FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
WORLD WIDE RUSH, LLC, a
Pennsylvania limited liability
company; INSITE OUTDOOR WORKS Nos. 08-56454,
LA, LLC, a Delaware limited 08-56523,
liability company,
09-55494
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
D.C. No.
v. 2:07-cv-00238-
CITY OF LOS ANGELES, a California ABC-JWJ
municipal corporation,
Defendant-Appellant.
SKY TAG, INC., a California
corporation; SKY TAG WEST, INC.,
a California corporation; SUNSET &
VINE, INC., a California
corporation; WEST HOLLYWOOD
INC., a California corporation; SKY
CREATIVE SERVICES, INC., a No. 09-55792
California corporation; SKY
POSTERS INC., a California
D.C. No.
2:08-cv-05434-
corporation, ABC-JWJ
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
CITY OF LOS ANGELES, a California
Charter city,
Defendant-Appellant.
7577
7578 WORLD WIDE RUSH v. LOS ANGELES
WILSHIRE CENTER, LLC, a
Delaware limited liability
company; JAMISON 1055 WILSHIRE,
LLC, a California limited liability
company; WILMONT, LLC, a
Delaware limited liability
company; EQUITABLE PLAZA, LLC,
a California limited liability
company; 3545 WILSHIRE, LLC, a
California limited liability
company; METROPLEX, LLC, a
California limited liability
company; 3600 WILSHIRE, LLC, a
California limited liability
company; 3699 WILSHIRE, LLC, a
California limited liability
company; 4041 WILSHIRE, LLC, a
California limited liability
company; 4055 WILSHIRE, LLC, a
California limited liability
company; 4201 WILSHIRE, LLC, a
California limited liability
company; JAMISON 5455 WILSHIRE,
LLC, a California limited liability
company; WEST WILSHIRE MEDICAL
CENTER, LLC, a California limited
liability company; 9800 LA
CIENEGA, LLC, a California limited
liability company;
WORLD WIDE RUSH v. LOS ANGELES 7579
FAIRFAX BUSINESS CENTER, LLC, a
California limited liability
company; 7080 HOLLYWOOD, LLC,
a Delaware limited liability
company; 700 FLOWER PLAZA,
LLC, a California limited liability
company company; 4929
WILSHIRE, LP, a Delaware limited
partnership; 3575 CAHUENGA, LLC,
a California limited liability
company; 1900 WESTWOOD, LLC,
a California limited liability; 933
N. LA BREA, LLC, a Delaware
limited liability company; ROYAL
BEVERLY GLEN PLAZA, LLC, a
California limited liability
company; 1055 SEVENTH, LLC, a
California limited liability
company; 6380 WILSHIRE, LLC, a
California limited liability
company; 11620 WILSHIRE, LLC, a
California limited liability
company; 3875 WILSHIRE, LLC, a
California limited liability
company; 16501 VENTURA, LLC, a
California limited liability
company; 17000 VENTURA, LLC, a
California limited liability
company; 22801 VENTURA, LLC, a
California limited liability
company,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
7580 WORLD WIDE RUSH v. LOS ANGELES
No. 09-55791
v. D.C. No.
CITY OF LOS ANGELES, a California 2:08-cv-04762-
Charter city, ABC-JWJ
Defendant-Appellant.
OPINION
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Audrey B. Collins, Chief District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted
December 10, 2009—Pasadena, California
Filed May 26, 2010
Before: Stephen Reinhardt, Stephen S. Trott and
Kim McLane Wardlaw, Circuit Judges.
Opinion by Judge Wardlaw
WORLD WIDE RUSH v. LOS ANGELES 7583
COUNSEL
Carmen A. Trutanich, Rockard J. Delgadillo, Jeri L. Burge,
Kenneth T. Fong, Tayo A. Popoola, and Michael J. Bostrom
of the Office of the City Attorney (Los Angeles, California)
for defendant-appellant City of Los Angeles.
Rex S. Heinke, Michael C. Small, L. Rachel Helyar, Maria
Ellinikos, and Christopher Blanchard of Akin, Gump, Strauss,
Hauer & Feld, LLP (Los Angeles, California) and Paul E.
Fisher of the Law Offices of Paul E. Fisher (Newport Beach,
C California) for plaintiffs-appellees World Wide Rush, LLC,
et al.
Gary S. Mobley of Case, Knowlson & Jordan, LLP (Newport
Beach, California) for plaintiffs-appellees Sky Tag, Inc., et al.
Philip R. Recht and Andrew T. Kugler of Mayer Brown, LLP
(Los Angeles, California) for amicus curiae Community
Redevelopment Association, LLC.
Michael Jenkins and Gregg Kovacevich of Jenkins & Hogin,
LLP (Manhattan Beach, California) for amicus curiae League
of California Cities.
7584 WORLD WIDE RUSH v. LOS ANGELES
Luis Li, Allison B. Stein, and Jenny M. Jiang of Munger, Tol-
les & Olson, LLP (Los Angeles, California) for amicus curiae
Van Wagner Communications.
