 F. 3d 79, 81–82
(CA2 2006) (rejecting the requirement and upholding a conviction for
conspiracy to violate the transportation provision where defendant’s
conduct was elaborate and highly secretive); United States v. Carr, 25
F. 3d 1194, 1206–1207 (CA3 1994) (upholding a conviction under the
transportation provision without discussing the requirement).
Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008) 5
Opinion of the Court
between “concealing something to transport it, and trans
porting something to conceal it,” and explained that
whether petitioner was doing the latter depended on
whether his ultimate plan upon reaching his destination
was to conceal the nature, location, source, ownership, or
control of the money. Id., at 296–297.
We granted certiorari, 552 U. S. ___ (2007).
II
The federal money laundering statute, 18 U. S. C.
§1956, prohibits specified transfers of money derived from
unlawful activities. Subsection (a)(1) makes it unlawful to
engage in certain financial transactions, while subsection
(a)(2) criminalizes certain kinds of transportation. Peti
tioner was charged under the transportation provision:
The indictment alleged that he attempted to transport
illicit proceeds across the Mexican border “knowing that
such transportation was designed in whole or in part to
conceal and disguise the nature, location, source, owner
ship, and control” of the funds.2 App. 10–11 (citing
——————
2 Subsection (a)(2) reads, in its entirety:
“Whoever transports, transmits, or transfers, or attempts to transport,
transmit, or transfer a monetary instrument or funds from a place in
the United States to or through a place outside the United States or to
a place in the United States from or through a place outside the United
States—
“(A) with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful
activity; or
“(B) knowing that the monetary instrument or funds involved in the
transportation, transmission, or transfer represent the proceeds of
some form of unlawful activity and knowing that such transportation,
transmission, or transfer is designed in whole or in part—
“(i) to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the
ownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity;
or
“(ii) to avoid a transaction reporting requirement under State or
Federal law,
“shall be sentenced to a fine of not more than $500,000 or twice the
value of the monetary instrument or funds involved in the transporta
6 REGALADO CUELLAR v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
§1956(a)(2)(B)(i)).
A
We first consider the “designed . . . to conceal” element.
Petitioner argues that to satisfy this element, the Gov
ernment must prove that the defendant attempted to
create the appearance of legitimate wealth. Petitioner
would replace “designed . . . to conceal or disguise the
nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or the
control of the proceeds” with “designed to create the ap
pearance of legitimate wealth.” §1956(a)(2)(B)(i). This is
consistent with the plain meaning of “money laundering,”
petitioner argues, because that term is commonly under
stood to mean disguising illegally obtained money in order
to make it appear legitimate. In petitioner’s view, this
common understanding of “money laundering” is implicit
in both the transaction and transportation provisions of
the statute because concealing or disguising any of the
listed attributes would necessarily have the effect of mak
ing the funds appear legitimate, and, conversely, revealing
any such attribute would necessarily reveal the funds as
illicit. The Government disagrees, contending that mak
ing funds appear legitimate is merely one way to accom
plish money laundering, and that revealing a listed at
tribute would not necessarily reveal the funds’ illicit
nature. In any event, the Government argues, the statute
should not be cabined to target only classic money laun
dering because Congress intended to reach any conduct
that impairs the ability of law enforcement to find and
——————
tion, transmission, or transfer whichever is greater, or imprisonment
for not more than twenty years, or both. For the purpose of the offense
described in subparagraph (B), the defendant’s knowledge may be
established by proof that a law enforcement officer represented the
matter specified in subparagraph (B) as true, and the defendant’s
subsequent statements or actions indicate that the defendant believed
such representations to be true.”
Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008) 7
Opinion of the Court
recover the unlawful proceeds.
We agree with petitioner that taking steps to make
funds appear legitimate is the common meaning of the
term “money laundering.” See American Heritage Dic
tionary 992 (4th ed. 2000) (hereinafter Am. Hert.) (defin
ing “launder” as “[t]o disguise the source or nature of
(illegal funds, for example) by channeling through an
intermediate agent”); Black’s Law Dictionary 1027 (8th ed.
