Thomas M. Gilbert Architects, P.C. v. Accent Builders & Developers, LLC

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-2103

THOMAS M. GILBERT ARCHITECTS, P.C.,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

ACCENT BUILDERS AND DEVELOPERS, LLC, a Virginia limited
liability company; DESIGN CUSTOM BUILDERS, INCORPORATED, a
Virginia corporation; MICHAEL TUMMILLO,

Defendants - Appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. James R. Spencer, Chief
District Judge. (3:07-cv-00699-JRS)

Argued: October 28, 2009 Decided: May 6, 2010

Before MICHAEL, Circuit Judge, HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge,
and Jane R. ROTH, Senior Circuit Judge of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting by designation.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ARGUED: James Edward Moore, CHRISTIAN & BARTON, LLP, Richmond,
Virginia, for Appellants. Christopher E. Gatewood, HIRSCHLER
FLEISCHER, PC, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF:
David B. Lacy, CHRISTIAN & BARTON, LLP, Richmond, Virginia, for
Appellants. R. Webb Moore, HIRSCHLER FLEISCHER, PC, Richmond,
Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:

Thomas M. Gilbert Architects, P.C. (Gilbert) sued

Accent Builders and Developers, LLC (Accent), Design Custom

Builders, Inc., and Michael Tummillo alleging infringement of a

copyright in certain architectural plans (Plans). The district

court granted summary judgment to Gilbert on liability. After a

bench trial on damages, the district court awarded Gilbert

$5,300 in actual damages, $224,894 in profits, and a permanent

injunction enjoining defendants’ further use of the Plans. On

appeal defendants argue that the district court improperly

granted summary judgment on their affirmative defenses and

improperly refused to subtract their operating expenses when it

awarded damages for profits. We reject defendants’ arguments

and affirm.

I.

The Plans were originally created pursuant to a

written agreement between a third party, Aspect Properties, LLC

(Aspect), and Gilbert. The agreement, entered into on July 26,

2002, required Gilbert to provide the Plans to Aspect in two

stages for the purpose of constructing 42 townhouses. In the

first stage Gilbert would provide schematic drawings for three

model townhouses for a fee of $7,500. In the second phase

Gilbert would provide any remaining architectural documents

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necessary for construction, including floor plans, front and

rear elevations, and three foundation plans, all for a fee of

$17,700. The agreement specified that all documents comprising

the Plans “remain the property of Thomas M. Gilbert, Architect,

P.C.” J.A. 316. It also specified that “[t]he fee for reuse of

the documents will be two hundred fifty dollars (250.00) per

unit and any changes requested will be on an hourly basis.”

J.A. 315. Gilbert delivered the Plans pursuant to the

agreement, and Aspect paid Gilbert in full. The documents

Aspect received contained the following copyright notice:

THOMAS M. GILBERT, ARCHITECT, P.C. EXPRESSLY RESERVES
ITS COMMON LAW COPYRIGHT OR OTHER PROPERTY RIGHTS IN
THESE PLANS. THESE PLANS ARE NOT TO BE REPRODUCED,
CHANGED, OR COPIED IN ANY FORM OR MANNER WHATSOEVER,
NOR ARE THEY TO BE ASSIGNED TO ANY THIRD PARTY,
WITHOUT FIRST OBTAINING THE EXPRESS WRITTEN PERMISSION
AND CONSENT OF THOMAS M. GILBERT, ARCHITECT, P.C.

J.A. 566-76.

Sometime in 2002 Tummillo partnered with Aspect to

pursue the townhouse project. On May 29, 2003, Aspect’s owners

formed Accent as a vehicle to complete the project, and Tummillo

acquired an ownership interest in Accent the same year. In 2004

Tummillo acquired complete ownership of Accent and the project.

By that time Gilbert had already delivered the Plans, and

Aspect’s owners required Tummillo to pay the balance owed

Gilbert and to reimburse them for the amounts already paid.