OPINION
WARDLAW, Circuit Judge:
The City of Los Angeles (“City”) appeals the grant of sum-
mary judgment in favor of World Wide Rush and Insite Out-
door Works LA (collectively “WWR”) and the entry of
injunctions in favor of WWR and Wilshire Center, Jamison,
and Sky Tag (collectively “Sky Tag”) enjoining enforcement
of certain billboard regulations. We must decide whether the
district court erred in concluding that (1) the City’s Freeway
Facing Sign Ban is an unconstitutionally underinclusive
restriction on commercial speech and (2) the City’s Super-
graphic and Off-Site Sign Bans are unconstitutional prior
restraints on speech. Because the City’s exceptions to the
Freeway Facing Sign Ban do not undermine the City’s
asserted interests in enacting the Ban, and because the City
Council’s authority to create exceptions to the Supergraphic
and Off-Site Sign Bans is a permissible aspect of its inherent
legislative discretion, we reverse.
The City also appeals the district court’s order finding it in
civil contempt of the injunction against enforcement of the
Freeway Facing Sign Ban and the Supergraphic and Off-Site
Sign Bans as to WWR’s billboards. Because we vacate the
injunction, we also reverse the contempt order.
Finally, we affirm the district court’s decision to allow just
one round of amendments to the pleadings as a proper exer-
cise of its discretion.
BACKGROUND
“The story of billboards in America is . . . characterized by
an ongoing struggle between an expanding industry and a
WORLD WIDE RUSH v. LOS ANGELES 7585
resistant public.” David Burnett, Note, Judging the Aesthetics
of Billboards, 23 J.L. & Pol. 171, 174 (2007). One of the first
chapters in this story played out in Saint Louis in 1911, when
the Missouri Supreme Court was called upon to decide
whether cities had the power to regulate billboards at all. See
St. Louis Gunning Adver. Co. v. City of St. Louis, 137 S.W.
929, 941 (Mo. 1911). At that time, billboards were “tempo-
rary affairs” constructed from “upright timbers, or posts set in
the ground” and “braced from the rear, with stringers running
from one to the other.” Id. at 941-42. They were described as
“inartistic” and “unsightly” monstrosities that were “liable to
be blown down and to fall upon and injure those who may
happen to be in their vicinity.” Id. It was even said that they
were “hiding places and retreats for criminals and all classes
of miscreants.” Id. The Missouri Supreme Court had little
trouble concluding that “this class of advertising as now con-
ducted” was “subject to control and regulation by the police
power of the state.” Id. at 942.
Of course, not everyone shared this view. One author
described billboards of that era as “thing[s] of beauty” that
bore “work of artistic and pleasing character, framed in a
structure of tasteful design.” Frank Presbrey, The History and
Development of Advertising 503-04 (1929). Decades later, in
an essay detailing the history of outdoor advertising, the Pres-
ident of the Outdoor Advertising Association of America
described billboards as “an important business tool” and
emphasized that their “influence reaches the people in every
city and town without getting in their way.” Phillip Tocker,
Standardized Outdoor Advertising: A History, Economics and
Self-Regulation, in Outdoor Advertising: History and Regula-
tion 56 (1969). He even argued that billboards “assisted com-
munities . . . in beautifying areas.” Id. at 53. “All that [the
billboard industry] asks in return,” he pleaded, “is to continue
to do business where others do business, under the same free-
doms and limitations.” Id. at 56.
These appeals present the latest chapter in “the story of bill-
boards.” No longer tied to wooden posts protruding from
7586 WORLD WIDE RUSH v. LOS ANGELES
holes in the ground, in modern-day cities such as Los Ange-
les, today’s billboards may be projected onto or hung from the
sides of skyscrapers or strategically located near main traffic
arteries so that they are visible from great distances by masses
of would-be consumers. Their labels alone (e.g., “super-
graphic signs”) conjure up a setting far removed from Saint
Louis in the early 1900s. As the nature of billboards has
changed, so too has the nature of the legal problems they pres-
ent. The question of the day is no longer whether cities may
regulate billboards at all, but is instead the extent to which
they may do so consistent with the First Amendment guaran-
tee of freedom of expression.
I. The City’s Sign Regulations
The City regulates signs, including billboards, through
Chapter I, Article 4.4 of the Los Angeles Municipal Code
(“LAMC”). Article 4.4’s stated purpose is to “promote public
safety and welfare” by “provid[ing] reasonable protection to
the visual environment” and by ensuring that billboards do
not “interfere with traffic safety or otherwise endanger public
safety.” LAMC § 14.4.1. Article 4.4 prohibits some types of
billboards and restricts the size, placement, and illumination
of others. These appeals arise from First Amendment chal-
lenges to certain content-neutral provisions of Article 4.4: the
“Freeway Facing Sign Ban” and the “Supergraphic and Off-
Site Sign Bans.”
