UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-5270
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
HENRY P. BENNETT, JR., a/k/a Juni, a/k/a Unc,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Charleston. David C. Norton, Chief District
Judge. (2:07-cr-00924-DCN-1)
Submitted: May 17, 2010 Decided: June 3, 2010
Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part; reversed in part by unpublished per curiam
opinion.
David B. Betts, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. Kevin
F. McDonald, Acting United States Attorney, Alston C. Badger,
Assistant United States Attorney, Charleston, South Carolina,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Henry P. Bennett, Jr., was found guilty after a jury
trial for seven drug counts and one money laundering offense:
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms
or more of cocaine and fifty grams or more of cocaine base, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2006) (Count 1); possession with
intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2006) (Counts 2, 13);
possession with intent to distribute a quantity of cocaine
(Counts 6, 10); possession with intent to distribute 500 grams
or more of cocaine (Counts 11, 12); and conspiracy to commit
money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. §
1956(a)(1)(A)(i), (a)(1)(B)(i) (West 2000 & Supp. 2009) (Count
14). Bennett received life sentences for Counts 1, 2, 11, 12,
and 13, 360-month sentences for Counts 6 and 10, and a 240-month
sentence for Count 14. All sentences were imposed to run
concurrent to each other.
On appeal, Bennett’s counsel filed a brief pursuant to
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting there are
no meritorious grounds for appeal, but raising the following
issue: whether the district court erred by denying Bennett’s
motion for acquittal based on sufficiency of the evidence. For
the reasons that follow, we affirm in part and reverse in part.
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We review the denial of a motion for acquittal de
novo, United States v. Alerre, 430 F.3d 681, 693 (4th Cir.
2005), and will sustain a conviction if there is substantial
evidence, taking the view most favorable to the Government, to
support it. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942).
Ample evidence supported all of Bennett’s convictions,
except for his conspiracy to commit money laundering charge
(Count 14). We find the evidence failed to support Bennett’s
conviction under Count 14 and reverse that conviction, as it
falls outside our extant case law to support either the
promotion or concealment prong of the money laundering statute.
See, e.g., United States v. Caplinger, 339 F.3d 226 (4th Cir.
2003) (international money laundering scheme to attract
investment in bogus scheme to market worldwide a drug promised
to be effective in treating HIV/AIDS and cancer); United States
v. Stewart, 256 F.3d 231 (4th Cir. 2001) (upholding money
laundering conviction based on bicoastal distribution of large
amounts of marijuana where drugs were shipped into Virginia by
overnight courier; defendant Livingston recruited various people
and provided them with aliases to receive wire transfers; in
three-year period defendant Stewart received 136 wire transfers
and money parcels totaling $345,840); and United States v.
Wilkinson, 137 F.3d 214 (4th Cir. 1998) (defendants borrowed
money from a Maryland lender, fraudulently representing that
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they were financing accounts receivable of physicians in
exchange for perfected security interests in the physicians’
accounts, with defendants obtaining in excess of three million
dollars through wire transfers by submitting dummy loan requests
via facsimile). Thus, we reverse Bennett’s conviction for Count
14.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case, including the issues raised in Bennett’s
pro se supplemental brief, and have found no other meritorious
issues for appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the remainder of
Bennett’s convictions and sentences. We deny Bennett’s pending
pro se motion to vacate the district court’s judgment. This
court requires that counsel inform his client, in writing, of
his right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If the client requests that a petition be
filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be
frivolous, then counsel may move this court for leave to
withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a
copy thereof was served on the client. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before the court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART;
REVERSED IN PART
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