PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 08-4616
JEFFREY ALLEN DRIPPE,
Appellant
v.
OFFICER TOBELINSKI, a/k/a “SKI”;
RALPH GOTOTWESKI,
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(Civil Action No. 3-06-cv-01096)
District Judge: Honorable A. Richard Caputo
Argued November 17, 2009
Before: AMBRO, ALDISERT and ROTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed: May 17, 2010)
JANINE VINCI (ARGUED)
1011 W. Ritner Street
Philadelphia, PA 19148
NEIL E. BOTEL
427 Millbank Road
Upper Darby, PA 19082
Attorneys for Appellant
BARBARA ADAMS, General Counsel
SUZANNE N. HUESTON, Chief Counsel
TIMOTHY A. HOLMES, Assistant Counsel (ARGUED)
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections
Office of Chief Counsel
55 Utley Drive
Camp Hill, PA 17011
Attorneys for Appellee
OPINION OF THE COURT
ALDISERT, Circuit Judge.
Jeffrey Allen Drippe, an inmate in an institution of the
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, appeals the order of
the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Pennsylvania granting summary judgment in favor of Officer
2
Ralph Gototweski because Drippe failed to exhaust his
administrative grievance remedies before filing suit pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983, as required by the Prison Litigation Reform
Act (“PLRA”).1 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Drippe first argues that
by the terms of the PLRA Gototweski waived the defense of
failure to exhaust, asking our Court to hold as a matter of law
that the PLRA imposes a strict timing requirement on
institutional defendants. We decline to do so. In the alternative,
Drippe argues that the District Court’s entertainment of
Gototweski’s oral motion for summary judgment, on the eve of
trial, violated Rule 6(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and merits reversal. We agree and will remand to the District
Court to permit Gototweski to file the appropriate motion under
Rule 6(b)(1)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.2
I.
1
Drippe originally filed a civil action pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983. The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1291.
2
Drippe additionally argues that the District Court’s
dismissal on summary judgment violated Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56 and Local Rules of the Middle District of
Pennsylvania 7.1 and 7.5, requiring motions filed prior to trial
to be in writing and accompanied by brief. Because we reverse
on the basis of the Rule 6(b) violation, we do not reach these
contentions.
3
A.
Drippe alleges that on August 1, 2004, he was forced to
shower in a dirty shower area without proper footwear and by
August 4, he had become extremely sick with flu-like symptoms
and a swollen leg. (App.3 3.) Drippe alleges Gototweski came to
his cell door, inquired after his welfare, stated “that looks really
bad” and informed Drippe that the Unit Sergeant would be
notified. (App. 3.) Drippe was not transported to the Medical
Department until August 7. He was ultimately diagnosed with
cellulitis. (App. 3.)
The Department of Corrections Grievance System
provides a multi-step administrative grievance process as
follows: (1) inmates file grievances with the institution’s
Grievance Coordinator; (2) if unsatisfied with the first step
“Initial Review,” inmates may file an “Appeal” of the decision
with the Institution’s Facility Manager (Superintendent); (3)
after receiving the decision of the Superintendent, inmates may
seek “Final Review” through the Chief Grievance Coordinator.
(App. 95, 102, 107-110.) The Grievance Policy requires that
“[t]he inmate shall include a statement of the facts relevant to
the claim,” and “[t]he inmate should identify any persons who
may have information that could be helpful in resolving the
grievance.” (Appellee’s Br. 14.)
3
“App.” refers to Appendix Volume I. “App. II” refers to
Appendix Volume II.
4
Drippe filed at least five grievances while incarcerated.
(App. 103, 113, 115, 122, 137.) Grievance # 95193 concerned
medical care at SCI-Frackville; it did not specifically refer to a
corrections officer. Final appeal was filed. (App. 132, 135, 138-
143.) Grievances # 211023 and # 124157 concerned medical
care at SCI-Graterford. (App. 111, 113.) Final appeal was filed
for grievance # 211023. (App. 108, 119-121.) Gototweski has
not worked at SCI-Graterford. Grievance # 239321 concerned
medical care received at SCI-Graterford. (App. 122.) Drippe
also filed grievance # 133607, challenging his sentence
calculation, under a different inmate number. (App. 137.)
B.
