Snyder v. Louisiana

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2007 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

SNYDER v. LOUISIANA

CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

No. 06–10119. Argued December 4, 2007—Decided March 19, 2008
During voir dire in petitioner’s capital murder case, the prosecutor used
peremptory strikes to eliminate black prospective jurors who had
survived challenges for cause. The jury convicted petitioner and sen
tenced him to death. Both on direct appeal and on remand in light of
Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U. S. 231, the Louisiana Supreme Court re
jected petitioner’s claim that the prosecution’s peremptory strikes of
certain prospective jurors, including Mr. Brooks, were based on race,
in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79.
Held: The trial judge committed clear error in rejecting the Batson
objection to the strike of Mr. Brooks. Pp. 3–13.
(a) Under Batson’s three-step process for adjudicating claims such
as petitioner’s, (1) a defendant must make a prima facie showing that
the challenge was based on race; (2) if so, “ ‘the prosecution must offer
a race-neutral basis for striking the juror in question’ ”; and (3) “ ‘in
light of the parties’ submissions, the trial court must determine
whether the defendant has shown purposeful discrimination.’ ”
Miller-El, supra, at 277 (THOMAS, J., dissenting) (quoting Miller-El v.
Cockrell, 537 U. S. 322, 328–329). Unless it is clearly erroneous, the
trial court’s ruling must be sustained on appeal. The trial court’s role
is pivotal, for it must evaluate the demeanor of the prosecutor exer
cising the challenge and the juror being excluded. Pp. 3–4.
(b) While all of the circumstances bearing on the racial-animosity
issue must be consulted in considering a Batson objection or review
ing a ruling claimed to be a Batson error, the explanation given for
striking Mr. Brooks, a college senior attempting to fulfill his student-
teaching obligation, is insufficient by itself and suffices for a Batson
error determination. Pp. 4–13.
(1) It cannot be presumed that the trial court credited the prose
cution’s first race-neutral reason, that Mr. Brooks looked nervous.
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Deference is owed to a trial judge’s finding that an attorney credibly
relied on demeanor in exercising a strike, but here, the trial judge
simply allowed the challenge without explanation. Since Mr. Brooks
was not challenged until the day after he was questioned and thus af
ter dozens of other jurors had been called, the judge might not have
recalled his demeanor. Or he may have found such consideration un
necessary, instead basing his ruling on the second proffered reason
for the strike. P. 6.
(2) That reason—Mr. Brooks’ student-teaching obligation—fails
even under the highly deferential standard of review applicable here.
Mr. Brooks was 1 of more than 50 venire members expressing con
cern that jury service or sequestration would interfere with work,
school, family, or other obligations. Although he was initially con
cerned about making up lost teaching time, he expressed no further
concern once a law clerk reported that the school’s dean would work
with Mr. Brooks if he missed time for a trial that week, and the
prosecutor did not question him more deeply about the matter. The
proffered reason must be evaluated in light of the circumstances that
the colloquy and law clerk report took place on Tuesday, the prosecu
tion struck Mr. Brooks on Wednesday, the trial’s guilt phase ended
on Thursday, and its penalty phase ended on Friday. The prosecu
tor’s scenario—that Mr. Brooks would have been inclined to find peti
tioner guilty of a lesser included offense to obviate the need for a
penalty phase—is both highly speculative and unlikely. Mr. Brooks
would be in a position to shorten the trial only if most or all of the ju
rors had favored a lesser verdict. Perhaps most telling, the trial’s
brevity, which the prosecutor anticipated on the record during voir
dire, meant that jury service would not have seriously interfered with
Mr. Brooks’ ability to complete his student teaching. The dean of
fered to work with him, and the trial occurred relatively early in the
fall term, giving Mr. Brooks several weeks to make up the time. The
implausibility of the prosecutor’s explanation is reinforced by his ac
ceptance of white jurors who disclosed conflicting obligations that ap
pear to have been at least as serious as Mr. Brooks’. Under Batson’s
third stage, the prosecution’s pretextual explanation gives rise to an
inference of discriminatory intent. There is no need to decide here
whether, in Batson cases, once a discriminatory intent is shown to be
a motivating factor, the burden shifts to the prosecution to show that
the discriminatory factor was not determinative. It is enough to rec
ognize that a peremptory strike shown to have been motivated in
substantial part by discriminatory intent could not be sustained
based on any lesser showing by the prosecution. The record here
does not show that the prosecution would have pre-emptively chal
lenged Mr. Brooks based on his nervousness alone, and there is no
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Syllabus

realistic possibility that the subtle question of causation could be
profitably explored further on remand more than a decade after peti
tioner’s trial. Pp. 6–13.
942 So. 2d 484, reversed and remanded.