A. Freeway Facing Sign Ban
Article 4.4’s Freeway Facing Sign Ban prohibits billboards
located within 2,000 feet of and “viewed primarily from” a
freeway or an on-ramp/off-ramp. LAMC § 14.4.6(A). Not-
withstanding the Freeway Facing Sign Ban, the City has per-
mitted freeway-facing billboards in some circumstances, two
of which are applicable here.1 First, in 1999, the City adopted
1
In proceedings before the district court, WWR identified three other
freeway-facing billboards to support its challenge to the Freeway Facing
WORLD WIDE RUSH v. LOS ANGELES 7587
an ordinance authorizing billboards near the Staples Center, a
state-of-the-art sports and entertainment complex that was
developed to eliminate blight and dangerous conditions in
downtown Los Angeles. See Los Angeles, Cal., Ordinance
No. 172465 (1999). The City asserted that the nature of the
Staples Center’s use, coupled with its location in the center of
a highly urbanized area, required billboards that could effec-
tively communicate event-related information. Id. Today,
there are several freeway facing billboards near the Staples
Center, including some that use flashing displays and fre-
quently changing digital content.
The City made another exception to the Freeway Facing
Sign Ban in 2008, when it undertook plans to renovate Santa
Monica Boulevard with the aim of improving the flow of traf-
fic between the 405 Freeway and the Beverly Hills border.
See Los Angeles, Cal., Ordinance No. 179827 (2008). How-
ever, the targeted traffic corridor was home to sixteen bill-
boards, the outright elimination of which might have triggered
the City’s obligation to compensate the billboards’ owners
under California’s eminent domain law. See Cal. Bus. & Prof.
Code § 5412. To avoid the requirements of takings law,
including the obligation of just compensation, the City agreed
with the billboard owners that four sign faces could be relo-
cated to a newly created special use district (“SUD”) near Fif-
Sign Ban. On appeal, however, WWR fails to discuss two of those bill-
boards and thus waives its argument that they undermine the Freeway Fac-
ing Sign Ban. See James River Ins. Co. v. Hebert Schenk, P.C., 523 F.3d
915, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2008) (waiver of arguments not adequately pres-
ented in briefs). A third freeway-facing set of signs depicts members of
the Los Angeles Chamber Orchestra. WWR concedes that consideration
of these signs is unnecessary to resolution of its constitutional claim and
explains that the parties’ real quarrel over these signs is whether they are
subject to the LAMC at all. The district court did not resolve this issue,
and it is not properly presented to us in these appeals. Therefore, our anal-
ysis is limited to the two billboard locations on which WWR rests its First
Amendment challenge to the Freeway Facing Sign Ban.
7588 WORLD WIDE RUSH v. LOS ANGELES
teenth Street. While the relocated billboards would face a
freeway, the Fifteenth Street SUD resulted in a net reduction
of billboards in the City.
B. Supergraphic and Off-Site Sign Bans
Supergraphic billboards are large-format signs projected
onto or hung from building walls. See LAMC § 14.4.2. They
are often made of large vinyl or mesh canvasses, which are
hung with cables from the sides of buildings. Id. Off-site bill-
boards display messages directing attention to a business or
product not located on the same premises as the sign itself. Id.
For example, a billboard promoting the latest blockbuster
movie, but attached to a furniture store, is an off-site sign. The
same billboard, when attached to a theater playing the movie,
is an on-site sign. Article 4.4 contains the Supergraphic and
Off-Site Sign Bans, which prohibit these types of billboards.
Id. §§ 14.4.4(B)(9), (11).
However, the Supergraphic and Off-Site Sign Bans exempt
“signs that are specifically permitted pursuant to a legally
adopted specific plan, supplemental use district or an
approved development agreement.” Id. A “specific plan” is a
land use plan that provides details for the implementation of
the City’s general land use plan. See id. § 11.5.7(A) (“A spe-
cific plan shall provide by ordinance regulatory controls or
incentives for the systematic execution of the General Plan.”);
see also Cal. Gov’t Code § 65450. A SUD is a land use plan-
ning device employed to “regulate and restrict the location of
certain types of uses whose requirements are difficult to antic-
ipate and cannot adequately be provided for in the” City’s
general zoning plan. LAMC § 12.32(S)(1)(a). “Sign districts,”
like the Fifteenth Street SUD discussed above, are among the
recognized types of SUDs. Id. § 13.11. Finally, a “develop-
ment agreement” is a mechanism by which the City may pro-
vide a developer with certainty that existing rules, policies,
and regulations will continue to govern his project once it has
been approved. See Cal. Gov’t Code § 65864.
WORLD WIDE RUSH v. LOS ANGELES 7589
The Supergraphic and Off-Site Sign Bans do not specify
the circumstances under which any of these exceptions may
be invoked, but other laws provide that SUDs and develop-
ment agreements must not conflict with specific plans, which,
in turn, must not conflict with the City’s general plan. See
Cal. Gov’t Code § 65454 (specific plans); id. § 65867.5(b)
(development agreements); LAMC § 13.11(C) (SUDs). The
authority to employ each exception to the Supergraphic and
Off-Site Sign Bans derives, not from Article 4.4, but from the
City’s legislative power to control local land use. See Cal.
Gov’t Code § 65867.5(a) (development agreements); LAMC
§ 11.5.7(A) (specific plans); id. § 12.32 (land use legislative
actions); id. § 13.11(B) (SUDs); Los Angeles, Cal., City
Charter § 558 (procedures for adoption of land use ordi-
nance).