Drippe filed suit in the District Court for the Middle
District of Pennsylvania under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for denial of
prompt medical treatment. He first filed a complaint against an
“Officer Tobelinski” on May 31, 2006. (App. 1.) He filed an
amended complaint naming Officer Gototweski on December
15, 2006. (App. 5-7.) The complaint alleged that on August 4,
2004, Gototweski observed Drippe’s injured leg and failed to
notify the appropriate authority. (App. 5-7.) Gototweski filed an
answer to the amended complaint, raising failure to exhaust as
an affirmative defense. (App. 8, 12.)
The magistrate judge issued a scheduling order, requiring
discovery to be concluded by February 1, 2008 and dispositive
motions to be submitted by March 3, 2008. (App. II, at 1.)
5
Gototweski filed a motion for summary judgment on October
25, 2007, which was denied by the magistrate judge. (App. 17.)
Gototweski filed another motion for summary judgment prior to
the pre-trial conference, arguing failure to exhaust because none
of the grievances reached Final Review. (App. 89.) During the
pre-trial conference, Gototweski’s attorney provided recently
discovered exhibits regarding the grievances. These documents
were filed under Drippe’s previous inmate number and indicated
that at least two grievances had properly been pursued to Final
Review. (See App. 135-137.) Subsequently, the District Court
entertained a third motion for summary judgment, presented
orally, on the eve of trial. (App. 203.) The District Court
sustained Gototweski’s defense of failure to exhaust and
dismissed the case, holding that the grievance “cannot fairly be
said to have given prison officials notice of the person claimed
here to be guilty of wrongdoing, nor the conduct that constituted
the alleged constitutional violation.” (App. II, at 28-31.)
Although it acknowledged the motion was untimely, the Court
reasoned that the affirmative defense of exhaustion raised a
question of law that must be resolved by the Court prior to
proceeding to trial on the merits. (App. II, at 28-31.) Notice of
appeal was filed on November 21, 2008. (App. II, at 32.)
II.
We decline to read a strict timing requirement into the
PLRA for prosecution of the affirmative defense of failure to
exhaust. We exercise plenary review over questions of statutory
6
construction. Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 226 (3d Cir. 2004).
The PLRA provides in relevant part:
No action shall be brought with respect to prison
conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any
other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any
jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such
administrative remedies as are available are
exhausted.
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (emphasis added). In Woodford v. Ngo,
548 U.S. 81, 93 (2006), the Supreme Court resolved a circuit
split, holding that “the PLRA exhaustion requirement requires
proper exhaustion.” This accords with our previous 2004
decision in Spruill, that the PLRA includes a procedural default
component and the determination whether a prisoner properly
exhausted a claim is made by evaluating compliance with the
prison’s specific grievance procedures.
Drippe urges us to adopt his construction of Pavey v.
Conley, 544 F.3d 739, 740 (7th Cir. 2008), a case from the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, resolving the question
of “whether a prisoner plaintiff in a suit for damages governed
by the [PLRA] is entitled by the Seventh Amendment to a jury
trial on any debatable factual issues relating to the defense of
failure to exhaust administrative remedies.” Under Pavey, a
prisoner plaintiff is not entitled to a jury trial on the factual
7
issues of exhaustion, which the court determined is a question
to be resolved by the trial judge. “Juries decide cases, not issues
of judicial traffic control. Until the issue of exhaustion is
resolved, the court cannot know whether it is to decide the case
or the prison authorities are to.” Id. at 741. Pavey analogized the
issue of exhaustion to subject matter jurisdiction, observing that
not every factual issue that arises during litigation is triable to a
jury as a matter of right. Id. Under Pavey, a district court must
comply with a specific approach to exhaustion questions. The
district court must first hold a hearing to address exhaustion,
then order exhaustion-related discovery, and finally, the district
court must resolve the question of exhaustion before
commencing merits-based pre-trial discovery. Id. at 742. The
decision concludes with an admonition that the question of
exhaustion must be decided before merits discovery commences:
We emphasize that discovery with respect to the
merits should be deferred until the issue of
exhaustion is resolved. If merits discovery is
allowed to begin before that resolution, the
statutory goal of sparing federal courts the burden
of prisoner litigation until and unless the prisoner
has exhausted his administrative remedies will not
be achieved[.]
