FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
June 1, 2010
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee, No. 09-6285
v. (W.D. Oklahoma)
JOE EDDIE PUGH, JR., (D.C. No. 09-CR-00232-HE-1)
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before HARTZ, ANDERSON, and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
On April 3, 2008, following a brief vehicle pursuit, Oklahoma City Police
Department (“OCPD”) officers arrested Joe Eddie Pugh, Jr., a convicted felon.
They found in his possession a loaded Ruger 9mm handgun. Mr. Pugh was
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
subsequently indicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Without a plea agreement, Mr. Pugh pled guilty and was
sentenced to 84 months’ imprisonment, followed by three years of supervised
release. Arguing that his sentence is substantively and procedurally unreasonable,
Mr. Pugh appeals. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
As indicated, Mr. Pugh was arrested and charged with being a felon in
possession of a firearm. 1 Following his guilty plea, and in preparation for
sentencing under the advisory United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines
Manual (“USSG”), the United States Parole Office prepared a presentence report
(“PSR”). The PSR calculated a total offense level of 17, which, with a criminal
history category of IV, yielded an advisory Guidelines sentencing range of 37 to
46 months. The PSR further noted that the preparing officer saw no grounds for
either departing or varying from the advisory Guidelines range. The PSR noted
Mr. Pugh’s extensive criminal history, beginning at the age of 12.
The government objected to paragraphs 82 and 83 of the PSR, arguing that
it believed an upward departure or variance was warranted based on the relevant
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors, particularly the nature and circumstances
1
In fact, the OCPD officers who arrested Mr. Pugh were looking for him,
because there was an outstanding Oklahoma County warrant to arrest him on the
charge of shooting with intent to kill.
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of the offense, the history and characteristics of Mr. Pugh, the need to reflect the
seriousness of the offense, and the need to afford adequate deterrence to criminal
conduct and to protect the public from any further crimes by Mr. Pugh. In
response, Mr. Pugh objected to PSR paragraphs 39 through 41, which included
within his criminal history three violent crimes where the charges were ultimately
dismissed.
The government subsequently filed a Sentencing Memorandum and Motion
for Upward Variance, arguing that Mr. Pugh’s extensive criminal history of
crimes involving violence and the possession of firearms, as well as his consistent
affiliation with the Westside Hustlers criminal street gang, warranted a higher
sentence than that suggested by the Guidelines. Mr. Pugh also filed a Sentencing
Memorandum, arguing that his extensive criminal record derived from a “lack of
parental supervision, negative peers, and substance abuse beginning at the age of
8.” Sentencing Mem. at 2-3, R. Vol. 1 at 10-11.
The sentencing hearing took place on December 2, 2009. The district court
adopted the PSR on all undisputed factual matters. As indicated, the PSR
recommended a total offense level of 17, a criminal history category of IV, and a
suggested sentencing range of 37 to 46 months. The government again asked the
district court to vary upward based upon Mr. Pugh’s gang affiliation and violent
criminal history. The government offered the testimony of OCPD Detective Jeff
Reed, and seven exhibits, including OCPD police reports, photographic line-ups,
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a state court bind-over order and Kansas Department of Corrections records.
When Mr. Pugh objected to the introduction of that evidence on Sixth
Amendment and due process grounds, the district court overruled the objection.
Detective Reed then testified that he was familiar with the criminal street
gang known as the Westside Hustlers, who had been involved in a series of drive-
by shootings and drug offenses. Mr. Pugh does not disavow membership in that
gang. The detective further testified that he had investigated two drive-by
shootings involving Mr. Pugh. One such shooting occurred on July 15, 2008,
when witnesses identified the shooter as a black male Westside Hustler in his
early twenties wearing braided hair. Mr. Pugh was the only Westside Hustler
matching that description. Detective Reed also presented a photographic lineup
he had shown to the witness of the July 15, 2008, drive-by shooting, from which
the witness identified Mr. Pugh as the shooter. Mr. Pugh was prosecuted for that
shooting in Oklahoma state court, and Detective Reed presented the relevant state
bind-over order for the preliminary hearing.
