United States v. Hayes

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2008 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

UNITED STATES v. HAYES

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 07–608. Argued November 10, 2008—Decided February 24, 2009
In 1996, Congress extended the federal Gun Control Act of 1968’s pro
hibition on possession of a firearm by convicted felons to include per
sons convicted of “a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence,” 18
U. S. C. §922(g)(9). Responding to a 911 call reporting domestic vio
lence, police officers discovered a rifle in respondent Hayes’s home.
Based on this and other evidence, Hayes was charged under
§§922(g)(9) and 924(a)(2) with possessing firearms after having been
convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. The indict
ment identified as the predicate misdemeanor offense Hayes’s 1994
conviction for battery against his then-wife, in violation of West Vir
ginia law. Hayes moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that
his 1994 conviction did not qualify as a predicate offense under
§922(g)(9) because West Virginia’s generic battery law did not desig
nate a domestic relationship between aggressor and victim as an
element of the offense. When the District Court denied the motion,
Hayes entered a conditional guilty plea and appealed. The Fourth
Circuit reversed, holding that a §922(g)(9) predicate offense must
have as an element a domestic relationship between offender and vic
tim.
Held: A domestic relationship, although it must be established beyond a
reasonable doubt in a §922(g)(9) firearms possession prosecution,
need not be a defining element of the predicate offense. Pp. 4–13.
(a) The definition of “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence,” con
tained in §921(a)(33)(A), imposes two requirements. First, the crime
must have, “as an element, the use or attempted use of physical force,
or the threatened use of a deadly weapon.” §921(a)(33)(A)(ii). Sec
ond, it must be “committed by” a person who has a specified domestic
relationship with the victim. Ibid. The definition does not, however,
2 UNITED STATES v. HAYES

Syllabus

require the predicate-offense statute to include, as an element, the
existence of that domestic relationship. Instead, it suffices for the
Government to charge and prove a prior conviction that was, in fact,
for “an offense . . . committed by” the defendant against a spouse or
other domestic victim. Pp. 4–9.
(1) As an initial matter, §921(a)(33)(A)’s use of the singular word
“element” suggests that Congress intended to describe only one re
quired element, the use of force. Had Congress also meant to make
the specified relationship a predicate-offense element, it likely would
have used the plural “elements,” as it has done in other offense
defining provisions. See, e.g., 18 U. S. C. §3559(c)(2)(A). Treating the
specified relationship as a predicate-offense element is also awkward
as a matter of syntax. It requires the reader to regard “the use or at
tempted use of physical force, or the threatened use of a deadly
weapon” as an expression modified by the relative clause “committed
by.” It is more natural, however, to say a person “commit[s]” an “of
fense” than to say one “commit[s]” a “use.” Pp. 5–6.
(2) The Fourth Circuit’s textual arguments to the contrary are
unpersuasive. First, that court noted, clause (ii) is separated from
clause (i)—which defines “misdemeanor”—by a line break and a
semicolon, while clause (ii)’s components—force and domestic rela
tionship—are joined in an unbroken word flow. Such less-than
meticulous drafting hardly shows that Congress meant to exclude
from §922(g)(9)’s prohibition domestic abusers convicted under ge
neric assault or battery laws. As structured, §921(a)(33)(A) defines
“misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” by addressing in clause (i)
the meaning of “misdemeanor,” and in clause (ii) “crime of domestic
violence.” Because a “crime of domestic violence” involves both a use
of force and a domestic relationship, joining these features together
in clause (ii) would make sense even if Congress had no design to con
fine laws qualifying under §921(a)(33)(A) to those designating as
elements both use of force and domestic relationship. A related
statutory provision, 25 U. S. C. §2803(3)(C), indicates that Congress
did not ascribe substantive significance to the placement of line
breaks and semicolons in 18 U. S. C. §921(a)(33)(A). Second, the
Fourth Circuit relied on the “rule of the last antecedent” to read
“committed by” as modifying the immediately preceding use-of-force
phrase rather than the earlier word “offense.” The last-antecedent
rule, however, “is not an absolute and can assuredly be overcome by
other indicia of meaning.” Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U. S. 20, 26.
Applying the rule here would require the Court to accept the unlikely
premises that Congress employed the singular “element” to encom
pass two distinct concepts, and that it adopted the awkward con
struction “commi[t]” a use. The rule, moreover, would render the
 Cite as: 555 U. S. ____ (2009) 3