ALITO, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J.,
and STEVENS, KENNEDY, SOUTER, GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ., joined.
THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which SCALIA, J., joined.
 Cite as: 552 U. S. ____ (2008) 1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________

No. 06–10119
_________________

ALLEN SNYDER, PETITIONER v. LOUISIANA
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF

LOUISIANA

[March 19, 2008]

JUSTICE ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner Allen Snyder was convicted of first-degree
murder in a Louisiana court and was sentenced to death.
He asks us to review a decision of the Louisiana Supreme
Court rejecting his claim that the prosecution exercised
some of its peremptory jury challenges based on race, in
violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 (1986). We
hold that the trial court committed clear error in its ruling
on a Batson objection, and we therefore reverse.
I
The crime for which petitioner was convicted occurred in
August 1995. At that time, petitioner and his wife, Mary,
had separated. On August 15, they discussed the possibil
ity of reconciliation, and Mary agreed to meet with peti
tioner the next day. That night, Mary went on a date with
Howard Wilson. During the evening, petitioner repeatedly
attempted to page Mary, but she did not respond. At
approximately 1:30 a.m. on August 16, Wilson drove up to
the home of Mary’s mother to drop Mary off. Petitioner
was waiting at the scene armed with a knife. He opened
the driver’s side door of Wilson’s car and repeatedly
stabbed the occupants, killing Wilson and wounding Mary.
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Opinion of the Court

The State charged petitioner with first-degree murder and
sought the death penalty based on the aggravating cir
cumstance that petitioner had knowingly created a risk of
death or great bodily harm to more than one person. See
La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 905.4(A)(4) (West Supp.
2008).
Voir dire began on Tuesday, August 27, 1996, and pro
ceeded as follows. During the first phase, the trial court
screened the panel to identify jurors who did not meet
Louisiana’s requirements for jury service or claimed that
service on the jury or sequestration for the duration of the
trial would result in extreme hardship. More than 50
prospective jurors reported that they had work, family, or
other commitments that would interfere with jury service.
In each of those instances, the nature of the conflicting
commitments was explored, and some of these jurors were
dismissed. App. 58–164.
In the next phase, the court randomly selected panels of
13 potential jurors for further questioning. Id., at 166–
167. The defense and prosecution addressed each panel
and questioned the jurors both as a group and individu
ally. At the conclusion of this questioning, the court ruled
on challenges for cause. Then, the prosecution and the
defense were given the opportunity to use peremptory
challenges (each side had 12) to remove remaining jurors.
The court continued this process of calling 13-person
panels until the jury was filled. In accordance with Lou
isiana law, the parties were permitted to exercise “back-
strikes.” That is, they were allowed to use their perempto
ries up until the time when the final jury was sworn and
thus were permitted to strike jurors whom they had ini
tially accepted when the jurors’ panels were called. See
La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 795(b)(1); State v. Taylor,
93–2201, pp. 22–23 (La. 2/28/96), 669 So. 2d 364, 376.
Eighty-five prospective jurors were questioned as mem
bers of a panel. Thirty-six of these survived challenges for
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Opinion of the Court

cause; 5 of the 36 were black (as is petitioner); and all 5 of
the prospective black jurors were eliminated by the prose
cution through the use of peremptory strikes. The jury
found petitioner guilty of first-degree murder and deter
mined that he should receive the death penalty.
On direct appeal, the Louisiana Supreme Court condi
tionally affirmed petitioner’s conviction. The court re
jected petitioner’s Batson claim but remanded the case for
a nunc pro tunc determination of petitioner’s competency
to stand trial. State v. Snyder, 98–1078 (La. 4/14/99), 750
So. 2d 832. Two justices dissented and would have found
a Batson violation. See id., at 866 (Johnson, J., dissent
ing), 863 (Lemmon, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
On remand, the trial court found that petitioner had
been competent to stand trial, and the Louisiana Supreme
Court affirmed that determination. State v. Snyder, 1998–
1078 (La. 4/14/04), 874 So. 2d 739. Petitioner petitioned
this Court for a writ of certiorari, and while his petition
was pending, this Court decided Miller-El v. Dretke, 545
U. S. 231 (2005). We then granted the petition, vacated
the judgment, and remanded the case to the Louisiana
Supreme Court for further consideration in light of Miller-
El. See Snyder v. Louisiana, 545 U. S. 1137 (2005). On
remand, the Louisiana Supreme Court again rejected
Snyder’s Batson claim, this time by a vote of 4 to 3. See
1998–1078 (La. 9/6/06), 942 So. 2d 484. We again granted
certiorari, 551 U. S. ___ (2007), and now reverse.
II
Batson provides a three-step process for a trial court to
use in adjudicating a claim that a peremptory challenge
was based on race:
“ ‘First, a defendant must make a prima facie showing
that a peremptory challenge has been exercised on the
basis of race[; s]econd, if that showing has been made,
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Opinion of the Court

the prosecution must offer a race-neutral basis for
striking the juror in question[; and t]hird, in light of
the parties’ submissions, the trial court must deter
mine whether the defendant has shown purposeful
discrimination.’ ” Miller-El v. Dretke, supra, at 277
(THOMAS, J., dissenting) (quoting Miller-El v.
Cockrell, 537 U. S. 322, 328–329 (2003)).
On appeal, a trial court’s ruling on the issue of discrimi
natory intent must be sustained unless it is clearly erro
neous. See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U. S. 352, 369
(1991) (plurality opinion); id., at 372 (O’Connor, J., joined
by SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment). The trial court
has a pivotal role in evaluating Batson claims. Step three
of the Batson inquiry involves an evaluation of the prose
cutor’s credibility, see 476 U. S., at 98, n. 21, and “the best
evidence [of discriminatory intent] often will be the de
meanor of the attorney who exercises the challenge,”
Hernandez, 500 U. S., at 365 (plurality opinion). In addi
tion, race-neutral reasons for peremptory challenges often
invoke a juror’s demeanor (e.g., nervousness, inattention),
making the trial court’s first-hand observations of even
greater importance. In this situation, the trial court must
evaluate not only whether the prosecutor’s demeanor
belies a discriminatory intent, but also whether the juror’s
demeanor can credibly be said to have exhibited the basis
for the strike attributed to the juror by the prosecutor. We
have recognized that these determinations of credibility
and demeanor lie “ ‘peculiarly within a trial judge’s prov
ince,’ ” ibid. (quoting Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U. S. 412,
428 (1985)), and we have stated that “in the absence of
exceptional circumstances, we would defer to [the trial
court].” 500 U. S., at 366.
III
Petitioner centers his Batson claim on the prosecution’s
strikes of two black jurors, Jeffrey Brooks and Elaine
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Opinion of the Court

