Savoy v. United States

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206
File Name: 10a0131p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
_________________

X
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RAYMOND SAVOY,
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Plaintiff-Appellant,
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No. 08-6240
v.
,
>
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Defendant-Appellee. -
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Tennessee at Jackson.
No. 07-01025—James D. Todd, District Judge.
Submitted: April 28, 2010
Decided and Filed: May 12, 2010
Before: BATCHELDER, Chief Judge; MOORE and COOK, Circuit Judges.

_________________

COUNSEL
ON BRIEF: R. Leigh Grinalds, ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Jackson,
Tennessee, for Appellee. Raymond Savoy, Fort Worth, Texas, pro se.
_________________

OPINION
_________________

KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. Raymond Savoy appeals the district
court’s partial denial of his motion for return of property. This matter arises as a proceeding
ancillary to Savoy’s criminal prosecution for child-pornography related charges in the United
States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee. United States v. Savoy, 280 F.
App’x 504, 506 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 742 (2008). This court has previously
affirmed Savoy’s convictions for violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251(a) and 2252(a)(4)(B) for using
minors to engage in sexually explicit conduct to produce videotapes and for possessing those
videotapes, which stemmed from evidence seized at the Rocky Top Tavern, Savoy’s place

1
No. 08-6240 Savoy v. United States Page 2

of business. While executing a search warrant at the Rocky Top Tavern for “‘intoxicating
liquors and all records, papers, ledgers, pictures, or devices used in the storage, sale,
transportation, distribution or manufacture of [said liquors] . . . contrary to the Laws of the
State of Tennessee,’” officers discovered videotapes in Savoy’s locked office that Savoy
indicated were used for his video-surveillance system in the Tavern. Id. at 506 (alteration
in original). The officers seized “[s]ixty VHS tapes . . . , two hundred ninety-one
photographs, the components of the surveillance system, and a television.” Doc. 8 (Dist. Ct.
Order at 1 n.2). The government used four of the videotapes depicting minors as evidence
in Savoy’s criminal prosecution.

After his conviction, Savoy, now a federal prisoner, filed a Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 41(g) motion for return of property, seeking the return of all of the seized property
not admitted into evidence in his trial, with the exception of the surveillance system. The
district court engaged in an in camera review of the photographs and videotapes and granted
Savoy’s motion with regard to all items except those videos and photographs whose subjects
were minors and those videos whose subjects were adults who were not aware that they were
being recorded. The district court found that Savoy was not entitled to lawful possession of
those adult videotapes under Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-13-605. Savoy appeals the
district court’s judgment with regard to the adult videos only.

I. DISCUSSION

A. Partial Denial of Savoy’s Motion to Return Property

We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a Rule 41 motion for return of
property, which involves “essentially a civil equitable proceeding.” United States v.
Duncan, 918 F.2d 647, 654 (6th Cir. 1990) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted),
cert. denied, 500 U.S. 933 (1991); United States v. Headley, 111 F. App’x 808, 809 (6th Cir.
2004) (unpublished order). “What we are concerned with is whether the district court
properly balanced the competing equities in deciding whether return was in order.” Duncan,
918 F.2d at 654. “‘The general rule is that seized property, other than contraband, should
be returned to its rightful owner once the criminal proceedings have terminated.’” United
States v. Hess, 982 F.2d 181, 186 (6th Cir. 1992) (quoting United States v. LaFatch, 565
F.2d 81, 83 (6th Cir. 1977)). Under Rule 41, “‘[a] district court has both the jurisdiction and
No. 08-6240 Savoy v. United States Page 3

the duty to return the contested property once the government’s need for it has ended.’”
United States v. Bowker, 372 F.3d 365, 387 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Hess, 982 F.2d at 187),
vacated on other grounds by 543 U.S. 1182, reinstated by 125 F. App’x 701 (2005).
“However, the person seeking return of property must show that they are lawfully entitled
to possess it.” United States v. Headley, 50 F. App’x 266, 267 (6th Cir. 2002) (unpublished
order); accord Sovereign News Co. v. United States, 690 F.2d 569, 577 (6th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 814 (1983); United States v. Francis, 646 F.2d 251, 262 (6th Cir.) (holding
that Rule 41 places the burden on the claimant), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1082 (1981).

