United States v. Bryant

United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
___________

No. 09-2532
___________

United States of America, *
*
Appellee, *
* Appeal from the United States
v. * District Court for the Eastern
* District of Missouri
Weldon Bryant, *
*
Appellant. *
___________

Submitted: February 12, 2010
Filed: June 4, 2010
___________

Before RILEY, Chief Judge,1 SMITH and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.
___________

SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.

Following a jury trial, Weldon Bryant was convicted of three counts of mail
fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341. The district court2 sentenced Weldon to 18
months imprisonment to run consecutive to his three-year state sentence for

1
The Honorable William Jay Riley became Chief Judge of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit on April 1, 2010.
2
The Honorable Stephen N. Limbaugh, Jr., United States District Judge for the
Eastern District of Missouri.
possession of a controlled substance,3 and ordered him to make restitution in the
amount of $29,444. Weldon appeals his convictions, sentence, and the restitution
order. We affirm.

I.

In 2000, Eleanor J. Bryant, a retired school teacher residing in Fairdealing,
Missouri, applied for a long-term care insurance policy (“the policy”) through
American Republic Insurance Company (“American Republic”). Once Ms. Bryant’s
application was accepted, American Republic’s subsidiary, John Hancock Life
Insurance Company (“John Hancock”), issued and administered the policy. The
policy offered reimbursement of up to $70.00 per day4 for the neccesary care expenses
associated with long-term disability, including home health care.5 To file a
reimbursement claim under the policy, the insured (or their representative) had to
submit a Custodial Nursing Care Questionnaire (“CNCQ”) form to John Hancock.
The CNCQ form required the claimant to provide a detailed description of the number
of hours that a caregiver6 had provided the insured, the dates of the service, and the

3
In 2004, Weldon was convicted in Missouri for possession of a controlled
substance. Weldon received a suspended imposition of sentence of five years
probation. His probation was revoked when he committed the instant offense, and
Weldon was sentenced to three-years imprisonment.
4
The maximum lifetime benefit under the policy was $153,000.
5
Specifically, the policy stated, “We will pay the actual charges incurred for
a provider of Home Health Care up to the Home Health Care Daily benefits as shown
in the Policy Schedule. Any unused portion of your Daily Benefit will remain in the
Policy Limit.” (Appellee’s App. 16 (emphasis added).)
6
The policy only provided reimbursement of payment to in-home caregivers
who qualified, under its terms, as “Home Health Care Providers.” (See Appellee’s
App. 14.) Some of the qualified providers listed in the policy included: licenced
agencies, licensed nurses, and certified nurse’s aides. (Id.)

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amount of money that the insured had paid the caregiver for service. The form was
to be signed by both the caregiver and the insured, or the insured’s representative.
Once a claim was approved, John Hancock would then reimburse the insured for all
expenses paid to the caregiver up to the $70.00 daily limit.

In January 2005, after Ms. Bryant was diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease,
John Hancock determined that Ms. Bryant was eligible for benefits under the policy.
Weldon, one of Ms. Bryant’s sons, obtained a Power of Attorney, authorizing him to
make health care decisions for his mother. Weldon then moved into Ms. Bryant’s
home and hired Jesse White, a Certified Nurse’s Assistant, to provide home health
care for his mother. Weldon began submitting CNCQ forms to John Hancock through
the United States mail. All of the forms were signed by White and included
information about the care White provided for Ms. Bryant. John Hancock reimbursed
Weldon for the expenses he claimed on the forms.

On October 1, 2005, White stopped providing home health care services for Ms.
Bryant. On two separate occasions subsequent to this date, Weldon arranged meetings
with White. At these meetings, Weldon informed White that he had misplaced some
of the CNCQ forms White had signed when providing home health care services to
Ms. Bryant. Weldon indicated that he had not yet been reimbursed for these prior
expenses and convinced White to sign approximately 20 blank CNCQ forms as
substitutes for the alleged misplaced forms. Weldon then completed the blank, signed
forms with fraudulent information regarding Ms. Bryant’s care, claiming that White
had provided skilled nursing care to Ms. Bryant, although in reality, White was no
longer Ms. Bryant’s caregiver. Weldon mailed the fraudulent CNCQ reimbursement
forms to John Hancock on several occasions from November 2005 until January 2007.

After Ms. Bryant stopped receiving care from White in Fairdealing, she moved
in with another son, Fred Bryant, in Fenton, Missouri. Fred employed Bon Vivant,

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a care facility, to assist Ms. Bryant. Fred began sending reimbursement requests to
John Hancock for Bon Vivant’s care of his mother. At the same time, Weldon was
submitting CNCQ forms which falsely represented that Ms. Bryant was still receiving
care from White.

John Hancock’s investigation into the matter revealed that Weldon had been
submitting inaccurate claims for reimbursement. In September 2008, Weldon was
indicted by a federal grand jury on four counts of mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1341. Prior to trial, the government dismissed one of these counts. On February 13,
2009, a jury found Weldon guilty on the remaining three counts of mail fraud.

