[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
MAY 20, 2010
No. 09-13980 JOHN LEY
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 07-00291-CR-01-MHS-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JAMMOM RYALS,
a.k.a. Jammon Ventura Ryals,
a.k.a. Jammon Rayls,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
_________________________
(May 20, 2010)
Before TJOFLAT, WILSON and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Jammon Ryals appeals his conviction and sentence for being a felon in
possession of a firearm. Ryals argues that the district court intimidated him at the
change of plea hearing into pleading guilty. He claims that when he refused to
accept the government’s plea agreement and enter a guilty plea, the district court
berated him, warning that Ryals was giving up “an unbelievable deal” and it was
unlikely he would “get anything even close to” it. Then, after Ryals continued in
his refusal, the district court stated: (1) the trial would take one day; (2) he would
not receive any reduction for acceptance of responsibility or cooperation; and
(3) he had no defense to the crime. He claims that a district court may not discuss
the penal consequences of a guilty plea as opposed to going to trial without
creating a coercive situation. Ryals also raises other issues related to his
sentencing, but we decline to address them in light of our holding below. The
government concedes on appeal that the district court impermissibly participated in
the plea negotiations and committed reversible error.
Where the defendant has failed to raise an issue below, we review for plain
error. United States v. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d 1291, 1298 (11th Cir. 2005). Although
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 allows “attorneys for government and
defense [to] engage in discussions with a view toward reaching a plea agreement
. . . [t]he court shall not participate in any such discussions.” United States v.
2
Corbitt, 996 F.2d 1132, 1134 (11th Cir. 1993) (quotation omitted); see
Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(c)(1). Therefore, “the sentencing judge should take no part
whatever in any discussion or communication regarding the sentence to be
imposed prior to the entry of a plea of guilty or conviction, or submission to him of
a plea agreement.” Corbitt, 996 F.2d at 1134 (quotation omitted). The ban on
participation is “a bright line rule prohibiting the participation of the judge in plea
negotiations under any circumstances: it is a rule that, as we have noted, admits of
no exceptions.” United States v. Johnson, 89 F.3d 778, 783 (11th Cir. 1996)
(quotation omitted). “Judicial participation is plain error, and the defendant need
not show actual prejudice.” Corbitt, 996 F.2d at 1135. Furthermore, “on remand
the case should be reassigned to another judge even if there is no evidence that the
judge is vindictive or biased, as a means to extend the prophylactic scheme
established by Rule 11 and to prevent the possible misimpression created by the
judge’s participation.” Id.
The district court committed plain error by participating in the plea
negotiations. Therefore, we VACATE Ryals’s conviction and sentence and
REMAND to another judge for a new Rule 11 hearing or a trial. 1
1
Ryals’ request for oral argument is denied.
3