Cite as: 552 U. S. ____ (2007) 1
Per Curiam
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
RICHARD F. ALLEN, COMMISSIONER, ALABAMA
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS v. DANIEL
SIEBERT
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 06–1680. Decided November 5, 2007
PER CURIAM.
Daniel Siebert was convicted and sentenced to death in
the State of Alabama for the murder of Linda Jarman.
Siebert’s conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct
appeal, and the certificate of judgment issued on May 22,
1990. This Court denied certiorari on November 5, 1990.
Siebert v. Alabama, 498 U. S. 963. On August 25, 1992,
Siebert filed a petition for postconviction relief in Alabama
state court. The state courts denied the petition as un
timely, however, because it was filed approximately three
months after the expiration of the then-applicable 2-year
statute of limitations, 2 Ala. Rule Crim. Proc. 32.2(c)
(2000–2001), which began to run from the date the certifi
cate of judgment issued.* The Alabama Supreme Court
denied certiorari on September 15, 2000. Siebert did not
seek review in this Court. On September 14, 2001, Siebert
filed a petition for a federal writ of habeas corpus, see 28
U. S. C. §2254, in the District Court for the Northern
District of Alabama.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
——————
* At the time Siebert’s petition was before the Alabama courts, Rule
32.2(c) provided that “the court shall not entertain any petition,” with
certain exceptions not applicable here, “unless the petition is filed . . .
within two (2) years after the issuance of the certificate of judgment by
the Court of Criminal Appeals.” The statute has since been amended to
provide for a 1-year limitations period, but is otherwise unchanged.
See 1 Ala. Rule Crim. Proc. 32.2(c) (2007–2008).
2 ALLEN v. SIEBERT
Per Curiam
1996 (AEDPA) established a 1-year statute of limitations
for filing a federal habeas petition. §2244(d)(1). The
limitations period is tolled, however, while “a properly
filed application for State post-conviction or other collat
eral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or
claim is pending.” §2244(d)(2). Because Siebert’s direct
appeal became final before AEDPA became effective, the
1-year limitations period began to run from April 24, 1996,
AEDPA’s effective date. See Carey v. Saffold, 536 U. S.
214, 217 (2002). Thus, absent tolling, Siebert’s federal
habeas petition would be untimely by over four years.
The District Court dismissed Siebert’s habeas petition
as untimely, reasoning that an application for state post-
conviction relief is not “properly filed” if it was rejected by
the state court on statute-of-limitations grounds. The
Court of Appeals reversed, however, holding that Siebert’s
state postconviction petition was “properly filed” within
the meaning of §2244(d)(2), because the state time bar was
not jurisdictional and the Alabama courts therefore had
discretion in enforcing it. See Siebert v. Campbell, 334
F. 3d 1018, 1030 (CA11 2003) (per curiam). The Court of
Appeals accordingly remanded to the District Court to
consider the merits of Siebert’s petition.
While Siebert’s habeas petition was pending on remand
in the District Court, we decided Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544
U. S. 408 (2005). In Pace, we held that a state postconvic
tion petition rejected by the state court as untimely is not
“properly filed” within the meaning of §2244(d)(2). Id., at
414, 417. Relying on Pace, the District Court again found
that Siebert’s state postconviction petition was not “prop
erly filed,” and dismissed his federal habeas petition as
untimely. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed and
remanded. In a one-paragraph opinion, the court distin
guished Pace on the ground that Rule 32.2(c), unlike the
statute of limitations at issue in Pace, “operate[s] as an
affirmative defense.” 480 F. 3d 1089, 1090 (CA11 2007).
Cite as: 552 U. S. ____ (2007) 3
Per Curiam
Thus, the court found its prior holding—that Siebert’s
state postconviction petition was “properly filed” because
the state court rejected it on a nonjurisdictional ground—
stood as the law of the case. Ibid.
The Court of Appeals’ carve-out of time limits that
operate as affirmative defenses is inconsistent with our
holding in Pace. Although the Pennsylvania statute of
limitations at issue in Pace happens to have been a juris
dictional time bar under state law, see Commonwealth v.
Banks, 556 Pa. 1, 5–6, 726 A. 2d 374, 376 (1999), the
jurisdictional nature of the time limit was not the basis for
our decision. Rather, we built upon a distinction that we
had earlier articulated in Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U. S. 4
(2000), between postconviction petitions rejected on the
basis of “ ‘filing’ conditions,” which are not “properly filed”
under §2244(d)(2), and those rejected on the basis of “pro
cedural bars [that] go to the ability to obtain relief,” which
are. Pace, supra, at 417 (citing Artuz, supra, at 10–11).
We found that statutes of limitations are “filing” condi
tions because they “go to the very initiation of a petition
and a court’s ability to consider that petition.” Pace, 544
U. S., at 417. Thus, we held “that time limits, no matter
their form, are ‘filing’ conditions,” and that a state post-
conviction petition is therefore not “properly filed” if it was
rejected by the state court as untimely. Ibid. (emphasis
added).
