[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 09-12342 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
MAY 12, 2010
Non-Argument Calendar
JOHN LEY
________________________
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 08-00198-CV-J-32-HTS
JERRY NEIL ALFRED,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
RANDY BRYANT,
DONNIE JACKSON,
R.C. JOHNS,
D.H. JOHNSON,
S. TUCKER, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(May 12, 2010)
Before EDMONDSON, BIRCH and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Jerry Neil Alfred (“Alfred”), a Florida prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals
the district court’s dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint alleging Eighth
Amendment violations based on his living in a prison cell for eighteen days
without a mattress and a properly functioning toilet. The Appellees are: (1) Randy
Bryant, Warden of the Florida State Prison (“FSP”); (2) Donnie Jackson, FSP
Assistant Warden; (3) R.C. Johns, FSP Correctional Officer (“Officer Johns”); (4)
D. H. Johnson, FSP Nurse (“Nurse Johnson”); (5) S. Tucker, FSP Correctional
Officer (“Officer Tucker”); (6) John Doe I, FSP Sergeant (substituted for K.
Baird); and (7) John Doe II, FSP Correctional Officer (substituted for C.
Buchanon). The district court dismissed the complaint as frivolous under 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). After careful consideration of the record, we AFFIRM.
I. BACKGROUND
Alfred alleged the following facts in his § 1983 complaint to support his
Eighth Amendment claim of cruel and unusual punishment. On 17 August 2007,
Alfred was transferred from administrative confinement to disciplinary
confinement at FSP. The cell lacked a mattress but Officer Johns assured Alfred
that a mattress would arrive later that day, which it did. Alfred noticed the
mattress lacked a fire retardant cover, however, and was stained with chemicals on
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both sides. Alfred notified Officer Tucker of the problem, and Officer Tucker
instructed him to place the mattress outside his cell for a replacement. Later that
evening, Alfred discovered his cell’s toilet did not completely flush its contents
due to insufficient water pressure. Alfred informed Officer Tucker that he needed
a cell reassignment due to the lack of a mattress and a malfunctioning toilet.
Officer Tucker advised him that another mattress was not available that night, so
the morning shift would have to address any problems.
Alfred noted the deficiencies on his cell inspection sheet the next day. He
also informed Officer John Doe II, who indicated that he would notify the housing
supervisor.
On 19 August 2007, Alfred forwarded an informal grievance complaint to
Assistant Warden Donnie Jackson, apprising him of the situation. Alfred did not
receive a response until September 18, 2007, after Alfred had already been
reassigned to another cell.
On 21 August 2007, Alfred filed the first of three sick-call requests, stating
that he felt numb, sore, stiff, and tight from sleeping on a bare steel bed. He also
complained of severe headaches and constipation. Nurse Johnson examined him
and provided him with pain medications and laxatives.
On 27 August 2007, the toilet overflowed for the sixth or seventh time. As
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before, Alfred cleaned the mess using his bare hands, a towel, and some soap.
Sergeant John Doe I again told Alfred that the maintenance department would
repair the toilet, although Alfred notes that a work order had already been filed
prior to Alfred’s placement there.
On 30 August 2007, Alfred by-passed the initial phase of the inmate
grievance procedure by filing a formal grievance with Warden Randy Bryant. Two
weeks later, and nine days after Alfred had been transferred to a new cell, the
Warden notified Alfred that the prison had no record of a grievance about the
matter and instructed him to submit an informal grievance.
Alfred stayed in the cell without a mattress and a properly functioning toilet
for eighteen days. He was transferred to a new cell on 4 September 2007. He
alleged in his complaint that the lack of a mattress deprived him of quality sleep
and resulted in his fatigue, general stiffness and soreness, and lower back pain.
Additionally, he stated he suffered from severe headaches, nausea, and
constipation due to the malfunctioning toilet. His lower back pain was exacerbated
when he slipped in a puddle on his cell floor and fell backwards against his bed.
Besides these physical injuries, Alfred asserted that his fellow inmates and the
prison staff caused him “grief, distress, anxiety, and even fright” by constantly
ridiculing him about the stench from his toilet. R1-1 at 9(j). Alfred sought
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compensatory and punitive damages totaling more than $1 million for his mental
and physical pain and suffering.
The district court dismissed the complaint as frivolous under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B) because it appeared that Alfred had “little or no chance of success”
on his Eighth Amendment claim of cruel and unusual punishment. R1-26 at 3.
While the court agreed that “the situation should have been remedied sooner,” the
court found that his “temporary, unsanitary and uncomfortable conditions” did not
rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation. Id. at 5-6. Moreover, the court
found that the Appellees’ conduct amounted, at most, to negligence as it did not
appear that they intended to inflict any pain. Finally, the court noted that Alfred
had suffered no physical injury.
On appeal, Alfred contends that his claim was not frivolous because he was
unconstitutionally exposed to a serious risk of harm from his unsanitary living
conditions. He asserts that he suffered both mental and physical injuries, as
described in his complaint. With respect to the Appellees’ intent, Alfred submits
that the Appellees’ knowledge of his situation and their failure to remedy it
constituted deliberate indifference.