Id. Drippe reads this language in isolation and argues that, as a
necessary corollary, the defense of exhaustion is waived if it is
not prosecuted by the deadline imposed by the Court for
8
dispositive motions. He urges us to read this requirement into
the PLRA in order to effectuate the dual purposes of the PLRA
– to return control to prison administrators and to provide for the
early and efficient resolution of disputes, thereby reducing the
burden on the federal court system. He argues that the defense
tests not the right to proceed to trial but the right to file suit, and
as such it no longer serves the purposes of the PLRA once
litigation has proceeded past the stages of discovery and pre-trial
motions.4
Exhaustion of administrative remedies is an affirmative
defense that need not be specially pleaded by the inmate or
demonstrated in the complaint. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199
(2007). In Jones, the Court overturned the imposition, by the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, of a series of procedural
restrictions allegedly gleaned from the PLRA – namely that
inmates must specifically plead exhaustion and identify
defendants in grievances. These requirements were not found in
the prison’s grievance policy, but were read into the PLRA by
the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court held that the PLRA’s
screening requirement “does not – explicitly or implicitly –
justify deviating from the usual procedural practice beyond the
departures specified by the PLRA itself.” Id. at 214. In
4
To the contrary, a jury trial is a significant burden on the
federal court system as well as the federal jury pool, and the
District Court’s resolution of the issue on summary judgment
conserved judicial resources.
9
concluding that there was no basis for determining that Congress
intended to transform exhaustion into a pleading requirement,
the Supreme Court engaged in a text-based analysis of the
PLRA and determined unequivocally that the Court of Appeals’
position had no basis in the text of the statute. “[T]he lower
court’s procedural rule lacks a textual basis in the PLRA. . . .
[N]othing in the statute imposes a ‘name all defendants’
requirement . . . . Respondents argue that without such a rule the
exhaustion requirement would become a ‘useless appendage,’
but the assertion is hyperbole[.]” Id. at 217 (citation omitted).
Similarly, Drippe urges our Court to read into the PLRA a
procedural requirement for which there is no textual basis.
Although we agree with the Pavey court that exhaustion of
administrative remedies under the PLRA is a question of law to
be determined by the judge, we take guidance from Jones v.
Bock, and will not read into the PLRA a timing requirement for
which the PLRA provides no textual support.
III.
Drippe argues additionally that the District Court’s
dismissal on oral motion for summary judgment – after jury
selection, on the eve of trial, seven months after the Court’s
scheduling deadline – should be reversed because the District
Court violated Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b)(1), which
requires that:
(1) In General. When an act may or must be done
10
within a specified time, the court may, for good
cause, extend the time:
(A) with or without motion or
notice if the court acts, or if a
request is made, before the original
time or its extension expires; or
(B) on motion made after the time
has expired if the party failed to act
because of excusable neglect.
We review the District Court’s order of dismissal for
abuse of discretion. Mindek v. Rigatti, 964 F.2d 1369, 1373 (3d
Cir. 1992). We hold that the District Court’s entertainment of
this motion contravened Rule 6(b), as construed by Lujan v.
National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871 (1990), and we will
remand.
A.
As a general matter, we accord district courts great
deference with regard to matters of case management. See, e.g.,
In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 685 F.2d 810, 817-818 (3d Cir.
1982) (“[M]atters of docket control and conduct of discovery are
committed to the sound discretion of the district court. We will
not interfere with a trial court’s control of its docket except upon
the clearest showing that the procedures have resulted in actual
11
and substantial prejudice to the complaining litigant.” (citation
and quotation omitted)); Yesudian ex rel. U.S. v. Howard Univ.,
270 F.3d 969, 971 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“Thus, given the great
deference we owe district courts in what are effectively their
case-management decisions, there was no reversible error in the
court’s decision to accept [the] late filing.” (citation and
quotation omitted)); Maldonado-Denis v. Castillo-Rodriguez, 23
F.3d 576, 583-584 (1st Cir. 1994) (“The district court is
afforded great leeway in granting or refusing enlargements and
its decisions are reviewable only for abuse of that discretion.
This deference is grounded in common sense. We deem it
self-evident that appellate courts cannot too readily agree to
meddle in such case-management decisions lest the trial court’s
authority be undermined and the systems sputter.” (citation and
quotation omitted)). However, there are times when a district
court exceeds the permissible bounds of its broad discretion.
This is such a case.
B.
In Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. at
895-896, the Supreme Court held that the district court did not
abuse its discretion when it declined to admit affidavits filed
untimely and in violation of the district court’s scheduling order.