2004) (hereinafter Black’s) (defining “money-laundering”
to mean “[t]he act of transferring illegally obtained money
through legitimate people or accounts so that its original
source cannot be traced”). But to the extent they are
inconsistent, we must be guided by the words of the opera
tive statutory provision, and not by the common meaning
of the statute’s title. See Pennsylvania Dept. of Correc-
tions v. Yeskey, 524 U. S. 206, 212 (1998) (declining to use
a statute’s title to limit the meaning of the text). Here,
Congress used broad language that captures more than
classic money laundering: In addition to concealing or
disguising the nature or source of illegal funds, Congress
also sought to reach transportation designed to conceal or
disguise the location, ownership, or control of the funds.
For example, a defendant who smuggles cash into Mexico
with the intent of hiding it from authorities by burying it
in the desert may have engaged in transportation de
signed to conceal the location of those funds, but his con
duct would not necessarily have the effect of making the
funds appear legitimate.
Nor do we find persuasive petitioner’s attempt to infuse
a “classic money laundering” requirement into the listed
attributes. Contrary to petitioner’s argument, revealing
those attributes—nature, location, source, ownership, or
control—would not necessarily expose the illegitimacy of
the funds. Digging up the cash buried in the Mexican
desert, for example, would not necessarily reveal that it
was derived from unlawful activity. Indeed, of all the
8 REGALADO CUELLAR v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
listed attributes, only “nature” is coextensive with the
funds’ illegitimate character: Exposing the nature of illicit
funds would, by definition, reveal them as unlawful pro
ceeds. But nature is only one attribute in the statute; that
it may be coextensive with the creation of the appearance
of legitimate wealth does not mean that Congress
intended that requirement to swallow the other listed
attributes.
We likewise are skeptical of petitioner’s argument that
violating the elements of the statute would necessarily
have the effect of making the funds appear more legiti
mate than they did before. It is true that concealing or
disguising any one of the listed attributes may have the
effect of making the funds appear more legitimate—
largely because concealing or disguising those attributes
might impede law enforcement’s ability to identify ille
gitimate funds—but we are not convinced that this is
necessarily so. It might be possible for a defendant to
conceal or disguise a listed attribute without also creating
the appearance of legitimate wealth. Cf. United States v.
Abbell, 271 F. 3d 1286, 1298 (CA11 2001) (noting that the
transaction provision, although designed to punish those
who “attemp[t] to legitimize their proceeds,” may be satis
fied without proof that a particular defendant did so).
Petitioner’s “appearance of legitimate wealth” requirement
simply has no basis in the operative provision’s text.
Petitioner argues that the money laundering transpor
tation provision must be aimed at something other than
merely secretive transportation of illicit funds because
that conduct is already punished by the bulk cash smug
gling statute, 31 U. S. C. §5332 (2000 ed., Supp. V). We
disagree. A comparison of the statutory language reveals
that, even if no “appearance of legitimate wealth” re
quirement exists in 18 U. S. C. §1956(a)(2)(B)(i), the two
statutes nonetheless target distinct conduct. The bulk
cash smuggling provision encompasses, in relevant part, a
Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008) 9
Opinion of the Court
defendant who,
“with the intent to evade a currency reporting re
quirement under section 5316, knowingly conceals
more than $10,000 in currency or other monetary in
struments . . . and transports or transfers or attempts
to transport or transfer such currency or monetary in
struments from a place within the United States to a
place outside of the United States.” 31 U. S. C.
§5332(a)(1).
To be sure, certain conduct may fall within both statutes.
For example, both provisions may be violated by a defen
dant who intends to evade a relevant reporting require
ment. See §5332(a)(1) (transportation of funds “with the
intent to evade a currency reporting requirement”); 18
U. S. C. §1956(a)(2)(B)(ii) (transportation of funds know
ing that it is designed “to avoid a transaction reporting
requirement”). But only the money laundering statute
may be violated in the absence of such intent. See
§1956(a)(2)(B)(i) (prohibiting transportation of illicit funds
knowing that the transportation is designed to conceal or
disguise a listed attribute). Similarly, although both
statutes encompass transportation of illicit funds, only the
bulk cash smuggling statute also punishes the mere
transportation of lawfully derived proceeds.3 Compare 31
U. S. C. §5332(a) (omitting any requirement that the funds
be unlawfully derived) with 18 U. S. C. §1956(a)(2)(B)
(requiring that the defendant “kno[w] that the monetary
instrument or funds involved in the transportation . . .
represent the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity”).
