In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
No. 09-2156
N ATASHA R AMA, et al.,
Petitioners,
v.
E RIC H. H OLDER, JR., Attorney General
of the United States,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals Agency.
Nos. A077-650-672, 671, 673
A RGUED F EBRUARY 22, 2010—D ECIDED M AY 28, 2010
Before K ANNE and W ILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and
S PRINGMANN, District Judge.
S PRINGMANN, District Judge. In February of 2000, Alba-
nian natives Natasha Rama, Ferrick Rama, and Ledia Rama
The Honorable Theresa L. Springmann, District Judge for
the United States District Court, Northern District of Indiana,
sitting by designation.
2 No. 09-2156
attempted to enter the United States without valid pass-
ports and subsequently applied for asylum. On July 13,
2004, an Immigration Judge (IJ) denied their request
and ordered that they be removed. The Board of Immigra-
tion Appeals (BIA) affirmed without opinion on Decem-
ber 7, 2005. This petition followed. For the reasons set
forth in the following opinion, we deny the petition
for review.
I. Background
On February 1, 2000, the Petitioners were stopped with
fake passports at Chicago O’Hare International Airport
by officers of the Immigration and Naturalization
Services (INS).1 Ferrick and Natasha were interviewed
separately by the officers.
In Natasha’s interview, she admitted using a
fraudulently-obtained passport that had been issued to
another resident of her native city. She claimed that she
and her family had traveled to the United States because
Ferrick had been involved in a car accident and owed a
large sum of money to the owner of the damaged car.
When the family was unable to pay the sum owed, the
owner ransacked the family’s house and poured scalding
milk on nine-year-old Ledia’s legs, permanently scarring
1
On March 1, 2003, the INS ceased to exist as an independent
agency within the Department of Justice and its functions
were transferred to the newly formed Department of Home-
land Security.
No. 09-2156 3
them. Natasha claimed that “[she] fear[s] for [her] husband
and [her] daughter [if they were forced to return to Alba-
nia] because the man who threatened [her] husband’s
life works for the Albanian government.” Admin. R. 647.
When the officer asked Natasha how she knew that the
person who threatened her husband and ransacked her
house works for the Albanian government, she replied,
“I don’t know. I just assumed because he has a nice car.” Id.
Ferrick was interviewed by an asylum officer on the
following day. During his interview, Ferrick admitted
that he had purchased fraudulent passports for himself,
his wife, and his daughter for ten thousand dollars. He
claimed that he came to the United States because, fol-
lowing an automobile accident in which he was involved,
the owner of the damaged car had come to his home
demanding money, and threw hot milk on his daughter.
He stated that he feared for his life.
After these interviews, the asylum officers deter-
mined that the Ramas had not established prima facie
eligibility for asylum and referred their cases for a
hearing before an IJ. The INS commenced removal pro-
ceedings against the Ramas on February 17, 2000, by
filing Notices to Appear (NTAs) charging them
(1) under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)
§ 212(a)(6)(C)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(I), as aliens
who, by fraud or willfully representing a material fact,
sought to procure a visa, other documentation, or admis-
sion into the United States or benefit provided under
the INA, and (2) under INA § 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), as immigrants who at the time of
4 No. 09-2156
application for admission were not in possession of valid
unexpired immigration visas, reentry permits, border
crossing cards, or other valid entry documents as
required by the INA, and a valid unexpired passport, or
other suitable travel document, or other document of
identity and nationality required under the regulations.
Before the IJ, the Ramas conceded the charge that they
were inadmissible because they did not possess valid
passports or visas at the time of admission. On January 31,
2001, Natasha filed with the IJ her application for
asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under
the United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT),
with Ferrick and Ledia as derivatives.
In her asylum application, Natasha added numerous
facts to those she gave to the INS officials at O’Hare
airport. She now claimed the following: she was seeking
asylum because of incidents she experienced in Albania
that were a result of Ferrick’s political activities. She
stated that Ferrick had become the Council Chief of the
Democratic Party for the village of Zharres in 1992. In 1997,
when the Socialist Party took power in Albania, Ferrick
received a letter from the police to present himself at the
police station. Knowing that two other Democratic Party
members had already been arrested, Ferrick chose to go
into hiding rather than report.
In December 1999, Ferrick collided his automobile with
another automobile containing two men. Ferrick identified
one of the passengers as a former classmate and an Alba-
nian police officer. The two men hit Ferrick and pointed
their guns at him. They then demanded that he pay
No. 09-2156 5
them $30,000, or risk being arrested. Five days later, four
masked men came to Natasha’s home, searched the home
for Ferrick, and threatened to kill the family if they
could not locate Ferrick. After that incident, Natasha
and her daughter moved to Natasha’s parents’ house.
Four days after moving in with her parents, four
masked men came to that house, blindfolded and
handcuffed Natasha and Ledia, and drove them to
another house. During their three days in captivity, the
men raped Natasha repeatedly, and threatened to kill
her and Ledia if she did not reveal Ferrick’s whereabouts.