Rule 41 provides, in relevant part:

(g) Motion to Return Property. A person aggrieved by an unlawful
search and seizure of property or by the deprivation of property may
move for the property’s return. The motion must be filed in the
district where the property was seized. The court must receive
evidence on any factual issue necessary to decide the motion. If it
grants the motion, the court must return the property to the movant,
but may impose reasonable conditions to protect access to the
property and its use in later proceedings.

FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(g). We have held “that Rule 41(g) ‘clearly contemplates a hearing “on
any issue of fact necessary to the decision of the motion.”’” Bowker, 372 F.3d at 387
(quoting Hess, 982 F.2d at 186). Here, the district court looked to state law to determine
whether Savoy was entitled to lawful possession of the adult videotapes. Under Tennessee
Code Annotated § 39-13-605,

(a) It is an offense for a person to knowingly photograph, or cause to be
photographed an individual, when the individual is in a place where
there is a reasonable expectation of privacy, without the prior
effective consent of the individual . . . if the photograph:
(1) Would offend or embarrass an ordinary person if
such person appeared in the photograph; and
(2) Was taken for the purpose of sexual arousal or
gratification of the defendant.
(b) As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires,
“photograph” means . . . any videotape or live television
transmission of any individual so that the individual is readily
identifiable.
(c) All photographs taken in violation of this section shall be
confiscated and, after their use as evidence, destroyed.
No. 08-6240 Savoy v. United States Page 4

TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-605. The district court found that “the tapes were made using a
hidden camera, and the females were not aware that they were being taped in various stages
of nudity and/or performing sex acts.” Doc. 8 (Dist. Ct. Op. at 3). But the court did not
make an explicit finding as to whether the females were “‘in a place where there is a
reasonable expectation of privacy’” as required under § 39-13-605. Savoy argues “that the
individual’s [sic] in the video’s [sic] did not have an expectancy of privacy in a public tavern
that was equipped with video surveillance.” Appellant Br. at 3. The government responds
that “while it is not reasonable to expect that one’s nude body would not be viewable by
1
those present, there is a reasonable expectation of privacy from recording.” Appellee Br.
at 7. Savoy thus argues that the “reasonable expectation of privacy” inquiry requires a
single analysis of the circumstances presented by the “place,” and the government
counters that the inquiry requires a separate analysis of the circumstances of each
“individual” recorded in the “place.”

We conclude that Savoy’s approach is closer to the plain language of the statute
and that under the plain language of the statute we must decide what is “a place where
there is a reasonable expectation of privacy” under § 39-13-605 and whether the Rocky
Top Tavern would meet that standard.2

1
The government, noting the dearth of case law related to § 39-13-605, attempts to utilize an
analogy to the Wisconsin Court of Appeals’s treatment of a “similar” Wisconsin statute, Wisconsin Statute
§ 942.09. Appellee Br. at 7–8 (citing State v. Jahnke, 762 N.W.2d 696 (Wis. Ct. App. 2008)). However,
the relevant language of the Wisconsin statute—“‘while that person is nude in a circumstance in which
he or she has a reasonable expectation of privacy’”—justified the court of appeals’s inquiry into the
viewpoint of the individual subject to the recording at issue. Jahnke, 762 N.W.2d at 698 & n.4 (quoting
Wis. Stat. § 942.09(2)(am)1) (emphasis added). This language in Wisconsin differs from the language at
issue in Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-13-605 in a materially significant way. Even so, we note that the
Wisconsin Court of Appeals distinguished the reasonable expectation of privacy held by a private person
recorded in the defendant’s private bedroom from the lack of a reasonable expectation of privacy that an
exotic dancer “who dance[s] nude before multiple patrons in a club open to the public” would enjoy. Id.
at 700 (emphasis added).
2
The district court also did not make an explicit finding that the videos, if made in violation of
§ 39-13-605, constituted “contraband,” but instead seemed to assume that if it was a crime to make the
videos then it was a crime to possess the videos. See Doc. 8 (Dist. Ct. Op. at 2–3). Although Savoy does
not raise this issue on appeal, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in treating the
videotapes as contraband. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) defines contraband in part as
“[g]oods that are unlawful to possess” and “derivative contraband” as “[p]roperty whose possession
becomes unlawful when it is used in committing an illegal act.” Under Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-
13-605(c), “[a]ll photographs taken in violation of this section shall be confiscated and, after their use as
evidence, destroyed.” We read this provision to imply that it is also unlawful to possess such items and
that they are contraband. See One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 699–700 (1965)
(distinguishing between “per se contraband” and “derivative contraband”).
No. 08-6240 Savoy v. United States Page 5

