Griffin v. Hardrick

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206
File Name: 10a0134p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
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TRUDY GRIFFIN,
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Plaintiff-Appellant,
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No. 09-5757
v.
,
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Defendant-Appellee. -
DARRELL HARDRICK,
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Tennessee at Nashville.
No. 08-00828—Aleta Arthur Trauger, District Judge.
Argued: March 10, 2010
Decided and Filed: May 13, 2010
Before: COLE, GILMAN, and WHITE, Circuit Judges.

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COUNSEL
ARGUED: Phillip L. Davidson, LAW OFFICES, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellant. Keli
J. Oliver, METROPOLITAN NASHVILLE DEPARTMENT OF LAW, Nashville,
Tennessee, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Phillip L. Davidson, LAW OFFICES, Nashville,
Tennessee, for Appellant. Keli J. Oliver, METROPOLITAN NASHVILLE DEPARTMENT
OF LAW, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellee.
GILMAN, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which COLE, J., joined. WHITE,
J. (pp. 11-13), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.
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OPINION
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RONALD LEE GILMAN, Circuit Judge. Trudy Griffin was brought to the
Davidson County Criminal Justice Center after she was arrested for disorderly conduct.
When Griffin created a disturbance while speaking with a nurse at the Center, two
corrections officers, Darrell Hardrick and Pamela Rutledge, each took one of her arms and

1
No. 09-5757 Griffin v. Hardrick Page 2

attempted to guide Griffin away from the nurse’s station. Griffin at that point began
struggling with the officers, causing Hardrick to perform a “leg-sweep maneuver” to bring
Griffin to the floor so that she could be handcuffed and taken back to her holding cell. As
Griffin fell to the floor, however, Rutledge tumbled with her. Rutledge accidentally landed
on one of Griffin’s legs, breaking Griffin’s tibia.

Griffin sued Hardrick over the incident, alleging an excessive-force claim under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 as well as a state-law claim for battery. The district court granted
Hardrick’s motion for summary judgment, holding that no reasonable jury could find that
Hardrick had intended the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain when he tripped
Griffin. For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual background

Griffin was arrested on August 20, 2005 for disorderly conduct and resisting arrest.
She was transported to the Davidson County Criminal Justice Center (Center) for booking.
While she was in a holding cell at the Center, Griffin asked permission to go to the nurse’s
station. After permission was granted, she walked down the hall to speak with a nurse about
bruises on her back and arms. Griffin repeatedly demanded that she be transported to a local
hospital so that she could be treated for these injuries. When the nurse told Griffin that she
would not be taken to a hospital, Griffin refused to take “no” for an answer and began raising
her voice with the nurse. At this point, Hardrick, a corrections officer with the Davidson
County Sheriff’s Office who was in charge of the booking area, approached Griffin.

Both parties agree that “Hardrick observed [Griffin] acting in a non-compliant
manner with regard to the instructions she received from the nurse,” and that Griffin “walked
away from Hardrick when he attempted to speak with her about the situation.” Griffin
claims that as she walked away, Hardrick threatened her by saying that “she was going to
live in his hell” and that she “was his bitch.” Hardrick then took hold of one of Griffin’s
arms, but Griffin attempted to pull away. Griffin claims that she told Hardrick to “watch her
arms” because they were sore from being bruised earlier.
No. 09-5757 Griffin v. Hardrick Page 3

At that point, Hardrick asked Rutledge, another corrections officer at the Center, to
assist with the situation. When Rutledge reached for Griffin’s other arm, Griffin pulled her
arm away (although she contends that she pulled away only “a little bit”). Hardrick and
Rutledge then began leading Griffin down the hall toward her holding cell. Griffin claims
that she was not struggling, resisting, or acting aggressively. She asserts that Hardrick
nevertheless suddenly tripped her, causing her to fall to the floor. This in turn caused
Rutledge to accidentally fall on top of her, which fractured Griffin’s tibia.

