[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-12685 MAY 26, 2010
________________________ JOHN LEY
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 08-21136-CR-JLK
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
RICKY WRIGHT,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(May 26, 2010)
Before PRYOR and FAY, Circuit Judges, and QUIST,* District Judge.
FAY, Circuit Judge:
Ricky Wright appeals his conviction and eighty-four month sentence for
knowingly possessing a firearm and ammunition that affected interstate commerce
*
Honorable Gordon J. Quist, United States District Judge for the Western District of
Michigan, sitting by designation.
after having been convicted of a felony. Wright presents a case of first impression
as to whether section 4A1.2(k) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines applies
to Florida’s community control program. Wright also challenges the
constitutionality of his conviction by alleging that Congress exceeded its authority
in passing the law under the Commerce Clause. After careful consideration, we
find that section 4A1.2(k) applies to Florida’s community control program. We
also find that Wright’s conviction is constitutionally sound. Accordingly, Wright
has presented no reversible error and we affirm the decision of the district court.
I. FACTS
A federal grand jury indicted Ricky Wright on two counts of knowingly
possessing a firearm and ammunition that affected interstate commerce after
having been convicted of a felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).1 Wright
initially pled not guilty, but later changed his plea and pled guilty to one count of
the indictment in exchange for dismissal of the second count.
During the plea hearing, the government proffered the following facts
without objection: A confidential source working with the ATF and DEA
1
“It shall be unlawful for any person– (1) who has been convicted in any court of, a crime
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year; . . . to ship or transport in interstate
or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to
receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign
commerce.” 18 U.S.C. § 922 (g).
2
contacted Wright and discussed purchasing a firearm from him.2 Later that day,
the source met with Wright and another male in Miami, Florida. At that time, the
source purchased a nine millimeter pistol from the second male for $450.00. The
purchase took place in Wright’s presence and at his direction. Four days later, the
source again contacted Wright and discussed purchasing another firearm from him.
Wright sent his girlfriend to sell a .40 caliber handgun and a magazine with
ammunition to the confidential informant in exchange for $2,840.00. At the time
of both transactions, Wright had been convicted of multiple felonies. A record
check of both firearms revealed that they had been manufactured outside of
Florida.
Before sentencing, Wright challenged the Presentence Investigation Report’s
calculation of his criminal history under the United States Sentencing Guidelines.
Wright’s relevant criminal history is undisputed. Wright pled guilty to conspiracy
to commit armed robbery and was sentenced to 120 days in county jail, followed
by two years community control and three years probation. After serving his jail
time, Wright was released from custody and his community control period
commenced. Wright subsequently violated the terms of his community control by
missing curfew on three separate occasions. As a result, Wright’s community
2
“ATF” refers to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives. “DEA” is the Drug
Enforcement Administration.
3
control was revoked and he was sentenced to 366 days in state prison.
Under the Guidelines, three criminal history points are assessed for a prior
sentence of imprisonment exceeding one year and one month. See U.S.S.G. §
4A1.1(a). Whereas only two criminal history points are assessed if the prior
sentence is between sixty days and thirteen months. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(b). In
determining the applicable length of a sentence, the Guidelines state: “In the cases
of a prior revocation of probation, parole, supervised release, special parole, or
mandatory release, add the original term of imprisonment to any term of
imprisonment imposed upon revocation. The resulting total is used to compute the
criminal history points for § 4A1.1(a),(b), or (c), as applicable.” U.S.S.G. §
4A1.2(k)(1).
The district court held that revocation of community control was governed
by § 4A1.2(k) and added the 366-day sentence to the original 120-day sentence.
This calculation pushed Wright past the thirteen month threshold that carried the
additional criminal history point, resulting in an advisory sentencing range of 84-
105 months instead of 70-87 months. Finding that a sentence at the low end of the
guideline range was reasonable, the district court sentenced Wright to eighty-four
months in prison.
Wright now appeals the determination that revocation of community control
4
is governed by § 4A1.2(k) and seeks a re-calculation of his criminal history.
Wright does not dispute that he violated the terms of his community control. He
concedes that the only question is whether community control qualifies as a form
of supervision covered by § 4A1.2(k).