II. Procedural History
WWR sued to enjoin enforcement of the Freeway Facing
Sign Ban and the Supergraphic and Off-Site Sign Bans. First,
relying on Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public
Service Commission of New York, 447 U.S. 557 (1980),
WWR argued that the Freeway Facing Sign Ban is an uncon-
stitutionally underinclusive restriction on commercial speech
because the City had, in fact, permitted some freeway facing
billboards despite the Ban. Second, WWR challenged the
Supergraphic and Off-Site Sign Bans as facially unconstitu-
tional prior restraints on speech. It argued that the exceptions
to the Bans vest the City Council with unbridled discretion to
select among preferred speakers because those exceptions
lack objective criteria for their application.
WWR did not assert a Central Hudson challenge to the
Supergraphic and Off-Site Sign Bans even though the district
court granted leave to amend the complaint more than one
year into the litigation and several months after the scheduling
order’s deadline. In granting leave at that late juncture, the
district court warned that it would not entertain any further
7590 WORLD WIDE RUSH v. LOS ANGELES
amendments to the pleadings, which “should have been set-
tled long ago.” After that, WWR did not seek leave to raise
new legal theories.
The district court granted WWR summary judgment on its
First Amendment claims. See World Wide Rush, LLC v. City
of Los Angeles, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1311 (C.D. Cal. 2008)
(“World Wide Rush I”). It concluded that the Freeway Facing
Sign Ban violates the First Amendment because the City’s
decisions to allow freeway facing billboards at the Staples
Center and in the 15th Street SUD undermine its stated inter-
ests in safety and aesthetics. Id. at 1328. It ruled that “preserv-
ing even one freeway-facing sign” was fatal to the Freeway
Facing Sign Ban. Id. The district court also concluded that the
Supergraphic and Off-Site Sign Bans violate the First Amend-
ment because “the City can avoid the blanket ban on off-site
and supergraphic signs simply by enacting a specific plan in
a certain area, but there are no standards that would prevent
the City from enacting a specific plan because it wishes to
approve particular speech or a particular speaker.” Id. at 1319.
Further, it found that the requirement that SUDs and develop-
ment agreements conform to specific plans is “a loophole that
eviscerates the standards” governing SUDs and development
agreements. Id. at 1321. The district court concluded, “The
City has set up a system that allows it to eliminate speech
based on content.” Id. Accordingly, the district court entered
an order enjoining the City from enforcing the Freeway Fac-
ing Sign Ban and the Supergraphic and Off-Site Sign Bans as
to WWR’s billboards.
The City thereafter decided that several of WWR’s super-
graphic billboards violated other Article 4.4 provisions not
covered by the district court’s injunction. For instance, the
City cited WWR for violations of Article 4.4’s regulations
restricting the size of “wall signs” and for failing to obtain
proper permits for several billboards. Faced with the new cita-
tions, WWR returned to the district court, arguing that the
City was using other provisions of Article 4.4 to circumvent
WORLD WIDE RUSH v. LOS ANGELES 7591
the district court’s order and that it could not obtain the neces-
sary permits because the City continued to enforce the invali-
dated provisions. The district court concluded that the City
improperly had denied WWR permits and issued WWR cita-
tions under the guise of other Article 4.4 provisions, when, in
fact, the City was continuing to enforce the Supergraphic and
Off-Site Sign Bans in contravention of the injunction. World
Wide Rush, LLC v. City of Los Angeles, 605 F. Supp. 2d 1088,
1105-11 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (“World Wide Rush II”). The dis-
trict court found the City in civil contempt and required it to
discharge certain citations. Id. at 1111-12.
Meanwhile, other billboard companies got in on the action.
As the district court explained, “Not long [after issuance of
the World Wide Rush I injunction], numerous billboard com-
panies began putting Supergraphic Signs up all over Los
Angeles. . . . As a result, well-traveled thoroughfares that con-
tained any sort of sizable building were soon pockmarked
with Supergraphic Signs.” Id. at 1092. The City responded in
kind by adopting a complete moratorium on new supergraphic
and off-site signs. See Los Angeles, Cal., Ordinance No.
180445 (2008). Some billboard companies, including Sky
Tag, filed copycat lawsuits, in which they sought injunctions
to protect their own billboards from City enforcement efforts.
For the reasons announced in the World Wide Rush I opinion,
the district court enjoined the City from enforcing the Super-
graphic and Off-Site Sign Bans as to certain of Sky Tag’s bill-
boards. See World Wide Rush II at 1112-14.
The City appeals the district court’s grant of summary
judgment and an injunction in favor of WWR in World Wide
Rush I. It also appeals the civil contempt judgment and
injunction in favor of Sky Tag in World Wide Rush II. WWR
appeals the district court’s refusal to entertain any further
amendments, supplements, or changes to its complaint after
granting leave to file its amended and supplemental com-
plaint.
7592 WORLD WIDE RUSH v. LOS ANGELES
The district court exercised jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “We
review de novo the constitutionality of a local ordinance.”
G.K. Ltd. Travel v. City of Lake Oswego, 436 F.3d 1064, 1070
(9th Cir. 2006). “We review for abuse of discretion the district
court’s civil contempt order.” Hook v. Ariz. Dep’t of Corrs.,
107 F.3d 1397, 1403 (9th Cir. 1997). We review for abuse of
discretion the district court’s decisions as to amendments to
the complaint. See Gardner v. Martino, 563 F.3d 981, 990
(9th Cir. 2009).