Hardrick, on the other hand, contends that Griffin was jerking and attempting to get
away. This prompted him to perform a “leg-sweep maneuver,” typically used by officers to
bring a noncompliant individual to the ground with the least amount of force necessary. He
does not dispute, however, that Rutledge accidentally fell on Griffin’s leg as a result of the
leg sweep. After Griffin was handcuffed on the ground, other Center employees carried her
into the holding-cell area. An ambulance was then called to the Center for the purpose of
taking Griffin to the hospital, where she required surgery, eight screws, and a metal plate to
fix her broken tibia.

A security camera caught the incident on videotape. The video establishes that
Griffin approached the nurse’s station and remained there for just under 10 minutes,
alternating between standing at the window and sitting in a chair placed by the station. She
can be seen motioning and waiving her arms at various points throughout her conversation
with the nurse. Hardrick walked toward Griffin and spoke with her for approximately 20
seconds before Rutledge approached the nurse’s station and stood a few feet away from
Hardrick and Griffin.

After another 10 seconds, Griffin began to walk away from Hardrick, who then
reached out to take her right arm. Griffin attempted to jerk her arm away, but Hardrick
maintained his grip, and Rutledge stepped in to take Griffin’s left arm. After a second or two
of struggling with Griffin outside the nurse’s station, Hardrick and Rutledge began to escort
her down the hallway, which she resisted. Hardrick then stuck out his leg to trip Griffin. At
this point, Griffin fell to the floor, and Rutledge tumbled on top of her.
No. 09-5757 Griffin v. Hardrick Page 4

B. Procedural history

In May 2006, Griffin filed a lawsuit in a Tennessee state court against Hardrick and
the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County (Metro), alleging a claim
of battery under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act. See Tenn. Code Ann.
§§ 29-20-101 to -408. Griffin later dismissed her claim against Metro, but added an
excessive-force claim against Hardrick pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 provides
a cause of action against those who violate a person’s constitutional rights while acting under
color of state law. This caused Hardrick to timely remove the case to the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee.

Hardrick subsequently moved for summary judgment. In response to Griffin’s
§ 1983 claim, he argued that not only was he entitled to qualified immunity, but that
Griffin’s claim could not succeed on the merits because Hardrick’s use of force did not
constitute the wanton infliction of pain. Hardrick further contended that he used only the
amount of force necessary to subdue Griffin, so that her battery claim was likewise without
merit.

The district court granted Hardrick’s motion for summary judgment in June 2009.
Because the court concluded that no reasonable jury could find that Hardrick’s conduct
constituted the wanton infliction of pain, it did not address Hardrick’s qualified-immunity
argument. The court also decided that where the identical use of force leads to both a § 1983
claim and a state-law battery claim, the same standard applies to both causes of action. It
therefore granted summary judgment to Hardrick on Griffin’s state-law battery claim as well.
Griffin has timely appealed.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of review

We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment. ACLU of Ky. v.
Grayson County, 591 F.3d 837, 843 (6th Cir. 2010). Summary judgment is proper where
no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). In considering a motion for summary judgment, the
district court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.
No. 09-5757 Griffin v. Hardrick Page 5

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). The central
issue is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to
a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986).

B. Griffin’s § 1983 claim

Section 1983 prohibits a person “acting under color of state law” from depriving an
individual “of a right secured by the Federal Constitution or laws of the United States.”
Wolotsky v. Huhn, 960 F.2d 1331, 1335 (6th Cir. 1992). Griffin’s complaint alleged that
Hardrick violated § 1983 by using excessive force against her in violation of the
Fourth Amendment. The district court, however, interpreted her claim as alleging a
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and Griffin does not dispute this characterization
on appeal.