II. DISCUSSION
A. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(k)
We review “a district court’s interpretation of the Guidelines de novo and its
factual findings for clear error.” United States v. Valnor, 451 F.3d 744, 750 (11th
Cir. 2006). Wright argues that the district court erred in finding that revocation of
community control falls under § 4A1.2(k)(2)(B), which covers the revocation of
“probation, parole, supervised release, special parole, or mandatory release.”3
Specifically, Wright argues that since community control is not an enumerated
form of supervision under § 4A1.2(k)(2)(B), the period of imprisonment associated
with his violation of community control should not count towards his criminal
history. As such, Wright asserts that the district court should have assessed him
two criminal history points based on his initial 120-day sentence instead of the
three criminal history points derived from adding the 120-day and 366-day
3
The district court only referenced the general provision, § 4A1.2(k), in making its
determination. It is unclear why Wright cites § 4A1.2(k)(2)(B), which alters the time constraints
for calculating criminal history based upon the revocation of the enumerated sentences. Wright
provides no discussion about how the time constraint would impact our findings.
5
sentences together. If Wright prevails, his corresponding Guideline range would
be 70-87 months instead of 84-105 months.
In support of his point, Wright contends that the language of the Guidelines
should be given its plain and ordinary meaning. See United States v. Tham, 118
F.3d 1501, 1506 (11th Cir. 1997). Wright asserts that the rule of lenity supports
his argument, contending that, “[t]he policy of lenity means that the Court will not
interpret a federal criminal statute so as to increase the penalty that it places on an
individual when such an interpretation can be based on no more than a guess as to
what Congress intended.” Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169, 178, 79 S. Ct
209, 214 (1958). Wright argues that the rule of lenity applies to the Sentencing
Guidelines. See United States v. Jeter, 329 F.3d 1229, 1230 (11th Cir. 2003) (per
curiam).
The government responds that the district court properly calculated Wright’s
criminal history. The government argues that the commentary to U.S.S.G. §§
4A1.1 and 4A1.2 indicates that the forms of supervision listed are not exhaustive;
therefore, sentences imposed upon revocation for other forms of supervision are
counted. The government also argues that the rule of lenity is inapplicable in this
case because the Sentencing Commission’s intent is clear. See United States v.
Camacho-Ibarquen, 410 F.3d 1307, 1315 (11th Cir. 2005).
6
This court has not squarely decided the issue of whether the imposition of a
sentence after a defendant violates the terms of his community control results in
the application of § 4A1.2(k). Wright is correct that the Guidelines do not use the
term community control. However, the comments to § 4A1.1 state that § 4A1.2(k)
applies to “revocation of probation, parole, or a similar form of release.” U.S.S.G.
§ 4A1.1, cmt. n.1 (emphasis added). Similarly, application note 11 explains that §
4A1.2(k) “covers revocations of probation and other conditional sentences.”
U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2, cmt. n.11 (emphasis added).
“[C]ommentary in the Guidelines Manuel that interprets or explains a
guideline is authoritative unless it violates the Constitution or a federal statute, or
is inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous reading of, that guideline.” Stinson v.
United States, 508 U.S. 36, 38, 113 S. Ct. 1913, 1915 (1993). Wright has not
asserted that the Guidelines or their commentary violate the Constitution or any
federal statute. At oral argument, Wright’s counsel argued for the first time that
the commentary simply refers back to the finite list of five types of release
enumerated in § 4A1.2(k) without expanding them.
Counsel juxtaposed the language in the applicable commentary to the
language in § 4A1.2(c), which states, “[s]entences for the following prior offenses
and offenses similar to them, by whatever name they are known. . . .” U.S.S.G. §
7
4A1.2(c)(1). Arguing that § 4A1.2(c) illustrates Congress’s ability to draft a
section with expansive language, counsel asserts that the lack of the catch-all
provision in § 4A1.2(k) indicates Congress’s wish to limit the application of §
4A1.2(k) to the specific forms of release listed.
We find this argument meritless. More importantly, it was never made in
Wright’s brief. To give it serious consideration now violates a long standing rule
that issues and contentions not raised in the initial brief are deemed abandoned.
See United States v. Curtis, 380 F.3d 1308, 1310 (11th Cir. 2004). As such, we
treat the commentary as authoritative and find that the enumerated forms of
supervision are not exhaustive. Because the Sentencing Commission’s intent is
clear, we need not address the rule of lenity. Camacho-Ibarquen, 410 F.3d at
1315. Therefore, the central issue is whether community control is a similar form
of release subject to § 4A1.2(k).
Similar Form of Release
The government argues that community control is a similar form of release
to probation. The government relies on Florida law to inform its interpretation.
Chapter 948 of the Florida Statutes, entitled “Probation and Community Control,”
defines probation as “a form of community supervision requiring specified
contacts with parole and probation officers.” Fla. Stat. § 948.001(5). The same
8
statute defines community control as “a form of intensive, supervised custody in
the community, including surveillance on weekends and holidays, administered by
officers with restricted caseloads.” Fla. Stat. § 948.001(2). The statute explains
that “[c]ommunity control is an individualized program in which the freedom of an
offender is restricted within the community, home, or noninstitutional residential
placement and specific sanctions are imposed and enforced.” Id.
Florida considers community control to be a hybrid concept, “less restrictive
than prison, but more severe than probation.” Bacon v. State, 620 So. 2d 1084,
1086 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). It is undisputed that Florida recognizes probation and
community control as separate and distinct punishments. See State v. Mestas, 507
So. 2d 587, 588 (Fla. 1987); Zack v. State, 753 So. 2d 9, 25 (Fla. 2000). However,
the question before us is not whether they are the same punishment. Rather, it is
whether they are similar forms of release.
Florida considers both probation and community control to be discretionary
alternatives to imprisonment. See Fla. Stat. § 948.011 (“when the defendant's
offense is punishable by both fine and imprisonment, the trial court may, in its
discretion, impose a fine upon him or her and place him or her on probation or into
community control as an alternative to imprisonment.”). Both are conditional
forms of release subject to revocation. See Fla. Stat. § 948.06. Florida law lumps
9
together “probation, community control, parole, [and] conditional release” as
“postprision release supervision.” See Fla. Stat. § 394.927(2).
However, state law merely informs our analysis of what is, ultimately, a
federal issue. The Sentencing Guidelines must be interpreted in accordance with
federal law, even when the Guidelines refer to some event occurring in state court.
See United States v. Glover, 154 F.3d 1291, 1294 (11th Cir. 1998). The Guidelines
apply to prior convictions from all fifty states, in addition to federal, foreign, tribal
and military courts. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1 cmt. backg’d. As such, there is inevitably
variation in the terminology utilized by the individual jurisdictions. Therefore, we
look to the substance of the punishment, rather than its title.
This circuit has yet to interpret the term community control. However, other
circuits’ decisions provide some guidance. Although the issue was uncontested,
the Sixth Circuit agreed that “a community corrections sentence is sufficiently
analogous to probation to warrant the application of § 4A1.2(k)(1).”4 United States
v. Wheeler, 330 F.3d 407, 411, n. 5 (6th Cir. 2003). When faced with an
uncategorized term, the Seventh Circuit compared the purpose of probation and the
4
In Tennessee, “community corrections” is a community based alternative to incarceration.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-36-103. The Community Corrections Act “promoted accountability of
offenders to their local community; filled gaps in the local correctional system through the
development of a range of sanctions and services; reduced the number of nonviolent felony
offenders in correctional institutions and jail; and provided ‘opportunities for offenders
demonstrating special needs to receive services which enhance their ability to provide for their
families and become contributing members of their community.’” State v. Cummings, 868 S.W.
2d 661, 667 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992) (quoting Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-36-104).
10
purpose of Illinois’s “conditional discharge” and found they were sufficiency
analogous to warrant the application of the Guidelines.5 United States v. Caputo,
978 F.2d 972, 976-77 (7th Cir. 1992).
Under the Sentencing Guidelines, probation is a “sentence in and of itself.”
U.S.S.G. § 5B1.1 intro. cmt. Probation may be used as an alternative to
incarceration, provided that the conditions imposed serve the statutory purposes of
sentencing. See id. Those statutory purposes include “promoting respect for the
law, providing just punishment for the offense, achieving general deterrence, and
protecting the public from further crimes by the defendant.” Id. Likewise,
Florida’s community control “contains rules, requirements, conditions, and
programs that are designed to encourage noncriminal functional behavior and
promote the rehabilitation of the offender and the protection of the community.”
See Fla. Stat. § 948.01(3)(b).