Syllabus

word “committed” superfluous, for Congress could have conveyed the
same meaning by referring simply to “the use . . . of physical force . . .
by a current or former spouse . . . .” Pp. 6–9.
(b) Practical considerations strongly support this Court’s reading of
§921(a)(33)(A). By extending the federal firearm prohibition to per
sons convicted of misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence,
§922(g)(9)’s proponents sought to close a loophole: Existing felon-in
possession laws often failed to keep firearms out of the hands of do
mestic abusers, for such offenders generally were not charged with,
or convicted of, felonies. Construing §922(g)(9) to exclude the domes
tic abuser convicted under a generic use-of-force statute would frus
trate Congress’ manifest purpose. The statute would have been a
dead letter in some two-thirds of the States because, in 1996, only
about one-third of them had criminal statutes specifically proscribing
domestic violence. Hayes argues that the measure that became
§§922(g)(9) and 921(a)(33)(A), though it initially may have had a
broadly remedial purpose, was revised and narrowed during the leg
islative process, but his argument is not corroborated by the revisions
he identifies. Indeed, §922(g)(9)’s Senate sponsor observed that a
domestic relationship often would not be a designated element of the
predicate offense. Such remarks are “not controlling,” Consumer
Product Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U. S. 102, 118, but
the legislative record is otherwise silent. Pp. 10–12.
(c) The rule of lenity, on which Hayes also relies, applies only when
a statute is ambiguous. Section 921(a)(33)(A)’s definition, though not
a model of the careful drafter’s art, is also not “grievous[ly] am
bigu[ous].” Huddleston v. United States, 415 U. S. 814, 831. The
text, context, purpose, and what little drafting history there is all
point in the same direction: Congress defined “misdemeanor crime of
domestic violence” to include an offense “committed by” a person who
had a specified domestic relationship with the victim, whether or not
the misdemeanor statute itself designates the domestic relationship
as an element of the crime. Pp. 12–13.
482 F. 3d 749, reversed and remanded.

GINSBURG, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which STEVENS,
KENNEDY, SOUTER, BREYER, and ALITO, JJ., joined, and in which THO-
MAS, J., joined as to all but Part III. ROBERTS, C. J., filed a dissenting
opinion, in which SCALIA, J., joined.
 Cite as: 555 U. S. ____ (2009) 1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________

No. 07–608
_________________

UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. RANDY EDWARD

HAYES

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

[February 24, 2009]

JUSTICE GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court.*
The federal Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U. S. C. §921 et
seq., has long prohibited possession of a firearm by any
person convicted of a felony. In 1996, Congress extended
the prohibition to include persons convicted of “a misde
meanor crime of domestic violence.” §922(g)(9). The
definition of “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence,”
contained in §921(a)(33)(A), is at issue in this case. Does
that term cover a misdemeanor battery whenever the
battered victim was in fact the offender’s spouse (or other
relation specified in §921(a)(33)(A))? Or, to trigger the
possession ban, must the predicate misdemeanor identify
as an element of the crime a domestic relationship be
tween aggressor and victim? We hold that the domestic
relationship, although it must be established beyond a
reasonable doubt in a §922(g)(9) firearms possession
prosecution, need not be a defining element of the predi
cate offense.

——————
* JUSTICE THOMAS joins all but Part III of this opinion.
2 UNITED STATES v. HAYES

Opinion of the Court

I

In 2004, law enforcement officers in Marion County,
West Virginia, came to the home of Randy Edward Hayes
in response to a 911 call reporting domestic violence.
Hayes consented to a search of his home, and the officers
discovered a rifle. Further investigation revealed that
Hayes had recently possessed several other firearms as
well. Based on this evidence, a federal grand jury re
turned an indictment in 2005, charging Hayes, under
§§922(g)(9) and 924(a)(2), with three counts of possessing
firearms after having been convicted of a misdemeanor
crime of domestic violence.
The indictment identified Hayes’s predicate misde
meanor crime of domestic violence as a 1994 conviction for
battery in violation of West Virginia law.1 The victim of
that battery, the indictment alleged, was Hayes’s then
wife—a person who “shared a child in common” with
Hayes and “who was cohabitating with . . . him as a
spouse.” App. 3.2
Asserting that his 1994 West Virginia battery conviction
——————
1 West
Virginia’s battery statute provides: “[A]ny person [who] unlaw
fully and intentionally makes physical contact of an insulting or pro
voking nature with the person of another or unlawfully and intention
ally causes physical harm to another person, . . . shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor.” W. Va. Code Ann. §61–2–9(c) (Lexis 2005).
2 The indictment stated, in relevant part:

“Defendant RANDY EDWARD HAYES’ February 24, 1994 Battery
conviction . . . constituted a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence
because:
“a. Battery is a misdemeanor under State law in West Virginia;
“b. Battery has, as an element, the use and attempted use of physical
force;
“c. Defendant RANDY EDWARD HAYES committed the offense of
Battery against the victim:
“i. who was his current spouse; and
“ii. who was a person with whom he shared a child in common; and
“iii. who was cohabitating with and had cohabitated with him as a
spouse.” App. 2–3 (bold typeface deleted).
 Cite as: 555 U. S. ____ (2009) 3

Opinion of the Court

did not qualify as a predicate offense under §922(g)(9),
Hayes moved to dismiss the indictment. Section 922(g)(9),
Hayes maintained, applies only to persons previously
convicted of an offense that has as an element a domestic
relationship between aggressor and victim. The West
Virginia statute under which he was convicted in 1994,
Hayes observed, was a generic battery proscription, not a
law designating a domestic relationship between offender
and victim as an element of the offense. The United
States District Court for the Northern District of West
Virginia rejected Hayes’s argument and denied his motion
to dismiss the indictment. 377 F. Supp. 2d 540, 541–542
(2005). Hayes then entered a conditional guilty plea and
appealed.
In a 2-to-1 decision, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit reversed. A §922(g)(9) predicate
offense, the Court of Appeals held, must “have as an ele
ment a domestic relationship between the offender and the
victim.” 482 F. 3d 749, 751 (2007). In so ruling, the
Fourth Circuit created a split between itself and the nine
other Courts of Appeals that had previously published
opinions deciding the same question.3 According to those
courts, §922(g)(9) does not require that the offense predi
cate to the defendant’s firearm possession conviction have
as an element a domestic relationship between offender
and victim. We granted certiorari, 552 U. S. ___ (2008), to
resolve this conflict.