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 Tummillo later asked Gilbert to make certain changes

to the Plans. The changes consisted mainly of moving the rear

wall of the townhouses back three feet and relocating the

fireplace from the corner to the rear wall. Gilbert had known

of Tummillo’s association with the project for some time prior

to the request, but it was not until Tummillo made the request

for changes that he became aware that Tummillo had acquired full

ownership. On September 11, 2006, Gilbert sent a proposal to

Tummillo offering to make the requested changes and conduct a

building code review for $14,000. Gilbert included a code

review in his offer because, in his opinion, the original Plans

could not have been used because of recent changes to the

building code. Tummillo believed that Gilbert’s price was too

high and made the changes himself by hand without further input

from Gilbert. When Tummillo submitted the Plans for approval

with the County, he removed all references to Gilbert on the

Plans, including the copyright notice.

After the County approved the Plans, defendants began

construction of the townhouses. Over the course of

construction, defendants made copies of the Plans for various

suppliers and contractors. In June 2007 Gilbert learned that

construction had commenced using the modified Plans. He

registered his original plans with the United States Copyright

Office and, on September 14, 2007, sent a cease-and-desist

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letter to defendants. After Gilbert was unable to resolve the

dispute, he filed this lawsuit for copyright infringement on

November 9, 2007.

The district court granted Gilbert summary judgment on

infringement, rejecting defendants’ affirmative defenses of

implied license, fair use, and copyright misuse. In the summary

judgment order the district court excluded the proposed

testimony of defendants’ architect-expert, who would have

testified that Gilbert made an excessive fee proposal for

modifying the Plans. The parties stipulated that Gilbert’s

actual damages were $5,300 and agreed to a bench trial on the

remaining issues pertaining to relief. At trial defendants

introduced testimony from Kevin Perlowski, their accountant.

Although 42 townhouse units were planned, only one six-unit

building had been completed and only two of those units had been

sold. Perlowski testified that defendants had incurred $181,659

in direct costs and $8,795 in closing costs for the first unit,

which sold for $328,000. Similarly, defendants had incurred

$189,620 in direct costs and $22,982 in closing costs for the

second unit, which sold for $299,950. If profit is calculated

by simply subtracting direct and closing costs from gross

revenues, defendants’ profit on the two units would be $224,894.

Defendants also incurred significant operating expenses,

however, during construction. Perlowski testified that pursuant

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to generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) the entirety

of these operating expenses, along with direct and closing

costs, must be subtracted from gross revenue to calculate

profit. After subtracting these operating expenses, defendants’

profits on the two units is reduced to zero, according to

Perlowski.

The district court’s findings of fact and conclusions

of law included (1) an award to Gilbert of $5,300 in statutory

damages and $224,894 in infringing profits from defendants’ use

of the Plans and (2) a permanent injunction against defendants’

further use of the Plans. In rejecting defendants’ calculation

of zero profits, the district court held that defendants had

failed to meet their burden of establishing their operating

expenses with sufficient precision. This appeal followed.

II.

Defendants argue that they should not be liable for

infringement because the district court, at the summary judgment

stage, improperly dismissed their affirmative defenses of (1)

implied license, (2) fair use, and (3) copyright misuse. We

review de novo the grant of summary judgment dismissing these

defenses. Stonehenge Eng’g Corp. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau,

201 F.3d 296, 301 (4th Cir. 2000).

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 A.

Defendants’ primary argument is that “Gilbert

implicitly granted a nonexclusive license to use, modify, copy

and distribute the Plans as necessary to complete the Project.”

Br. of Appellants at 21. “The existence of an implied

nonexclusive license . . . constitutes an affirmative defense to

an allegation of copyright infringement.” Nelson-Salabes, Inc.

v. Morningside Dev., LLC, 284 F.3d 505, 514 (4th Cir. 2002).

The grant of a nonexclusive license is essentially a promise not

to sue for infringement. See U.S. Philips Corp. v. Int’l Trade

Comm’n, 424 F.3d 1179, 1189 (Fed. Cir. 2005). When such a

promise is implied, courts generally enforce it according to the

rules governing quasi-contract and contracts implied-in-fact.

