United States v. Brown

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-4797

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

KENYATTA AHMAD BROWN,

Defendant – Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Charleston. David C. Norton, Chief District
Judge. (2:07-cr-00860-DCN-1)

Submitted: April 9, 2010 Decided: May 18, 2010

Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and DUNCAN and DAVIS, Circuit
Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

J. Joseph Condon, Jr., North Charleston, South Carolina, for
Appellant. W. Walter Wilkins, United States Attorney, Sean
Kittrell, Assistant United States Attorney, Charleston, South
Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:

Kenyatta Ahmad Brown appeals his conviction after

entering a conditional guilty plea to using and carrying a

firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) (2006), and possession

with intent to distribute five or more grams of cocaine base, in

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B) (2006). On

appeal, Brown contends that the district court erred in denying

his motion to suppress evidence of the firearms and cocaine

base, because the traffic stop at which the evidence was

obtained violated the Fourth Amendment. We affirm.

When considering a district court’s ruling on a motion

to suppress evidence, we review the district court’s factual

findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo.

United States v. Rusher, 966 F.2d 868, 873 (4th Cir. 1992). The

district court concluded that police had probable cause to stop

the vehicle in which Brown was a passenger based on a violation

of South Carolina’s motor vehicle law requiring every driver and

occupant of a motor vehicle while it is being operated to wear a

fastened safety belt. On appeal, Brown contends there was no

probable cause for the traffic stop “because the basis of the

stop was not criminal and no traffic violations had occurred.”

We disagree. Because police had probable cause to believe that

a violation of the state’s motor vehicle law had occurred, the

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investigatory stop was lawful. See Arizona v. Johnson, 129 S.

Ct. 781 (2009); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996).

We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. We

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED