[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 09-13826 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
MAY 17, 2010
Non-Argument Calendar
JOHN LEY
________________________
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 97-00036-CR-4-RH
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
EDWARD TAYLOR,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
_________________________
(May 17, 2010)
Before BLACK, CARNES and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Edward Taylor appeals the district court's denial of his motion for a sentence
reduction, filed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). Taylor challenges the district
court’s finding he was accountable for more than 4.5 kilograms of crack cocaine,
making him ineligible for a §3582(c)(2) reduction. After review, we vacate and
remand.
In the § 3582(c)(2) context,"we review de novo the district court's legal
conclusions regarding the scope of its authority under the Sentencing Guidelines."
United States v. White, 305 F.3d 1264, 1267 (11th Cir. 2002). A § 3582(c)(2)
motion to reduce sentence does not provide the basis for de novo resentencing, and
the district court must maintain "all original sentencing determinations" apart from
the original Guidelines range. United States v. Bravo, 203 F.3d 778, 781 (11th Cir.
2000). Accordingly, a district court must leave intact its previous factual decisions
from the sentencing hearing, including drug quantity calculations, when deciding
whether to reduce a defendant's sentence under § 3582. United States v. Cothran,
106 F.3d 1560, 1563 (11th Cir. 1997).
Amendment 706 reduces from 38 to 36 the base offense level for offenses
that involved more than 1.5, but fewer than 4.5, kilograms of cocaine base, but it
does not reduce the offense level for offenses involving more than 4.5 kilograms.
See U.S.S.G. App. C, amends. 706, 711, 713 (Supp. Mar. 3, 2008); U.S.S.G.
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§ 2D1.1(c)(1). In United States v. Davis, 587 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir. 2009), the
sentencing court expressly found only that Davis was responsible for more than 1.5
kilograms of crack cocaine, but the PSI stated Davis was responsible for at least 8
kilograms. Id. at 1303-04. Because Davis did not object to the PSI's finding, and
the sentencing court adopted the PSI's facts, Davis was ineligible for a § 3582
reduction. Id.
The sentencing court found Taylor was responsible for an amount of crack
cocaine that "exceeds 1.5 kilograms" but, unlike in Davis, Taylor objected to the
PSI’s description of the amount of drugs attributed to him and the district court did
not adopt the PSI's finding as to a larger drug quantity. Further, although the
sentencing court referred to various cocaine transactions in its findings, only the
court's references to "a one-kilogram transaction . . . where the cocaine was cooked
at Mr. Taylor's house," and "testimony about cooking crack cocaine in Mr. Taylor's
presence at least one time, involving half a kilogram," identified any specific
quantity of crack cocaine. Thus, the sentencing court's additional factual findings
do not reflect a finding that Taylor was accountable for more than 4.5 kilograms of
crack cocaine. Because the district court was prohibited from making a new drug
quantity finding in the instant § 3582(c)(2) proceeding, the district court erred by
concluding that Taylor was ineligible for relief. Thus, we vacate the denial order
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and remand the case for the district court to exercise its discretion under
§ 3582(c)(2).
VACATED AND REMANDED.
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