Case: 09-40612 Document: 00511124824 Page: 1 Date Filed: 05/28/2010
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
May 28, 2010
No. 09-40612 Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
DAVID RASHEED ALI,
Plaintiff - Appellant
v.
NATHANIEL QUARTERMAN, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS DIVISION,
Defendant - Appellee
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas
Before JOLLY and GARZA, Circuit Judges, and MILLER, District Judge.*
E. GRADY JOLLY:
This interlocutory appeal challenges the district court’s order
administratively closing the case pending the outcome of a similar case in a
different district, and also denying all outstanding motions. We vacate the order
and remand the case to the district court for further consideration and such
proceedings as it deems appropriate.
*
District Judge, Southern District of Texas, sitting by designation.
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No. 09-40612
I.
David Rasheed Ali claims his Muslim faith requires him to wear a beard
and a Kufi,1 and he wants the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (“TDCJ”)
to allow him to do so. On March 27, 2009, he filed suit against TDCJ through
its director under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, complaining its policies violate this claimed
right under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000,
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1. On the same day, he requested preliminary injunctive
relief. The district court referred the case to a magistrate judge, who
recommended sua sponte that the district court administratively close 2 the
proceedings pending the outcome of a similar case in the Southern District of
Texas, Garner v. Morales.3 The cases appear materially identical, except that
Garner seeks only a quarter-inch beard, whereas Ali says he must grow a “fist-
length” beard. On June 4, the district court adopted the magistrate judge’s
report and recommendations, administratively closing the case until Garner’s
resolution, including appeals, and denying “any and all” outstanding motions,
among which was the motion for a preliminary injunction. The district court
cited its concern for potentially inconsistent verdicts relating to the Texas prison
system as justification for the stay. It is unclear, however, when Garner will be
resolved, although the parties in Garner are to file dispositive motions by May
24, 2010. Ali timely appealed to this court, specifying the administrative closure
and the denial of his motion for a preliminary injunction.
1
A Kufi is a white cloth head covering.
2
An administrative closure is a docket-management tool to maintain an accurate count
of active cases. CitiFinancial Corp. v. Harrison, 453 F.3d 245, 250 (5th Cir. 2006).
3
Our court remanded the case to the district court on March 6, 2009. Garner v.
Morales, No. 07-41015, 2009 WL 577755, at *6 (5th Cir. Mar. 6, 2009) (per curiam).
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II.
We first consider our appellate jurisdiction. Generally, our court has
jurisdiction to review only final judgments of the district courts. 28 U.S.C. §
1291. Exceptions to the rule are strictly construed to prevent piecemeal appeals.
Sherri A.D. v. Kirby, 975 F.2d 193, 201 (5th Cir. 1992). One exception allows
appeals of “[i]nterlocutory orders . . . refusing . . . injunctions, except where a
direct review may be had in the Supreme Court.” 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1); Sherri
A.D., 975 F.2d at 202 (reviewing denial of a preliminary injunction under §
1292(a)(1)). “Orders which explicitly grant or deny injunctive relief are
immediately appealable as of right; no additional finding of immediate,
irreparable injury is required.” Sherri A.D., 975 F.2d at 203. In its June 4 order,
the district court denied “any and all” outstanding motions, necessarily including
the motion for a preliminary injunction. Although the order does not specifically
reference the motion for a preliminary injunction, it clearly denies the motion.
Thus, we have jurisdiction to consider the preliminary injunction’s denial.
We also have jurisdiction to review the district court’s administrative
closure of the case. “[A]n order granting or refusing an injunction brings before
the appellate court the entire order, not merely the propriety of injunctive relief,
and the appellate court may decide the merits so long as concerned only with the
order from which the appeal is taken.” Magnolia Marine Transport Co. v.
Laplace Towing Corp., 964 F.2d 1571, 1580 (5th Cir. 1992) (quotations omitted).
Our cases are inconsistent on the question whether additional issues presented
in the same order must be “inextricably intertwined” for our court to consider
them along with the issues that give rise to our jurisdiction. Gates v. Cook, 234
F.3d 221, 228 n.5 (5th Cir. 2000) (reviewing unrelated issue decided in an order
that also granted injunction without requiring the issue to be inextricably
intertwined); Thornton v. Gen. Motors Corp., 136 F.3d 450, 453 (5th Cir. 1998)
(per curiam) (reviewing a district-court action that would not be appealable on
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its own upon finding that it was inextricably intertwined with another district-
court action in the same order). We need not settle this inconsistency, as the
preliminary injunction’s denial and the case’s administrative closure are
inextricably intertwined insofar as the district court will have to reopen the case
to reconsider the preliminary injunction. We address each issue in turn.
III.
When denying a motion for a preliminary injunction, a district court must
offer findings of fact and conclusions of law to justify the denial. Fed. R. Civ. P.
52(a)(2). The district court did neither here. We hold that the district court
erred in denying the motion for a preliminary injunction without findings of fact
and conclusions of law and in its administrative closure of the case. We
therefore remand the motion for preliminary injunction to the district court for
further consideration and to provide reasons for its ruling. See Chandler v. City
of Dallas, 958 F.2d 85, 90 (5th Cir. 1992) (per curiam).
Turning to the administrative closure, which is equivalent to a stay,
CitiFinancial Corp., 453 F.3d at 250, we hold the court abused its discretion by
administratively closing the case by merely citing the pending outcome in
Garner as dispositive. Although district courts have inherent authority to
control their dockets, “only in rare circumstances will a litigant in one cause be
compelled to stand aside while a litigant in another settles the rule of law that
will define the rights of both.” Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 255 (1936).
Whether such a circumstance exists depends on a balance between the harm of
moving forward and the harm of holding back. Here, the district court should
consider the potential harm to Ali of a stay and weigh that with the
considerations supporting a stay. We do not gainsay the consideration of
contradictory rules applying to the Texas prison system, but that is only one
element of the equation. For example, the court may find it reasonable to allow
Ali to develop the factual basis of his claim, including especially his evidence
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that the grooming regulations are not the least restrictive means to further the
compelling interest asserted by the state. The court may have the state at least
give its reasons for the necessity of the rule and its reasons why a decision in
Garner would serve to expedite rather than delay the resolution of Ali’s claim or
why judicial economy might thereby be served in a way reasonable to all
concerned. Furthermore, since the district court’s administrative closure, our
court decided Gooden v. Crain, 353 F. App’x 885 (5th Cir. 2009), which, although
unpublished, the district court may find illuminating in how to best further
handle this case. In sum, the district court should move forward with the case
so far as is practicable, and if it chooses to stay proceedings, it should do so in
the light of the considerations set forth in Landis as they might apply to the
circumstances of this case.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the district court is vacated and the
case is remanded for further proceedings.
VACATED and REMANDED.
5