Scott. Because we find that the trial court committed
clear error in overruling petitioner’s Batson objection with
respect to Mr. Brooks, we have no need to consider peti
tioner’s claim regarding Ms. Scott. See, e.g., United States
v. Vasquez-Lopez, 22 F. 3d 900, 902 (CA9 1994) (“[T]he
Constitution forbids striking even a single prospective
juror for a discriminatory purpose”); United States v. Lane,
866 F. 2d 103, 105 (CA4 1989); United States v. Clemons,
843 F. 2d 741, 747 (CA3 1988); United States v. Battle, 836
F. 2d 1084, 1086 (CA8 1987); United States v. David, 803
F. 2d 1567, 1571 (CA11 1986).
In Miller-El v. Dretke, the Court made it clear that in
considering a Batson objection, or in reviewing a ruling
claimed to be Batson error, all of the circumstances that
bear upon the issue of racial animosity must be consulted.
545 U. S., at 239. Here, as just one example, if there were
persisting doubts as to the outcome, a court would be
required to consider the strike of Ms. Scott for the bearing
it might have upon the strike of Mr. Brooks. In this case,
however, the explanation given for the strike of Mr.
Brooks is by itself unconvincing and suffices for the de
termination that there was Batson error.
When defense counsel made a Batson objection concern
ing the strike of Mr. Brooks, a college senior who was
attempting to fulfill his student-teaching obligation, the
prosecution offered two race-neutral reasons for the strike.
The prosecutor explained:
“I thought about it last night. Number 1, the main
reason is that he looked very nervous to me through
out the questioning. Number 2, he’s one of the fellows
that came up at the beginning [of voir dire] and said
he was going to miss class. He’s a student teacher.
My main concern is for that reason, that being that he
might, to go home quickly, come back with guilty of a
lesser verdict so there wouldn’t be a penalty phase.
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Those are my two reasons.” App. 444.
Defense counsel disputed both explanations, id., at 444–
445, and the trial judge ruled as follows: “All right. I’m
going to allow the challenge. I’m going to allow the chal
lenge.” Id., at 445. We discuss the prosecution’s two
proffered grounds for striking Mr. Brooks in turn.
A
With respect to the first reason, the Louisiana Supreme
Court was correct that “nervousness cannot be shown from
a cold transcript, which is why . . . the [trial] judge’s
evaluation must be given much deference.” 942 So. 2d, at
496. As noted above, deference is especially appropriate
where a trial judge has made a finding that an attorney
credibly relied on demeanor in exercising a strike. Here,
however, the record does not show that the trial judge
actually made a determination concerning Mr. Brooks’
demeanor. The trial judge was given two explanations for
the strike. Rather than making a specific finding on the
record concerning Mr. Brooks’ demeanor, the trial judge
simply allowed the challenge without explanation. It is
possible that the judge did not have any impression one
way or the other concerning Mr. Brooks’ demeanor. Mr.
Brooks was not challenged until the day after he was
questioned, and by that time dozens of other jurors had
been questioned. Thus, the trial judge may not have
recalled Mr. Brooks’ demeanor. Or, the trial judge may
have found it unnecessary to consider Mr. Brooks’ de
meanor, instead basing his ruling completely on the sec
ond proffered justification for the strike. For these rea
sons, we cannot presume that the trial judge credited the
prosecutor’s assertion that Mr. Brooks was nervous.
B
The second reason proffered for the strike of Mr.
Brooks—his student-teaching obligation—fails even under
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Opinion of the Court

the highly deferential standard of review that is applicable
here. At the beginning of voir dire, when the trial court
asked the members of the venire whether jury service or
sequestration would pose an extreme hardship, Mr.
Brooks was 1 of more than 50 members of the venire who
expressed concern that jury service or sequestration would
interfere with work, school, family, or other obligations.
When Mr. Brooks came forward, the following exchange
took place:
“MR. JEFFREY BROOKS: . . . I’m a student at
Southern University, New Orleans. This is my last
semester. My major requires me to student teach,
and today I’ve already missed a half a day. That is
part of my—it’s required for me to graduate this
semester.
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Mr. Brooks, if you—how
many days would you miss if you were sequestered on
this jury? Do you teach every day?
“MR. JEFFREY BROOKS: Five days a week.

“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Five days a week.

“MR. JEFFREY BROOKS: And it’s 8:30 through

3:00.
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: If you missed this week,
is there any way that you could make it up this
semester?
“MR. JEFFREY BROOKS: Well, the first two weeks
I observe, the remaining I begin teaching, so there is
something I’m missing right now that will better me
towards my teaching career.
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Is there any way that you
could make up the observed observation [sic] that
you’re missing today, at another time?
“MR. JEFFREY BROOKS: It may be possible, I’m
not sure.
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay. So that—
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Opinion of the Court

“THE COURT: Is there anyone we could call, like a
Dean or anything, that we could speak to?
“MR. JEFFREY BROOKS: Actually, I spoke to my
Dean, Doctor Tillman, who’s at the university proba
bly right now.
“THE COURT: All right.

