United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 08-1989
CARLOS CONCEPCIÓN CHAPARRO; MARITZA ACEVEDO-ORAMA; YARITZA
ACEVEDO-ORAMA; ELIZABETH ACEVEDO-ORAMA; MIGDALIA ACEVEDO-ORAMA;
JOSÉ A. MÉNDEZ-VALLE; ANGEL CASTRO-GONZÁLEZ; MIGUEL A. CORTÉS-
ROMÁN; WILLIAM ROSA-FIGUEROA; MIGUEL TORRES-PÉREZ; EDWIN ACEVEDO-
ACEVEDO; RAÚL PANETO-COLÓN; MARIA PANETO-COLÓN; GILBERTO VARGAS-
RÍOS; AMILCAR MUÑIZ-ROSADO; ADELAIDA ROSARIO-GALLOZA; ÁNGEL L.
JIMÉNEZ-ACEVEDO; EDWIN VILLARRUBIA-SOTO; JOSÉ VILLANUEVA-
RODRÍGUEZ; JOSÉ A. CUEVAS-HERNÁNDEZ; ELBA I. QUINTANA-ROMÁN;
RAMONITA ACEVEDO-MUÑOZ; PABLO VILLANUEVA-RUIZ; THUALIA MUÑIZ-
SANTONI; GLORIVEE SUÁREZ; RAMONITA RODRÍGUEZ-VARELA; ANÍBAL
MÉNDEZ-ACEVEDO,
Plaintiffs, Appellees,
EILEEN S. SÁNCHEZ-FELICIANO; SANTIAGO HERNÁNDEZ-RUIZ,
Plaintiffs,
v.
MIGUEL A. RUIZ-HERNÁNDEZ, in his official capacity as mayor of
the Municipality of Aguada and in his personal capacity; GLENDA
L. PEÑA-MUÑOZ, in her official capacity as the Municipality of
Aguada's human resources director and in her personal capacity;
ANÍBAL MENDOZA, in his official capacity as the Municipality of
Aguada's public works director and in his personal capacity,
Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs, Appellants,
MUNICIPALITY OF AGUADA, PUERTO RICO,
Defendant, Appellant.
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Carmen Consuelo Cerezo, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lynch, Chief Judge,
Torruella and Howard, Circuit Judges.
Susana I. Peñagarícano-Brown, Assistant Solicitor General,
with whom Irene S. Soroeta-Kodesh, Solicitor General, Leticia
Casalduc-Rabell, Deputy Solicitor General, and Zaira Z. Girón-
Anadón, Deputy Solicitor General, were on brief for appellants
Miguel A. Ruiz-Hernández and Glenda L. Peña-Muñoz, in their
personal capacities.
Lizabel M. Negrón for appellant Municipality of Aguada.
Claudio Aliff-Ortiz, with whom Eliezer Aldarondo-Ortiz,
Eliezer A. Aldarondo-Lopez and Aldarondo & López Bras were on brief
for appellees.
June 3, 2010
LYNCH, Chief Judge. This is the second appearance here
of a civil rights suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 brought by a group of
twenty-two contract employees against the Municipality of Aguada in
Puerto Rico and two municipal officers. See Acevedo-Feliciano v.
Ruiz-Hernández (Acevedo-Feliciano IV), 447 F.3d 115 (1st Cir.
2006). That opinion, with which we assume familiarity, states the
underlying facts.
In the earlier phases of this case, before the appeal and
remand, a jury rejected plaintiffs' claim that they suffered
political party affiliation discrimination in violation of their
First Amendment rights. This left only one federal claim in the
case: whether plaintiffs had, on the facts of this case, a
sufficient property interest in their employment by the
Municipality to invoke federal constitutional procedural due
process rights and whether those rights were violated.
Between June and September 2000, the (now-former) mayor
of Aguada gave plaintiffs approximately one-year contracts of
employment with the Municipality, through June 30, 2001. These
contracts stated that plaintiffs' employment was "by way" of a
grant from the Commonwealth to the Municipality under Law 52. That
law authorizes the Commonwealth to grant municipalities certain
funds to promote local employment. See P.R. Laws. Ann. tit. 29,
§ 711c. Law 52 funds initially paid for plaintiffs' salaries.