1. Statutory Language: “when the individual is in a place where
there is a reasonable expectation of privacy”
Our research uncovered only four Tennessee cases that even mention § 39-13-
605,3 and only two that state the facts of conviction. In State v. Castrejon, No. M2005-
01886-CCA-R3-CD, 2006 WL 1097486 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 6, 2006) (unpublished
opinion), the court upheld the defendant’s consecutive sentence for conviction under
§ 39-13-605 for videotaping himself touching a minor while she slept. Id. at *1. In State
v. Dickens, No. M2003-00783-CCA-R3-CD, 2004 WL 735025 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr.
6, 2004), the court upheld, against a sufficiency challenge, the defendant’s conviction
for criminal attempt to commit unlawful photographing in violation of § 39-13-605 for
attempting to take a picture of a naked woman over the top of the wall in a closed,
locked tanning-booth stall that was “designed to ensure privacy.” Id. at *1–2, *4.
Neither court engaged in any analysis of whether the offense occurred in “a place where
there is a reasonable expectation of privacy.” However, the Dickens court’s sufficiency
analysis focused not on the woman’s expectation of privacy within the tanning booth but
rather on the place itself, stating “that each tanning room is designed to ensure privacy.
The doors lock from the inside and, although the walls do not extend all the way to the
ceiling, it would be difficult to see over them without standing on something.” Id. at *4.
The court thus focused on whether the place itself—the tanning room—could give rise
to a reasonable expectation of privacy and not whether the individual then in the place
had a reasonable expectation of privacy. Although the statute seems designed to protect
the privacy interests of the individual subject to the photograph, the statute considers that
privacy interest with reference to the individual’s presence “in a place where there is a
reasonable expectation of privacy.”4

3
Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-13-607 utilizes the same language—“in a place where there is
a reasonable expectation of privacy”—to codify the offense of observation without consent. Unfortunately
the Tennessee courts have not interpreted the phrase under this statute, either.
4
The Tennessee Legislature has proposed an amendment that replaces “is in a place where there
is” with “has” such that the provision would read “when the individual has a reasonable expectation of
privacy.” S.B. 3219, 106th Leg., 2d Sess. (Tenn. 2009); H.B. 3277, 106th Leg., 2d Sess. (Tenn. 2009).
This amendment, if it passes, would support the government’s position that we must analyze the reasonable
expectation of privacy held by each individual on the videotapes. However, we are bound to interpret the
statute as it was written at the time applicable to Savoy’s claim, i.e., in 2005 when the videos were seized
and Savoy was prosecuted.
No. 08-6240 Savoy v. United States Page 6

The Tennessee courts have produced a wealth of case law on places where a
person may or may not have “a reasonable expectation of privacy.” Most recently, the
Tennessee Supreme Court upheld the Court of Criminal Appeals’s decision “rejecting
the Sixth Circuit bright-line rule that a resident always has a reasonable expectation of
privacy in a secured common area” in favor of “the totality of the circumstances test . . .
for determining the reasonableness of an expectation of privacy.” State v. Talley, —
S.W.3d —, 2010 WL 987072, at *6–7 (Tenn. Mar. 19, 2010). Applying this test, the
court held that “the Defendant [resident] did not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the commonly shared, interior hallway of a condominium complex” because
no resident “could unilaterally exclude others rightfully within the hallway,” residents
had collectively allowed non-residents to have intermittent access to the common areas,
and there was “no evidence that the defendant had taken any precautions to maintain his
privacy in the common areas of the building.” Id. at *7–8. The court noted that “[a]s
a general rule, unlocked or unsecured common areas of apartment buildings do not
qualify for any reasonable expectation of privacy.” Id. at *6 n.4.

