United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
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No. 08-3996
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William C. Plouffe, Jr., *
*
Appellant, *
* Appeal from the United States
v. * District Court for the Eastern
* District of Arkansas.
Stark Ligon, Executive Director, *
Office of Professional Conduct, *
Arkansas Supreme Court *
Committee on Professional *
Conduct, in his official capacity, *
*
Appellee. *
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Submitted: March 11, 2010
Filed: June 2, 2010
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Before BYE, COLLOTON and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.
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GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.
William Plouffe, Jr., an attorney admitted to practice law in Arkansas, filed a
complaint under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986 and 1988 against Stark Ligon,
Executive Director of the Arkansas Office of Professional Conduct. The complaint
asked the district court1 to enjoin attorney disciplinary proceedings that Ligon initiated
against Plouffe. Ligon moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the district court
should abstain from exercising jurisdiction under the Younger abstention doctrine.2
The district court granted the motion to dismiss, and we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
The disciplinary proceedings against Plouffe can be traced back to a brief
Plouffe filed on July 5, 2007, in an appeal before the Arkansas Court of Appeals. In
the opinion issued in that case, a three-judge panel of the Arkansas Court of Appeals
concluded that Plouffe’s brief was “littered with disrespectful remarks and judgments
about the circuit judge.” Chamberlain v. Smith, No. 07-575, 2007 WL 4248488, at
*1 (Ark. Ct. App. Dec. 5, 2007) (unpublished). The court described Plouffe’s remarks
as “inappropriate and irrelevant to the issue on appeal.” Id. The court also found that
the “tenor and tone” of Plouffe’s brief came “dangerously close to a breach of our
Model Rules of Professional Conduct.” Id.
In his role as Executive Director of the Arkansas Office of Professional
Conduct, Ligon is responsible for investigating all complaints concerning members
of the Arkansas bar and presenting meritorious cases to the Arkansas Supreme Court
Committee on Professional Conduct. After investigating the statements Plouffe made
in the Chamberlain brief, Ligon filed an ethics complaint against Plouffe before the
Committee on Professional Conduct. The ethics complaint alleged that Plouffe
violated Rule 8.4(d) of the Arkansas Rules of Professional Conduct, which provides
that “[i]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct that is
prejudicial to the administration of justice.” The ethics complaint claims that Plouffe
1
The Honorable James M. Moody, United States District Judge for the Eastern
District of Arkansas.
2
See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
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“attributed seriously wrong conduct to appellee’s counsel and bias to the trial judge,
in accusations which appeared as assertions of fact, but which were wholly
unsupported by proof in the record.”
Plouffe then filed this action against Ligon, asking the district court to enjoin
the ongoing attorney disciplinary proceedings. Ligon moved to dismiss the complaint,
arguing that the district court should abstain from hearing the matter under the
Younger abstention doctrine. The district court agreed that Younger abstention
applied and dismissed the complaint. Plouffe appeals.
II. DISCUSSION
The Younger abstention doctrine, as it has evolved, provides that federal courts
should abstain from exercising jurisdiction when (1) there is an ongoing state
proceeding, (2) which implicates important state interests, and (3) there is an adequate
opportunity to raise any relevant federal questions in the state proceeding. Middlesex
County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982) (applying
Younger abstention to abstain from interfering in attorney disciplinary proceedings).
Even if these three requirements are met, a federal court should not abstain if there is
a showing of “bad faith, harassment, or some other extraordinary circumstance that
would make abstention inappropriate.” Id. at 435. The Supreme Court has suggested
that an exception making abstention inappropriate might exist where a state statute is
“flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions in every
clause, sentence and paragraph, and in whatever manner and against whomever an
effort might be made to apply it.” Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 447 (1977)
(quoting Younger, 401 U.S. at 53-54).
On appeal, Plouffe argues that the second and third requirements for abstention
are not met. Alternatively, he argues that the “patently unconstitutional” exception
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applies because the statements he made in the Chamberlain brief are accurate and
protected by the First Amendment.
We generally review the grant of a motion to dismiss de novo, accepting the
allegations in the complaint as true and construing them in the light most favorable to
the non-moving party. Norwood v. Dickey, 409 F.3d 901, 903 (8th Cir. 2005).
However, “[w]e review the application of the Younger abstention doctrine for abuse
of discretion.” Id.
With respect to the second requirement, that the disciplinary proceedings
“implicate important state interests,” see Middlesex County, 457 U.S. at 432, Plouffe
acknowledges that there is a strong state interest in attorney disciplinary proceedings.
See id. at 434 (finding that the state “has an extremely important interest in
maintaining and assuring the professional conduct of the attorneys it licenses”).
However, he argues that the second requirement is not met here because the federal
courts “have an even stronger interest” in addressing his constitutional claims.3
Plouffe’s argument misapprehends Younger abstention. This requirement demands
only that the state proceedings “implicate important state interests.” Id. at 432. We
do not weigh the competing interests of the federal and state courts in adjudicating
Plouffe’s claims. See id. at 432-34. Because the disciplinary proceedings here
implicate important state interests, the second requirement is met.