After six months of funding under Law 52 ended on December 31,
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2000, plaintiffs were paid for another month with municipal funds.
The Municipality terminated their employment on January 31, 2001,
without notice or hearing, some five months shy of the expiration
of their contracts.
In order for plaintiffs to have procedural due process
rights in their employment, each plaintiff must have had a
reasonable expectation, based on a statute, policy, rule, or
contract, that he or she would continue to be employed. See Wojcik
v. Mass. State Lottery Comm'n, 300 F.3d 92, 101 (1st Cir. 2002).
These interests are commonly called "property interests," and we
look to state law to see if such property interests exist.
Acevedo-Feliciano IV, 447 F.3d at 121 (citing Bishop v. Wood, 426
U.S. 341, 344 (1976)). Whether these property interests rise to a
level sufficient to trigger procedural due process protections
remains a federal question. Id.
In our prior decision, we vacated the district court's
entry of judgment in favor of defendants, which was based on its
determination that "either the Law 52 contract or municipal law
required that each plaintiff's hiring contract be read to include
the implicit condition that the term of employment was conditioned
on the Municipality's receipt of Law 52 funding." Id. at 122.
After a discussion of Law 52 and pertinent municipal law,
we held that this rationale was not dispositive or supported, that
more analysis was needed, and that Puerto Rican law on the subject
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was unclear. Id. at 122-24. We vacated and remanded so the court
could address "whether Puerto Rican law supplies any sort of
property interest once the Law 52 funding ceased." Id. at 124.
On remand, the district court directed both parties to
file cross-motions for summary judgment, granted summary judgment
for plaintiffs, and held an evidentiary hearing on related facts.
The district court held that on the undisputed facts, plaintiffs
had a continued expectation of employment even though the Law 52
funding had expired. See Acevedo-Feliciano v. Ruiz-Hernández, 524
F. Supp. 2d 150, 154 (D.P.R. 2007) (Acevedo-Feliciano V). It so
held because municipal law did not prohibit the Municipality from
using general funds to continue paying plaintiffs' salaries, and
the Municipality knew it had substantial uncommitted funds when it
terminated plaintiffs' contracts. Id. at 153-54.
The court further found that plaintiffs' expectation
constituted a property interest in continued employment cognizable
under the due process clause. Id. at 154. It also held that there
was no indication from defendants that there were any adequate
state remedies. Id. at 154-55. After a trial on damages, a jury
granted compensatory damages, punitive damages, and back pay to
plaintiffs.
The Municipality and the individual defendants have
appealed. We address their contentions in turn.
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I. Denial of Certification to Puerto Rico Supreme Court
After more than nine years of litigation, a prior appeal,
and having lost at trial, defendants ask that questions be
certified to the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico. The request is more
than a little late--it was not raised until after remand--and the
district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
certification. See U.S. Steel v. M. DeMatteo Constr. Co., 315 F.3d
43, 53-54 (1st Cir. 2002).
In addition to being untimely, the two questions
defendants ask to be certified are the wrong questions. Defendants
say the dispositive, unsettled questions of Puerto Rican law on the
procedural due process claim are (1) whether a one-year appointment
made under Law 52 creates a legitimate expectation of continued
employment for the entire year if, at the time of appointment, the
Law 52 allotment was only for six months; and (2) whether the
Municipality must continue funding those appointments from other
funds once Law 52 funds expire.
The more significant question of Puerto Rican law
necessary to resolve plaintiffs' claim, however, is whether, under
municipal law, the Municipality could choose to use general
municipal funds to pay for Law 52 positions beyond the funding from
the Law 52 grant, so as to create a legitimate expectation of an
approximately one-year appointment. The district court held that
the Municipality was allowed, but not required, to do so under
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municipal law. See Acevedo-Feliciano V, 542 F. Supp. 2d at 153-54.
