UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-4574
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
AHMAD PETERSON, a/k/a MeltMan,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of West Virginia, at Clarksburg. Irene M. Keeley,
District Judge. (1:08-cr-00004-IMK-1)
Submitted: April 29, 2010 Decided: May 21, 2010
Before WILKINSON, DUNCAN, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Brian J. Kornbrath, Federal Public Defender, Clarksburg, West
Virginia, for Appellant. Betsy C. Jividen, Acting United States
Attorney, Shawn Angus Morgan, Assistant United States Attorney,
Clarksburg, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Following a jury trial, Ahmad Peterson was convicted
on two counts of distributing cocaine base within 1000 feet of a
protected location, in violation of 21 U.S.C.A. § 841 (West 1999
& Supp. 2009) and 21 U.S.C. § 860 (2006). The district court
sentenced Peterson to sixty-three months in prison. Peterson
timely appealed.
Counsel has filed a brief in accordance with Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), concluding that there are no
meritorious issues for appeal but questioning whether the
district court erred by not striking for cause jurors with ties
to law enforcement and by allowing the Government to introduce
evidence of uncharged misconduct. * Finding no error, we affirm.
Peterson first contends that the district court erred
by declining to disqualify several jurors who had connections to
law enforcement. A trial judge’s decision regarding whether to
remove a juror for cause will not be overruled except for a
“manifest abuse of . . . discretion.” Poynter v. Ratcliff, 874
F.2d 219, 222 (4th Cir. 1989). A district court’s determination
not to excuse a juror for cause is entitled to “special
deference.” Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1038 (1984). The
*
Peterson was advised of his right to file a pro se
supplemental brief but declined to do so.
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critical issue is whether the juror “could be fair and impartial
and decide the case on the facts and law presented.” United
States v. Capers, 61 F.3d 1100, 1105 (4th Cir. 1995). A
challenge to a juror for cause is usually limited to
demonstrations of actual bias, with the doctrine of implied bias
applying only to “extreme situations” where the circumstances
make it highly unlikely that the average person could remain
impartial. United States v. Turner, 389 F.3d 111, 117 (4th Cir.
2004) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Here,
each juror stated that his or her connection to law enforcement
would not impact his or her ability to serve fairly on the jury.
Because there was no evidence of actual bias and because the
jurors’ relationships to law enforcement did not rise to the
level of an “extreme situation” implying the unlikelihood of
impartiality, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
refusing to strike the jurors for cause.
Peterson next argues that the district court erred by
allowing the Government to introduce evidence of uncharged
misconduct through the testimony of Neil Floyd, Traci McLean,
and Nate Jackson. This court typically reviews evidentiary
rulings for abuse of discretion. United States v. Perkins, 470
F.3d 150, 155 (4th Cir. 2006). Rule 404(b) prohibits the
admission of evidence of “other crimes” solely to prove a
defendant’s bad character or criminal disposition. United
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States v. Siegel, 536 F.3d 306, 316 (4th Cir. 2008). “Evidence
of uncharged conduct is not ‘other crimes’ evidence subject to
Rule 404 if the uncharged conduct ‘arose out of the same series
of transactions as the charged offense, or if [evidence of the
uncharged conduct] is necessary to complete the story of the
crime on trial.’” Id. at 316 (quoting United States v. Kennedy,
32 F.3d 876, 885 (4th Cir. 1994)) (alteration in original). In
other words, the Government may “provide context relevant to the
criminal charges.” United States v. Cooper, 482 F.3d 658, 663
(4th Cir. 2007).
Floyd was a confidential informant who made two
controlled purchases of crack from Peterson. Floyd’s
explanation that he became a confidential informant after being
caught with crack that he bought from Peterson provided context
relevant to Peterson’s charges. Thus, the district court did
not abuse its discretion by finding the testimony outside of the
purview of Rule 404(b) and admitting the evidence.
McLean testified that she purchased crack and powder
cocaine from Peterson, and Jackson testified about Peterson’s
drug distribution activities. Peterson contends that this “bad
acts” evidence was inadmissible. Although not admissible to
prove the defendant’s character, evidence of other wrongs may be
admitted to prove “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.”
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Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). Rule 404(b) is an inclusionary rule,
allowing evidence of other crimes or acts to be admitted, except
that which tends to prove only criminal disposition. United
States v. Queen, 132 F.3d 991, 994-95 (4th Cir. 1997). For
evidence of uncharged misconduct “[t]o be admissible under Rule
404(b), evidence must be (1) relevant to an issue other than
character; (2) necessary; and (3) reliable.” Siegel, 536 F.3d
at 317 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In
addition, the evidence must be more probative than prejudicial.
Id. at 319 (citing Fed. R. Evid. 403).
The evidence of Peterson’s involvement in ongoing drug
trafficking activities tended to and was necessary to prove his
intent, an element of the crime under 21 U.S.C.A. § 841.
Moreover, the evidence was reliable, because the two witnesses
corroborated each other’s accounts of Peterson’s involvement in
drug trafficking activities in the time frame of the offenses
charged in the indictment. See Siegel, 536 F.3d at 319
(“Evidence is reliable for purposes of Rule 404(b) unless it is
so preposterous that it could not be believed by a rational and
properly instructed jury.” (quoting United States v. Aramony, 88
F.3d 1369, 1378 (4th Cir. 1996)). Finally, the probative value
of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by unfair
prejudice, particularly in light of the limiting instruction
that the district court gave the jury. See United States v.
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Johnson, 587 F.3d 625, 631 (4th Cir. 2009) (presuming that the
jury followed the court’s limiting instruction). Therefore, the
district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the
testimony into evidence.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.
We therefore affirm Peterson’s conviction and sentence. This
court requires that counsel inform Peterson, in writing, of the
right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If Peterson requests that a petition be filed,
but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous,
then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Peterson. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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