——————
3 Section 1956(a)(2)(A) also punishes the mere transportation of
lawfully derived proceeds, but it imposes the additional requirement,
not found in 31 U. S. C. §5332 (2000 ed., Supp. V), that the defendant
must have “inten[ded] to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful
activity.”
10 REGALADO CUELLAR v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
B
Having concluded that the statute contains no “appear
ance of legitimate wealth” requirement, we next consider
whether the evidence that petitioner concealed the money
during transportation is sufficient to sustain his convic
tion. As noted, petitioner was convicted under
§1956(a)(2)(B)(i), which, in relevant part, makes it a crime
to attempt to transport “funds from a place in the United
States to . . . a place outside the United States . . . know
ing that the . . . funds involved in the transportation . . .
represent the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity
and knowing that such transportation . . . is designed in
whole or in part . . . to conceal or disguise the nature, the
location, the source, the ownership, or the control of the
proceeds of specified unlawful activity.” Accordingly, the
Government was required in this case to prove that peti
tioner (1) attempted to transport funds from the United
States to Mexico, (2) knew that these funds “represent[ed]
the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity,” e.g., drug
trafficking, and (3) knew that “such transportation” was
designed to “conceal or disguise the nature, the location,
the source, the ownership, or the control” of the funds.
It is the last of these that is at issue before us, viz.,
whether petitioner knew that “such transportation” was
designed to conceal or disguise the specified attributes of
the illegally obtained funds. In this connection, it is im
portant to keep in mind that the critical transportation
was not the transportation of the funds within this coun
try on the way to the border. Instead, the term “such
transportation” means transportation “from a place in the
United States to . . . a place outside the United States”—
here, from the United States to Mexico. Therefore, what
the Government had to prove was that petitioner knew
that taking the funds to Mexico was “designed,” at least in
part, to conceal or disguise their “nature,” “location,”
Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008) 11
Opinion of the Court
“source,” “ownership,” or “control.”
Petitioner argues that the evidence is not sufficient to
sustain his conviction because concealing or disguising a
listed attribute of the funds during transportation cannot
satisfy the “designed . . . to conceal” element. Citing cases
that interpret the identical phrase in the transaction
provision to exclude “mere spending,”4 petitioner argues
that the transportation provision must exclude “mere
hiding.” Otherwise, petitioner contends, all cross-border
transport of illicit funds would fall under the statute
because people regularly make minimal efforts to conceal
money, such as placing it inside a wallet or other recepta
cle, in order to secure it during travel. The Government
responds that concealment during transportation is suffi
cient to satisfy this element because it is circumstantial
evidence that the ultimate purpose of the transportation—
i.e., its “design”—is to conceal or disguise a listed attribute
of the funds. This standard would not criminalize all
cross-border transport of illicit funds, the Government
argues, because, just as in the transaction cases,5 the
statute encompasses only substantial efforts at conceal
——————
4 See, e.g., Esterman, 324 F. 3d, at 570–572; United States v. Cor-
chado-Peralta, 318 F. 3d 255, 259 (CA1 2003); McGahee, 257 F. 3d, at
527; United States v. Herron, 97 F. 3d 234, 237 (CA8 1996); United
States v. Majors, 196 F. 3d 1206, 1213 (CA11 1999); United States v.
Stephenson, 183 F. 3d 110, 120–121 (CA2 1999); Dobbs, 63 F. 3d, at
398; United States v. Garcia-Emanuel, 14 F. 3d 1469, 1474 (CA10
1994).
5 See, e.g., Ness, 466 F. 3d, at 81 (concluding that extensive attempts
at secrecy were sufficient to support a conviction under 18 U. S. C.
§1956(a)(1), but “express[ing] no view” as to whether transactions
involving “less elaborate stratagems or a lesser measure of secrecy”
would be sufficient); United States v. Johnson, 440 F. 3d 1286, 1291
(CA11 2006) (“Evidence of concealment must be substantial”); Dimeck,
24 F. 3d, at 1247 (“The transportation of the money from Detroit to
California in a box, suitcase, or other container does not convert the
mere transportation of money into money laundering”).
12 REGALADO CUELLAR v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
ment. As a result, the Government agrees with the Court
of Appeals that a violation of the transportation provision
cannot be established solely by evidence that the defen
dant carried money in a wallet or concealed it in some
other conventional or incidental way. See 478 F. 3d, at
291 (characterizing the defendant’s transportation of
money in a box in United States v. Dimeck, 24 F. 3d 1239,
1246 (CA10 1994), as a “minimal attempt at concealment”
that is distinguishable from petitioner’s “effort to hide or
conceal” the funds).