——————
3 See United States v. Heckenliable, 446 F. 3d 1048, 1049 (CA10

2006); United States v. Belless, 338 F. 3d 1063, 1067 (CA9 2003); White
v. Department of Justice, 328 F. 3d 1361, 1364–1367 (CA Fed. 2003);
United States v. Shelton, 325 F. 3d 553, 562 (CA5 2003); United States
v. Kavoukian, 315 F. 3d 139, 142–144 (CA2 2002); United States v.
Barnes, 295 F. 3d 1354, 1358–1361 (CADC 2002); United States v.
Chavez, 204 F. 3d 1305, 1313–1314 (CA11 2000); United States v.
Meade, 175 F. 3d 215, 218–221 (CA1 1999); United States v. Smith, 171
F. 3d 617, 619–621 (CA8 1999).
4 UNITED STATES v. HAYES

Opinion of the Court

II

Section 922(g)(9) makes it “unlawful for any person . . .
who has been convicted in any court of a misdemeanor
crime of domestic violence . . . [to] possess in or affecting
commerce, any firearm or ammunition.” Section
921(a)(33)(A) defines “misdemeanor crime of domestic
violence” as follows:
“[T]he term ‘misdemeanor crime of domestic violence’
means an offense that—
“(i) is a misdemeanor under Federal, State, or
Tribal law; and
“(ii) has, as an element, the use or attempted use of
physical force, or the threatened use of a deadly
weapon, committed by a current or former spouse,
parent, or guardian of the victim, by a person with
whom the victim shares a child in common, by a per
son who is cohabitating with or has cohabitated with
the victim as a spouse, parent, or guardian, or by a
person similarly situated to a spouse, parent, or
guardian of the victim” (footnotes omitted).
This definition, all agree, imposes two requirements:
First, a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” must
have, “as an element, the use or attempted use of physical
force, or the threatened use of a deadly weapon.” Second,
it must be “committed by” a person who has a specified
domestic relationship with the victim. The question here
is whether the language of §921(a)(33)(A) calls for a fur
ther limitation: Must the statute describing the predicate
offense include, as a discrete element, the existence of a
domestic relationship between offender and victim? In
line with the large majority of the Courts of Appeals, we
conclude that §921(a)(33)(A) does not require a predicate
offense statute of that specificity. Instead, in a §922(g)(9)
prosecution, it suffices for the Government to charge and
prove a prior conviction that was, in fact, for “an offense
 Cite as: 555 U. S. ____ (2009) 5

Opinion of the Court

. . . committed by” the defendant against a spouse or other
domestic victim.
We note as an initial matter that §921(a)(33)(A) uses the
word “element” in the singular, which suggests that Con
gress intended to describe only one required element.
Immediately following the word “element,”
§921(a)(33)(A)(ii) refers to the use of force (undoubtedly a
required element) and thereafter to the relationship be
tween aggressor and victim, e.g., a current or former
spouse. The manner in which the offender acts, and the
offender’s relationship with the victim, are “conceptually
distinct attributes.” United States v. Meade, 175 F. 3d
215, 218 (CA1 1999).4 Had Congress meant to make the
latter as well as the former an element of the predicate
offense, it likely would have used the plural “elements,” as
it has done in other offense-defining provisions. See, e.g.,
18 U. S. C. §3559(c)(2)(A) (“[T]he term ‘assault with intent
to commit rape’ means an offense that has as its elements
engaging in physical contact with another person or using
or brandishing a weapon against another person with
intent to commit aggravated sexual abuse or sexual
abuse.”). Cf. Black’s Law Dictionary 559 (8th ed. 2004)
(defining “element” as “[a] constituent part of a claim that
must be proved for the claim to succeed ”).5
Treating the relationship between aggressor and victim
as an element of the predicate offense is also awkward as
a matter of syntax. It requires the reader to regard “the
use or attempted use of physical force, or the threatened
use of a deadly weapon” as an expression modified by the
relative clause “committed by.” In ordinary usage, how
ever, we would not say that a person “commit[s]” a “use.”
It is more natural to say that a person “commit[s]” an
“offense.” See, e.g., United States v. Belless, 338 F. 3d
1063, 1066 (CA9 2003) (“One can ‘commit’ a crime or an
offense, but one does not ‘commit’ ‘force’ or ‘use.’ ”).
In reaching the conclusion that §921(a)(33)(A) renders
both the use of force and a domestic relationship between
aggressor and victim necessary elements of a qualifying
predicate offense, the Fourth Circuit majority relied on
two textual arguments. First, the court noted that clause
(ii) is separated from clause (i) by a line break and a semi
colon; in contrast, the components of clause (ii)—force and
domestic relationship—are joined in an unbroken word
flow. See 482 F. 3d, at 753.
Had Congress placed the “committed by” phrase in its
own clause, set off from clause (ii) by a semicolon or a line
break, the lawmakers might have better conveyed that
“committed by” modifies only “offense” and not “use” or
“element.” Congress’ less-than-meticulous drafting, how
ever, hardly shows that the legislators meant to exclude
——————
5 Invoking the Dictionary Act, Hayes contends that the singular “ele