On the third day, one of the men threw hot milk on Ledia.
The men then drove Natasha and Ledia to the hospital,
where Natasha stayed for three days and Ledia
remained for two weeks.
At the Merits Hearing before the IJ, Ferrick and Natasha
gave testimony that largely conformed to Natasha’s
asylum application. Also testifying was Professor Bernie
Fisher, who testified to the poor relationship between the
Albanian Socialist and Democratic Parties, the Socialist
Party’s use of intimidation tactics, and the stigma
attached to rape in Albania, which he said could explain
Natasha’s failure to mention the rape in her interview
with INS officials.
On July 13, 2004, the IJ issued a written opinion
finding the Ramas removable as charged and denying
their application for asylum, withholding of removal, and
protection under CAT. In a thorough opinion that con-
tained a detailed recitation of the facts, the IJ made an
adverse credibility determination based on inconsis-
6 No. 09-2156
tencies between the Ramas’ statements at O’Hare Airport,
and the claims made in Natasha’s asylum application
and the testimony before the IJ. Notably, the IJ found that
during the airport interviews, the Ramas did not disclose
any details regarding Natasha’s rape, Ferrick’s political
involvement in the Democratic Party, the notice Ferrick
had received ordering him to report to the police station,
Ferrick’s going into hiding, or the kidnaping of Natasha
and Ledia. The IJ found that there was good excuse for
the non-disclosure of the rape, but noted that “the omis-
sions extend well beyond the multiple rapes to the very
heart of [the Ramas’] claim: [Ferrick’s] Democratic Party
involvement.” Admin. R. 179. Other inconsistencies cited
by the IJ included inconsistencies between Natasha’s
testimony about her hospitalization and a medical certifi-
cate from the hospital that did not mention any injuries
consistent with rape. Finally, the IJ found persuasive
Ferrick’s failure to submit evidence to corroborate his
claimed leadership in the Democratic Party. While
Ferrick did submit a letter confirming his membership in
the party, the letter made no mention of a leadership
position. Concluding, the IJ stated that “[the Ramas]
have failed to meet their burden of proof in establishing
eligibility for asylum . . . specifically, they failed to
credibly establish that they suffered past persecution
or have a well-founded fear of persecution.” Admin. R. at
182-83. On August 9, 2004, the Ramas timely appealed
the IJ’s decision to the BIA. On December 7, 2005, the
BIA summarily affirmed without opinion the IJ’s findings.
No. 09-2156 7
II. Analysis
A. Standard of Review
Because the BIA summarily affirmed the IJ’s decision
without opinion, we base our review on the IJ’s analysis.
See Hanaj v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 694, 699 (7th Cir. 2006). We
review the IJ’s denial of Natasha’s petition for asylum and
withholding of removal under the highly deferential
substantial evidence test. See Ememe v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d
446, 450 (7th Cir. 2004). Pursuant to this test, we must
uphold the IJ’s findings if they are supported by reason-
able, substantial, and probative evidence on the record
considered as a whole; we may reverse the IJ’s determina-
tions only if we determine that the evidence compels a
different result. Id. at 451; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)
(“[T]he administrative findings of fact are conclusive
unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to
conclude to the contrary.”). Similarly, the IJ’s “[c]redibility
determinations are questions of fact and should only be
overturned under extraordinary circumstances, although
they must be supported by specific, cogent reasons that
bear a legitimate nexus to the finding.” Balogun v. Ashcroft,
374 F.3d 492, 498 (7th Cir. 2004) (quoting Pop v. I.N.S.,
270 F.3d 527, 530-31 (7th Cir. 2001)).
B. Asylum
8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1) affords the Attorney General the
discretionary authority to grant “asylum to an alien . . . if
the Attorney General determines that such alien is a
refugee within the meaning of section 1101(a)(42)(A) of
8 No. 09-2156
this title.” Section 1101(a)(42)(A) defines “refugee” as one
who is unable or unwilling to return to her country
“because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecu-
tion on account of race, religion, nationality, membership
in a particular social group, or political opinion.” The
burden of proof is on the Ramas to show that they are
“refugees” and are thus eligible for asylum. See 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.13(a). “[C]redibility is the linchpin of a ‘well
founded fear’ claim.” Balogun, 374 F.3d at 498. Regarding
a claim of well-founded fear of persecution, an ap-
plicant’s burden “turns largely upon the applicant’s own
testimony and credibility.” Capric v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1075,
1085 (7th Cir. 2004). The testimony of an applicant, if
credible, may be sufficient to sustain the burden of proof
without corroboration. Id. However, if the IJ finds the
testimony to be incredible, corroborating evidence is
required. Balogun, 374 F.3d at 500.