DISCUSSION
I. Constitutionality of the Sign Regulations
Courts have “often faced the problem of applying the broad
principles of the First Amendment to unique forms of expres-
sion. . . . Each method of communicating ideas is a law unto
itself and that law must reflect the differing natures, values,
abuses and dangers of each method. We deal here with the
law of billboards.” Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453
U.S. 490, 500-01 (1981) (citations, footnote, and internal quo-
tation marks omitted).
A. Freeway Facing Sign Ban
[1] “In Central Hudson, the Supreme Court announced a
four-part test for assessing the constitutionality of a restriction
on commercial speech: (1) if ‘the communication is neither
misleading nor related to unlawful activity,’ then it merits
First Amendment scrutiny as a threshold matter; in order for
the restriction to withstand such scrutiny, (2) ‘[t]he State must
assert a substantial interest to be achieved by restrictions on
commercial speech;’ (3) ‘the restriction must directly advance
the state interest involved;’ and (4) it must not be ‘more
extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.’ ” Metro
Lights, L.L.C. v. City of Los Angeles, 551 F.3d 898, 903 (9th
Cir. 2009) (quoting Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564-66), cert.
WORLD WIDE RUSH v. LOS ANGELES 7593
denied 130 S. Ct. 1014 (2009). “[T]he last two steps of the
Central Hudson analysis basically involve a consideration of
the ‘fit’ between the legislature’s ends and the means chosen
to accomplish those ends.” Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514
U.S. 476, 486 (1995) (internal quotation marks omitted).
[2] As a general matter, there is no question that restric-
tions on billboards advance cities’ substantial interests in aes-
thetics and safety. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 508-10; Metro
Lights, 551 F.3d at 904. However, a city “may diminish the
credibility of [its] rationale for restricting speech in the first
place” where it exempts some speech from the general restric-
tion. Metro Lights, 551 F.3d at 905 (internal quotation marks
omitted). The critical question is whether the City “denigrates
its interest in . . . safety and beauty and defeats its own case
by permitting” freeway facing billboards at the Staples Center
and in the Fifteenth Street SUD while forbidding other free-
way facing billboards. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 510-11. “To
put it in the context of the Central Hudson test, a regulation
may have exceptions that undermine and counteract the inter-
est the government claims it adopted the law to further; such
a regulation cannot directly and materially advance its aim,”
and is, therefore, unconstitutionally underinclusive. Metro
Lights, 551 F.3d at 905 (quoting Rubin, 514 U.S. at 489); see
also Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n, Inc. v. United States,
527 U.S. 173, 190-93 (1999) (a regulation may be unconstitu-
tionally underinclusive if it “is so pierced by exceptions and
inconsistencies” that it cannot advance the government’s
interest in the regulation).
[3] Here, the City’s exceptions to the Freeway Facing Sign
Ban do not undermine the City’s interests in aesthetics and
safety. Indeed, the exceptions were made for the express pur-
pose of advancing those very interests. Allowing billboards at
the Staples Center was an important element of a project to
remove blight and dangerous conditions from downtown Los
Angeles. Similarly, the Fifteenth Street SUD was an out-
growth of the City’s efforts to improve traffic flow, and
7594 WORLD WIDE RUSH v. LOS ANGELES
thereby safety, on Santa Monica Boulevard. Not only did the
agreement to allow signs in the Fifteenth Street SUD advance
that project, it also resulted in a net reduction of billboards in
the City. Ironically, the most significant denigration to the
City’s interests in traffic safety and aesthetics might result,
not from allowing the freeway facing billboards at the Staples
Center and in the Fifteenth Street SUD, but instead from strict
adherence to the Freeway Facing Sign Ban, which might have
severely hampered, if not completely defeated, both projects.
[4] The district court took an all-or-nothing approach to its
constitutional analysis of the Freeway Facing Sign Ban, stat-
ing that to “preserv[e] even one freeway-facing sign . . .
undermines the City’s stated interests in traffic safety and aes-
thetics.” World Wide Rush I, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1328. Our
First Amendment jurisprudence, however, contemplates some
judicial “deference for a municipality’s reasonably graduated
response to different aspects of a problem.” Metro Lights, 551
F.3d at 910. As the Supreme Court has explained, “It does not
follow from the fact that the city has concluded that some
commercial interests outweigh its municipal interests in this
context that it must give similar weight to all other commer-
cial advertising.” Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 512. Moreover,
exceptions to the Freeway Facing Sign Ban must be consid-
ered holistically, not in isolation. Again, the Supreme Court
has explained, “[T]he effect of the challenged restriction on
commercial speech ha[s] to be evaluated in the context of the
entire regulatory scheme, rather than in isolation.” Greater
New Orleans, 527 U.S. at 192; see also Metro Lights, L.L.C.,
551 F.3d at 904 (“[W]e must look at whether the City’s ban
advances its interest in its general application, not specifically
with respect to Metro Lights.”).
[5] “[E]valuated in the context of the entire regulatory
scheme,” the challenged exceptions to the Freeway Facing
Sign Ban do not render the Ban “so pierced by exceptions and
inconsistencies” as to be unconstitutionally underinclusive.