The remaining questions concerning the application of that
principle to the facts of this case were for the federal court to
resolve. We decline to certify, and the district court did not
abuse its discretion in declining to do so.
II. Existence of Procedural Due Process Rights
The district court granted summary judgment for
plaintiffs because it found as a matter of law that plaintiffs had
a property interest under state law, which was cognizable under the
due process clause, and that defendants deprived plaintiffs of that
right without due process of law. Id. at 155. We review the
district court's grant of summary judgment de novo and will affirm
if "there is no genuine issue as to any issue of material fact and
. . . the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
Agusty-Reyes v. Dep't of Educ., 601 F.3d 45, 52 (1st Cir. 2010).
There are no contested material facts. The only
questions before us are legal ones, specifically (1) whether, based
on contractual, policy, or other sources derived from Puerto Rican
law, plaintiffs had a property interest in continued employment
with the Municipality; (2) whether that interest is a
constitutionally protected right under the due process clause of
the federal Constitution; and (3) whether the Municipality deprived
plaintiffs of that right without providing constitutionally
adequate process. See Maymi v. P.R. Ports Auth., 515 F.3d 20, 29
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(1st Cir. 2008). Plaintiffs satisfied all these conditions, and we
affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment in their
favor.
A. Existence of Property Interests
We first address whether plaintiffs had a reasonable
expectation of continued employment, based on their contracts,
surrounding Puerto Rican law, and the facts of the case. We hold
that they did.
The undisputed facts1 established that when the
Municipality hired plaintiffs, the contracts committed the
Municipality to employing plaintiffs for almost a year, through
June 30, 2001, though the Municipality knew that the Law 52 grant
expired on December 31, 2000, approximately six months into that
period.
The Municipality also had the power to commit to
employing plaintiffs for their full contractual terms, despite the
limited duration of the Law 52 funds. Law 52 does not, by its
terms, prohibit municipalities from supplementing Law 52 monies
with municipal funds, see P.R. Laws. Ann. tit. 29, § 711c, and the
Commonwealth's Law 52 agreement with the Municipality here
specifically provided that "[i]f the Municipality offers to the
1
Contrary to defendants' assertions, because the
procedural due process question was appropriately resolved on
undisputed facts on summary judgment, there is no Seventh Amendment
issue. See, e.g., Darr v. Town of Telluride, 495 F.3d 1243, 1252
(10th Cir. 2007).
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employees other benefits which are not part of this agreement, the
Municipality assumes responsibility therefore and pays them with
its funds." Acevedo-Feliciano IV, 447 F.3d at 123.
Nor was the Municipality prohibited by law from making
this commitment. Indeed, the Autonomous Municipalities Act
authorizes the mayor to propose readjustments to the Municipality's
general expenses budget when there are anticipated surpluses. See
P.R. Laws. Ann. tit. 21, § 4309.
Further, it is undisputed that the Municipality acted in
ways to confirm plaintiffs' contractual expectations. After the
Law 52 funds expired, the Municipality paid plaintiffs for some
weeks out of municipal funds, confirming plaintiffs' expectation
that their employment would continue under their contracts even
after the Law 52 funds expired. This is sufficient to show that
plaintiffs had a property interest in continued employment under
state law.
B. Interests Cognizable as Procedural Due Process Rights
Plaintiffs' property interest in continued employment
under their approximately one-year contracts is a recognized
procedural due process right. This circuit's law holds that a one-
year term of employment with Puerto Rican government bodies is
generally considered a protected property interest for procedural
due process purposes. See Acevedo-Feliciano IV, 447 F.3d at 121;
Caro v. Aponte-Roque, 878 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1989).
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C. Deprivation of Plaintiffs' Due Process Rights
Finally, we consider, and reject, defendants' argument
that plaintiffs were not deprived of protected property interests
without due process of law because the process Puerto Rico provided
was adequate.
The plaintiffs' basic claim is that the Municipality
deprived them of their property interest in continued employment
pursuant to an official policy: the mayor, the Municipality's
official policymaker, made the final decision to terminate
plaintiffs, and the parties stipulated before the district court
that no pre-termination hearing was provided.