ment” encompasses the plural “elements.” See Brief for Respondent 25.
The Dictionary Act provides that, “unless the context indicates other
wise,” “words importing the singular include and apply to several
persons, parties, or things.” 1 U. S. C. §1. On the rare occasions when
we have relied on this rule, doing so was “necessary to carry out the
evident intent of the statute.” First Nat. Bank in St. Louis v. Missouri,
263 U. S. 640, 657 (1924). As we explain infra, at 10–12, Hayes’s
reading of 18 U. S. C. §921(a)(33)(A) does not accord with Congress’ aim
in extending the gun possession ban.
 Cite as: 555 U. S. ____ (2009) 7

Opinion of the Court

from §922(g)(9)’s firearm possession prohibition domes
tic abusers convicted under generic assault or battery
provisions.
As structured, §921(a)(33)(A) defines “misdemeanor
crime of domestic violence” by addressing in clause (i) the
meaning of “misdemeanor” and, in turn, in clause (ii),
“crime of domestic violence.” Because a “crime of domestic
violence” involves both a use of force and a domestic rela
tionship, joining these features together in clause (ii)
would make sense even if Congress had no design to con
fine laws qualifying under §921(a)(33)(A) to those desig
nating as elements both use of force and domestic rela
tionship between aggressor and victim. See id., at 761
(Williams, J., dissenting). See also United States v. Bar
nes, 295 F. 3d 1354, 1358–1360, 1361 (CADC 2002) (“The
fact that the Congress somewhat awkwardly included the
‘committed by’ phrase in subpart (ii) (instead of adding a
subpart (iii)) is not significant in view of the unnatural
reading that would result if ‘committed by’ were construed
to modify ‘use of force.’ ”).
A related statutory provision, 25 U. S. C. §2803(3)(C),
indicates that Congress did not ascribe substantive sig
nificance to the placement of line breaks and semicolons in
18 U. S. C. §921(a)(33)(A). In 2006, Congress amended
§921(a)(33)(A)(i) to include misdemeanors under “[t]ribal
law” as predicate offenses. As a companion measure,
Congress simultaneously enacted §2803(3)(C), which
employs use-of-force and domestic-relationship language
virtually identical to the language earlier placed in
§921(a)(33)(A)(i), except that §2803(3)(C) uses no semico
lon or line break.
Section 2803(3)(C) authorizes federal agents to “make
an arrest without a warrant for an offense committed in
Indian country if—”
“the offense is a misdemeanor crime of domestic vio
lence . . . and has, as an element, the use or attempted
8 UNITED STATES v. HAYES

Opinion of the Court

use of physical force, or the threatened use of a deadly
weapon, committed by a current or former spouse,
parent, or guardian of the victim, by a person with
whom the victim shares a child in common, by a per
son who is cohabitating with or has cohabitated with
the victim as a spouse, parent, or guardian, or by a
person similarly situated to a spouse, parent or guard
ian of the victim . . . .”
At the time Congress enacted §2803(3)(C), the Courts of
Appeals uniformly agreed that §921(a)(33)(A) did not limit
predicate offenses to statutory texts specifying both a use
of force and a domestic relationship as offense elements.
Congress presumably knew how §921(a)(33)(A) had been
construed, and presumably intended §2803(3)(C) to bear
the same meaning. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U. S. 71, 85–86 (2006) (“[W]hen
‘judicial interpretations have settled the meaning of an
existing statutory provision, repetition of the same lan
guage in a new statute indicates, as a general matter, the
intent to incorporate its . . . judicial interpretations as
well.’ ” (quoting Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U. S. 624, 645
(1998))). Relying on spacing and punctuation to hem in
§921(a)(33)(A), while reading §2803(3)(C) to contain no
similar limitation, would create a disjunction between
these two provisions that Congress could not have
intended.
As a second justification for its construction of
§921(a)(33)(A), the Court of Appeals invoked the “rule of
the last antecedent,” under which “a limiting clause or
phrase . . . should ordinarily be read as modifying only the
noun or phrase that it immediately follows.” Barnhart v.
Thomas, 540 U. S. 20, 26 (2003). The words “committed
by” immediately follow the use-of-force language, the court
observed, and therefore should be read to modify that
phrase, not the earlier word “offense.” See 482 F. 3d, at
 Cite as: 555 U. S. ____ (2009) 9