See Wrench v. Taco Bell Corp., 256 F.3d 446, 456-57 (6th Cir.

2000) (noting that Michigan law governs a contract for

copyrighted material that was implied-in-fact as distinguished

from one that was implied-in-law); I.A.E., Inc. v. Shaver, 74

F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 1996). In this circuit an implied non-

exclusive license exists and is enforceable when:

(1) a person (the licensee) requests the creation of a
work, (2) the creator (the licensor) makes that
particular work and delivers it to the licensee who
requested it, and (3) the licensor intends that the
licensee copy and distribute his work.

Nelson-Salabes, Inc., 284 F.3d at 514 (quoting I.A.E., Inc., 74

F.3d at 776).

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 The case law does not make clear whether the source of

these rules is state or federal law. Nelson-Salabes is our only

published decision to address the implied license defense to

copyright infringement, and it does not trace the rules’ source

to either body of law. The absence of citation to state law

suggests that we assumed federal law applied. However, in Foad

Consulting Group, Inc. v. Azzalino — a case cited in Nelson-

Salabes and applying the same rule — the Ninth Circuit expressly

declared that state law governed “so long as it does not

conflict with the Copyright Act.” 270 F.3d 821, 827 (9th Cir.

2001). Judge Kozinski, a member of the panel in Foad, concurred

in the result, drawing a distinction between contracts implied-

in-fact and those implied-in-law. He believed that implied

licenses generally fell into the latter category as “incident[s]

of copyright” and therefore should be governed by federal law.

Id. at 832.

We need not resolve the source-of-law issue to decide

the case before us. First and foremost, we see nothing in state

law that conflicts with the three-element test adopted in

Nelson-Salabes. In evaluating the test’s third element when a

written contract exists, we conclude the applicable rule —

whether under Virginia law or federal common law — is that: (1)

quasi-contract principles do not govern, Nedrich v. Jones, 429

S.E.2d 201, 207 (Va. 1993); WRH Mortgage, Inc. v. S.A.S.

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Assocs., 214 F.3d 528, 534 (4th Cir. 2000); and (2) the parties’

intent “should be ascertained, whenever possible, from the

language the parties employed in the contract,” Virginia Elec.

and Power Co. v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 683 S.E.2d 517, 525 (Va.

2009). See also United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S.

715, 728 (1979) (“[W]hen there is little need for a nationally

uniform body of law, state law may be incorporated as the

federal rule of decision.”). We note that in Nelson-Salabes we

held that courts “should examine the totality of the

circumstances” when determining intent. Id. at 515. But on

this point Nelson-Salabes is distinguishable because there was

no written agreement between the parties in that case. While

the Nelson-Salabes standard for determining intent is eminently

reasonable in the absence of a written agreement, the same

cannot be said when one exists, as it did between Gilbert and

Aspect.

We first examine whether Gilbert granted Aspect a

nonexclusive license to modify the Plans and use them as

modified. The parties raise and discuss in varying detail the

possibility that, because the original agreement was between

Gilbert and Aspect, only Aspect could have had such a license.

If, however, Aspect did not have a license to modify the Plans,

defendants could not have had one. Accordingly, we consider

whether Aspect had non-exclusive license.

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 The parties dispute only the third element of the test

adopted in Nelson-Salabes: whether Gilbert intended to grant

Aspect a nonexclusive license to modify the Plans and use them

as modified. As discussed above, the threshold question we must

answer is whether Gilbert and Aspect’s intent can be ascertained

from the text of the agreement. We conclude that it can and

that Aspect’s license extended only to copying and using the

original Plans for construction of the townhouses. Reading the

document as a whole, it is clear that Gilbert must have at least

granted Aspect a limited license to copy and use. The Plans

would be utterly useless to Aspect unless it had permission to

use the Plans for construction of the townhouses and to make

copies for its contractors as needed. See Effects Assocs., Inc.

v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555, 558-59 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding an

implied license when the absence of one would render the

author’s contribution “of minimal value”). Moreover, to read

the agreement as requiring Aspect to pay $25,200 in fees for

useless documents would threaten the enforceability of the

contract for failure of consideration. See Waskey v. Thomas,

235 S.E.2d 346, 349 n.2 (Va. 1977).

The agreement does, however, expressly reserve

ownership of Gilbert’s copyright in the Plans by declaring that

they “remain the property of Thomas M. Gilbert, Architect, P.C.”

