UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-4681
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
RICHARD DARRYL PRUITT,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. N. Carlton Tilley,
Jr., Senior District Judge. (1:08-cr-00133-NCT-1)
Submitted: March 16, 2010 Decided: May 14, 2010
Before NIEMEYER, MICHAEL, * and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Louis C. Allen, Federal Public Defender, John A. Dusenbury, Jr.,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greensboro, North Carolina,
for Appellant. Terry Michael Meinecke, Assistant United States
Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
*
Judge Michael was a member of the original panel but did
not participate in this decision. This opinion is filed by a
quorum of the panel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 46(d).
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Richard Darryl Pruitt pled guilty, pursuant to a plea
agreement, to one count of possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1),
924(a)(2) (2006). The district court sentenced Pruitt to
120 months’ imprisonment. He now appeals. Counsel has filed a
brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),
stating that there are no meritorious issues for appeal, but
questioning whether the district court erred in imposing the
sentence. Finding no error, we affirm.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
review. Our review of the transcript of the plea hearing leads
us to conclude that the district court substantially complied
with the mandates of Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 in accepting Pruitt’s
guilty plea and that Pruitt’s substantial rights were not
infringed. Critically, the transcript reveals that the district
court ensured that the plea was supported by an independent
factual basis and that Pruitt entered the plea knowingly and
voluntarily with an understanding of the attendant consequences.
See United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 116, 119-20
(4th Cir. 1991).
We review Pruitt’s sentence under an abuse-of-
discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41
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(2007). In conducting this review, we must first examine the
sentence for “significant procedural error, such as failing to
calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range,
treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the
[18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) [(2006)] factors, selecting a sentence
based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately
explain the chosen sentence.” Id. at 51. “When rendering a
sentence, the district court must make an individualized
assessment based on the facts presented,” applying the “relevant
§ 3553(a) factors to the specific circumstances of the case
before it.” United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328
(4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted).
The district court must also “state in open court the particular
reasons supporting its chosen sentence” and “set forth enough to
satisfy” this court that it has “considered the parties’
arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising [its] own
legal decisionmaking authority.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). The court, however, is not required to “robotically
tick through § 3553(a)’s every subsection.” United States v.
Johnson, 445 F.3d 339, 345 (4th Cir. 2006).
If the sentence is free of procedural error, we then
consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence,
“tak[ing] into account the totality of the circumstances.”
Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. If the sentence is within the appropriate
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Guidelines range, this court applies a presumption on appeal
that the sentence is reasonable. See United States v. Go, 517
F.3d 216, 218 (4th Cir. 2008).
We conclude that the district court did not commit
procedural or substantive error in sentencing Pruitt. The court
properly calculated and treated as advisory the Guidelines
sentence and heard argument from the parties and Pruitt’s
allocution. The court considered the relevant § 3553(a)
factors, addressing on the record the nature and circumstances
of the offense, Pruitt’s history and characteristics, and the
need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of Pruitt’s
offense and to deter Pruitt. Further, neither counsel nor
Pruitt offers any grounds to rebut the presumption on appeal
that the within-Guidelines sentence of 120 months’ imprisonment
is reasonable.
We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment and
deny Pruitt’s motion for other relief. This court requires that
counsel inform Pruitt, in writing, of the right to petition the
Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If
Pruitt requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes
that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move
in this court for leave to withdraw from representation.
Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on
Pruitt.
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We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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