Prisoners are protected from the use of excessive force by the Eighth Amendment.
Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986). As a pretrial detainee, however, Griffin’s
rights stem from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which “protects a
pretrial detainee from the use of excessive force that amounts to punishment.” Graham v.
Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10 (1989). The law is unsettled as to whether the analysis for
a Fourteenth Amendment excessive-force claim and an Eighth Amendment excessive-force
claim is the same. See Leary v. Livingston County, 528 F.3d 438, 443 (6th Cir. 2008)
(“[T]here is room for debate over whether the Due Process Clause grants pretrial detainees
more protections than the Eighth Amendment does . . . .”). Compare Orem v. Rephann, 523
F.3d 442, 446 (4th Cir. 2008) (applying the Eighth Amendment standard to a pretrial
detainee’s excessive-force claim under the Fourteenth Amendment), with Wilson v. Williams,
83 F.3d 870, 875 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Since [the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment]
extends beyond the prohibition of merely ‘cruel and unusual’ punishment, pretrial detainees
must arguably be afforded a higher standard than that provided by the Eighth Amendment.”).

In the instant case, however, both parties and the district court relied on this court’s
unpublished decision in Watkins v. Evans, Nos. 95-4162, 95-4341, 1996 WL 499094, at *2
(6th Cir. Sept. 3, 1996), which held that the standards are the same. Because Griffin does
not seek to invoke the potentially broader protections of the Fourteenth Amendment, we will
No. 09-5757 Griffin v. Hardrick Page 6

analyze her claim under the Eighth Amendment standard. See Lewis v. Downey, 581 F.3d
467, 475 (7th Cir. 2009) (analyzing a pretrial detainee’s excessive-force claim under the
same standard as an Eighth Amendment excessive-force claim where the detainee did not
seek to invoke “any safeguards the Fourteenth Amendment provides beyond those it shares
with the Eighth Amendment”).

The test for whether the use of force violates the Eighth Amendment requires a court
to determine if the defendant’s conduct caused the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain.” Moore v. Holbrook, 2 F.3d 697, 700 (6th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). In other
words,

[t]o ascertain whether excessive force was used under the Eighth
Amendment, the court must determine whether the force was applied in a
good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and
sadistically to cause harm. Such a claim has both an objective and a
subjective component. The objective component requires that the pain be
serious. The subjective component requires that the offending, non-penal
conduct be wanton.

Watkins, 1996 WL 499094, at *2 (citations omitted).

Hardrick does not dispute that Griffin suffered serious pain, so the objective element
is satisfied. We must therefore determine if a genuine issue exists as to whether Hardrick’s
conduct in using the leg-sweep maneuver on Griffin was “applied in a good-faith effort to
maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” See id.

As an initial matter, Griffin argues that the district court erred in considering the
videotape when ruling on Hardrick’s motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court,
however, has held that a court may properly consider videotape evidence at the summary-
judgment stage. “When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly
contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not
adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.”
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (holding that, based on videotape evidence, a
police officer did not use excessive force in ramming a fleeing suspect’s car). Moreover, the
reasonableness of a defendant’s actions is an appropriate matter to determine on summary
judgment. Dunn v. Matatall, 549 F.3d 348, 353 (6th Cir. 2008) (explaining that Scott
No. 09-5757 Griffin v. Hardrick Page 7

“instructs us to determine as a matter of law whether the events depicted on [a] video, taken
in the light most favorable to [the nonmoving party], show that the Officers’ conduct was
objectively reasonable”). The district court thus properly considered the videotape evidence
in determining whether Hardrick’s actions were wanton.

Turning now to whether Hardrick’s use of force was excessive, this court has
previously cautioned that an official’s decision to use force is entitled to deference:

[O]fficials confronted with a prison disturbance must balance the threat
[that] unrest poses to inmates, prison workers, administrators, and visitors
against the harm inmates may suffer if guards use force. Because prison
officials must make their decisions in haste, under pressure, and frequently
without the luxury of a second chance, we must grant them wide-ranging
deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their
judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to
maintain institutional security.

Combs v. Wilkinson, 315 F.3d 548, 557 (6th Cir. 2002) (first alteration in original) (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted). The issue is therefore not whether the use of force
was absolutely necessary in hindsight, but “whether the use of force could plausibly have
been thought necessary, or instead evinced such wantonness with respect to the unjustified
infliction of harm as is tantamount to a knowing willingness that it occur.” Whitley, 475 U.S.
at 321.