The late filing was governed by Rule 6(b), which “not only
specifically confers the ‘discretion’ relevant to the present issue,
but also provides the mechanism by which that discretion is to
be invoked and exercised.” Id. Pursuant to the Rule, “any
12
postdeadline extension must be ‘upon motion made,’ and is
permissible only where the failure to meet the deadline ‘was the
result of excusable neglect.’” Id. at 896 (quoting Rule 6(b)). A
contrary interpretation would directly contravene the Rule’s
specific delineation between “requests” and “motions.” In a
pivotal footnote, the Supreme Court explained that
Rule 6(b) establishes a clear distinction between
“requests” and “motions,” and the one cannot be
converted into the other without violating its
provisions. . . . Rule 6(b)(1) allows a court (“for
cause shown” and “in its discretion”) to grant a
“request” for an extension of time, whether the
request is made “with or without motion or
notice,” provided the request is made before the
time for filing expires. After the time for filing has
expired, however, the court (again “for cause
shown” and “in its discretion”) may extend the
time only “upon motion.” To treat all postdeadline
“requests” as “motions” (if indeed any of them
can be treated that way) would eliminate the
distinction between predeadline and postdeadline
filings that the Rule painstakingly draws. Surely
the postdeadline “request,” to be even permissibly
treated as a “motion,” must contain a high degree
of formality and precision, putting the opposing
party on notice that a motion is at issue and that
he therefore ought to respond.
13
Id. at 896 n.5.
Courts have construed Lujan’s construction of Rule 6(b)5
5
Lujan was decided in 1990, and in 2007 Rule 6(b) was
amended as part of the general restyling of the Rules to make
them more easily understood. The changes were intended to be
stylistic only. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b) advisory committee’s note. At
the time of Lujan, the text of Rule 6(b) read:
[(b) Enlargement.] When by these rules or by a
notice given thereunder or by order of court an act
is required or allowed to be done at or within a
specified time, the court for cause shown may at
any time in its discretion
(1) with or without motion or notice order
the period enlarged if request therefor is
made before the expiration of the period
originally prescribed or as extended by a
previous order, or
(2) upon motion made after the expiration
of the specified period permit the act to be
done where the failure to act was the result
of excusable neglect[.]
Lujan, 497 U.S. at 895. The text of the rule presently reads:
(b) Extending Time.
(1) In General. When an act may or must
be done within a specified time, the court
14
to impose a strict requirement that litigants file formal motions
for Rule 6(b) time-extensions when attempting to file in
contravention of a scheduling order. See Smith v. District of
Columbia, 430 F.3d 450, 456 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“In [Lujan], the
Supreme Court noted the distinction between this provision and
Rule 6(b)(1), which allows a court to grant an extension if a
‘request’ is made before the time for filing expires. By contrast,
the Court emphasized that post-deadline extensions may be
granted only ‘for cause shown’ and ‘upon motion.’ Any
post-deadline motion ‘must contain a high degree of formality
and precision, putting the opposing party on notice that a motion
is at issue and that he therefore ought to respond.’” (quoting
Lujan, 497 U.S. at 896 n.5)); Jones v. Cent. Bank, 161 F.3d 311,
314 n.2 (5th Cir. 1998) (“[R]ule 6(b)(2) requires that, once a
deadline has expired (as occurred in the instant case), leave to
file late can be granted only ‘upon motion made.’ The Supreme
may, for good cause, extend the time:
(A) with or without motion or
notice if the court acts, or if a
request is made, before the original
time or its extension expires; or
(B) on motion made after the time
has expired if the party failed to act
because of excusable neglect.
The amendment does not alter the request-motion dichotomy,
and the rule remains substantively the same as when addressed
by Lujan.
15
Court said so explicitly in construing rule 6(b) in [Lujan]. . . . In
other words, there is no discretion to grant a post-deadline
extension absent a motion and showing of excusable neglect.”
(citing Lujan, 497 U.S. at 896)); ADAPT of Phila. v. Phila.
Hous. Auth., 511 F. Supp. 2d 510, 515 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (“If the
moving party does not seek an extension until after the time
limit has expired, the court may exercise its discretion only if a
motion is made and the moving party proves its failure to
comply with the applicable deadline was the result of excusable
neglect.” (citing Lujan, 497 U.S. at 896 n.5)).
C.
We are left with the question whether the District Court’s
last-minute hearing on summary judgment violated Rule 6(b),
requiring reversal. We agree that Rule 6(b) and Lujan require
motions, untimely under the Rules, to be filed in accordance
with the requirements of Rule 6(b)(1)(B). Thus a party must
make a formal motion for extension of time and the district court
must make a finding of excusable neglect, under the Pioneer
factors, before permitting an untimely motion. Pioneer Inv.
Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs., 507 U.S. 380, 395 (1993).