Based on the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals’s application of § 39-13-605
and the Tennessee Supreme Court’s approach to the privacy inquiry, we conclude that
a totality-of-the-circumstances test should apply for determining whether a place may
give rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy under § 39-13-605, recognizing that
“[t]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places, and provides sanctuary for citizens
wherever they have a legitimate expectation of privacy.” Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S.
91, 96 n.5 (1990) (internal quotation marks omitted). “But the extent to which the
Fourth Amendment protects people may depend upon where those people are.”
Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88 (1998). Therefore we must determine whether,
under the totality of the circumstances at issue in each videotape, an individual in the
Rocky Top Tavern would be justified in asserting that he or she is “in a place where
there is a reasonable expectation of privacy.”
No. 08-6240 Savoy v. United States Page 7

2. The Rocky Top Tavern

Although the district court did not make findings with respect to the contents of
the videos aside from their unsuspecting adult female subjects, this court has previously
stated the facts related to the videotapes as follows:

During the search, officers discovered a locked room, which Defendant
Savoy opened for them. Mr. Savoy described this room as his office.
The room contained a single bed, a desk, a television (TV), a video
cassette recorder (VCR), and several videotapes. Defendant advised
officers that the TV and VCR were used in relation to his
video-surveillance system. According to the officers, Mr. Savoy
consented to the officers viewing the videotapes on his TV and VCR.
Agents played the tapes to determine whether they contained illegal
liquor or beer sales. However, the tapes actually depicted sex acts
between Mr. Savoy and unknown females, what appeared to be minor
females removing their clothing and dancing, and sexual acts between a
male and what appeared to be a minor female. Officers then found a
camera and microphone hidden in a hollowed-out two-by-four (2 x 4)
stud behind the bar. The camera and microphone were not readily visible
to persons inside the bar, and were recovered only after Defendant Savoy
advised agents of their respective location. The officers seized all of the
videotapes for further review.

Savoy, 280 F. App’x at 506 (footnote omitted). Because Savoy was charged with child-
pornography related offenses, this court discussed only the contents of the videos
admitted into evidence at trial, and those tapes depicted only minors—not the adult
females in the videotapes at issue here. However, this court recounted that the
videotapes admitted into evidence at trial depicted minor females in various states of
nudity and/or engaged in sex acts “behind the bar.” Id. at 507. None of the four
videotapes admitted into evidence contained footage from within the “locked room,” and
it seems that the camera captured events solely in the area “behind the bar” because the
camera was located “behind the bar.” See id. at 506–07.

Our inquiry is therefore confined to the business premises of the Rocky Top
Tavern. “An expectation of privacy in commercial premises . . . is different from, and
indeed less than, a similar expectation in an individual’s home.” New York v. Burger,
482 U.S. 691, 700 (1987); see also Carter, 525 U.S. at 90–91; Autoworld Specialty Cars,
No. 08-6240 Savoy v. United States Page 8

