UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
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No. 97-11000
Summary Calendar
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ALVIN JONES,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
FEDERAL EXPRESS CORP.,
Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Texas
(3:95-CV-2111-R)
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May 12, 1998
Before JOLLY, BENAVIDES, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
BENAVIDES, Circuit Judge:*
Appellant Alvin Jones appeals the district court’s grant of
summary judgment to Appellee Federal Express Corporation. We
affirm.
Federal Express terminated Alvin Jones’s employment on
February 18, 1992. On November 8, 1994, Jones, acting pro se,
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
brought suit in federal district court alleging that his
termination constituted race and gender discrimination in violation
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e et seq. and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. While this lawsuit (“Jones
I”) was pending, Jones applied for and was denied re-employment
with Federal Express. Jones filed a complaint with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), alleging that Federal
Express refused to rehire him based on disability discrimination
and in retaliation for his previous discrimination charge. On June
22, 1995, the EEOC issued Jones a right-to-sue letter.
On September 19, 1995, Jones filed the lawsuit out of which
this appeal arises (“Jones II”). In his original complaint in
Jones II, he alleged that his February 1992 termination violated
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-
12213, and constituted retaliatory discharge for filing a worker’s
compensation claim. He made no factual allegations regarding
Federal Express’s 1994 refusal to rehire him in his original
complaint, but attached to the original complaint the EEOC right-
to-sue letter relating to his refusal-to-rehire claim. The record
does not reflect that the original complaint was ever served on
Federal Express.
In October 1995, more than 90 days after the EEOC issued the
right-to-sue letter, Jones filed his first amended complaint in
Jones II, which included factual allegations relating to his
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refusal-to-rehire claim. The first amended complaint was served on
Federal Express in January 1995. Federal Express filed a motion
for summary judgment in Jones I on March 28, 1996, and the motion
was granted on July 16, 1996.
The district court granted summary judgment to Federal Express
in Jones II on August 14, 1997. The district court held that
Jones’s claims relating to his February 1992 discharge were barred
by res judicata (claim preclusion), and that his claims arising out
of Federal Express’s refusal to rehire him were barred by the 90-
day statute of limitations set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
This appeal followed.
The district court properly concluded Jones’s claims of
disability discrimination and retaliatory discharge in Jones II
were barred by claim preclusion. “Res judicata bars all claims
that were or could have been advanced in support of the cause of
action on the occasion of its former adjudication.” Fleming v.
Travenol Labs., Inc., 707 F.2d 829, 834 (5th Cir. 1983). Although
Jones attached different legal labels to his claims in the two
lawsuits, the factual bases for his earlier termination claims are
the same as those in Jones II. See Fleming, 707 F.2d at 834
(concluding that the factual basis for § 1983 and fourteenth
amendment claims was the same as the factual basis for sex
discrimination claims arising out of the same termination).
Accordingly, the doctrine of claim preclusion bars his claims in
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Jones II relating to the February 1992 termination because Jones
could have brought these claims in Jones I.
The district court also properly dismissed as time barred
those claims relating to Federal Express’s refusal to rehire Jones.
He first pleaded his refusal-to-rehire claims in his amended
complaint, which was filed on October 24, 1995. This filing was
untimely under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) because it occurred more
than 90 days after the EEOC issued the right-to-sue letter. Even
employing the liberal rules of pleading applicable to pro se
litigants, Jones’s original complaint in Jones II, which was filed
within the 90 days, was insufficient to satisfy 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(f)(1). That pleading contained no factual allegations concerning
Federal Express’s refusal to rehire him. Instead, his original
complaint contained factual allegations relating only to his
February 1992 termination. The filing of his EEOC right-to-sue
letter as an attachment to this original complaint was insufficient
to comply with § 2000e-5(f)(1)’s requirement that a complaint be
brought within 90 days of the issuance of a right-to-sue letter and
was insufficient to provide notice of such claims. See Baldwin
County Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 104 S. Ct. 1723 (1984);
Antoine v. United States Postal Serv., 781 F.2d 433 (5th Cir.
1986); Firle v. Mississippi State Dep’t of Educ., 762 F.2d 487,
488-89 (5th Cir. 1985). Under these circumstances, there was no
basis for allowing the claims in his amended original complaint to
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relate back to the date of filing the original complaint under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c). See Baldwin County, 466
U.S. at 150 n.3, 104 S. Ct. at 1725 n.3. Thus, Jones’s claims
arising from Federal Express’s refusal to rehire him were properly
dismissed as untimely.
AFFIRMED.
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