“MR. JEFFREY BROOKS: Would you like to speak

to him?
“THE COURT: Yeah.
“MR. JEFFREY BROOKS: I don’t have his card on
me.
“THE COURT: Why don’t you give [a law clerk] his
number, give [a law clerk] his name and we’ll call him
and we’ll see what we can do.
“(MR. JEFFREY BROOKS LEFT THE BENCH).”
App. 102–104.
Shortly thereafter, the court again spoke with Mr.
Brooks:
“THE LAW CLERK: Jeffrey Brooks, the require
ment for his teaching is a three hundred clock hour
observation. Doctor Tillman at Southern University
said that as long as it’s just this week, he doesn’t see
that it would cause a problem with Mr. Brooks com
pleting his observation time within this semester.
“(MR. BROOKS APPROACHED THE BENCH)
“THE COURT: We talked to Doctor Tillman and he
says he doesn’t see a problem as long as it’s just this
week, you know, he’ll work with you on it. Okay?
“MR. JEFFREY BROOKS: Okay.
“(MR. JEFFREY BROOKS LEFT THE BENCH).”
Id., at 116.
Once Mr. Brooks heard the law clerk’s report about the
conversation with Doctor Tillman, Mr. Brooks did not
express any further concern about serving on the jury, and
the prosecution did not choose to question him more
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Opinion of the Court

deeply about this matter.
The colloquy with Mr. Brooks and the law clerk’s report
took place on Tuesday, August 27; the prosecution struck
Mr. Brooks the following day, Wednesday, August 28; the
guilt phase of petitioner’s trial ended the next day, Thurs
day, August 29; and the penalty phase was completed by
the end of the week, on Friday, August 30.
The prosecutor’s second proffered reason for striking
Mr. Brooks must be evaluated in light of these circum
stances. The prosecutor claimed to be apprehensive that
Mr. Brooks, in order to minimize the student-teaching
hours missed during jury service, might have been moti
vated to find petitioner guilty, not of first-degree murder,
but of a lesser included offense because this would obviate
the need for a penalty phase proceeding. But this scenario
was highly speculative. Even if Mr. Brooks had favored a
quick resolution, that would not have necessarily led him
to reject a finding of first-degree murder. If the majority
of jurors had initially favored a finding of first-degree
murder, Mr. Brooks’ purported inclination might have led
him to agree in order to speed the deliberations. Only if
all or most of the other jurors had favored the lesser ver
dict would Mr. Brooks have been in a position to shorten
the trial by favoring such a verdict.
Perhaps most telling, the brevity of petitioner’s trial—
something that the prosecutor anticipated on the record
during voir dire1—meant that serving on the jury would
not have seriously interfered with Mr. Brooks’ ability to
complete his required student teaching. As noted, peti
tioner’s trial was completed by Friday, August 30. If Mr.
Brooks, who reported to court and was peremptorily chal
lenged on Wednesday, August 28, had been permitted to
serve, he would have missed only two additional days of
student teaching, Thursday, August 29, and Friday, Au
——————
1 See, e.g., App. 98, 105, 111, 121, 130, 204.
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Opinion of the Court

gust 30. Mr. Brooks’ dean promised to “work with” Mr.
Brooks to see that he was able to make up any student-
teaching time that he missed due to jury service; the dean
stated that he did not think that this would be a problem;
and the record contains no suggestion that Mr. Brooks
remained troubled after hearing the report of the dean’s
remarks. In addition, although the record does not in
clude the academic calendar of Mr. Brooks’ university, it is
apparent that the trial occurred relatively early in the fall
semester. With many weeks remaining in the term, Mr.
Brooks would have needed to make up no more than an
hour or two per week in order to compensate for the time
that he would have lost due to jury service. When all of
these considerations are taken into account, the prosecu
tor’s second proffered justification for striking Mr. Brooks
is suspicious.
The implausibility of this explanation is reinforced by
the prosecutor’s acceptance of white jurors who disclosed
conflicting obligations that appear to have been at least as
serious as Mr. Brooks’. We recognize that a retrospective
comparison of jurors based on a cold appellate record may
be very misleading when alleged similarities were not
raised at trial. In that situation, an appellate court must
be mindful that an exploration of the alleged similarities
at the time of trial might have shown that the jurors in
question were not really comparable. In this case, how
ever, the shared characteristic, i.e., concern about serving
on the jury due to conflicting obligations, was thoroughly
explored by the trial court when the relevant jurors asked
to be excused for cause.2
A comparison between Mr. Brooks and Roland Laws, a
——————
2 The Louisiana Supreme Court did not hold that petitioner had pro