Opinion of the Court

753–755. The rule of the last antecedent, however, “is not
an absolute and can assuredly be overcome by other indi
cia of meaning.” Barnhart, 540 U. S., at 26.6
Applying the rule of the last antecedent here would
require us to accept two unlikely premises: that Congress
employed the singular “element” to encompass two distinct
concepts, and that it adopted the awkward construction
“commi[t]” a “use.” See supra, at 5–6. Moreover, as the
dissent acknowledges, post, at 4, the last-antecedent rule
would render the word “committed” superfluous: Congress
could have conveyed the same meaning by referring sim
ply to “the use . . . of physical force . . . by a current or
former spouse . . . .” See Tr. of Oral Arg. 29. “Committed”
retains its operative meaning only if it is read to modify
“offense.”
Most sensibly read, then, §921(a)(33)(A) defines “mis
demeanor crime of domestic violence” as a misdemeanor
offense that (1) “has, as an element, the use [of force],” and
(2) is committed by a person who has a specified domestic
relationship with the victim. To obtain a conviction in a
§922(g)(9) prosecution, the Government must prove be
yond a reasonable doubt that the victim of the predicate
offense was the defendant’s current or former spouse or
was related to the defendant in another specified way.
But that relationship, while it must be established, need
not be denominated an element of the predicate offense.7
——————
6 As the United States points out, the Court of Appeals “itself recog
nized the flexibility of the rule [of the last antecedent].” Brief for
United States 20, n. 7. Under a strict application of the rule, the
“committed by” phrase would modify only its immediate antecedent,
i.e., “the threatened use of a deadly weapon,” and not the entire phrase
“use or attempted use of physical force, or the threatened use of a
deadly weapon.” The court rightly regarded such a reading as implau
sible. See 482 F. 3d 749, 755 (CA4 2007).
7 We find it not at all “surprising”—indeed, it seems to us “most natu

ral”—to read §921(a)(33)(A) to convey that a person convicted of batter
ing a spouse or other domestic victim has committed a “crime of domes
10 UNITED STATES v. HAYES

Opinion of the Court

III
Practical considerations strongly support our reading of
§921(a)(33)(A)’s language. Existing felon-in-possession
laws, Congress recognized, were not keeping firearms out
of the hands of domestic abusers, because “many people
who engage in serious spousal or child abuse ultimately
are not charged with or convicted of felonies.” 142 Cong.
Rec. 22985 (1996) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg). By
extending the federal firearm prohibition to persons con
victed of “misdemeanor crime[s] of domestic violence,”
proponents of §922(g)(9) sought to “close this dangerous
loophole.” Id., at 22986.
Construing §922(g)(9) to exclude the domestic abuser
convicted under a generic use-of-force statute (one that
does not designate a domestic relationship as an element
of the offense) would frustrate Congress’ manifest purpose.
Firearms and domestic strife are a potentially deadly
combination nationwide. See, e.g., Brief for Brady Center
to Prevent Gun Violence et al. as Amici Curiae 8–15; Brief
for National Network to End Domestic Violence et al. as
Amici Curiae 2–8. Yet, as interpreted by the Fourth
Circuit, §922(g)(9) would have been “a dead letter” in some
two-thirds of the States from the very moment of its en
actment. 482 F. 3d, at 762 (Williams, J., dissenting).
As of 1996, only about one-third of the States had crimi
nal statutes that specifically proscribed domestic violence.
See Brief for United States 23, n. 8.8 Even in those States,
domestic abusers were (and are) routinely prosecuted
under generally applicable assault or battery laws. See
Tr. of Oral Arg. 19. And no statute defining a distinct
——————
tic violence,” whether or not the statute of conviction happens to con
tain a domestic-relationship element. Cf. post, at 2.
8 Additional States have enacted such statutes since 1996, but about

one-half of the States still prosecute domestic violence exclusively
under generally applicable criminal laws. See Brief for United States
23–24, and n. 9.
 Cite as: 555 U. S. ____ (2009) 11

Opinion of the Court

federal misdemeanor designated as an element of the
offense a domestic relationship between aggressor and
victim. Yet Congress defined “misdemeanor crime of
domestic violence” to include “misdemeanor[s] under
Federal . . . law.” §921(a)(33)(A)(i). Given the paucity of
state and federal statutes targeting domestic violence, we
find it highly improbable that Congress meant to extend
§922(g)(9)’s firearm possession ban only to the relatively
few domestic abusers prosecuted under laws rendering a
domestic relationship an element of the offense. See
Barnes, 295 F. 3d, at 1364 (rejecting the view that “Con
gress remedied one disparity—between felony and misde
meanor domestic violence convictions—while at the same
time creating a new disparity among (and sometimes,
within) states”).9
The measure that became §922(g)(9) and §921(a)(33)(A),
Hayes acknowledges, initially may have had a broadly
remedial purpose, see Brief for Respondent 28–29, but the
text of the proposal, he maintains, was revised and nar
rowed while the measure remained in the congressional
hopper. The compromise reflected in the text that gained
passage, Hayes argues, restricted the legislation to of
fenses specifically denominating a domestic relationship
as a defining element. The changes Hayes identifies,
however, do not corroborate his argument.
Congress did revise the language of §921(a)(33)(A) to
spell out the use-of-force requirement. The proposed
legislation initially described the predicate domestic
violence offense as a “crime of violence . . . committed by” a
person who had a domestic relationship with the victim.
142 Cong. Rec. 5840. The final version replaced the un
——————
9 Generally, as in this case, it would entail no “ ‘elaborate factfinding

process,’ ” cf. post, at 7, to determine whether the victim of a violent
assault was the perpetrator’s “current or former spouse” or bore one of
the other domestic relationships specified in §921(a)(33)(A)(ii) to the
perpetrator.
12 UNITED STATES v. HAYES