Defendants advance two arguments as to why state
processes provided plaintiffs with all the process they were due.
First, defendants say that, in practice, the Municipality provided
plaintiffs with all the process they were due because plaintiffs
were given notice and a collective opportunity to comment on their
termination in the meeting where they were handed their termination
notices. That argument is foreclosed by our earlier conclusion,
based on the parties' previous submissions before this court, that
"none of the plaintiffs were granted a pre-termination hearing."
Acevedo-Feliciano IV, 447 F.3d at 118-19.
Second, defendants say that under Parratt v. Taylor, 451
U.S. 527 (1981), and its progeny, plaintiffs cannot make out a
§ 1983 claim without showing the inadequacy of existing state
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remedies, and that plaintiffs have failed to carry that burden.
Defendants rely on cases involving random and unauthorized state
deprivations of property interests, in which a pre-termination
hearing is, by definition, infeasible and the question becomes
whether the state's post-deprivation processes are enough to
protect plaintiffs' rights. See, e.g., Chmielinski v.
Massachusetts, 513 F.3d 309, 315 (1st Cir. 2008). That is plainly
not the kind of violation alleged here.2
III. Claims against Individual Defendants
A. Qualified Immunity
Though the individual defendants repeatedly asserted that
they were entitled to qualified immunity both before and after the
remand, the district court did not address this question on
remand.3 Instead, having granted plaintiffs summary judgment on
2
Nor is this a case in which plaintiffs sought to
vindicate a right that had elapsed before suit was filed. Rather,
plaintiffs were "denied a right by virtue of which [they were]
presently entitled . . . to pursue a gainful occupation," and that
right cannot "be fully protected by an ordinary breach-of-contract
suit." Lujan v. G&G Fire Sprinklers, Inc., 532 U.S. 189, 196
(2001).
3
In August 2002, during the initial stages of this case,
the district court deemed one effort by the individual defendants
to present the qualified immunity question at summary judgment to
be untimely due to failure to comply with the court's deadlines.
See Acevedo-Feliciano v. Ruiz-Hernández (Acevedo-Feliciano I), No.
01-1445 (D.P.R. Aug. 16, 2002) (order denying defendants' motion
for summary judgment). On an interlocutory appeal, we affirmed the
untimeliness ruling on February 3, 2003. We added that "the
qualified immunity defense, if properly asserted in the defendants'
pleadings and otherwise properly maintained and presented, will
still be available at trial; the only consequence of the district
court's refusal to entertain the summary judgment motion on the
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their procedural due process claim, the district court held that
the only remaining issue was to determine how much the Municipality
and the individual defendants owed plaintiffs in damages.4 See
Acevedo-Feliciano V, 542 F. Supp. 2d at 155.
We hold that the individual defendants are entitled to
qualified immunity. Even when plaintiffs make out a violation of
a constitutional right, officials are entitled to qualified
immunity unless that right was also "clearly established at the
time of [their] alleged misconduct." Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S.
Ct. 808, 816 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Whether a
right is clearly established in turn depends on the clarity of the
law at the time of the violation and whether, on the facts of the
case, a reasonable official would know that his actions violated
plaintiffs' constitutional rights. See Walden v. City of
qualified immunity question has been to preclude a pretrial
resolution of the issue." See Acevedo-Feliciano v. Ruiz-Hernández
(Acevedo-Feliciano II), No. 02-2287 (1st Cir. Feb. 3, 2003)
(unpublished judgment).
Defendants took all steps necessary to preserve this claim.
They again raised it in their April 4, 2003, motion for judgment as
a matter of law before the first jury trial, see Acevedo-Feliciano
v. Ruiz-Hernández (Acevedo-Feliciano III), 275 F. Supp. 2d 162,
164, 167-68 (D.P.R. 2003) (denying defendants qualified immunity on
the First Amendment claim but avoiding the question on the due
process claim by holding that plaintiffs had no procedural due
process right in continued employment). They also raised it after
remand in their motion for summary judgment on the procedural due
process claim, in their motion for judgment as a matter of law, and
in their motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
4
To the extent that plaintiffs claim otherwise, nothing in
our prior decision precluded the individual defendants from
continuing to assert, on remand, that they were entitled to
qualified immunity.