Plouffe argues that the third requirement is not met because the attorney
disciplinary proceedings do not provide him an adequate opportunity to raise his
constitutional claims. Plouffe must present his constitutional claims in the attorney
disciplinary proceedings “unless it plainly appears that this course would not afford
adequate protection.” See id. at 435 (quoting Younger, 401 U.S. at 45). The burden
3
Plouffe suggests that he would raise a First Amendment claim and a Fourteenth
Amendment due process claim during the attorney disciplinary proceedings.
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rests on Plouffe to show that the disciplinary proceedings do not afford him an
adequate opportunity to raise his constitutional claims. See Neal v. Wilson, 112 F.3d
351, 357 (8th Cir. 1997).
Plouffe notes that the attorney disciplinary proceedings allow only limited
discovery and that the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure are not binding during the
proceedings. He describes these procedural features as inadequate and baldly asserts
that they will prevent him from adequately raising his constitutional claims. However,
Plouffe does not explain how limited discovery or the relaxation of the rules of civil
procedure prevents him from presenting his constitutional claims during the
disciplinary proceedings. And we have not independently identified any plausible
basis for finding that the alleged limitations would prevent the presentation of his
constitutional claims. We can find nothing in the rules governing the attorney
disciplinary proceedings that would prevent Plouffe from raising his constitutional
claims. See Ark. Sup. Ct. P. Regulating Prof’l Conduct of Att’ys at Law.
Furthermore, we have previously found that the Arkansas Supreme Court adequately
considers constitutional claims raised during attorney disciplinary proceedings. See
Neal, 112 F.3d at 357. Plouffe has not shown that the alleged limitations prevent him
from adequately presenting his constitutional claims during the attorney disciplinary
proceedings, so we reject his argument concerning the third requirement.
Finally, Plouffe argues that the “patently unconstitutional” exception applies
because the statements he made in the Chamberlain brief are protected by the First
Amendment. Under this extremely narrow exception, we might enjoin a state
proceeding where the relevant state law is “flagrantly and patently” unconstitutional
“in every clause, sentence and paragraph, and in whatever manner and against
whomever an effort might be made to apply it.” Trainor, 431 U.S. at 447 (quoting
Younger, 401 U.S. at 53-54). Plouffe admits that Rule 8.4(d) is not facially
unconstitutional. Indeed, he acknowledges that the First Amendment would not
protect him if the court found that his statements were knowingly false, as the ethics
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complaint alleges. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974). Thus,
by Plouffe’s own admission, Rule 8.4(d) is not “flagrantly and patently”
unconstitutional “in whatever manner and against whomever an effort might be made
to apply it.” See Trainor, 431 U.S. at 447. Accordingly, the “patently
unconstitutional” exception does not apply here.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the district court did not err in applying the Younger
abstention doctrine and dismissing Plouffe’s complaint. Accordingly, we affirm the
judgment of the district court.
COLLOTON, Circuit Judge, concurring.
I concur in the opinion of the court, but believe that clarification is warranted
regarding our standard of review. The court says that we review the application of the
abstention doctrine of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), for “abuse of
discretion.” Ante, at 4. The annals include several cases saying the same thing, all of
which trace back to a decision that did not say it. See Warmus v. Melahn, 62 F.3d
252, 255 (8th Cir. 1995) (citing Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Riney, 21 F.3d 793, 798 (8th
Cir. 1994), for the proposition), vacated on other grounds, 512 U.S. 1241 (1996).
The Supreme Court has been clear that where Younger applies, “there is no
discretion to grant injunctive relief.” Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United
States, 424 U.S. 800, 816 n.22 (1976); cf. Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 73 (1971)
(discussing authority to grant declaratory relief). In reviewing the district court’s
decision to abstain from exercising jurisdiction over Plouffe’s complaint for injunctive
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relief, therefore, we are not evaluating an exercise of discretion. We are considering
a question of law.
An error of law can always be characterized as “an abuse of discretion,” see
United States v. Blue Bird, 372 F.3d 989, 991 (8th Cir. 2004), so it is technically not
incorrect to say that we check in Younger cases to make sure there is no such abuse.
But the issue is more accurately described as a legal matter that we review de novo,
and that is how our prior panel decisions (despite their fealty to the Warmus language)
have treated it. In the interest of avoiding confusion and improving clarity, it would
behoove us to say so directly. Accord Village of DePue v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 537
F.3d 775, 782 (7th Cir. 2008); Diamond “D” Constr. Corp. v. McGowan, 282 F.3d
191, 197-98 (2d Cir. 2002); Roe No. 2 v. Ogden, 253 F.3d 1225, 1232 (10th Cir.
2001); Brooks v. New Hampshire Supreme Court, 80 F.3d 633, 637 (1st Cir. 1996);
Fieger v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 740, 743 (6th Cir. 1996); Fresh Int’l Corp. v. Agric. Labor
Relations Bd., 805 F.2d 1353, 1356 & n.2 (9th Cir. 1986); see also Nivens v. Gilchrist,
319 F.3d 151, 153 (4th Cir. 2003) (reviewing for “abuse of discretion,” but noting that
“an error of law constitutes an abuse of discretion”).
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