We have held that the primary purpose of probation is “rehabilitation, the
accomplishment of which will serve to protect the public.” United States v.
Gaskell, 134 F.3d 1039, 1045 (11th Cir. 1998) (quoting United States v.
Engelhorn, 122 F.3d 508, 512 (8th Cir. 1997)). Probation allows the government
5
In Illinois, conditional discharge is a discretionary alternative to imprisonment. See People v.
Butchek, 317 N.E. 2d 148, 156 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974). It is a conditional and revocable release
without probationary supervision but under such conditions as may be imposed by the court. 730
Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/5-1-4.
11
to oversee an offender’s rehabilitation while giving federal courts the authority to
incarcerate the offender if he or she violates any of the stated conditions. See id.
We find that Florida’s community control program serves a similar purpose.
In comparing community control to probation, both are alternative,
community-based methods to punish offenders in lieu of incarceration. Both are
discretionary forms of release subject to revocation. Both release the offender into
the community subject to stated conditions and require extensive government
supervision to ensure compliance. Both contain conditions specifically designed to
rehabilitate the offender and promote respect for the law while simultaneously
protecting the public.
We recognize that probation and community control have some minor
differences, but examination of the content of both reveals strong similarities in
their purpose and application. Based on those similarities, we find that they are
similar forms of release as contemplated by the Sentencing Guidelines. Therefore,
we find that community control is sufficiently analogous to probation to warrant
the application of U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(k).
B. 18 U.S.C. § 922 (g)
Wright argues that his conviction is unconstitutional and must be vacated
because his possession of a firearm and ammunition did not substantially affect
12
interstate commerce. He notes that every subsection of § 922 limits the statute to
interstate or foreign commerce, except for § 922(g), which extends the statute to
the possession of a firearm that is “in or affecting commerce.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).
Wright asserts that “Congress has intended to reach purely intrastate commerce by
this section of the statute,” which is beyond its power derived from the Commerce
Clause and therefore, unconstitutional. Wright concedes that he did not raise this
argument below but argues that plain error relieves him of that burden.
Generally, we review de novo the constitutionality of a statute because it is
a question of law. See United States v. Cespedes, 151 F.3d 1329, 1331 (11th Cir.
1998). However, we review Wright’s challenge regarding the constitutionality of §
922(g) for plain error because he raises it for the first time on appeal. See United
States v. Jones, 289 F.3d 1260, 1265 (11th Cir. 2002). Plain error occurs if (1)
there was error, (2) that was plain, (3) that affected the defendant’s substantial
rights, and (4) that seriously affected the “fairness, integrity, or public reputation of
judicial proceedings.” Id.
The government responds that Wright fails to demonstrate plain error
because this court has already held that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is not
constitutionally invalid under the Commerce Clause. United States v. Nichols, 124
F.3d 1265, 1266 (11th Cir. 1997). We agree. Nichols rejected an identical
13
constitutional challenge to § 922(g)(1) that the term “commerce” is not defined as
“interstate or foreign commerce.” 124 F.3d at 1266. In making that determination,
we reviewed the Supreme Court’s holding in Scarborough v. United States. 431
U.S. 563, 571, 97 S. Ct. 1963, 1967 (1977). Specifically, we noted that the passage
“‘in or affecting commerce’ indicates a Congressional intent to assert its full
Commerce Clause power.” Id. We also noted in United States v. McAllister, that
“§ 922(g)(1) is not an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’s power under the
Commerce Clause.” 77 F.3d 387, 389 (11th Cir. 1996). Accordingly, we reject
Wright’s challenge to the constitutionality of § 922(g).
Wright further contends that § 922(g) is unconstitutional as applied because
mere possession of a firearm and ammunition does not substantially affect
interstate commerce. However, § 922(g) only requires that the government prove
some “minimal nexus” to interstate commerce, which it may accomplish by
“demonstrat[ing] that the firearm possessed traveled in interstate commerce.”
United States v. Scott, 263 F.3d 1270, 1274 (11th Cir. 2001). Here, the
government established that the firearms involved in Wright’s offense were
manufactured outside of Florida, the state in which the offense took place. Thus,
the firearms necessarily traveled in interstate commerce and therefore satisfied the
minimal nexus requirement. Accordingly, we find no merit in Wright’s assertion
14
that § 922(g) is unconstitutional as applied to him.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is,
AFFIRMED.