Greater New Orleans, 527 U.S. at 190-92. The City reason-
WORLD WIDE RUSH v. LOS ANGELES 7595
ably may have concluded that, on balance, safer and more
attractive thoroughfares would result from renovations to
Santa Monica Boulevard and a reduction in the City’s total
number of billboards, even if this required installation of
some freeway facing billboards along Fifteenth Street. The
City also reasonably may have concluded that the benefits of
redeveloping and attracting people to an otherwise dangerous
and blighted downtown area outweighed the harm of addi-
tional freeway facing billboards restricted to that area. See,
e.g., Metro Lights, 551 F.3d at 911 (even with some excep-
tions, sign ban “went a long way toward cleaning up the clut-
ter, which the City believed to be a worthy legislative goal”).
[6] In concluding otherwise, the district court relied on the
Supreme Court’s decision in Greater New Orleans. There, the
Court concluded that a federal regulation prohibiting adver-
tisements for gambling in private casinos but allowing adver-
tisements for gambling on reservations violated the First
Amendment. Greater New Orleans, 527 U.S. at 177-79.
Greater New Orleans is inapposite, however, because the reg-
ulatory distinction between the two types of casinos counter-
acted the government’s purported interest in minimizing
gambling. As the Greater New Orleans Court explained,
allowing one type of advertising while prohibiting the other
would merely channel gamblers to the reservations, thus ren-
dering the regulation “squarely at odds with the governmental
interests asserted in this case.” Id. The Freeway Facing Sign
Ban is not a means by which the evil sought to be prohibited
is simply channeled elsewhere, at odds with the asserted gov-
ernmental interests. Rather, the City submitted a convincing
rationale — which is entirely consistent with its asserted gov-
ernmental interest — for exempting some freeway facing
signs from its Ban.
The other cases upon which WWR relies are similarly inap-
posite. In each of those cases, the government created a dis-
tinction between permissible and prohibited forms of
commercial speech, and, in each case, the distinction under-
7596 WORLD WIDE RUSH v. LOS ANGELES
mined the government’s asserted interests in the regulation as
a whole. See Rubin, 514 U.S. at 489 (“There is little chance
that § 205(e)(2) can directly and materially advance its aim,
while other provisions of the same Act directly undermine
and counteract its effects.”); City of Cincinnati v. Discovery
Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 417-18 (1993) (no “reasonable
fit” between government interests and regulation which
required removal of 62 newsracks but allowed 1,500 to 2,000
to remain); Ballen v. City of Redmond, 466 F.3d 736, 743 (9th
Cir. 2006) (exceptions to sign ban “compromise the City’s
interests” in traffic safety and aesthetics). Here, by contrast,
the City permitted billboards at the Staples Center and in the
Fifteenth Street SUD precisely because of its interests in
safety and aesthetics. In addition, the exceptions to the Free-
way Facing Sign Ban are content-neutral, whereas the distinc-
tions employed in Greater New Orleans (private casinos
versus reservation casinos), Rubin (beer labels versus wine
labels), Discovery Network (commercial newsracks versus
non-commercial newsracks), and Ballen (content-based
exceptions to ban) implicated the messages communicated by
the signs at issue. See Metro Lights, 551 F.3d at 904-05 (“[A]
regulation can be unconstitutional if it in effect restricts too
little speech because its exemptions discriminate on the basis
of the signs’ messages.”) (internal quotation marks omitted);
Ballen, 466 F.3d at 743 (“[T]he City’s use of a content-based
ban rather than a valid time, place, or manner restriction indi-
cates that the City has not carefully calculated the costs and
benefits associated with the burden on speech imposed by its
discriminatory, content-based prohibition.”).
[7] Our recent decision in Metro Lights, in which we
rejected a Central Hudson challenge to an LAMC provision
banning off-site signs generally, but permitting them on bus
shelters, is more analogous.2 Metro Lights, 551 F.3d at
2
The district court did not have the benefit of our decision in Metro
Lights when it decided World Wide Rush I. In World Wide Rush II, the dis-
trict court rejected the City’s argument that Metro Lights abrogated the
district court’s decision in World Wide Rush I. See World Wide Rush II,
605 F. Supp. 2d at 1016.
WORLD WIDE RUSH v. LOS ANGELES 7597
900-01. Relying on Metromedia, we approved the City’s justi-
fication for the bus shelter advertisement exception that “pro-
liferation of offsite advertising by numerous and disparate
private parties creates more distracting ugliness than a single,
controlled series of advertisements on city property over
which the City wields contractual supervision.” Id. at 910. We
concluded that “the specific exception in question here does
not weaken the direct link between the City’s objectives and
its general prohibition of offsite advertising.” Id.; see also
Outdoor Sys., Inc. v. City of Mesa, 997 F.2d 604, 611 (9th Cir.
1993) (“[T]here is a reasonable fit between the sign codes and
the interests they seek to achieve.”); Clear Channel Outdoor,
Inc. v. City of New York, 594 F.3d 94, 110 (2d Cir. 2010)
(“The City may legitimately allow limited and controlled
advertising on street furniture, while also reducing clutter on
City sidewalks. Allowing some signs does not constitutionally
require a city to allow all similar signs.”). Here, as in Metro
Lights, the City’s decision to permit some freeway facing bill-
boards at the Staples Center and in the Fifteenth Street SUD
does not break the link between the Freeway Facing Sign Ban
and the City’s objectives in traffic safety and aesthetics.