In this case, we find that the IJ’s credibility determina-
tion is supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative
evidence on the record considered as a whole. The IJ
relied on three reasons in entering an adverse credi-
bility determination: (1) new factual assertions raised
during the petitioners’ testimony before the IJ that were
not raised to the immigration officers at the airport;
(2) the petitioners’ testimony before the IJ concerning
Ferrick’s participation in the Democratic Party was incon-
sistent with the documentary evidence; and (3) Natasha’s
oral testimony concerning her hospitalization and the
hospitalization of Ledia was inconsistent with the docu-
mentary evidence. We will address each reason, in turn.
No. 09-2156 9
1. New Factual Assertions
The IJ’s first basis for questioning the petitioners’ credi-
bility is supported by reasonable, substantial, and proba-
tive evidence. As she noted, the petitioners did not
disclose at the airport any details regarding Natasha’s
rape, Ferrick’s political involvement with the Democratic
Party, the notice that Ferrick received ordering him to the
police station, the incident that caused Ferrick to go into
hiding, or the kidnaping of Natasha and Ledia. The IJ
accepted the petitioners’ explanation that the rape may
not have been mentioned because of the cultural and other
difficulties of disclosing it, but noted that “the omissions
extend well beyond the multiple rapes to the very heart
of [the petitioners’] claim: [Ferrick’s] Democratic Party
involvement.” She found unconvincing Ferrick’s explana-
tion that he did not discuss his political involvement at
the airport interview because he did not know how
much information to disclose.
The IJ also found the petitioners not to be credible
because at the airport interview, Ferrick did not state
the identities of his daughter’s attackers by name,
despite the fact that he was able to identify the men
during the Merits Hearing. When pressed at the airport
for their identities, Ferrick merely identified the men as
people from “the city.” The IJ found that the petitioners
did not provide any explanation to resolve the incon-
sistency and that their failure to do so was a specific
reason to support an adverse credibility determination.
10 No. 09-2156
2. Ferrick’s Involvement with the Democratic Party
The next factor upon which the IJ relied was Ferrick’s
testimony that he was the town leader of the Democratic
Party, which was not consistent with the letter Ferrick
obtained verifying his membership. The letter did not
mention that Ferrick had any leadership position. The IJ
held that “it is reasonable to expect him to submit a
letter confirming his position as an elected leader[,]
something significantly different from mere member-
ship” in light of his submission of a letter from the Demo-
cratic Party. We find the IJ’s reasoning sound and cannot
say that it was not based on reasonable, substantial, and
probative evidence in the record.
3. Natasha’s and Ledia’s Hospitalization
Third, in making her adverse credibility determination,
the IJ determined that Natasha’s medical statement
from the time of her hospitalization indicates that she
was about three months pregnant, and was admitted for
treatment of an “incipient abdomen.” The medical docu-
mentation did not reference torn clothes, bruises, or cuts
on Natasha’s body, as she had claimed. Based on these
inconsistencies, the IJ found Natasha’s testimony about
her rape “disingenuous.” The IJ also found that the
medical certificate indicated that Natasha was hospi-
talized for eight days, but Natasha testified that she had
been hospitalized for three. Natasha testified that Ledia
was hospitalized for twelve days, but the medical certifi-
cate indicated that Ledia had been hospitalized for ten.
The IJ determined that Natasha’s explanation that she
No. 09-2156 11
could not recall the number of days that Ledia remained
in the hospital to be “unconvincing especially in light of
the previous discrepancies regarding [Natasha’s] own
alleged hospitalization.” Admin. R. at 181. That the IJ
relied on the medical certificate as well as testimony
to reach her adverse credibility determination on this
point shows us that the determination was based on
reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence in the
record.
For this Court “[t]o reverse the BIA finding we must
find that the evidence not only supports [reversal], but
compels it.” INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 n.1
(1992). The IJ found the Ramas’ claim of fear to be not
credible, and she cited specific, cogent reasons that bore
a legitimate nexus to that finding. Because the evidence
does not compel reversal, we will affirm the IJ’s denial
of the Ramas’ asylum claim, and the BIA’s summary
affirmance of the IJ’s decision.
C. Withholding of Removal
8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) provides that “the Attorney General
may not remove an alien to a country if the Attorney
General decides that the alien’s life or freedom would be
threatened in that country because of the alien’s race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion.” In order to gain relief under
this Section, “the applicant must demonstrate a clear
probability of persecution,” which is “a much more
demanding burden” than is found in the asylum context.
Capric, 355 F.3d at 1095. Therefore, as we have often
12 No. 09-2156
said, “if an applicant’s asylum claim fails, his with-
holding of deportation claim will also necessarily fail.” Id.
This rule includes those claims for withholding of
removal under CAT. See Aung v. Gonzales, 495 F.3d 742,
747 (7th Cir. 2007). Because we have found that the IJ’s
decision denying Natasha’s asylum claim fails, we must
also uphold her decision denying Natasha’s claim for
withholding of deportation.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review
is D ENIED.
5-28-10