Under Pioneer, the excusable neglect inquiry must consider “all
relevant circumstances surrounding the party’s omission. These
include . . . the danger of prejudice . . . , the length of the delay
and its potential impact on judicial proceedings, the reason for
the delay, including whether it was within the reasonable control
of the movant, and whether the movant acted in good faith.” Id.;
16
see also In re O’Brien Envtl. Energy, Inc., 188 F.3d 116, 125 n.7
(3d Cir. 1999) (holding that Pioneer factors apply to all
excusable neglect inquiries mandated under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure). We do not evaluate the District Court’s
purported finding of excusable neglect because, notwithstanding
Gototweski’s averment otherwise, the record is devoid of
evidence suggesting that such a finding was made.6
We conclude that the District Court violated Rule 6(b) by
granting Gototweski’s third and final motion for summary
judgment. The scheduling order required all dispositive motions
to be filed by March 3, 2008. On November 10, 2008,
Gototweski filed his second motion for summary judgment on
the grounds that none of Drippe’s grievances reached the final
and required stage of the grievance review procedure. On
November 17, 2008, after additional documents came to light,
Gototweski made an oral motion for summary judgment – after
jury selection, on the eve of trial – premised on yet a new theory
of failure to exhaust.7 The Court entertained oral argument but
6
In fact, the Court at first did not even acknowledge that
it was entertaining the motion much less making a formal
finding of excusable neglect. “Well, I’m not sure I’m
entertaining your motion. I’m listening to you on the question.”
(App. 205.)
7
Gototweski would have us style his oral motion as an
amendment to his previous written motion. Because the second
17
gave Drippe’s counsel no opportunity to present a considered
response by brief. After the District Court heard oral argument
on the oral motion, Drippe’s counsel asked “Do you want us to
brief?” to which the Court replied, “No. You’ve briefed it. I
mean, basically you’ve talked about it.” (App. 227.)
The District Court’s entertainment of Gototweski’s oral
motion to dismiss, some seven months after the scheduling
deadline for dispositive motions, does not comply with Rule
6(b) as construed by Lujan. Under Rule 6(b), late filings must
“contain a high degree of formality and precision” in order to
“put[] the opposing party on notice that a motion is at issue and
that he therefore ought to respond.” Lujan, 497 U.S. at 896 n.5.
The discretion to entertain late motions is conferred by Rule
6(b), id. at 895-896, and the District Court’s failure to comply
with the Rule’s requirements for extending time is therefore an
abuse of discretion. The resolution of this issue – failure to
exhaust administrative remedies – was highly fact-intensive and
required a judgment by the District Court whether the specific
grievances complied with the specific prison’s grievance
procedure. Drippe’s counsel should have been given the
opportunity both to research and to brief the issue. Compliance
with the timing provisions of Rule 6(b) would have provided
that opportunity. We will reverse and remand to permit Appellee
Gototweski to submit a motion for extension of time in
motion itself violated Rule 6(b), an amendment necessarily
violates it as well and we need not make this distinction.
18
compliance with Rule 6(b)(1)(B).
*****
We will reverse the District Court’s dismissal on
summary judgment and remand to the District Court to permit
Gototweski to file a motion for an extension of time under Rule
6(b)(1)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
19
AMBRO, Circuit Judge, concurring
My colleagues and I agree that Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b) was
violated. While the District Court makes an excusable neglect
determination in the first instance, I write separately to provide
further factual background of the case and to discuss my
additional concern regarding Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
56(c).
Gototweski filed his answer on July 31, 2007, in which,
among a laundry list of 19 affirmative defenses, he asserted
exhaustion as one (and it came at the end of the list). On August
1, 2007, the Magistrate Judge entered a scheduling order, setting
a discovery deadline of February 1, 2008, and a dispositive
motions deadline of March 3, 2008. The order stated that “[t]he
parties are also advised that once the deadlines have been
established, extensions of those time periods will be sparingly
granted and only for good cause shown, upon application made
before the expiration of the relevant deadline.”
Gototweski moved for summary judgment in October
2007, arguing that he could not have been personally involved
in the alleged constitutional violation because he was not
working at Drippe’s institution on August 4, 2004, one of the
four days Drippe alleges Gototweski acted with deliberate
indifference. Gototweski did not so much as mention
exhaustion in his motion.