15
PRYOR, Circuit Judge, concurring, in which FAY, Circuit Judge, joins:
I concur fully in the majority opinion. I agree that we have no occasion to
apply the rule of lenity in this appeal because section 4A1.2(k)(1) of the
Sentencing Guidelines is unambiguous, but I write separately to explain why I
doubt the rule of lenity should play any role in our interpretation of advisory
Sentencing Guidelines.
This Court has invoked the rule of lenity to interpret ambiguous provisions
of the Sentencing Guidelines on two occasions, both when the Guidelines were
mandatory, but we have never explained whether applying the rule of lenity to the
Guidelines serves the purposes that underlie the rule. See United States v. Inclema,
363 F.3d 1177, 1182 (11th Cir. 2004); United States v. Rolande-Gabriel, 938 F.2d
1231, 1237–38 (11th Cir. 1991). Those purposes are to “ensure[] that criminal
statutes will provide fair warning concerning conduct rendered illegal and strike[]
the appropriate balance between the legislature, the prosecutor, and the court in
defining criminal liability.” Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 427, 105 S.
Ct. 2084, 2089 (1985).
The decision of the Supreme Court in United States v. Booker weakened the
logic that might have supported our application of the rule of lenity to mandatory
Sentencing Guidelines because that decision made the Guidelines advisory. 543
16
U.S. 220, 259, 125 S. Ct. 738, 764 (2005). Whether we should continue to apply
the rule of lenity to advisory Sentencing Guidelines is an open question in this
Circuit. That question warrants careful consideration when it is presented to this
Court.
The rule of lenity is a canon of statutory construction that requires courts to
construe ambiguous criminal statutes narrowly in favor of the accused. See United
States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95 (1820). In England, courts strictly
construed criminal laws “to protect the common criminal from capital
punishment.” Phillip M. Spector, The Sentencing Rule of Lenity, 33 U. Tol. L.
Rev. 511, 518 (2002). Although the rule of lenity has its roots in seventeenth
century England, see Livingston Hall, Strict or Liberal Construction of Penal
Statutes, 48 Harv. L. Rev. 748, 749–50 (1935), American courts later applied the
rule for distinctly American reasons, which were “forged in the furnace of
American constitutionalism.” Spector, supra, at 521.
Chief Justice John Marshall explained that the rule of lenity serves two
constitutional principles—due process of law and separation of powers:
The rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly, is perhaps
not much less old than construction itself. It is founded on the
tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals; and on the plain
principle that the power of punishment is vested in the legislative, not
in the judicial department. It is the legislature, not the Court, which is
to define a crime, and ordain its punishment.
17
Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 95. The rule respects the rights of individuals by
requiring fair warning of “‘what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed.’”
United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348, 92 S. Ct. 515, 522 (1971) (quoting
McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27, 51 S. Ct. 340, 341 (1931)). And the
rule protects the balance of power among the three branches of government by
reserving to the legislature the task of determining what conduct to prohibit and
what punishment to impose. Id., 92 S. Ct. at 523. When courts construe
ambiguous criminal statutes in favor of the accused, the judicial branch refrains
from expansively interpreting criminal statutes so as to prohibit more conduct or
punish more severely than Congress intended. See Ladner v. United States, 358
U.S. 169, 177–78, 79 S. Ct. 209, 214 (1958).
Consistent with these animating concerns, the Supreme Court has applied
the rule of lenity “not only to interpretations of the substantive ambit of criminal
prohibitions, but also to the penalties they impose.” Bifulco v. United States, 447
U.S. 381, 387, 100 S. Ct. 2247, 2252 (1980); see also United States v. R.L.C., 503
U.S. 291, 305, 112 S. Ct. 1329, 1338 (1992). Bifulco involved the interpretation of
a penalty provision of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act
of 1970. 447 U.S. at 382–83, 100 S. Ct. at 2250. That provision stated the penalty
for conspiracy as “imprisonment or fine or both” and limited the maximum
18
punishment for conspiracy to the maximum punishment available for the
substantive target offense. Id. at 385, 100 S. Ct. at 2251. The question before the
Court was whether the provision permitted the imposition of a special parole term.