Opinion of the Court

elaborated phrase “crime of violence” with the phrase “has,
as an element, the use or attempted use of physical force,
or the threatened use of a deadly weapon.” This appar
ently last-minute insertion may help to explain some of
the syntactical awkwardness of the enacted language, but
it does not evince an intention to convert the “committed
by” phrase into a required element of the predicate
offense.
Indeed, in a floor statement discussing the revised
version of §922(g)(9), Senator Frank Lautenberg, the
sponsor of the provision, observed that a domestic rela
tionship between aggressor and victim often would not be
a designated element of the predicate offense:
“[C]onvictions for domestic violence-related crimes of
ten are for crimes, such as assault, that are not explic
itly identified as related to domestic violence. There
fore, it will not always be possible for law enforcement
authorities to determine from the face of someone’s
criminal record whether a particular misdemeanor
conviction involves domestic violence, as defined in
the new law.” Id., at 26675.
The remarks of a single Senator are “not controlling,”
Consumer Product Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.,
447 U. S. 102, 118 (1980), but, as Hayes recognizes, the
legislative record is otherwise “absolutely silent.” See Tr.
of Oral Arg. 32, 35. It contains no suggestion that Con
gress intended to confine §922(g)(9) to abusers who had
violated statutes rendering the domestic relationship
between aggressor and victim an element of the offense.
IV
The rule of lenity, Hayes contends, provides an addi
tional reason to construe §922(g)(9) and §921(a)(33)(A) to
apply only to predicate offenses that specify a domestic
relationship as an element of the crime. “[T]he touchstone
 Cite as: 555 U. S. ____ (2009) 13

Opinion of the Court

of the rule of lenity is statutory ambiguity.” Bifulco v.
United States, 447 U. S. 381, 387 (1980) (internal quota
tion marks omitted). We apply the rule “only when, after
consulting traditional canons of statutory construction, we
are left with an ambiguous statute.” United States v.
Shabani, 513 U. S. 10, 17 (1994). Section 921(a)(33)(A)’s
definition of “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence,” we
acknowledge, is not a model of the careful drafter’s art.
See Barnes, 295 F. 3d, at 1356. But neither is it “griev
ous[ly] ambigu[ous].” Huddleston v. United States, 415
U. S. 814, 831 (1974). The text, context, purpose, and
what little there is of drafting history all point in the same
direction: Congress defined “misdemeanor crime of domes
tic violence” to include an offense “committed by” a person
who had a specified domestic relationship with the victim,
whether or not the misdemeanor statute itself designates
the domestic relationship as an element of the crime.
* * *
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit is reversed,
and the case is remanded for further proceedings consis
tent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
 Cite as: 555 U. S. ____ (2009) 1

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________

No. 07–608
_________________

UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. RANDY EDWARD

HAYES

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

[February 24, 2009]

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS, with whom JUSTICE SCALIA
joins, dissenting.
A person convicted of a “misdemeanor crime of domestic
violence” is prohibited from possessing a firearm. 18
U. S. C. §922(g)(9). The question before the Court is
whether the definition of “misdemeanor crime of domestic
violence” in §921(a)(33)(A) includes misdemeanor offenses
with no domestic-relationship element.
Section 921(a)(33)(A) provides:
“[T]he term ‘misdemeanor crime of domestic violence’
means an offense that—
“(i) is a misdemeanor under Federal, State, or
Tribal law; and
“(ii) has, as an element, the use or attempted use of
physical force, or the threatened use of a deadly
weapon, committed by a current or former spouse,
parent, or guardian of the victim, by a person with
whom the victim shares a child in common, by a per
son who is cohabitating with or has cohabitated with
the victim as a spouse, parent, or guardian, or by a
person similarly situated to a spouse, parent, or
guardian of the victim.” (Footnote omitted.)
The majority would read the “committed by” phrase in
clause (ii) to modify the word “offense” in the opening
2 UNITED STATES v. HAYES

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

clause of subparagraph (A), leapfrogging the word “ele
ment” at the outset of clause (ii). That reading does not
require the specified domestic relationship in clause (ii) to
be an element of the predicate misdemeanor statute.
Individuals convicted under generic use-of-force statutes
containing no reference to domestic violence would there
fore be subject to prosecution under §922(g)(9).
The Court of Appeals held to the contrary that “commit
ted by” modifies the immediately preceding phrase: “the
use or attempted use of physical force, or the threatened
use of a deadly weapon.” §921(a)(33)(A); 482 F. 3d 749,
753–754 (CA4 2007). Read that way, a domestic relation
ship is an element of the prior offense.
That seems to be the most natural reading right off the
bat. The term at issue is “misdemeanor crime of domestic
violence.” That is a defined term—so the definition cer
tainly must be parsed—but it would be at least surprising
to find from that parsing that a “misdemeanor crime of
domestic violence” need not by its terms have anything to
do with domestic violence.
1. The grammatical rule of the last antecedent indicates
that the domestic relationship is a required element of the
predicate offense. That rule instructs that “a limiting
clause or phrase . . . should ordinarily be read as modify
ing only the noun or phrase that it immediately follows.”
Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U. S. 20, 26 (2003). Pursuant to
that rule, the “committed by” phrase in clause (ii) is best
read to modify the preceding phrase “the use or attempted
use of physical force, or the threatened use of a deadly
weapon.” See 482 F. 3d, at 754–755. By not following the
usual grammatical rule, the majority’s reading requires
jumping over two line breaks, clause (i), a semicolon, and
the first portion of clause (ii) to reach the more distant
antecedent (“offense”). Due to the floating “that” after
“offense,” if “committed by” modified “offense” the text
would read “offense that committed by.”
 Cite as: 555 U. S. ____ (2009) 3