Inc. v. United States, 815 F.2d 385, 388 (6th Cir. 1987) (“‘[Proprietor] did not have any
reasonable expectation of privacy in areas of the store where the public was invited to
enter and to transact business.’” (quoting Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 469
(1985))). Tennessee courts have recognized that even when a person visits “another’s
[private] home for a short period of time and is essentially at the location to conduct a
business transaction, the [person] possesses no expectation of privacy in the home.”
Kyles v. State, No. W2004-00374-CCA-R3-PC, 2005 WL 645161, at *5 (Tenn. Crim.
App. Mar. 16, 2005) (unpublished opinion) (citing Carter, 525 U.S. at 89–91). And the
Tennessee courts abide by the “now-classic principle: ‘What a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection. . . . But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area
accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.’” State v. Medford, No.
W2002-00226-CCA-R3-CD, 2003 WL 22446575, at *8 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 21,
2003) (unpublished opinion) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967));
see State v. Ross, 49 S.W.3d 833, 843 & n.9 (Tenn. 2001). “Public accessibility, in other
words, does not invariably defeat a reasonable expectation of privacy.” Medford, 2003
WL 22446575, at *8; see State v. Munn, 56 S.W.3d 486, 494–95 (Tenn. 2001) (holding
that defendant who requested to be alone with parent in police-station interview room
and to have the recording equipment turned off had reasonable expectation of privacy
from being recorded by hidden audio and video recording system after police complied
with both requests and closed the door behind them when they left the room); State v.
Roode, 643 S.W.2d 651 (Tenn. 1982) (holding that helicopter surveillance of area of
defendant’s property within public view did not violate reasonable expectation of
privacy). However, there is no reasonable expectation of privacy “in areas of [a
business] where the public was invited to enter and to transact business.” Maryland v.
Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 469 (1985); see State v. Heller, No. W2007-01455-CCA-R3-CD,
2008 WL 2901581, at *7–9 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 24, 2008) (unpublished opinion)
(holding that defendant had standing to challenge search of his person at a business but
not to challenge the search of the business itself because present only as casual visitor
without a reasonable expectation of privacy); State v. Norton, No. E2001-01903-CCA-
No. 08-6240 Savoy v. United States Page 9

R3-CD, 2002 WL 1585634, at *8 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 18, 2002) (unpublished
opinion) (noting that owner had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his tavern
because it was open to the public at the time the search warrant was executed, but
expressly not ruling on privacy interests of customers present).

The district court failed to make findings of fact to support that the “reasonable
expectation of privacy” element of § 39-13-605 was satisfied under the totality of the
circumstances here. Without such findings, we are unable to determine whether the
district court abused its discretion in assuming that the element was satisfied because
each videotape presents a unique set of circumstances that requires a fact-intensive
totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry to determine whether the Rocky Top Tavern
qualifies as “a place where there is a reasonable expectation of privacy” under the
circumstances of each recording. The videotapes were entered into the record in the
district court, but neither Savoy nor the government has presented any evidence as to
whether the adult females in the requested videos were present at the Rocky Top Tavern
for anything other than business purposes at the time that the nudity and/or sexual
activity occurred and was recorded. Because findings of fact are the province of the
district court, and the district court has already conducted a review of the twenty
videotapes at issue, we vacate the district court’s judgment with regard to the adult
videotapes and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The district
court must determine whether each videotape in question was recorded while the Rocky
Top Tavern was open to the public for business purposes, what specific areas of the bar
premises the hidden camera captured in each video (whether the videos contain only
footage from “behind the bar” or within public view), and whether any steps were taken
in an attempt to maintain the privacy of the activities that occurred in each video. See
Heller, 2008 WL 2901581, at *8;5 Carter, 525 U.S. at 88–91 (holding that defendant’s

5
In determining whether a business patron had standing to challenge the search of the business
itself, the Heller court specifically listed “seven factors to be considered when determining if a legitimate
expectation of privacy exists,” including:
(1) ownership of the property; (2) whether the defendant has a possessory interest in the
thing seized; (3) whether the defendant has a possessory interest in the placed [sic]
searched; (4) whether the defendant has the right to exclude other[s] from the place;
(5) whether he has exhibited a subjective expectation that the place would remain free
from intrusion by the state; (6) whether the defendant took normal precautions to
No. 08-6240 Savoy v. United States Page 10

expectation of privacy in premises owned by another depends on the purpose of the
visit); Lowe v. Clift, 2007 WL 2112672, at *4 (E.D. Tenn. 2007) (unpublished opinion)
(“Moreover, patrons of a venue into which the public is invited do not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy—they necessarily encounter others who observe their presence
and behavior.” (citing Macon, 472 U.S. at 469)). Only after the district court makes
findings of fact that enable it to determine whether the “reasonable expectation of
privacy” element of Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-13-605 was satisfied under the
totality of the circumstances for each videotape individually may the court determine
whether Savoy is or is not entitled to lawfully possess each videotape for purposes of his
Rule 41(g) motion for return of property.