In short, our holding in Pace turned not on the nature of
the particular time limit relied upon by the state court,
but rather on the fact that time limits generally establish
“conditions to filing” a petition for state postconviction
relief. Whether a time limit is jurisdictional, an affirma
tive defense, or something in between, it is a “condition to
filing,” Artuz, supra, at 9—it places a limit on how long a
prisoner can wait before filing a postconviction petition.
The fact that Alabama’s Rule 32.2(c) is an affirmative
defense that can be waived (or is subject to equitable
4 ALLEN v. SIEBERT
Per Curiam
tolling) renders it no less a “filing” requirement than a
jurisdictional time bar would be; it only makes it a less
stringent one. Indeed, in Pace we cited the very statute at
issue in this case as an example of such a “filing” require
ment. See 544 U. S., at 417, n. 7 (citing 2 Ala. Rule Crim.
Proc. 32.2(c) (2004–2005)).
Excluding from Pace’s scope those time limits that
operate as affirmative defenses would leave a gaping hole
in what we plainly meant to be a general rule, as statutes
of limitations are often affirmative defenses. See, e.g.,
Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(c); Kirkland v. State, 143 Idaho 544,
546, 149 P. 3d 819, 821 (2006) (“The statute of limitations
for petitions for post-conviction relief is not jurisdictional.
It ‘is an affirmative defense that may be waived if it is not
pleaded by the defendant’ ” (quoting Cole v. State, 135
Idaho 107, 110, 15 P. 3d 820, 823 (2000); citation omit
ted)); People v. Boclair, 202 Ill. 2d 89, 101, 789 N. E. 2d
734, 742 (2002) (holding that time bar for filing postcon
viction petition is “an affirmative defense and can be
raised, waived, or forfeited, by the State”). What is more,
whether a time limit is jurisdictional or an affirmative
defense is often a disputed question, as the interpretive
history of Rule 32.2(c) itself illustrates, see Ex parte Ward,
No. 1051818, 2007 WL 1576054, *6 (Ala., June 1, 2007)
(noting confusion in the Alabama lower courts over
whether Rule 32.2(c) is jurisdictional). Under the Court of
Appeals’ approach, federal habeas courts would have to
delve into the intricacies of state procedural law in decid
ing whether a postconviction petition rejected by the state
courts as untimely was nonetheless “properly filed” under
§2244(d)(2). Our decision in Pace precludes such an ap
proach.
We therefore reiterate now what we held in Pace: “When
a postconviction petition is untimely under state law, ‘that
[is] the end of the matter’ for purposes of §2244(d)(2).” 544
U. S., at 414 (quoting Carey, 536 U. S., at 226; alteration
Cite as: 552 U. S. ____ (2007) 5
Per Curiam
in original). Because Siebert’s petition for state postcon
viction relief was rejected as untimely by the Alabama
courts, it was not “properly filed” under §2244(d)(2).
Accordingly, he was not entitled to tolling of AEDPA’s 1
year statute of limitations.
The petition for certiorari is granted. The judgment of
the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Cite as: 552 U. S. ____ (2007) 1
STEVENS, J., dissenting
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
RICHARD F. ALLEN, COMMISSIONER, ALABAMA
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS v. DANIEL
SIEBERT
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 06–1680. Decided November 5, 2007
JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE GINSBURG joins,
dissenting.
There is an obvious distinction between time limits that
go to the very initiation of a petition, and time limits that
create an affirmative defense that can be waived. Com
pare the majority and dissenting opinions in John R. Sand
& Gravel Co. v. United States, 457 F. 3d 1345 (CA Fed.
2006), cert. granted, 550 U. S. __ (2007). The time limit
under consideration in Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U. S. 408
(2005), was of the former kind—as the Court’s opinion
expressly noted. See id., at 417 (discussing “time limits,
which go to the very initiation of a petition and a court’s
ability to consider that petition”). The time limit at issue
in this case is of the latter, distinguishable kind—as the
Court of Appeals correctly stated. 480 F. 3d 1089, 1090
(CA11 2007) (holding that Pace did not address statutory
tolling for “a statute of limitations that operated as an
affirmative defense”).
It is true that there is language in the majority opinion
in Pace that is broad enough to cover both kinds of limita
tions provisions, but only the former (those that do not
operate as affirmative defenses) can even arguably provide
a reasonable basis for concluding that an untimely petition
has not been “properly filed” within the meaning of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 110
2 ALLEN v. SIEBERT
STEVENS, J., dissenting
Stat. 1214 (AEDPA).* I therefore respectfully dissent.
——————
* I continue to believe, as stated in my dissent in Pace, 544 U. S., at
427, that state timeliness bars that operate like procedural bars (for
example, those that require the courts to consider enumerated excep
tions) should not determine whether a state postconviction petition is
“properly filed” under AEDPA. Even accepting Pace, however, this case
is distinguishable and should not be summarily reversed.