Id. at 382–83, 100 S. Ct. at 2250. Because Congress had not unambiguously
“authorize[d] special parole terms as punishment for those convicted of drug
conspiracies,” the Supreme Court strictly construed the provision in favor of the
accused and held that it did not permit the imposition of a term of special parole.
Id. at 400–01, 100 S. Ct. at 2259.
More recently, the Supreme Court invoked the rule of lenity in construing
the phrase “original sentence” in a provision of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988,
which provided that “if a defendant is found by the court to be in possession of a
controlled substance . . . the court shall revoke the sentence of probation and
sentence the defendant to not less than one-third of the original sentence.” United
States v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39, 44, 54, 114 S. Ct. 1259, 1263, 1267–68 (1994)
(internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted). The Supreme Court concluded
that the phrase “original sentence” was ambiguous and held that “original
sentence” refers to the sentence of imprisonment that the district court had
authority to impose under the Guidelines, not to the original sentence of probation
that the district court actually imposed. Id. at 54, 114 S. Ct. at 1267–68. As these
19
decisions illustrate, when courts are unable to discern what punishment Congress
intended to impose, they must resolve ambiguity in the statute “against the
imposition of a harsher punishment.” Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83, 75 S.
Ct. 620, 622 (1955).
Although the Supreme Court frequently has applied the rule of lenity to
ambiguous criminal statutes, it has not considered whether the rule of lenity applies
to the Sentencing Guidelines. As originally enacted, the Sentencing Reform Act of
1984 established the Sentencing Commission “as an independent commission in
the judicial branch,” directed the Commission to “devise guidelines to be used for
sentencing,” and required sentencing courts to impose sentences within the
applicable guidelines ranges. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 367–68,
109 S. Ct. 647, 652–53 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because the Act
made the Guidelines mandatory, the Supreme Court “consistently held that the
Guidelines ha[d] the force and effect of laws.” Booker, 543 U.S. at 234, 125 S. Ct.
at 750.
After the enactment of the Sentencing Reform Act, this Court and nearly all
of our sister circuits held or stated in dicta that the rule of lenity applies to
ambiguous provisions of the then mandatory Sentencing Guidelines. See Inclema,
363 F.3d at 1182; United States v. Simpson, 319 F.3d 81, 86–87 (2d Cir. 2002);
20
United States v. Fenton, 309 F.3d 825, 828 n.3 (3d Cir. 2002); United States v.
Boucha, 236 F.3d 768, 776 (6th Cir. 2001); United States v. Gay, 240 F.3d 1222,
1232 (10th Cir. 2001); United States v. Bowen, 127 F.3d 9, 13–15 (1st Cir. 1997);
United States v. Fuentes-Barahona, 111 F.3d 651, 653 (9th Cir. 1997); United
States v. Lazaro-Guadarrama, 71 F.3d 1419, 1421 (8th Cir. 1995); United States v.
Cutler, 36 F.3d 406, 408 (4th Cir. 1994); United States v. Burke, 888 F.2d 862, 866
(D.C. Cir. 1989). Only the Second Circuit offered an explanation for its decision
to apply the rule of lenity to the Sentencing Guidelines. See Simpson, 319 F.3d at
86. After observing that the purposes of the rule of lenity are to promote fair
notice, decrease the risk of arbitrary enforcement, and to maintain the proper
balance of powers, the Second Circuit summarily concluded that “[a]pplication of
the rule of lenity to the Guidelines promotes these goals.” Id. at 87.
The Seventh Circuit disagreed and held that the rule of lenity does not apply
to the Sentencing Guidelines. United States v. Mrazek, 998 F.2d 453, 455 (7th Cir.
1993) (Easterbrook, J.); see also United States v. White, 888 F.2d 490, 497–98 (7th
Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook, J.), abrogated on other grounds by United States v.
Stinson, 508 U.S. 36, 113 S. Ct. 1913 (1993). In an opinion by Judge Frank
Easterbrook, the Seventh Circuit distinguished the Sentencing Guidelines from
criminal statutes by explaining that the Guidelines “set neither maximum nor
21
minimum penalties” and only “structure and confine the ways in which judges
exercise discretion in sentencing.” White, 888 F.2d at 498. The Seventh Circuit
considered the purposes that underlie the rule of lenity and concluded that they
were not in play: “We are not at risk of imposing penalties greater than Congress
authorized, or of inducing the ultracautious to abstain from lawful activities that
might be confused with the subjects of the statute; we are not worried about the
adequacy of notice.” Id.