J.A. 316. While an express reservation of ownership in the

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Plans’ copyright is not dispositive of the licensing issue, see

Foad Consulting Group, Inc., 270 F.3d at 830, at a minimum it

evinces an intent to grant, at best, a limited license. Indeed,

the limited nature of the license is evident in the agreement’s

provision on reuse and changes: “The fee for reuse of the

documents will be two hundred fifty dollars (250.00) per unit

and any changes requested will be on an hourly basis.” J.A.

315.

The reuse and changes provision clearly evinces

Gilbert and Aspect’s intent that Aspect not have permission to

modify the Plans and use the Plans as modified without Gilbert’s

involvement. Were it not intended to circumscribe Aspect’s

license to use the documents, it would have no meaning. If, for

example, Gilbert had not intended to retain its rights to

derivative works based on the Plans, it would not have needed to

include a clause providing for changes. Aspect could have hired

Gilbert to make the changes or not, but the choice would have

been left entirely with Aspect. Similarly, it is hard to

imagine that Gilbert would charge a fee for reuse of the Plans —

as for construction of townhouses besides the original 42 — but

not expect compensation for modifications.

Defendants’ arguments to the contrary rest primarily

on what the agreement does not say rather than what it does say.

They rely largely on the factors mentioned in Nelson-Salabes for

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assessing intent in the totality of the circumstances. As we

have noted, Nelson-Salabes’s totality of the circumstances

analysis does not apply when there is a valid, written agreement

between the parties. The only argument that defendants make

based on the text of the agreement is that it “lack[s] any . . .

provision forbidding Aspect, or anyone else, from using the

Plans to complete the Project without Gilbert’s involvement or

express consent.” Br. of Appellants at 25. In making this

argument, defendants appear to assume, wrongly, that a broad

implied license is presumed in contracts for architectural

plans. No such presumption exists, and even if it did, the

agreement’s restrictive language concerning reuse and changes

would overcome it.

Because Gilbert and Aspect’s intent is clear from the

language of the agreement, no genuine issue of material fact

exists. Aspect did not have a license to modify the Plans and

use them as modified, and therefore could not have had such a

license. Accordingly, we affirm summary judgment on defendants’

implied license defense.

B.

Defendants’ fair use and copyright misuse defenses are

more easily dispatched. Long a common law doctrine, fair use

was codified in the Copyright Act of 1976 under 17 U.S.C. § 107.

Cambell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994). Section

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107 lists four factors for courts to consider in determining

whether a particular use is fair use:

(1) the purpose and character of the use, including
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for
nonprofit educational purposes;

(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;

(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used
in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and

(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market
for or value of the copyrighted work.

17 U.S.C. § 107. In their briefs defendants make no attempt to

consider the first three factors, relying exclusively on the

fourth. Defendants argue that a jury could have reasonably

concluded that the changes Tummillo made to the Plans were

“minor field changes.” Reply Br. of Appellants at 14-15.

Because Gilbert admitted that it does not expect to be

compensated for minor field changes, defendants contend that a

jury could have concluded that there was no potential market

upon which Tummillo’s changes could have had an effect. Based

on this factor alone, defendants argue that the district court

erred.

We reject this argument and adopt the district court’s

more careful analysis. We agree with the district court that

the first three factors weigh against fair use because

defendants’ use of the Plans was entirely commercial, because

architectural plans are generally regarded as creative works,

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and because defendants’ use of the Plans was admittedly

substantial. As for defendants’ argument that there was no

potential market for the changes Tummillo made, defendants point

to no evidence that these changes were in fact “minor field

changes.” Bald characterizations are not evidence. What

evidence does exist suggests that Gilbert regularly charged for

the kind of changes Tummillo made and that Tummillo himself

described them as “structural changes” for which he could be

held liable if something went wrong. J.A. 225. Accordingly, we

affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment on

defendants’ fair use defense.