We agree with petitioner that merely hiding funds
during transportation is not sufficient to violate the stat
ute, even if substantial efforts have been expended to
conceal the money. Our conclusion turns on the text of
§1956(a)(2)(B)(i), and particularly on the term “design.” In
this context, “design” means purpose or plan; i.e., the
intended aim of the transportation. See Am. Hert. 491
(“To formulate a plan for; devise”; “[t]o create or contrive
for a particular purpose or effect”); Black’s 478 (“A plan or
scheme”; “[p]urpose or intention combined with a plan”);
see also Brief for United States 14 (“ ‘to conceive and plan
out in the mind’ ” (quoting Webster’s Third New Interna
tional Dictionary 611 (1993)). Congress wrote “knowing
that such transportation is designed . . . to conceal or
disguise” a listed attribute of the funds, §1956(a)(2)(B)(i),
and when an act is “designed to” do something, the most
natural reading is that it has that something as its pur
pose. The Fifth Circuit employed this meaning of design
when it referred to the “transportation design or plan to
get the funds out of this country.” See 478 F. 3d, at 289.
But the Fifth Circuit went on to discuss the “design” of
the transportation in a different sense. It described the
packaging of the money, its placement in the hidden com
partment, and the use of animal hair to mask its scent as
“aspects of the transportation” that “were designed to
conceal or disguise” the nature and location of the cash.
Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008) 13
Opinion of the Court
Ibid. (emphasis added). Because the Fifth Circuit used
“design” to refer not to the purpose of the transportation
but to the manner in which it was carried out, its use of
the term in this context was consistent with the alternate
meaning of “design” as structure or arrangement. See Am.
Hert. 491, 492 (“To plan out in systematic, usually graphic
form”; “[t]he purposeful or inventive arrangement of parts
or details”); Black’s 478 (“The pattern or configuration of
elements in something, such as a work of art”). The Gov
ernment at times also appears to adopt this meaning of
“design.” See Brief for United States 21 (“Congress fo
cused on how the transportation itself was ‘designed’ ”);
id., at 43 (arguing that petitioner’s design to move funds
without detection is proof of a design to conceal or disguise
the location and nature of the funds).6 If the statutory
term had this meaning, it would apply whenever a person
transported illicit funds in a secretive manner. Judge
Smith supplied an example of this construction: A petty
thief who hides money in his shoe and then walks across
the border to spend the money in local bars, see 478 F. 3d,
at 301 (dissenting opinion), has engaged in transportation
——————
6 This understanding of “design” is also implicit in some of the Gov
ernment’s statements that secretive transportation is sufficient to
prove a violation of the statute. See Brief for United States 46 (arguing
that the statute covers any “surreptitiou[s]” movement of funds “to a
location where United States law enforcement authorities are impaired
from detecting and intercepting them,” apparently regardless of
whether such impairment was the purpose of the plan); id., at 11
(“When a defendant surreptitiously transports or attempts to transport
illegal proceeds across the border knowing of their illegal character,
money laundering is the appropriate charge”); id., at 13 (“The statute
explicitly covers, and was intended to cover, a wide range of conduct
that impairs the ability of law enforcement to find and recover the
proceeds of crime”); Tr. of Oral Arg. 46. Agent Richard Nuckles, Immi
gration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), appears to have adopted this
standard at trial as well. See Tr. 196 (Oct. 12, 2004) (testifying that
attempting to move funds across the border without detection would be
illegal, apparently regardless of the reason for doing so).
14 REGALADO CUELLAR v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
designed to conceal the location of the money because he
has hidden it in an unlikely place.
We think it implausible, however, that Congress in
tended this meaning of “design.” If it had, it could have
expressed its intention simply by writing “knowing that
such transportation conceals or disguises,” rather than the
more complex formulation “knowing that such transporta
tion . . . is designed . . . to conceal or disguise.”
