McPhatter v. New York City Police Department

09-3364-cv McPhatter v. New York City Police Department UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS F OR T HE S ECOND C IRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER R ULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT . C ITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER J ANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY F EDERAL R ULE OF A PPELLATE P ROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS C OURT ’ S L OCAL R ULE 32.1.1. W HEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS C OURT , A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE F EDERAL A PPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE ( WITH THE NOTATION “ SUMMARY ORDER ”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL . At a stated Term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of New York, on the 24 th day of May, two thousand and ten. Present: AMALYA L. KEARSE, ROBERT D. SACK, RICHARD C. WESLEY, Circuit Judges. ________________________________________________ ROSETTA MCPHATTER, Plaintiff-Appellant, - v. - (09-3364-cv) NEW YORK CITY, NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, Defendants-Appellees. __________________________________________________ Appearing for Appellant: ROSETTA MCPHATTER, pro se, Brooklyn, New York. Appearing for Appellees: DONA B. MORRIS, Assistant Corporation Counsel, City of New York Law Department, for Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel, New York, New York. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Gershon, J.). 1 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, 2 AND DECREED that the judgment of the United States District 3 Court for the Eastern District of New York be AFFIRMED. 4 Plaintiff Rosetta McPhatter appeals, pro se, from the 5 August 3, 2009, judgment of the district court granting 6 summary judgment to defendants, the New York City Police 7 Department (“NYPD”) and New York City (“the City”). 8 Plaintiff, a former employee of the NYPD, brought this 9 action pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 10 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., the Age Discrimination in 11 Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., and the Americans 12 with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (“ADA”). 13 Before this Court, plaintiff appeals only the dismissal of 14 her claims brought pursuant to the ADA and the dismissal of 15 her claim of improper retaliation for bringing a charge 16 before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. [Pl. Br. 17 at 1-2] 18 We presume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying 19 facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on 20 appeal. After conducting a de novo review of the record, 2 1 drawing all reasonable factual inferences in favor of the 2 plaintiff, we conclude that the district court’s grant of 3 summary judgment in favor of the defendants was proper. See 4 Miller v. Wolfpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d 5 Cir. 2003). 6 We agree with the district court that, even assuming 7 plaintiff made out a prima facie case that she had a history 8 of a disability as defined by the ADA, or was perceived by 9 her employer as disabled within the meaning of the statute, 10 she did not show that her suspension — the act upon which 11 her claim was founded — was based on discrimination. See 12 McPhatter v. N.Y. City, No. 06 Civ. 1181 (NG) (LB), 2009 WL 13 2412980, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. July 30, 3009). Defendants offered 14 a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for McPhatter’s 15 suspension, and her subsequent termination. Plaintiff 16 failed to offer any “argument at all that this reason was 17 merely a pretext for a discriminatory motive.” Id.; see 18 also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 19 133, 148 (2000). 20 With respect to McPhatter’s retaliation claim, we hold 21 that she failed to establish a causal connection between the 22 filing of her discrimination charge and any adverse 3 1 employment action. See Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 2 532 U.S. 268, 273-74 (2001). As the district court noted, 3 “plaintiff was subject to escalating disciplinary actions . 4 . . well before she engaged in any protected activity.” 5 McPhatter, 2009 WL 2412980, at *7. Even assuming arguendo 6 that plaintiff established a prima facie case of 7 retaliation, her claim must fail. McPhatter did not proffer 8 any material evidence that would permit a rational 9 factfinder to conclude that defendants’ legitimate, non- 10 discriminatory reasons for their actions were pretextual. 11 The Court has reviewed all of plaintiff’s arguments and 12 finds them to be without merit. Accordingly, the judgment 13 of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED. 14 15 For the Court 16 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk 17 18 19 4