Detective Reed provided similar testimony and evidence relating to a
June 29, 2008, drive-by shooting committed by a black male with braided hair and
affiliated with the Westside Hustlers. The detective again introduced a
photographic lineup, from which the witness to the shooting positively identified
Mr. Pugh as the shooter. The final pieces of evidence presented by Detective
Reed were Kansas Department of Corrections disciplinary reports, which revealed
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Mr. Pugh had misused state property, disobeyed orders, engaged in misconduct,
theft and lying, and had been caught in a restricted area, all while he was
incarcerated for a state offense. Finally, the detective presented an OCPD
firearms report on the June and July drive-by shootings, which indicated both
involved the same pistol (a 9mm caliber), and he presented an interview he had
conducted with a known Westside Hustler, who knew Mr. Pugh and stated that,
during three drive-by shootings, he drove the car and Mr. Pugh was the shooter.
After hearing argument from both sides, the district court proceeded to
sentencing. While taking the Guidelines as an advisory starting place, the court
concluded that the Guidelines sentencing range did not provide an appropriate
sentence:
It does seem to me as I consider all this evidence here against
the ultimate Section 3553 sentencing factors that this does appear . . .
to be a case where the guidelines do not ultimately arrive at an
appropriate sentence, . . . in principal part because of these other
circumstances that have been dealt with in testimony and through the
presentence report as to the nature of Mr. Pugh’s activities.
. . . It does seem to me that the evidence that we have heard here of
participation in other drive-by shootings, and I guess a total of four
or perhaps more drive-by shootings, by the defendant are pertinent
here as I evaluate both the seriousness of this offense and as I
consider the defendant’s circumstances and history and
characteristics of him, and as those ultimately bear on the other
sentencing factors relating to the need to protect the public and to
provide an appropriately serious response and so on.
In particular, it seems to me that there is a difference when
you’re dealing with an offense of conviction, as we are here, of a
felon in possession of a firearm, the circumstances do matter. Was
the firearm in the felon’s possession on some relatively non-serious
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basis of perhaps a desire for personal protection or something like
that doesn’t justify it under the law, but at least it’s a less serious
circumstance than what we have here where the evidence I think
makes it clear enough based on a course of conduct by the defendant
over a period of several years that the purpose for his possessing the
firearm was not something of the sort of simply self-protection, but it
was being used in an ongoing manner, or the reason he kept it on him
was to be a part of this broader pattern of criminal activity that we’re
concerned with here.
Tr. of Sentencing Hr’g at 43-44, R. Vol. 3. The court continued:
. . . And I think in particular, there is, of course, a need to deter this
defendant from serious criminal misconduct in the future or to deter
others who might be inclined to engage in the same conduct that’s
pertinent here. And of course, there is a need to protect the public
from further crimes of the defendant.
The evidence that I’ve heard and that is indicated in the
presentence report I think makes clear that is a very substantial
concern here, and that a more lengthy sentence of incarceration is
necessary to protect the public from the substantial risk of recidivism
that does exist here based on the facts that have been established.
Id. at 45-46. The court was clearly concerned about Mr. Pugh’s criminal history
and gang-related activity:
. . . And, of course, here it would be difficult, it seems to me, to
identify a course of criminal activity involving anything more serious
than these repetitive multiple instances of drive-by shootings that in
my view have been established here by a preponderance of the
evidence.
...
. . . And I would say, of course, too, in terms of evaluating both his
personal characteristics and the circumstances out of which this
offense arose that the evidence I think certainly establishes by a
preponderance of the evidence that this criminal activity arose out of
and was connected with significant gang involvement and gang
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activity on the part of the defendant that also requires or suggests a
more substantial sentence would be appropriate.
Id. The court determined that these negative and violent aspects surrounding
Mr. Pugh’s criminal conduct was not outweighed by the mitigating factors
Mr. Pugh urged, such as his age and immaturity and lack of guidance as a youth.
The court accordingly sentenced Mr. Pugh to a sentence higher than that
recommended by the Guidelines—i.e., 84 months, followed by three years of
supervised release. This appeal followed, in which Mr. Pugh challenges his
sentence as substantively and procedurally unreasonable.
DISCUSSION
Mr. Pugh summarizes his argument as follows: “The district court
committed Constitutional error by sentencing Mr. Pugh to a sentence that was
91% higher and over 3 years more than the high end of the advisory sentencing
guidelines range of imprisonment. The variance from the advisory guidelines was
based on judicial fact-finding of criminal activity for which Mr. Pugh was not
convicted.” Appellant’s Br. at 11.