Griffin does not dispute that she was acting in a noncompliant manner toward the
nurse, that she walked away from Hardrick while he was speaking with her, and that she
attempted to jerk her arm away from Hardrick. As is evident from the video, Hardrick was
calm and nonaggressive during his initial conversation with Griffin. He stood at least a foot
away from Griffin and spoke with her for about 30 seconds before ever touching her. Most
importantly, the video establishes that Griffin was clearly struggling against both Hardrick
and Rutledge before Hardrick employed the leg-sweep maneuver.

The fact that Griffin had been engaged in a loud, lengthy, and animated conversation
with the nurse gave Hardrick a reasonable basis to believe that force would be necessary to
control Griffin. Similarly, Griffin was struggling against Hardrick and Rutledge as they
attempted to lead her away from the nurse’s station, giving Hardrick a plausible reason to
believe that force was necessary to bring Griffin to the floor so that she could be handcuffed
No. 09-5757 Griffin v. Hardrick Page 8

and taken back to her holding cell. Hardrick’s initial calm demeanor with Griffin suggests
that he was not seeking to wantonly inflict pain on her, but was attempting to bring her under
control.

Griffin does not dispute that Hardrick was in compliance with all relevant Center
policies on the use of force, and she does not dispute Hardrick’s contention that he was
acting according to his training when employing the leg-sweep maneuver. Indeed, to counter
the fact that Hardrick was responding to the situation as trained, Griffin argues only that the
opinion of the subject-control instructor for the Davidson County Sheriff’s Office—that the
leg-sweep maneuver was proper under the circumstances—was based on the video, which
testimony she claims would invade the province of the jury and should therefore have been
excluded from consideration on summary judgment.

But as discussed above, a court may properly consider videotape evidence at the
summary-judgment stage, Scott, 550 U.S. at 380-81, so an expert opinion based on such
evidence is appropriate, see Fed. R. Evid. 702; Brainard v. Am. Skandia Life Assurance
Corp., 432 F.3d 655, 663 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that an expert opinion is permitted at the
summary judgment stage so long as the opinion is not “a conclusory assertion about ultimate
legal issues” (citation omitted)). The fact that Hardrick was acting according to established
procedures suggests that he had not undertaken the leg-sweep maneuver in a wanton manner,
but was acting as he was trained while attempting to gain control of Griffin. Moreover, there
is no basis whatsoever to infer that Hardrick intended to use such force as would break
Griffin’s leg. The force that did so came solely from the unfortunate accident of Rutledge
collapsing on Griffin as they both fell to the floor. These circumstances do not support a
§ 1983 claim for the wanton infliction of pain on the part of Hardrick.

In response to the adverse ruling by the district court, Griffin argues that she
presented several genuine issues of material fact sufficient to defeat Hardrick’s motion for
summary judgment. Griffin, for example, contends that “Hardrick never denied that Griffin
received injuries to her arms before coming into the [Center],” and that he “never denied that
he made threats towards Griffin that ‘she was going to live in his hell’ and that she ‘was his
bitch.’” But these alleged threats do not create a genuine issue of material fact under the
particular circumstances here because the videotape shows that Griffin was still struggling
No. 09-5757 Griffin v. Hardrick Page 9

with the officers at the time Hardrick employed the leg-sweep maneuver. So at that moment,
Hardrick had a reasonable basis to believe that further force was necessary to control Griffin,
even if he had earlier made the alleged generalized threats against her.

Griffin next argues that she was walking away because she was scared of Hardrick
and wanted to return to her holding cell, thus creating a genuine issue of material fact. But
this allegation is not material even if it is true (which seems doubtful given Hardrick’s calm
demeanor as shown on the videotape when he initially interacted with Griffin). Whether or
not she felt that she had a good reason for walking away, Griffin was still noncompliant with
the nurse and was resisting Hardrick and Rutledge before Hardrick used the leg-sweep
maneuver. Moreover, Griffin has never contended that she communicated her alleged
motivation to Hardrick, so her reason for noncompliance is irrelevant as to whether Hardrick
reasonably thought that force was necessary to bring Griffin under control.