B. Supergraphic and Off-Site Sign Bans
[8] Under the prior restraint doctrine, “a law cannot condi-
tion the free exercise of First Amendment rights on the unbri-
dled discretion of government officials.” Desert Outdoor
Adver. v. City of Moreno Valley, 103 F.3d 814, 818 (9th Cir.
1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Regulations must
contain narrow, objective, and definite standards to guide the
licensing authority and must require the official to provide an
explanation for his decision.” Long Beach Area Peace Net-
work v. City of Long Beach, 574 F.3d 1011, 1025 (9th Cir.
2009) (internal quotation marks, citations, and alterations
omitted); see also Seattle Affiliate of the Oct. 22nd Coal. to
Stop Police Brutality v. City of Seattle, 550 F.3d 788, 798 (9th
Cir. 2008) (ordinance must have “narrowly drawn, reasonable
and definite standards that guide the hand of the administra-
7598 WORLD WIDE RUSH v. LOS ANGELES
tor”). The district court concluded that the Supergraphic and
Off-Site Sign Bans were unconstitutional prior restraints on
speech because their exceptions impermissibly vest the City
Council with unbridled discretion to select among speakers on
the basis of content. This legal conclusion was erroneous,
however, because the prior restraint doctrine does not apply
to the legislative function at issue here. The exceptions to the
Supergraphic and Off-Site Sign Bans are rooted in the City
Council’s legislative discretion, not its discretion to make
executive decisions as part of the LAMC’s regulatory scheme.
This distinction makes all the difference.
[9] “Unbridled discretion challenges typically arise when
discretion is delegated to an administrator, police officer, or
other executive official,” as opposed to a legislative body.
Long Beach Area Peace Network, 574 F.3d at 1042; see, e.g.,
Thomas v. Chi. Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 319-20 (2002)
(superintendent of park district); City of Lakewood v. Plain
Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 753 (1988) (mayor); Out-
door Media Group, Inc. v. City of Beaumont, 506 F.3d 896,
904 (9th Cir. 2007) (planning director); G.K. Ltd. Travel, 436
F.3d at 1082 (permitting official); Desert Outdoor Adver., 103
F.3d at 818-19 (city official). In rare circumstances, however,
a legislative body’s reservation of authority could constitute
an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech. As we recently
explained:
[W]here a legislative body has enacted a permitting
scheme for expressive conduct but has reserved
some decisionmaking authority for itself under that
scheme, that reserved authority is vulnerable to chal-
lenge on grounds of unbridled discretion.
Long Beach Area Peace Network, 574 F.3d at 1042. The First
Amendment requires standards to cabin the legislative body’s
authority to execute aspects of the regulatory scheme in such
circumstances because that authority “is distinct from the gen-
WORLD WIDE RUSH v. LOS ANGELES 7599
eral discretion a legislative body has to enact (or not enact)
laws.” Id.
This is not that rare circumstance in which the legislative
body created a licensing power and reserved it for itself. The
City Council’s authority to enact special plans, create SUDS,
or enter into development agreements derives from its regular
and well-recognized legislative power to regulate land use. It
does not depend upon or derive from the Supergraphic and
Off-Site Sign Bans. The City Council would have the power
to employ any of those land use tools even if none was ever
mentioned in the Bans; the Bans do no more than affirm the
existence of these legislative powers. The First Amendment is
not implicated by the City Council’s exercise of legislative
judgment in these circumstances.
[10] Our recent decision in Long Beach Area Peace Net-
work is illustrative. There, the city enacted a regulatory
scheme by which permits would be issued for certain gather-
ings in public places. See Long Beach Area Peace Network,
574 F.3d at 1025-26. The city council retained the ability to
waive permit fees, but the ordinance did not provide standards
to cabin the council’s exercise of that authority. Id. at 1041.
The ordinance was subject to attack under the prior restraint
doctrine because the city council’s authority was “unlike its
usual legislative authority.” Id. at 1042. Instead, that authority
derived exclusively from the permitting scheme:
Absent a preexisting permitting scheme, a city coun-
cil could not in advance impose service charges or
other fees on a group seeking to hold a demonstra-
tion in a public forum.
Id. Here, by contrast, the City Council does have the authority
to employ specific plans, SUDs, and development agreements
absent the Supergraphic and Off-Site Sign Bans. Because the
prior restraint doctrine does not require the City to restrict
“the general discretion a legislative body has to enact (or not
7600 WORLD WIDE RUSH v. LOS ANGELES
enact) laws,” the district court erred in concluding that the
Supergraphic and Off-Site Sign Bans are unconstitutional
prior restraints on speech. Id.
