[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
MAY 10, 2010
No. 09-15809 JOHN LEY
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 09-00018-CR-001-CAR-3
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
RAMON DE PAZ-SALVADOR,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia
_________________________
(May 10, 2010)
Before DUBINA, Chief Judge, MARTIN and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant Ramon de Paz-Salvador appeals his 77-month sentence for illegal
reentry into the United States, 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(2), (b)(2). On appeal, Paz-
Salvador argues that the district court: (a) procedurally erred because it failed to
adequately explain its chosen sentence at the low-end of the guideline range, and
(b) issued a substantively unreasonable sentence.
We review “all sentences–whether inside, just outside, or significantly
outside the Guidelines range–under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.”
United States v. Livesay, 525 F.3d 1081, 1090 (11th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation
marks omitted). “[T]he district court must adequately explain the chosen sentence
to allow for meaningful appellate review and to promote the perception of fair
sentencing.” Id. (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50, 128 S. Ct. 586,
597 (2007)). “The length and amount of detail of the judge’s reasoning required
depends on the circumstances.” Id. The “sentencing judge is not required to state
on the record that it has explicitly considered each of the § 3553(a) factors,” but
“should set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the
parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal
decisionmaking authority.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). A district
court’s “explicit acknowledgment that it has considered a defendant’s arguments
and the § 3553(a) factors is sufficient to demonstrate that it has adequately and
properly considered those factors.” United States v. Ellisor, 522 F.3d 1255, 1278
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(11th Cir. 2008).
Pursuant to Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 128 S. Ct. 586 (2007), we
must review the sentencing process for both procedural error and substantive
reasonableness. Livesay, 525 F.3d at 1091. Procedural errors occur when the
district court fails to calculate or improperly calculates the guidelines range, treats
the guidelines as mandatory, fails to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selects a
sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or fails to explain adequately the chosen
sentence–including an explanation for any deviation from the guidelines range. Id.
We examine substantive reasonableness “under an abuse-of-discretion standard,
taking into account the totality of the circumstances” and “must give due deference
to the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the
extent of the variance.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). We “expect a
sentence within the Guidelines range to be reasonable.” United States v. Talley,
431 F.3d 784, 788 (11th Cir. 2005).
Pursuant to § 3553(a), the sentencing court shall impose a sentence
“sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes set forth in
paragraph (2) of this subsection,” namely, to reflect the seriousness of the offense,
promote respect for the law, provide just punishment for the offense, deter criminal
conduct, protect the public from future crimes of the defendant, and provide the
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defendant with needed educational or vocational training or medical care. See 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). The sentencing court must also consider the following factors
in determining a particular sentence: the nature and circumstances of the offense
and the history and characteristics of the defendant, the kinds of sentences
available, the applicable guideline range, the pertinent policy statements of the
Sentencing Commission, the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, and
the need to provide restitution to victims. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (3)-(7).
Here, the record demonstrates that the district court did not procedurally err
in imposing the sentence. The district court adequately explained why it issued
Paz-Salvador a low-end of the guidelines range sentence when it discussed that
Paz-Salvador’s violent aggravated felony, for obstruction of a law enforcement
officer, simple assault, and simple battery, constituted a crime of violence and that
Paz-Salvador’s criminal history category of VI accurately reflected his 14-point
criminal history. Additionally, we conclude that the district court did not
substantively err in imposing the sentence. During sentencing, the district court
properly considered Paz-Salvador’s history and characteristics and whether a
guideline range sentence reflected the seriousness of the offense, promoted respect
for the law, and provided just punishment. The district court also acknowledged
Paz-Salvador’s history of disobeying law enforcement officers and re-entering the
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United States illegally. Based on the totality of the circumstances, the district court
did not abuse its discretion by imposing a low-end of the guidelines range
sentence. Accordingly, we affirm Paz-Salvador’s sentence.
AFFIRMED.
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