The reasoning of the Seventh Circuit in White relied in part on an
assumption that the Sentencing Guidelines did not set minimum or maximum
penalties and that judicial interpretation of the Guidelines did not present a risk that
a court would impose a sentence greater than Congress had permitted, see id. at
498, but that assumption was debatable when the Guidelines were mandatory. As
the Supreme Court explained one year after the Seventh Circuit decided White,
“[t]he answer to any suggestion that the statutory character of a specific penalty
provision gives it primacy over administrative sentencing guidelines is that the
mandate to apply the Guidelines is itself statutory.” R.L.C., 503 U.S. at 297, 112
S. Ct. at 1334. Because Congress required sentencing courts to apply the
Sentencing Guidelines and impose a sentence within the applicable guidelines
range, it was reasonable to view the Guidelines as effectively setting minimum and
22
maximum penalties that varied based on the circumstances of the offense and the
characteristics of the offender.
When this Court invoked the rule of lenity to interpret ambiguous
provisions of the Sentencing Guidelines, the Guidelines were mandatory. See
Inclema, 363 F.3d at 1182; Rolande-Gabriel, 938 F.2d at 1238. Even if we were
correct to apply the rule of lenity to mandatory Sentencing Guidelines, those
decisions no longer bind us because the Supreme Court made the Guidelines
advisory in Booker. 543 U.S. at 259, 125 S. Ct. at 764. Although they still must
take account of the Guidelines, pertinent policy statements, and the purposes of
sentencing, district courts no longer are statutorily required to impose a sentence
within the guidelines range. Id. We have not applied the rule of lenity to the
Sentencing Guidelines since Booker, nor have we considered whether we should.
Whether the rule of lenity applies to advisory Sentencing Guidelines is an open
question in this Circuit.
In my view, it is doubtful that the judicial interpretation of advisory
Sentencing Guidelines promulgated by an independent commission implicates
either of the twin concerns that motivate the rule of lenity. The first concern—fair
warning—is not at issue because the Guidelines “do not bind or regulate the
primary conduct of the public.” Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 396, 109 S. Ct. at 667. The
23
concern about fair warning is rooted in “the belief that fair warning should be
accorded as to what conduct is criminal and punishable by deprivation of liberty or
property.” Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814, 831, 94 S. Ct. 1262, 1272
(1974). The Sentencing Guidelines do not make any conduct criminal, so “[w]e
are not at risk of . . . inducing the ultracautious to abstain from lawful activities that
might be confused with the subjects of the statute.” White, 888 F.2d at 498. The
Sentencing Guidelines come into play only after someone has been convicted of a
criminal offense. The second concern—separation of powers—also is not at issue.
The rule of lenity promotes separation of powers by reserving to Congress the
power to “define a crime, and ordain its punishment.” See Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5
Wheat.) at 95. As explained above, the Sentencing Guidelines do not define
crimes, so we are not at risk of usurping that congressional prerogative. Nor do
advisory Sentencing Guidelines ordain punishments for the various criminal
offenses. After Booker, the fetters that Congress had placed on the discretion of
district courts to sentence within the statutory range are no longer binding.
Sentencing courts are free to impose any sentence within the statutory range
established by Congress, subject to appellate review for reasonableness. See
Booker, 543 U.S. at 264, 125 S. Ct. at 767. Consequently, our interpretation of
advisory Sentencing Guidelines presents no risk that we will “impos[e] penalties
24
greater than Congress authorized.” White, 888 F.2d at 498. It is still true that
“[o]ur interpretation of sentencing guidelines and accompanying commentary is
governed by traditional rules of statutory construction,” United States v. Perez, 366
F.3d 1178, 1182 (11th Cir. 2004), but the purposes of the rule of lenity suggest that
it plays no role in the interpretation of advisory guidelines.
We need not construe an ambiguous provision of the Sentencing Guidelines
strictly or liberally. Instead, we should construe it “reasonably, to contain all that it
fairly means.” Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the
Law 23 (1997). As Judge Easterbrook put it, “Our task is to find the best reading
of the text, without a thumb on the scale.” Mrazek, 998 F.2d at 455.
25