Defendants’ copyright misuse argument amounts to a

claim that Gilbert demanded too high a price for the changes

Tummillo requested. Defendants cite no authority for this

proposition apart from a passage, taken out of context, from the

Ninth Circuit’s decision in Foad. Nowhere in Foad does the

Ninth Circuit discuss the defense of copyright misuse, and we

have found no precedent lending support to defendants’ argument.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary

judgment on defendants’ copyright misuse defense. *

*
We note that defendants’ copyright misuse defense would
fail regardless of the testimony of their expert J. Baxter
Bailey because the defense is legally incoherent in these
circumstances. Because Bailey’s testimony was relevant only to
(Continued)
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 III.

The sole issue that the parties dispute with regard to

damages is whether the district court should have deducted

defendants’ operating expenses from gross revenue when

calculating the award for infringing profits. Section 504 of

the Copyright Act provides that

In establishing the infringer’s profits, the copyright
owner is required to present proof only of the
infringer’s gross revenue, and the infringer is
required to prove his or her deductible expenses and
the elements of profit attributable to factors other
than the copyrighted work.

17 U.S.C. § 504(b). We have previously held that § 504 “creates

an initial presumption that the infringer’s profits . . .

attributable to the infringement are equal to the infringer’s

gross revenue.” Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens Football Club,

Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 520 (4th Cir. 2003) (internal quotations and

citations omitted). “Once the copyright owner has established

the amount of the infringer’s gross revenues, the burden shifts

to the infringer to prove either that part or all of those

revenues are deductible expenses . . . .” Id. (internal

quotations and citations omitted). If the infringer wishes to

establish that its operating expenses are deductible expenses,

defendants’ copyright misuse defense, we also affirm the
district court’s exclusion of his testimony.

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it has the “burden of proving that each item of general expense

contributed to the production of the infringing items, and of

further offering a fair and acceptable formula for allocating a

given portion of overhead to the particular infringing items in

issue.” In Design v. K-Mart Apparel Corp., 13 F.3d 559, 565-66

(2d Cir. 1994) (quoting 3 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer,

Nimmer on Copyright § 14.03[B] (1993)).

We agree with the district court that defendants

simply failed to carry their burden of allocating that portion

of their operating expenses attributable to the two units that

were sold. In fact, Perlowski specifically admitted that he

made “no attempt to allocate operating expenses to a particular

unit.” J.A. 469. Defendants respond that Perlowski was merely

following GAAP in deducting the entirety of defendants’

operating expenses from their revenues on the two units sold.

GAAP, however, is not the law here. There are likely many good

reasons why the GAAP rules are as they are, but those reasons do

not necessarily coincide with the reasons bearing on assessing

damages for copyright violations. As Gilbert notes, for

example, some of defendants’ operating expenses went towards

developing the land on which the 42 townhouses were to be built

and have no relation to defendants’ infringing acts. Because

each item of deductible expense must contribute to the

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infringing products, at least some of defendants’ operating

expenses as calculated cannot be deducted from gross revenues.

Finally, we reject defendants’ argument that the

district court should have assumed the burden of allocation

itself. Section 504 is clear that the burden of proving

deductible expenses lies with defendants. Despite defendants’

assertions, the Second Circuit’s decision in In Design does not

hold otherwise. In that case, the infringers did provide a

formula for allocating overhead, and the Second Circuit affirmed

the district court’s acceptance of that formula. In Design, 13

F.3d at 566. While we do not go so far as to hold that it would

have been error for the district court to have allocated on its

own initiative, we cannot say that failing to do so was error.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s award of infringing

profits in the amount of $224,894.

IV.

For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the

district court is

AFFIRMED.

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