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

The majority counters that people do not ordinarily say
someone “commit[s]” a “use” of force. See ante, at 6. True
enough, but only because “use” of force is a term that
encompasses a variety of conduct, which if listed sepa
rately would not pose the objection the majority raises
(e.g., commits a battery, robbery, or kidnaping). There is
no reason to believe that the reasonable drafting decision
to insert “use” of force rather than coming up with a laun
dry list of offenses was meant to alter the meaning of the
statute.
The majority also relies on Congress’s use of the word
“element” in the singular. From that, the majority infers
that Congress intended to describe only one required
element—the use of force. Ante, at 5. In its view, Con
gress would have used the plural “elements” if it meant to
encompass both the use of force and the offender’s rela
tionship with the victim. Ibid.
That argument is contrary to the Dictionary Act, which
specifies that unless the context indicates otherwise,
“words importing the singular include and apply to several
persons, parties, or things.” 1 U. S. C. §1; see Rowland v.
California Men’s Colony, Unit II Men’s Advisory Council,
506 U. S. 194, 200 (1993). More significantly, reading
“element” as limited to the singular does not resolve what
that element is. See United States v. Barnes, 295 F. 3d
1354, 1369 (CADC 2002) (Sentelle, J., dissenting). A
single element often contains multiple components. In the
very provision at issue, the “threatened use of a deadly
weapon” includes three concepts: (1) the threatened use (2)
of a weapon (3) that is deadly.
In other statutes, Congress has used the word “element”
in the singular to refer to the use of force and its object.
See, e.g., 18 U. S. C. §16(a) (defining “crime of violence” as
“an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use,
or threatened use of physical force against the person or
property of another”). The majority finds it “unsurprising”
4 UNITED STATES v. HAYES

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

that Congress would have chosen to combine the mode of
aggression and its object in a “single, undifferentiated
element.” Ante, at 5, n. 4. It asserts, however, that Con
gress would not have so joined the use of force and the
offender’s relationship with the victim, because those
requirements “are not readily conceptualized as a single
element.” Ibid. That distinction is elusive; both 18
U. S. C. §16(a) and the provision at issue here contain as
distinct components the act (use of force) and the target
(person or property in the former case, domestic relation
ship victim in the latter).
The majority also points out that interpreting “commit
ted by” to modify the “use” of force would render the word
“committed” superfluous. That may be so, but as shown,
reading “committed by” to modify “offense” has its own
flaws. All this goes to show that the statute is not an
example of elegant syntax under either reading. The
majority properly acknowledges that, under its view, the
statutory language reflects “less-than-meticulous drafting”
and “syntactical awkwardness,” and “is not a model of the
careful drafter’s art.” Ante, at 6, 12, 13. I am willing to
acknowledge the same with respect to my reading. But I
conclude from such reciprocal shortcomings that the text
is at least ambiguous.
2. That brings us to the structure of the statute. The
most natural reading of the statute, as it is laid out, is
that the underlying misdemeanor must have as an ele
ment the use of force committed by a person in a domestic
relationship with the victim. The definition of “misde
meanor crime of domestic violence” is twice qualified: first,
by the relative clause “is a misdemeanor under Federal,
State, or Tribal law”; and second by the relative clause
“has, as an element, the use or attempted use of physical
force, or the threatened use of a deadly weapon, committed
by [a person in a specified domestic relationship with the
victim].” §921(a)(33)(A) (footnote omitted). The fact that
 Cite as: 555 U. S. ____ (2009) 5

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

Congress included the domestic relationship language in
the clause of the statute designating the element of the
predicate offense strongly suggests that it is in fact part of
the required element.
The majority’s contrary reading requires restructuring
the statute and adding words. The majority first must
place the “committed by” phrase in its own clause—set off
by a line break, a semicolon, or “(iii)”—to indicate that
“committed by” refers all the way back to “offense.” And,
as noted, because the word “that” appears at the end of
subparagraph (A), the statute would then read “an offense
that committed by.” To arrive at its reading, the majority
must ignore the floating “that” or add “and is” before
“committed by.”
The Government would define “misdemeanor crime of
domestic violence” as “an offense, committed by a person
with a domestic relationship with the victim, that is a
misdemeanor and has, as an element, the use or at
tempted use of physical force, or the threatened use of a
deadly weapon.” Brief for United States 13; see also Tr. of
Oral Arg. 8–9. That reading also requires rearranging the
statute. The “committed by” phrase would have to be
severed from clause (ii) and moved up to appear after the
word “offense” in subparagraph (A). Changing and rear
ranging the wording as the Government does to explain
what the actual words mean is, in any event, not a compel
ling line of argument.
The majority attempts to diminish the magnitude of
these alterations by stating that the lawmakers might
have better conveyed their intent by setting off the “com
mitted by” phrase with “a semicolon” or “a line break.”
Ante, at 6. But those are not insignificant revisions; they
alter the structure of the statute, and we have recognized
that structure is often critical in resolving verbal ambigu
ity. See Castillo v. United States, 530 U. S. 120, 124
(2000) (“The statute’s structure clarifies any ambiguity
6 UNITED STATES v. HAYES