Other issues cited by Griffin are clearly contradicted by the record. She claims that
Hardrick tripped her without provocation and that at no time did she resist either Hardrick
or Rutledge. To the contrary, the video clearly shows Griffin resisting the officers’ efforts
to lead her down the hallway and her efforts to break away from them.

The district court thus did not err in granting Hardrick’s motion for summary
judgment on Griffin’s § 1983 excessive-force claim. Although we consider this to be a close
case, we ultimately conclude that no reasonable jury could find that Hardrick “evinced such
wantonness . . . as is tantamount to a knowing willingness” that Griffin’s injury occur. See
Whitley v. Abers, 475 U.S. 312, 321 (1986). We therefore need not decide the merits of
Hardrick’s argument that he is entitled to qualified immunity.

C. Griffin’s state-law battery claim

In addition to her § 1983 claim, Griffin alleged a state-law battery claim against
Hardrick. Griffin brought this claim under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act,
which permits individuals to bring a cause of action against governmental employees who
allegedly commit intentional torts. See Baines v. Wilson County, 86 S.W.3d 575, 583 n.5
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2002). Griffin’s appellate brief, however, does not mention her battery
claim. Indeed, her Statement of the Case references only an excessive-force violation against
No. 09-5757 Griffin v. Hardrick Page 10

Hardrick pursuant to § 1983. Nor was her battery claim mentioned at oral argument. She
has therefore likely abandoned this claim on appeal. See Marks v. Newcourt Credit Group,
Inc., 342 F.3d 444, 462 (6th Cir. 2003) (“An appellant waives an issue when he fails to
present it in his initial briefs before this court.”). But see Madden v. Chattanooga City Wide
Serv. Dep’t, 549 F.3d 666, 673 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding that where the same analysis applies
to a plaintiff’s federal and state-law causes of action, a defendant does not waive its defense
to the state-law claim by failing to present the state-law claim on appeal if it argued the
federal claim).

But even if Griffin has not abandoned this claim, it fails on the merits. Where a
plaintiff asserts a battery claim under Tennessee law that arises out of the same use of force
as her § 1983 excessive-force claim, the analysis is the same for both causes of action. That
is, “whether the analysis concerns whether an officer violated a plaintiff’s constitutional
rights by using excessive force or whether the analysis concerns whether an officer
committed state-law battery by using force that was ‘clearly excessive,’ the same principles
. . . are applied.” Lee v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson County, 596 F. Supp. 2d
1101, 1118 (M.D. Tenn. 2009) (holding that officers entitled to summary judgment on a
§ 1983 excessive-force claim were automatically entitled to summary judgment on the
Tennessee common-law battery claim); see also Harris v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, No.
3:06-0868, 2007 WL 4481176, at *9 (M.D. Tenn. Dec. 18, 2007) (“[T]he plaintiff has set
forth adequate grounds for his [§ 1983] claim of excessive force against each of the officers.
Because Tennessee courts apply the same ‘excessive force’ principles to assault and battery
claims against police officers, the plaintiff has additionally set forth adequate grounds against
each of the officers for assault and battery under Tennessee law.”). We thus find no error
in the district court’s conclusion that because Hardrick was entitled to summary judgment
on Griffin’s § 1983 claim, he was also entitled to summary judgment on her state-law battery
claim.

III. CONCLUSION

For all of the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
No. 09-5757 Griffin v. Hardrick Page 11

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DISSENT
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HELENE N. WHITE, Circuit Judge (dissenting). I respectfully dissent. I agree that
it is appropriate for the court to consider a video of the events when ruling on a motion for
summary judgment, and to discount any allegations clearly rebutted by the video. I do not,
however, agree that the video in this case clearly undermines Griffin’s account leaving no
genuine issue of material fact. I would reverse and remand for further proceedings.