cedurally defaulted reliance on a comparison of the African-American
jurors whom the prosecution struck with white jurors whom the prose
cution accepted. On the contrary, the State Supreme Court itself made
such a comparison. See 942 So. 2d 484, 495–496 (2006).
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Opinion of the Court

white juror, is particularly striking. During the initial
stage of voir dire, Mr. Laws approached the court and
offered strong reasons why serving on the sequestered jury
would cause him hardship. Mr. Laws stated that he was
“a self-employed general contractor,” with “two houses
that are nearing completion, one [with the occupants] . . .
moving in this weekend.” Id., at 129. He explained that,
if he served on the jury, “the people won’t [be able to] move
in.” Id., at 130. Mr. Laws also had demanding family
obligations:
“[M]y wife just had a hysterectomy, so I’m running the
kids back and forth to school, and we’re not originally
from here, so I have no family in the area, so between
the two things, it’s kind of bad timing for me.” Ibid.
Although these obligations seem substantially more press
ing than Mr. Brooks’, the prosecution questioned Mr. Laws
and attempted to elicit assurances that he would be able
to serve despite his work and family obligations. See ibid.
(prosecutor asking Mr. Laws “[i]f you got stuck on jury
duty anyway . . . would you try to make other arrange
ments as best you could?”). And the prosecution declined
the opportunity to use a peremptory strike on Mr. Laws.
Id., at 549. If the prosecution had been sincerely con
cerned that Mr. Brooks would favor a lesser verdict than
first-degree murder in order to shorten the trial, it is hard
to see why the prosecution would not have had at least as
much concern regarding Mr. Laws.
The situation regarding another white juror, John Don
nes, although less fully developed, is also significant. At
the end of the first day of voir dire, Mr. Donnes ap
proached the court and raised the possibility that he
would have an important work commitment later that
week. Id., at 349. Because Mr. Donnes stated that he
would know the next morning whether he would actually
have a problem, the court suggested that Mr. Donnes raise
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the matter again at that time. Ibid. The next day, Mr.
Donnes again expressed concern about serving, stating
that, in order to serve, “I’d have to cancel too many
things,” including an urgent appointment at which his
presence was essential. Id., at 467–468. Despite Mr.
Donnes’ concern, the prosecution did not strike him. Id.,
at 490.
As previously noted, the question presented at the third
stage of the Batson inquiry is “ ‘whether the defendant has
shown purposeful discrimination.’ ” Miller-El v. Dretke,
545 U. S., at 277. The prosecution’s proffer of this pretex
tual explanation naturally gives rise to an inference of
discriminatory intent. See id., at 252 (noting the “pretex
tual significance” of a “stated reason [that] does not hold
up”); Purkett v. Elem, 514 U. S. 765, 768 (1995) (per cu
riam) (“At [the third] stage, implausible or fantastic justi
fications may (and probably will) be found to be pretexts
for purposeful discrimination”); Hernandez, 500 U. S., at
365 (plurality opinion) (“In the typical peremptory chal
lenge inquiry, the decisive question will be whether coun
sel’s race-neutral explanation for a peremptory chal-
lenge should be believed”). Cf. St. Mary’s Honor Center v.
Hicks, 509 U. S. 502, 511 (1993) (“[R]ejection of the de-
fendant’s proffered [nondiscriminatory] reasons will per
mit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional
discrimination”).
In other circumstances, we have held that, once it is
shown that a discriminatory intent was a substantial or
motivating factor in an action taken by a state actor, the
burden shifts to the party defending the action to show
that this factor was not determinative. See Hunter v.
Underwood, 471 U. S. 222, 228 (1985). We have not previ
ously applied this rule in a Batson case, and we need not
decide here whether that standard governs in this context.
For present purposes, it is enough to recognize that a
peremptory strike shown to have been motivated in sub
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Opinion of the Court

stantial part by discriminatory intent could not be sus
tained based on any lesser showing by the prosecution.
And in light of the circumstances here—including absence
of anything in the record showing that the trial judge
credited the claim that Mr. Brooks was nervous, the
prosecution’s description of both of its proffered explana
tions as “main concern[s],” App. 444, and the adverse
inference noted above—the record does not show that the
prosecution would have pre-emptively challenged Mr.
Brooks based on his nervousness alone. See Hunter,
supra, at 228. Nor is there any realistic possibility that
this subtle question of causation could be profitably ex
plored further on remand at this late date, more than a
decade after petitioner’s trial.
* * *
We therefore reverse the judgment of the Louisiana
Supreme Court and remand the case for further proceed
ings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
 Cite as: 552 U. S. ____ (2008) 1