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Providence, 596 F.3d 38, 53 (1st Cir. 2010). We hold that the
individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because
the defendants could not have reasonably known in 2001 that
plaintiffs had a constitutionally protected right under the due
process clause.
Our previous decision established that Puerto Rico law
was unclear as to whether plaintiffs had any rights to continued
employment once the Law 52 funding ended. See Acevedo-Feliciano
IV, 447 F.3d at 124. The various pleadings submitted on municipal
law at summary judgment amply demonstrate the lack of clarity.
Indeed, the district court had originally concluded that Puerto
Rican law established that plaintiffs had no such rights, see
Acevedo-Feliciano III, 275 F. Supp. 2d. at 166-67, and then
reversed that determination on remand, see Acevedo-Feliciano V, 524
F. Supp. 2d at 152-54, relying in both instances on roughly the
same provisions of Commonwealth and municipal law. Given the
intricate maze of Commonwealth and municipal law regarding
employment under Law 52, no reasonable official would have known,
in 2001, that terminating plaintiffs' approximately one-year
contracts because Law 52 funds had expired would violate
plaintiffs' procedural due process rights.
Because the individual defendants are entitled to
immunity, we vacate the judgment against them and remand with
instructions to dismiss all claims against the individual
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defendants with prejudice. This ruling does not, however, affect
the Municipality's liability. See Walden, 596 F.3d at 55 n.23.
B. Award of Punitive Damages
The jury awarded punitive damages to each of the twenty-
two plaintiffs in the sum of $15,000 each, which was allotted as
$7,500 against each of the two individual defendants. It was
error, indeed plain error, to submit this issue to the jury.
Punitive damages in a § 1983 civil rights action can be
granted at the jury's discretion only if "the defendant's conduct
is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it
involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally
protected rights of others." Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56
(1983). This court has "emphasized that the 'evil motive,'
'intent,' or 'reckless or callous indifference' pertains to the
'defendant's knowledge that [he] may be acting in violation of
federal law.'" Davignon v. Hodgson, 524 F.3d 91, 110 (1st Cir.
2008) (alteration in original) (quoting Iacobucci v. Boulter, 193
F.3d 14, 25-26 (1st Cir. 1999)).
Puerto Rican law was unclear as to whether plaintiffs had
a right to continued employment and so whether any constitutionally
protected interest was involved at all. Given the complexity of
the Commonwealth and municipal law at issue, it cannot logically be
true that the individual defendants knew they may have been acting
in violation of federal law. We vacate the punitive damages award
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and order dismissal of the punitive damages claim with prejudice on
remand.
IV. Award of Damages against the Municipality
As to each of the twenty-two plaintiffs, the jury awarded
$15,000 in compensatory ("suffering and anguish") damages and
$4,960 for back pay jointly and severally against defendants. We
need not determine whether this is the appropriate measure of
damages for a procedural due process violation; it is enough that
the Municipality has never challenged it.
Indeed, the Municipality's only challenge to the back pay
award is a specific argument that the award improperly included for
each plaintiff a $500 Christmas bonus for 2001. There was no error
in the district court's denial of remittitur on these grounds.
Plaintiffs had a property interest in their employment through June
30, 2001, and under Puerto Rican law, any employee who works for
the government for at least six months of a calendar year is
entitled to an annual Christmas bonus. See P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 3,
§ 757. There was sufficient evidence to support the award of the
bonus.
We have considered the rest of the arguments made by each
side and either have no need to reach them or have concluded they
are without merit.
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V. Conclusion
We vacate the judgments against the individual defendants
including the punitive damages award against them. We remand with
instructions to dismiss all claims against the individual
defendants with prejudice. Otherwise, the judgment against the
Municipality is affirmed. No costs are awarded.
So ordered.
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