We now review all federal sentences for reasonableness, which “includes
both a procedural component, as well as a substantive component which relates to
the length of the resulting sentence.” United States v. Smart, 518 F.3d 800, 803
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(10 th Cir. 2008). Mr. Pugh purports to challenge both the procedural and
substantive aspects of his sentence.
I. Procedural Reasonableness:
We have held that “if a district court bases a sentence on a factor not within
the categories set forth in § 3553(a), this would indeed be one form of procedural
error.” Id.; see also United States v. Cook, 550 F.3d 1292, 1295 (10 th Cir. 2008)
(“A challenge to the application of a sentencing enhancement tests the procedural
reasonableness of a sentence, which requires, among other things, a properly
calculated Guidelines range”). Mr. Pugh argues that the district court’s
consideration of the drive-by shootings amounted to the consideration of a factor
not within the § 3553(a) categories and, was therefore, procedurally unreasonable.
Mr. Pugh concedes, however, that our court has specifically held that
uncharged and even acquitted conduct may be considered for sentencing purposes,
and need only be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v.
Magallanez, 408 F.3d 672, 684 (10th Cir. 2005). Mr. Pugh submits that “these
holdings are constitutionally infirm and that it is a violation of the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments to the United States Constitution to sentence him on the basis of
crimes for which he was not charged or convicted.” Appellant’s Br. at 15. We
decline his invitation to discard these precedents. “[W]e are bound by the
precedent of prior panels absent en banc consideration or a superseding contrary
decision by the Supreme Court.” United States v. Albert, 579 F.3d 1188, 1197
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n.11 (10th Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted). The district court committed no
procedural error in selecting Mr. Pugh’s sentence.
II. Substantive Reasonableness:
“A challenge to the sufficiency of the § 3553(a) justifications relied on by
the district court implicates the substantive reasonableness of the resulting
sentence.” Smart, 518 F.3d at 804. The central inquiry is whether the district
court abused its discretion: “appellate ‘reasonableness’ review merely asks
whether the trial court abused its discretion.” Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338,
351 (2007) (citing United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005)). “Briefly
stated, we now review ‘all sentences–whether inside, just outside, or significantly
outside the Guidelines range—under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.’”
Smart, 518 F.3d at 806 (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 40 (2007)).
Mr. Pugh argues his sentence is substantively unreasonable because “the
district court imposed a sentence that was equal to a 91% increase above the high
end of the advisory guidelines range.” Appellant’s Br. at 19. While he concedes
that our court has evolved away from applying specific “sliding scale”
comparisons to justify particular variances, he argues that we “continue[] to view
the extent of the variance as an important factor in assessing the reasonableness
of the sentence.” Id.
Mr. Pugh overstates what our cases require. In reality, our court has
emphasized the considerable discretion which must be afforded the district court’s
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sentencing decisions. See Smart, 518 F.3d at 806-10. “A district court abuses its
discretion when it renders a judgment that is arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or
manifestly unreasonable.” United States v. Munoz-Nava, 524 F.3d 1137, 1146
(10th Cir. 2008) (internal quotations omitted). That standard has not been met in
this case.
As the Supreme Court has stated, in reviewing the discretionary sentencing
decisions of district courts to vary from a particular Guideline range, we “may
consider the extent of the deviation, but must give due deference to the district
court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the
variance.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. “The fact that the appellate court might
reasonably have concluded that a different sentence was appropriate is
insufficient to justify reversal of the district court.” Id. While the variance in
this case was substantial, we cannot say that it is outside the range of
reasonableness. And “to the extent that [Mr. Pugh] is arguing that we must find
‘compelling reasons’ to support so large a variance, . . . this approach is no longer
permissible after [Gall and Smart].” United States v. Pinson, 542 F.3d 822, 837
(10th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1548 (Feb. 20, 2010).
In sum, we have carefully reviewed the entire record and can discern no
procedural error in the district court’s selection of a sentence, and we perceive
nothing substantively unreasonable in the sentence imposed. The district court
was clearly deeply concerned about Mr. Pugh’s violent conduct in participating in
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drive-by shootings, and his lengthy criminal past, beginning at the age of 12. The
court’s thorough explanation for its sentence, set out in part above, convinces us
that the court carefully and thoughtfully exercised its discretion to reach a
reasonable sentence.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s decision to impose an 84-
month sentence is AFFIRMED.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge
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