The District Court denied the motion in August 2008,
reasoning that because Drippe’s allegations spanned a time
frame of four days (August 4 through 7, 2004), Gototweski
could have been personally involved in the incidents on the
latter three days despite his absence on the first day. The Court
informed the parties that the trial would be held in November
2008,1 and in October provided a set date of November 17. Yet
Gototweski had not mentioned “exhaustion” in the litigation
since his inclusion of it as an affirmative defense in his answer,
filed well over a year earlier.
On November 10, 2008, seven days before trial,
Gototweski filed a “second motion for summary judgment,”
asserting, on the basis of an unsworn declaration by a
Department of Corrections administrative officer, that Drippe
did not complete the final step of the grievance process as to
three of the four grievances he had filed, and thus they were
unexhausted. 2 (The one grievance Gototweski agreed Drippe
had completed was not relevant to the allegations in his lawsuit.)
1
The summary judgment deadline was not the only deadline
disregarded by Gototweski’s counsel. On September 30, 2008,
Gototweski moved for an “enlargement of discovery deadlines,”
even though the discovery period had expired almost eight
months prior. The Court denied this motion as untimely.
2
The Pennsylvania Department of Corrections has a three-
step grievance process: 1) an initial grievance filed with the
grievance coordinator at the institution, 2) an appeal to the
Superintendent of the institution, and 3) a final appeal to the
Pennsylvania Secretary of Corrections.
2
The case had by then proceeded for two years, through full
discovery, and the deadline for dispositive motions had passed
over eight months earlier.
Despite the assertion in Gototweski’s motion, Drippe had
completed the final step of the grievance process for the relevant
grievance. Drippe’s counsel, in his opposition memorandum to
Gototweski’s summary judgment motion, submitted a sworn
affidavit by a paralegal in his law firm stating that an agent of
the Department of Corrections had informed the paralegal that
a final grievance appeal was in the Department’s records under
the proper name “Jeffrey Drippe.” 3 Apparently, the final appeal
had been filed under a different identification number than the
number on the previous two grievance filings. Gototweski’s
counsel sent a copy of the final grievance to Drippe’s counsel on
November 12, 2008.
On the day of trial (November 17) and after jury
selection, the District Court heard argument on Gototweski’s
summary judgment motion. But for the actions of Drippe’s
counsel—curiously, it took only one phone call by his paralegal
to uncover the inaccuracy in the brief of Gototweski concerning
a document that had been in the control of his employer for
3
Drippe also argued that Gototweski’s motion should be
denied because it was filed in violation of Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 6(b) and 56, and Gototweski had not shown
excusable neglect.
3
years—that faulty motion might have been granted.
Gototweski’s counsel corrected the record and agreed that
Drippe had completed the grievance procedure. The basis for
Gototweski’s second motion for summary judgment, therefore,
was no longer valid.
Incredibly, Gototweski’s counsel chose to advance orally
a new theory of exhaustion—one not made in his written motion
for summary judgment—that the grievance he now agreed was
exhausted was insufficient to give prison officials notice that
Gototweski was charged with wrongdoing. This was yet a third
motion for summary judgment, and this time it wasn’t even
written. With the prior, written motion, Drippe at least had an
opportunity (however short) to rebut the basis for the
motion—which he did successfully. With the oral motion,
Drippe had no opportunity to develop a response.
Additionally, Gototweski’s motion violated Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(c) as it read at the time of the events in this case.4 It
required at least ten days notice to the non-moving party on a
4
Rule 56(c) has since been amended to read, in relevant part,
that “a party may move for summary judgment at any time until
30 days after the close of all discovery.” Discovery in this case
closed on February 1, 2008, and 30 days later was March 2.
Thus the November 17, 2008, summary judgment motion would
have been improper under the new version of the rule by over
eight months.
4
motion for summary judgment. Here, Drippe received only
seven days notice on the second summary judgment motion and
no notice on the third motion.
Our Court has long “insisted on strict compliance with
the procedural requirements of Rule 56(c).” Brooks v. Hussman
Corp., 878 F.2d 115, 116–17 (3d Cir. 1989). As Judge Becker
stated, “summary judgment motions within ten days of trial
violate the plain words of Rule 56(c) and are unfair to opponents
who may lack adequate time to respond.” In re School Asbestos
Litig., 977 F.2d 764, 794 (3d Cir. 1992). How much more
unfair, then, is an oral summary judgment motion made on the
day of trial, after jury selection, with no opportunity for a
plaintiff to prepare a response.
We require prisoners to adhere strictly to the procedural
rules of the Prison Litigation Reform Act. It is not too much to
ask that non-prisoner parties play by the same rules when the
procedures are those of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
5