THOMAS, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________

No. 06–10119
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ALLEN SNYDER, PETITIONER v. LOUISIANA
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF

LOUISIANA

[March 19, 2008]

JUSTICE THOMAS, with whom JUSTICE SCALIA joins,
dissenting.
Petitioner essentially asks this Court to second-guess
the fact-based determinations of the Louisiana courts as to
the reasons for a prosecutor’s decision to strike two jurors.
The evaluation of a prosecutor’s motives for striking a
juror is at bottom a credibility judgment, which lies “ ‘ pe
culiarly within a trial judge’s province.’ ” Hernandez v.
New York, 500 U. S. 352, 365 (1991) (plurality opinion)
(quoting Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U. S. 412, 428 (1985));
Hernandez, supra, at 372 (O’Connor, J., concurring in
judgment); ante, at 4. “[I]n the absence of exceptional
circumstances, we [should] defer to state-court factual
findings.” Hernandez, 500 U. S., at 366. None of the
evidence in the record as to jurors Jeffrey Brooks and
Elaine Scott demonstrates that the trial court clearly
erred in finding they were not stricken on the basis of
race. Because the trial court’s determination was a “per
missible view of the evidence,” id., at 369, I would affirm
the judgment of the Louisiana Supreme Court.
The Court begins by setting out the “deferential stan
dard,” ante, at 7, that we apply to a trial court’s resolution
of a Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 (1986), claim, noting
that we will overturn a ruling on the question of discrimi
natory intent only if it is “clearly erroneous,” ante, at 4.
Under this standard, we “will not reverse a lower court’s
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THOMAS, J., dissenting

finding of fact simply because we would have decided the
case differently.” Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U. S. 234, 242
(2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). Instead, a
reviewing court must ask “whether, ‘on the entire evi
dence,’ it is ‘left with the definite and firm conviction that
a mistake has been committed.’ ” Ibid. (quoting United
States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U. S. 364, 395
(1948)).
The Court acknowledges two reasons why a trial court
“has a pivotal role in evaluating Batson claims.” Ante, at
4. First, the Court notes that the trial court is uniquely
situated to judge the prosecutor’s credibility because the
best evidence of discriminatory intent “ ‘ often will be the
demeanor of the attorney who exercises the challenge.’ ”
Ibid. (quoting Hernandez, supra, at 365 (plurality opin
ion)). Second, it recognizes that the trial court’s “first
hand observations” of the juror’s demeanor are of “grea[t]
importance” in determining whether the prosecutor’s
neutral basis for the strike is credible. Ante, at 4.
The Court’s conclusion, however, reveals that it is only
paying lipservice to the pivotal role of the trial court. The
Court second-guesses the trial court’s determinations in
this case merely because the judge did not clarify which of
the prosecutor’s neutral bases for striking Mr. Brooks was
dispositive. But we have never suggested that a reviewing
court should defer to a trial court’s resolution of a Batson
challenge only if the trial court made specific findings with
respect to each of the prosecutor’s proffered race-neutral
reasons. To the contrary, when the grounds for a trial
court’s decision are ambiguous, an appellate court should
not presume that the lower court based its decision on an
improper ground, particularly when applying a deferential
standard of review. See Sprint/United Management Co.
v. Mendelsohn, ante, at ___ (slip op., at 6–7).
The prosecution offered two neutral bases for striking
Mr. Brooks: his nervous demeanor and his stated concern
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THOMAS, J., dissenting