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

inherent in its literal language”). I therefore respectfully
disagree with the majority that “misdemeanor crime of
domestic violence” is most sensibly read as including
misdemeanor offenses without a domestic-relationship
element.
3. Moving beyond text and structure, the majority rec
ognizes that there is “little . . . drafting history,” ante, at
13, but gamely trots out what there is: a statement on the
floor of the Senate by the bill’s sponsor, see ante, at 12.
Such tidbits do not amount to much. See Consumer Prod
uct Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U. S. 102,
118 (1980). This is especially true here where the state
ment was delivered the day the legislation was passed and
after the House of Representatives had passed the perti
nent provision. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah
Services, Inc., 545 U. S. 546, 568 (2005); see also Brief for
Respondent 33. The majority nonetheless looks to the
floor statement because “the legislative record is otherwise
‘absolutely silent.’ ” Ante, at 12. But that is no reason to
accord the statement significance: We dismiss the value of
such statements due to their inherent flaws as guides to
legislative intent, flaws that persist (and indeed may be
amplified) in the absence of other indicia of intent.
The majority also finds it “highly improbable that Con
gress meant to extend §922(g)(9)’s firearm possession ban
only to the relatively few domestic abusers prosecuted
under laws rendering a domestic relationship an element
of the offense.” Ante, at 11. In its view, construing
§922(g)(9) to exclude persons convicted under a generic
use-of-force statute would “frustrate Congress’ manifest
purpose,” ante, at 10, of keeping guns out of the hands of
domestic abusers. See ante, at 10 (quoting statement of
Sen. Lautenberg, 142 Cong. Rec. 22985 (1996)).
Invoking the sponsor’s objective as Congress’s manifest
purpose, however, “ignores the complexity of the problems
Congress is called upon to address and the dynamics of
 Cite as: 555 U. S. ____ (2009) 7

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

legislative action.” Board of Governors, FRS v. Dimension
Financial Corp., 474 U. S. 361, 373–374 (1986). Legisla
tive enactments are the result of negotiations between
competing interests; “the final language of the legislation
may reflect hard-fought compromises.” Id., at 374. Even
if there were sufficient sentiment to extend the gun ban,
individual legislators might have disagreed on the appro
priate reach of the new provision. See ibid. Some mem
bers might well have been willing to extend the ban be
yond individuals convicted of felonies, but only if the
predicate misdemeanor by its terms was addressed to
domestic violence.
4. The majority’s approach will entail significant prob
lems in application. Under the interpretation adopted by
the court below, it is easy to determine whether an indi
vidual is covered by the gun ban: Simply look to the record
of the prior conviction. Under the majority’s approach, on
the other hand, it will often be necessary to go beyond the
fact of conviction and “engage in an elaborate factfinding
process regarding the defendant’s prior offens[e],” Taylor
v. United States, 495 U. S. 575, 601 (1990), to determine
whether it happened to involve domestic violence.
That is one reason we adopted a categorical approach to
predicate offenses under the Armed Career Criminal Act,
18 U. S. C. §924(e)(1), “looking only to the statutory defini
tions of the prior offenses, and not to the particular facts
underlying those convictions.” Taylor, supra, at 600; see
Shepard v. United States, 544 U. S. 13, 19 (2005) (Court
considered “predicate offens[e] in terms not of prior con
duct but of prior ‘convictions’ and the ‘element[s]’ of
crimes”). As we warned in Taylor and reaffirmed in
Shepard, “the practical difficulties and potential unfair
ness of a factual approach are daunting.” Taylor, supra, at
601; see Shepard, supra, at 20. Those same concerns are
implicated here, given that the majority would require
juries and courts to look at the particular facts of a prior
8 UNITED STATES v. HAYES

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

conviction to determine whether it happened to involve
domestic violence, rather than simply looking to the ele
ments of the predicate offense. See ante, at 4-5.
5. Taking a fair view, the text of §921(a)(33)(A) is am
biguous, the structure leans in the defendant’s favor, the
purpose leans in the Government’s favor, and the legisla
tive history does not amount to much. This is a textbook
case for application of the rule of lenity.
“Because construction of a criminal statute must be
guided by the need for fair warning, it is rare that legisla
tive history or statutory policies will support a construc
tion of a statute broader than that clearly warranted by
the text.” Crandon v. United States, 494 U. S. 152, 160
(1990). It cannot fairly be said here that the text “clearly
warrants” the counterintuitive conclusion that a “crime of
domestic violence” need not have domestic violence as an
element. That leaves the majority’s arguments about
legislative history and statutory purpose. This is not the
“rare” case in which such grounds provide “fair warning,”
especially given that there is nothing wrong with the
conduct punished—possessing a firearm—if the prior
misdemeanor is not covered by the statute.
If the rule of lenity means anything, it is that an indi
vidual should not go to jail for failing to conduct a 50-state
survey or comb through obscure legislative history. Ten
years in jail is too much to hinge on the will-o’-the-wisp of
statutory meaning pursued by the majority.