§1956(a)(2)(B)(i). It seems far more likely that Congress
intended courts to apply the familiar criminal law con
cepts of purpose and intent than to focus exclusively on
how a defendant “structured” the transportation. In addi
tion, the structural meaning of “design” is both overinclu
sive and underinclusive: It would capture individuals who
structured transportation in a secretive way but lacked
any criminal intent (such as a person who hid illicit funds
en route to turn them over to law enforcement); yet it
would exclude individuals who fully intended to move the
funds in order to impede detection by law enforcement but
failed to hide them during the transportation.
To be sure, purpose and structure are often related.
One may employ structure to achieve a purpose: For ex
ample, the petty thief may hide money in his shoe to
prevent it from being detected as he crosses the border
with the intent to hide the money in Mexico. See 478 F.
3d, at 301 (Smith, J., dissenting). Although transporting
money in a conventional manner may suggest no particu
lar purpose other than simply to move it from one place to
another, secretively transporting it suggests, at least, that
the defendant did not want the money to be detected
during transport. In this case, evidence of the methods
petitioner used to transport the nearly $81,000 in cash—
bundled in plastic bags and hidden in a secret compart
ment covered with animal hair—was plainly probative of
an underlying goal to prevent the funds from being de
tected while he drove them from the United States to
Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008) 15
Opinion of the Court
Mexico. The same secretive aspects of the transportation
also may be circumstantial evidence that the transporta
tion itself was intended to avoid detection of the funds,
because, for example, they may suggest that the transpor
tation is only one step in a larger plan to facilitate the
cross-border transport of the funds. Cf. id., at 289 (noting
that “concealment of the funds during the U. S. leg of the
trip [was] a vital part of the transportation design or plan
to get the funds out of this country”). But its probative
force, in that context, is weak. “There is a difference
between concealing something to transport it, and trans
porting something to conceal it,” id., at 296–297 (Smith, J.,
dissenting); that is, how one moves the money is distinct
from why one moves the money. Evidence of the former,
standing alone, is not sufficient to prove the latter.
This case illustrates why: Even with abundant evidence
that petitioner had concealed the money in order to trans
port it, the Government’s own expert witness—ICE Agent
Richard Nuckles—testified that the purpose of the trans
portation was to compensate the leaders of the operation.7
Tr. 179 (Oct. 12, 2004), App. 64–65 (“[T]he bulk of [the
money] generally goes back to Mexico, because the smug
gler is the one who originated this entire process. He’s
going to get a large cut of the profit, and that money has to
be moved back to him in Mexico”). The evidence suggested
that the secretive aspects of the transportation were em
ployed to facilitate the transportation, see 478 F. 3d, at
289 (noting that “concealment of the funds during the
U. S. leg of the trip [was] a vital part of the transportation
design or plan”), but not necessarily that secrecy was the
purpose of the transportation. Agent Nuckles testified
——————
7 Concealing or disguising a listed attribute need be only one of the
purposes of the transportation. See §1956(a)(2)(B)(i) (providing that a
transportation plan need be designed “in whole or in part” to conceal or
disguise). But here, compensating the leaders of the operation was the
only purpose to which Agent Nuckles testified.
16 REGALADO CUELLAR v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
that the secretive manner of transportation was consistent
with drug smuggling, see Tr. 179–180, App. 65–66, but the
Government failed to introduce any evidence that the
reason drug smugglers move money to Mexico is to conceal
or disguise a listed attribute of the funds.
Agent Nuckles also testified that Acuna, the Mexican
border town to which petitioner was headed, has a cash
economy and that U. S. currency is widely accepted there.
See Tr. 188–189, App. 69. The Fifth Circuit apparently
viewed this as evidence that petitioner transported the
money in order to conceal or disguise it: “[G]iven Mexico’s
largely cash economy, if [petitioner] had successfully
transported the funds to Mexico without detection, the
jury was entitled to find that the funds would have been
better concealed or concealable after the transportation
than before.” 478 F. 3d, at 292. The statutory text makes
clear, however, that a conviction under this provision
requires proof that the purpose—not merely effect—of the
transportation was to conceal or disguise a listed attrib
ute. Although the evidence suggested that petitioner’s
transportation would have had the effect of concealing the
funds, the evidence did not demonstrate that such con
cealment was the purpose of the transportation because,
for instance, there was no evidence that petitioner knew
about or intended the effect.8
——————
8 In many cases, a criminal defendant’s knowledge or purpose is not
established by direct evidence but instead is shown circumstantially
based on inferences drawn from evidence of effect. See, e.g., 1 W.
LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law §5.2(a), p. 341 (2d ed. 2003).
Specifically, where the consequences of an action are commonly known,
a trier of fact will often infer that the person taking the action knew
what the consequences would be and acted with the purpose of bringing
them about. Although, as noted above, the Government introduced
some evidence regarding the effect of transporting illegally obtained
money to Mexico, the Government has not pointed to any evidence in
the record from which it could be inferred beyond a reasonable doubt
that petitioner knew that taking the funds to Mexico would have had
Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008) 17
Opinion of the Court
In sum, we conclude that the evidence introduced by the
Government was not sufficient to permit a reasonable jury
to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that petitioner’s
transportation was “designed in whole or in part . . . to
conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source,
the ownership, or the control of the proceeds.”
§1956(a)(2)(B)(i).
III
The provision of the money laundering statute under
which petitioner was convicted requires proof that the
transportation was “designed in whole or in part to conceal
or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the owner
ship, or the control” of the funds. §1956(a)(2)(B)(i). Al
though this element does not require proof that the defen
dant attempted to create the appearance of legitimate
wealth, neither can it be satisfied solely by evidence that a
defendant concealed the funds during their transport. In
this case, the only evidence introduced to prove this ele
ment showed that petitioner engaged in extensive efforts
to conceal the funds en route to Mexico, and thus his con
viction cannot stand. We reverse the judgment of the
Fifth Circuit.
It is so ordered.
——————
one of the relevant effects.
Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008) 1
ALITO, J., concurring
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 06–1456
_________________
HUMBERTO FIDEL REGALADO CUELLAR,
PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
[June 2, 2008]
JUSTICE ALITO, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and
JUSTICE KENNEDY join, concurring.
I join the opinion of the Court but write briefly to sum-
marize my understanding of the deficiency in the Govern-
ment’s proof.
As the Court notes, ante, at 10, the Government was
required in this case to prove that petitioner knew that
the plan to transport the funds across the Mexican border
was designed at least in part to “conceal or disguise the
nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or the
control” of the funds. 18 U. S. C. §1956(a)(2)(B)(i).
Transporting the funds across the border would have
had the effect of achieving this objective if, once the funds
made it into Mexico, it would have been harder for law
enforcement authorities in this country (1) to ascertain
that the funds were drug proceeds (“nature”), (2) to find
the funds (“location”), (3) to determine where they came
from (“source”), (4) to ascertain who owned them (“owner-
ship”), or (5) to find out who controlled them (“control”).
But as the Court notes, ante, at 15, the prosecution had to
prove, not simply that the transportation of the funds
from the United States to Mexico would have had one of
these effects, ibid., but that petitioner knew that achieving
one of these effects was a design (i.e., purpose) of the
transportation.
2 REGALADO CUELLAR v. UNITED STATES
ALITO, J., concurring
As the Court also notes, ante, at 16, n. 8, a criminal
defendant’s intent is often inferred. Here, proof of peti-
tioner’s knowledge and of the intent of the person or per-
sons who “designed” the transportation would have been
sufficient if the prosecution had introduced evidence show-
ing, not only that taking “dirty” money across the border
has one or more of the effects noted above, but that it is
commonly known in the relevant circles (that is, among
those who design and carry out “such transportation,”
§1956(a)(2)(B)) that taking “dirty” money to Mexico has
one of the effects noted above. Such evidence would per-
mit a trier of fact to infer (1) that the person or persons
who “designed” the plan to have the funds taken to Mexico
intended to achieve the effect in question and (2) that a
person like petitioner (that is, a person who is recruited to
transport the funds) knew that this was the design.
Of course, if the prosecution had introduced such evi-
dence, the defense could have countered with any avail-
able proof showing (1) that in fact the achievement of
these effects was not a design of the transportation or
(2) that petitioner in fact did not know that achieving one
of these effects was a purpose of the plan. It would have
then been up to the trier of fact to decide whether the
statutory elements had been adequately proven.
At petitioner’s trial, as the Court notes, ante, at 16, the
Government introduced some evidence regarding the
effect of transporting illegally obtained money to Mexico,
but the Government has not pointed to any evidence in the
record from which it could be inferred beyond a reasonable
doubt that a person like petitioner knew that taking the
funds to Mexico would have had one of the relevant ef-
fects. For this reason, I agree with the Court that peti-
tioner’s conviction cannot be sustained.