about missing class. App. 444. The trial court, in reject
ing defendant’s Batson challenge, stated only “All right.
I’m going to allow the challenge. I’m going to allow the
challenge.” Id., at 445. The Court concedes that “the
record does not show” whether the trial court made its
determination based on Mr. Brooks’ demeanor or his
concern for missing class, ante, at 6, but then speculates
as to what the trial court might have thought about Mr.
Brooks’ demeanor. As a result of that speculation, the
Court concludes that it “cannot presume that the trial
court credited the prosecutor’s assertion that Mr. Brooks
was nervous.” Ibid. Inexplicably, however, the Court
concludes that it can presume that the trial court imper
missibly relied on the prosecutor’s supposedly pretextual
concern about Mr. Brooks’ teaching schedule, even though
nothing in the record supports that interpretation over the
one the Court rejects.
Indeed, if the record suggests anything, it is that the
judge was more influenced by Mr. Brooks’ nervousness
than by his concern for missing class. Following an ex
change about whether his desire to get back to class would
make Mr. Brooks more likely to support a verdict on a
lesser included offense because it might avoid a penalty
phase, defense counsel offered its primary rebuttal to the
prosecutor’s proffered neutral reasons. Immediately after
argument on the nervousness point, the judge ruled on the
Batson challenge, even interrupting the prosecutor to do
so:
“MR. VASQUEZ: His main problem yesterday was the
fact that he didn’t know if he would miss some teach
ing time as a student teacher. The clerk called the
school and whoever it was and the Dean said that
wouldn’t be a problem. He was told that this would
go through the weekend, and he expressed that that
was his only concern, that he didn’t have any other
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THOMAS, J., dissenting

problems.
“As far as him looking nervous, hell, everybody out
here looks nervous. I’m nervous.
“MR. OLINDE: Judge, it’s —
“MR. VASQUEZ: Judge, that’s — You know.
“MR. OLINDE: — a question of this: It’s a peremptory
challenge. We need 12 out of 12 people. Mr. Brooks
was very uncertain and very nervous looking and —
“THE COURT: All right. I’m going to allow the chal
lenge. I’m going to allow the challenge.” App. 445.
Although this exchange is certainly not hard-and-fast
evidence of the trial court’s reasoning, it undermines the
Court’s presumption that the trial judge relied solely on
Mr. Brooks’ concern for missing school.
The Court also concludes that the trial court’s determi
nation lacked support in the record because the prosecutor
failed to strike two other jurors with similar concerns.
Ante, at 10–12. Those jurors, however, were never men
tioned in the argument before the trial court, nor were
they discussed in the filings or opinions on any of the
three occasions this case was considered by the Louisiana
Supreme Court.* Petitioner failed to suggest a compari
son with those two jurors in his petition for certiorari, and
apparently only discovered this “clear error” in the record
when drafting his brief before this Court. We have no
business overturning a conviction, years after the fact and
after extensive intervening litigation, based on arguments
not presented to the courts below. Cf. Miller-El v. Dretke,
545 U. S. 231, 283 (2005) (THOMAS, J., dissenting).

——————
* While the Court correctly observes that the Louisiana Supreme
Court made a comparison between Mr. Brooks and unstricken white
jurors, that is true only as to jurors Vicki Chauffe, Michael Sandras,
and Arthur Yeager. 1998–1078 (La. 9/6/06), 942 So. 2d 484, 495–496.
The Court, on the other hand, focuses on Roland Laws and John
Donnes, who were never discussed below in this context.
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THOMAS, J., dissenting

Because I believe that the trial court did not clearly err
in rejecting petitioner’s Batson challenge with respect to
Mr. Brooks, I also must address the strike of Ms. Scott.
The prosecution’s neutral explanation for striking Ms.
Scott was that she was unsure about her ability to impose
the death penalty. Like the claims made about Mr.
Brooks, there is very little in the record either to support
or to undermine the prosecution’s asserted rationale for
striking Ms. Scott. But the trial court had the benefit of
observing the exchange between the prosecutor and Ms.
Scott, and accordingly was in the best position to judge
whether the prosecutor’s assessment of her response was
credible. When asked if she could consider the death
penalty, her first response was inaudible. App. 360. The
trial court, with the benefit of contextual clues not appar
ent on a cold transcript, was better positioned to evaluate
whether Ms. Scott was merely softspoken or seemed hesi
tant in her responses. Similarly, a firsthand observation
of demeanor is the only thing that could give sufficient
content to Ms. Scott’s ultimate response—“I think I could,”
id., at 361—to determine whether the prosecution’s con
cern about her willingness to impose the death penalty
was well founded. Given the trial court’s expertise in
making credibility determinations and its firsthand
knowledge of the voir dire exchanges, it is entirely proper
to defer to its judgment. Accordingly, I would affirm the
judgment below.