In my view, the videotape does not “blatantly contradict[]” Griffin’s version of the
facts “so that no reasonable jury could believe” her, and therefore summary judgment was
not appropriate. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380-81 (2007). Under Scott, in determining
whether there are material factual disputes, we must accept the facts as depicted in the video,
even when contrary to a party’s sworn testimony. However, facts that are not clearly
portrayed in the video remain entitled to an interpretation most favorable to the non-moving
party. Morales v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 71 F.3d 531, 535 (6th Cir. 1995); see
Scott, 550 U.S. at 380 (facts must be viewed in a light most favorable to non-moving party
when there is a “genuine dispute as to those facts”). Accepting all events portrayed in the
video as true, there remains a material factual dispute as to whether Hardrick performed the
takedown maneuver maliciously and sadistically to cause harm, rather than “in a good-faith
effort to maintain or restore discipline.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6 (1992).

In Scott, the Court found that the plaintiff’s claim that he was driving in a “cautious
and controlled” fashion was clearly rebutted by the video that showed him traveling upwards
of 85 miles per hour on narrow roads, swerving around cars, crossing the double-yellow line,
forcing other cars traveling in both directions to the side of the road, running multiple red
lights, and driving in the left-turn-only lane. Id. at 379-80. The video here, however, does
not definitively establish either what transpired prior to Hardrick executing the takedown
maneuver, or that Hardrick did not act maliciously or wantonly in executing the maneuver.

Griffin contends that Hardrick told her “she was going to live in hell” and that she
“was his bitch.” The video, which has no accompanying audio, does not contradict this
allegation. The district court’s perception of the “calmness” of Hardrick’s demeanor is not
No. 09-5757 Griffin v. Hardrick Page 12

incompatible with his having made these statements to Griffin, and thus, at this point in the
litigation, we should assume he did. As the district court recognized, such statements “could
indicate a ‘sadistic’ or ‘malicious’ state of mind at the time of the physical encounter.” See
Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 302 (1991).

The majority concludes that “[m]ost importantly, the video establishes that Griffin
was clearly struggling against both Hardrick and Rutledge before Hardrick employed the
leg-sweep maneuver.” I do not agree that the video shows that Griffin was struggling with
the officers to an extent that no reasonable juror could conclude that Hardrick acted
wantonly and maliciously in performing the takedown. The video does show that Griffin
began walking away from Hardrick, and that she resisted his initial attempt to grab her arm.
Griffin, however, contends that she did so because her arms were already sore and bruised,
and that Hardrick’s grip caused her additional pain. Indeed, Hardrick concedes that Griffin
told him to “watch [her] arms.”

The video is ambiguous, however, as to whether Griffin was continuing to struggle
at the time of the takedown and, even if she was, whether Hardrick could plausibly have
thought a takedown necessary under the circumstances. In the approximately eight second
span from when Rutledge took hold of Griffin’s other arm until Hardrick performed the
takedown maneuver, Griffin can be seen continuing to talk with the two officers with no
aggressive physical movement. Hardrick and Rutledge then pull her forward forcefully,
sufficient to make her stumble. It appears that Griffin has almost regained her balance when
Hardrick performs the takedown, and she continues to be restrained at both arms by the
officers. Further, no other inmates were in the area, and a third corrections officer stood
nearby observing and ready to intervene. See Seiter, 501 U.S. at 303 (whether conduct “can
be characterized as ‘wanton’ depends upon the constraints facing the official”) (emphasis in
original).

To be sure, prison officials are entitled to “wide-ranging deference in the adoption
and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal
order.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321-22 (1986). But such deference “does not
insulate from review actions taken in bad faith and for no legitimate purpose.” Id. at 322.
A jury viewing the events portrayed in the video in light of the statements Griffin attributes
No. 09-5757 Griffin v. Hardrick Page 13

to Hardrick could reasonably conclude that Hardrick could not plausibly have thought that
the use of the takedown maneuver, although executed properly, was necessary, and that, in
fact, he performed it solely to inflict pain, even if not of the degree that ultimately occurred.