II. DISCUSSION
We review for an abuse of discretion the district court’s dismissal of
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Alfred’s complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). Miller v. Donald, 541 F.3d
1091, 1100 (11th Cir. 2008). Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act, a
district court must dismiss a claim, at any time, if the court determines the claim is
frivolous. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) (2009). “A claim is frivolous if it is
without arguable merit either in law or fact.” Bilal v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 1349
(11th Cir. 2001); see also Carroll v. Gross, 984 F.2d 392, 393 (11th Cir. 1993) (per
curiam) (dismissal for frivolousness authorized when it appears the plaintiff stands
“‘little or no chance of success’”). While we construe pro se pleadings liberally,
we need not accept as true “wildly implausible allegations in the complaint.”
Miller, 541 F.3d at 1100.
To prevail on a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must prove that a person acting
under color of state law deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution. See
Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 120, 112 S. Ct. 1061, 1066
(1992); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2003). As the parties do not dispute that the Appellees
were acting under color of state law, the sole issue is whether the Appellees
deprived Alfred of his Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual
punishment.
“The Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, but neither does it
permit inhumane ones.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832, 114 S. Ct. 1970,
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1976 (1994) (quotation marks and citation omitted). At a minimum, the Eighth
Amendment requires prison officials to provide adequate food, clothing, shelter,
and medical care. Id. An inmate’s safety must also be protected through
reasonable measures. Id. The prisoner bears the burden of proving that the
challenged prison condition is “extreme” and “pose[s] an unreasonable risk of
serious damage to the [prisoner’s] future health or safety.” Chandler v. Crosby,
379 F.3d 1278, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004) (quotation marks and citation omitted). In
order to violate the Eighth Amendment, the risk of harm from the condition must
be “so grave that it violates contemporary standards of decency to expose anyone
unwillingly to such a risk.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted) (emphasis in
original).
Besides this objective component, the prisoner must satisfy a subjective
prong by showing that the prison officials acted with deliberate indifference. Id.
This does not require that the prison official purposefully acted to cause harm, but
it does involve something beyond mere negligence. Id. The prison official must
know of and disregard an “excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Farmer, 511
U.S. at 837, 114 S. Ct. at 1979. In other words, “the official must both be aware of
facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious
harm exists, and he must also draw that inference.” Id. A prison condition
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generally does not violate the Eighth Amendment unless it involves “the wanton
and unnecessary infliction of pain.” Chandler, 379 F.3d at 1289 (quotation marks
and citation omitted).
We have previously held that sleeping on a unsanitary eating table or on a
dirty mattress on the floor did not violate an inmate’s Eighth Amendment rights.
See Hamm v. Dekalb County, 774 F.2d 1567, 1569, 1575-76 (11th Cir. 1985). The
plaintiff in Hamm temporarily endured these sleeping arrangements an unspecified
number of times during a ten-month period due to prison overcrowding. Id. at
1569. Even when considered in conjunction with the plaintiff’s allegations of
inadequate medical care and unsanitary food service, we concluded that the totality
of the conditions was constitutional. Id. at 1575-76.
As in Hamm, Alfred’s conditions of confinement did not rise to the level of
an Eighth Amendment violation. “Inmates cannot expect the amenities,
conveniences and services of a good hotel.” Harris v. Fleming, 839 F.2d 1232,
1235 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding no Eighth Amendment violation when an inmate
stayed 28 days in a filthy, roach-infested cell without toilet paper for five days or
soap, a toothbrush and toothpaste for ten days). Objectively speaking, sleeping on
a steel bed without a mattress for eighteen days, though uncomfortable, is not so
extreme as to violate contemporary standards of decency. See Hamm, 774 F.2d at
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1575-76. Similarly, having to use a toilet which lacks proper water pressure and
occasionally overflows is unpleasant but not necessarily unconstitutional. See
Smith v. Copeland, 87 F.3d 265, 268-69 (8th Cir. 1996) (rejecting Eighth
Amendment claim based on an toilet that overflowed in the prisoner’s cell for four
days). Any unsanitary conditions caused by the toilet here were mitigated by the
provision of cleaning supplies to Alfred. See Davis v. Scott, 157 F.3d 1003, 1004,
1006 (5th Cir. 1998) (finding no Eighth Amendment violation because the prisoner
received supplies to clean blood and excretion from his cell where he stayed for
three days). When viewed together, the lack of a mattress and a malfunctioning
toilet were not “sufficiently serious to violate the Eighth Amendment.” See
Chandler, 379 F.3d at 1289.
Moreover, none of Alfred’s purported physical and mental injuries (i.e.,
stiffness, lower back pain, headaches, vomiting, constipation, grief, anxiety,
distress, and fear) indicate that the challenged prison conditions constituted “an
unreasonable risk of serious damage” to his health or safety. See id. (quotation
marks and citation omitted). The district court thus correctly determined that
Alfred’s Eighth Amendment claims stood “little or no chance of success.” 1
1
Though we need not reach the subjective prong, we agree with the district court that no
deliberate indifference has been shown. Given our conclusion that the lack of a mattress and a
fully functioning toilet did not pose an unreasonable risk of serious harm to Alfred, the
Appellees could not have drawn the requisite inference that “a substantial risk of serious harm”
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Carroll, 984 F.2d at 393 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
III. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in dismissing Alfred’s § 1983 complaint as frivolous because his prison
conditions did not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of the complaint pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
AFFIRMED.
existed. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837, 114 S. Ct. at 1979.
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