B. Consideration of Search Warrant for Rule 41 Analysis

Savoy argues that the district court in reviewing his Rule 41(g) motion should
have “consider[ed] the validity of the State Search Warrant, and whether it went outside
the scope of ‘things to be searched,[] and/or items to be seized[]’ before deciding to only
return some of the property to Appellant’s designee” because the search warrant was
“obtained because of the sale of liquor in an establishment licensed for the sale of beer
only.” Appellant Br. at 3; see also id. at 4. This argument has no merit because this
court has already decided that the videotapes that were used in Savoy’s prosecution were
properly seized, Savoy, 280 F. App’x at 510–11, and the same rationale applies to the
adult videotapes at issue here. An earlier panel of this court held that the “seizure of
Defendant’s videotapes was valid because the tapes were reasonably related to the
offense that formed the basis of his search warrant,” in accordance with the Supreme
Court’s holding in Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947), “that a law enforcement
agent in making a valid search may seize property found on the premises being searched
which is the subject matter of a different crime, even though the officer was not aware
that such property was on the premises when the search was initiated.” Savoy, 280

maintain his privacy; and (7) whether he was legitimately on the premises.
Heller, 2008 WL 2901581, at *8 (quoting State v. Oody, 823 S.W.2d 554, 560 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991));
accord Talley, 2010 WL 987072, at *5.
No. 08-6240 Savoy v. United States Page 11

F. App’x at 511. The fact that the adult videotapes were not later used in Savoy’s
prosecution for child pornography charges does not impact our analysis.6

C. Additional Request Not Filed with District Court

Savoy acknowledges that he did not include in his Motion for Return of Personal
Property a specific request for the return of his video surveillance equipment, but he
argues that the district court should have addressed its return anyway because “[a] Pro
se litigant should not be required to list every little piece of property that was seized.”
Appellant Br. at 5. Although “we are mindful to construe [pro se] arguments liberally,”
El Bey v. Roop, 530 F.3d 407, 413 (6th Cir. 2008), a claimant may abandon a claim to
seized items by not requesting their return in the request filed for the other items seized,
see McBean v. United States, 43 F. App’x 853, 855 (6th Cir. 2002) (unpublished order).
Aside from the liberal construction afforded pro se filings, Savoy presents no arguments
on appeal as to why the district court should have returned his video surveillance
equipment. Savoy’s motion was not a general request for all property seized but rather
made specific requests for the return of the videotapes, photographs, and negatives.7
Savoy’s failure to request the return of his surveillance equipment in the district court
precludes us from considering the propriety of return of that property in the first
instance. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(g); El Bey, 530 F.3d at 412. Savoy may present this
request to the district court on remand.

II. CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, we vacate the district court’s judgment with regard to the
twenty videotapes at issue in this appeal, and we remand for the district court to make
findings of fact that will enable it to determine whether, consistent with Federal Rule of

6
The legality of the initial seizure of the adult videotapes would not alter our analysis under Rule
41(g) because the same analysis applies “where the initial seizure was lawful and where it was unlawful.”
Francis, 646 F.2d at 262 n.7.
7
Although Savoy’s motion did not reference the television, the district court ordered the
television’s return because the government had no objection to its return—this stands in contrast with the
government’s objection in the district court to the return of the surveillance system. See Doc. 7 (Dist. Ct.
Order at 1–2).
No. 08-6240 Savoy v. United States Page 12

Criminal Procedure 41(g), Savoy is entitled to lawful possession of the videotapes under
Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-13-605.