II. Injunction and Contempt
[11] “[A] person subject to an injunction must ordinarily
obey it.” Irwin v. Mascott, 370 F.3d 924, 931 (9th Cir. 2004)
(discussing Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307
(1967)). However, one may challenge an injunction with
which one disagrees “through the usual processes of law, such
as an appeal.” Id. The City appropriately took that approach
here, appealing the underlying injunction as well as the order
finding it in contempt. Vacatur of the injunction entered in
World Wide Rush I voids the civil contempt order entered in
World Wide Rush II. See United States v. United Mine Work-
ers of Am., 330 U.S. 258, 295 (1947) (“The right to remedial
relief falls with an injunction which events prove was errone-
ously issued.”); Kirkland v. Legion Ins. Co., 343 F.3d 1135,
1142-43 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Because entering the order to pay
was an abuse of discretion, the corresponding contempt order
cannot stand.”); Davies v. Grossmont Union High Sch. Dist.,
930 F.2d 1390, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991) (“[T]he legitimacy of the
contempt adjudication is based on the validity of the underly-
ing order.”).
III. Amendments to the Pleadings
WWR could have, but failed to, assert a Central Hudson
challenge to the Supergraphic and Off-Site Sign Bans. WWR
argues that this is so because the district court abused its dis-
cretion in curtailing amendments to the pleadings. We dis-
agree.
On January 7, 2007, WWR filed its initial complaint, which
the district court would later describe as, “to put it mildly, dis-
organized.” Following a motion to dismiss, the district court
concluded that WWR could proceed on allegations that the
WORLD WIDE RUSH v. LOS ANGELES 7601
LAMC impermissibly vested unbridled discretion in a Cul-
tural Affairs Committee and a Community Redevelopment
Agency and on a facial challenge to the LAMC’s “Hazard to
Traffic” provision, which is distinct from the Freeway Facing
Sign Ban. See LAMC § 14.4.5. The initial complaint did not
contain a Central Hudson challenge to the Freeway Facing
Sign Ban or a prior restraint challenge to the Supergraphic
and Off-Site Sign Bans. The scheduling order’s September
24, 2007, deadline for amending the pleadings came and went
without activity. As the district court stated, “This should
have settled the pleadings.” It did not.
On January 14, 2008, WWR moved for a preliminary
injunction, raising for the first time its Central Hudson chal-
lenge to the Freeway Facing Sign Ban and its unconstitutional
prior restraint challenge to the Supergraphic and Off-Site Sign
Bans. On April 3, 2008, instead of denying WWR’s prelimi-
nary injunction motion for raising claims beyond the scope of
the complaint, the district court extended the deadline for
amendments to the pleadings to May 5, 2008, and accepted
WWR’s amended complaint, which incorporated its new First
Amendment claims. At that time, the district court admon-
ished the parties that it would not entertain any further amend-
ments to the pleadings after May 5, noting that “the pleadings
should have been settled long ago.” The new May 5, 2008,
deadline for amending the pleadings came and went without
further activity; WWR never sought leave for further amend-
ments.
[12] Specifically, WWR never moved for leave to add to
its complaint a Central Hudson challenge to the Supergraphic
and Off-Site Sign Bans. The district court could not rule on
a motion that WWR never made, and we reject WWR’s
attempt to appeal a nonexistent denial of a nonexistent
motion. Given the absence of an adverse ruling from which
it may appeal, WWR argues that it would have been futile to
seek leave to amend the complaint in light of the district
court’s statement that such requests would not be entertained.
7602 WORLD WIDE RUSH v. LOS ANGELES
We do not share WWR’s view that the district court’s admo-
nition was an excuse for WWR’s failure to at least proffer a
proposed amendment to the pleadings. Assuming, however,
that the panel may consider the language of the district court’s
April 3 order as a de facto prospective denial of motions to
amend the pleadings, WWR’s argument still fails. The district
court’s discretion to deny leave to amend is particularly broad
where a plaintiff previously has amended the complaint. See
Zucco Partners, LLC v. Digimarc Corp., 552 F.3d 981, 1007
(9th Cir. 2009). Here, WWR already had been given leave to
amend the complaint more than a year into the litigation and
several months after passage of the scheduling order’s dead-
line. The district court understandably was wary of further
delays. WWR advances no reason — much less a good reason
— for its failure to amend its complaint to include a Central
Hudson challenge to the Supergraphic and Off-Site Sign
Bans. This oversight is particularly inexcusable given that
WWR was aware of the possibility of a Central Hudson claim
(as evident from its challenge to the Freeway Facing Sign
Ban) and was aware of the Supergraphic and Off-Site Sign
Bans (as evident from its unbridled discretion challenge to
those Bans).
CONCLUSION
The district court erred in holding that the billboards at the
Staples Center and in the Fifteenth Street SUD render the
Freeway Facing Sign Ban an unconstitutionally underinclu-
sive restriction on commercial speech under Central Hudson.
The district court also erred in concluding that the Super-
graphic and Off-Site Sign Bans are unconstitutional prior
restraints on speech. We therefore REVERSE the grant of
summary judgment in favor of WWR and VACATE the
injunctions in favor of WWR and Sky Tag. We also
REVERSE the district court’s order finding the City in civil
contempt of the injunction as to WWR’s billboards. We
AFFIRM the district court’s order amending the scheduling
WORLD WIDE RUSH v. LOS ANGELES 7603
order and admonishing the parties that future amendments
would not be entertained.
AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED and VACATED in
part.