At the conclusion of Weldon’s sentencing hearing, the district court determined
Weldon’s base offense level to be seven under United States Sentencing Commission,
Guidelines Manual, §2B1.1(a). The court then applied a four-level enhancement for
causing a loss in excess of $10,000, under USSG §2B1.1(b)(1)(C). This resulted in
an offense level of 11. With a criminal history category of III based on his 2004
Missouri drug conviction, Weldon’s advisory Sentencing Guidelines range was 12 to
18 months imprisonment. In denying Weldon’s request for a downward departure, the
district court stated, “I don’t believe there’s any proper grounds for downward
departure because the criminal history category does not substantially over represent
the seriousness of your situation and your criminal history.” (Sent. Tr. 27.) Further,
the district court explained:

There’s no question in my mind that you can be a useful and productive
citizen and you will on your release, but I have to say I was shocked
when I found out that you had a conviction for cocaine on your record
in 2004. That was the first I’d heard about it and I could hardly believe
it because a person of your standing in the community, with all the
advantages that you have - - My goodness, your mother was a school
teacher for all of your life. Only blessing in this whole tragedy is that
she’s suffering from dementia and probably doesn’t know about your
situation now . . . . 90 percent of the people that we see in this courtroom

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 haven’t had a fraction of the advantages that you’ve had. I mean you’re
a very intelligent person with a college degree and successful life most
of all and here you get a drug violation and while you’re on probation,
you commit fraud to the tune of some $29,000 against an insurance
company and regardless of your motives on that, I mean this is just
simply inexcusable. Pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 and
the provisions of Title 18, United States Code, Section 3553(a) and also
pursuant to the sentencing objectives of just punishment, general
deterrence and incapacitation, it is the judgment and sentence of the
Court that you are hereby committed to the custody of the Bureau of
Prisons to be imprisoned for a term of 18 months.

(Id. at 26-27.) Further, “pursuant to the provisions of [USSG] section 5G1.3,” the
district court ordered that Weldon’s sentence run consecutively to his three-year
sentence for his prior state court conviction. (Id. at 27.) In addition, the court ordered
Weldon to pay restitution in the amount of $29,444 to John Hancock, the amount of
loss to John Hancock proven by the government at trial.

II.

Weldon appeals, challenging (1) the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his
mail fraud convictions, (2) his sentence, and (3) the district court’s refusal to award
a portion of the restitution amount to Ms. Bryant’s estate.

A.

“We review the sufficiency of the evidence de novo, viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to the government, resolving evidentiary conflicts in the
government’s favor, and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the jury’s
verdict.” United States v. Stymeist, 513 F.3d 759, 764 (8th Cir. 2009), cert. denied,

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No. 09-9420, 2010 WL 891331 (Apr. 5, 2010). To establish mail fraud,7 the
government must prove: “(1) a scheme to defraud by means of material false
representations or promises, (2) intent to defraud, (3) reasonable foreseeability that the
mail would be used, and (4) [that] the mail was used in furtherance of some essential
step in the scheme.” United States v. Parker, 364 F.3d 934, 943 (8th Cir. 2004) (citing
18 U.S.C. § 1341); see also United States v. Frost, 321 F.3d 738, 740-41 (8th Cir.
2003) (affirming a mail fraud conviction where defendant mailed documents
requesting payment with forged signatures in order to maintain the appearance that
other parties had approved the payments).

Weldon disputes only the first element, arguing that the reimbursed insurance
funds he received from John Hancock “were legitimately obtained for the purposes
sought,” including payment for his own care of Ms. Bryant. (Appellant’s Br. 14.) He
claims that his false representations about White’s care of Ms. Bryant were not
materially false representations under Ms. Bryant’s policy because “for purposes of
a criminal fraud under the mail fraud statute, the government must prove more than
a deceit perpetrated on the insurance company with respect to the identity of the care-
giver.” (Id. at 11.) Weldon further argues that material terms of the policy—that Ms.
Bryant was ill, qualified for benefits under the policy, and was provided care by

7
A person can be convicted of mail fraud when the person:

having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to
defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or
fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises . . . for the
purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so to
do, places in any post office or authorized depository for mail
matter, any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by the
Postal Service . . . or takes or receives therefrom, any such matter
or thing, or knowingly causes to be delivered by mail . . . any such
matter or thing . . . .

18 U.S.C. § 1341.
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Weldon—were not misrepresented by him, and because the identity of the caregiver
was not specifically listed as a material term of the contract, John Hancock was not
defrauded out of a property right by a material representation when Weldon
represented that White was caring for Ms. Bryant.

Weldon is correct that to constitute mail fraud, a defendant’s misrepresentations
must be material. See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 23-25 (1999); see also
United States v. Heppner, 519 F.3d 744, 748-49 (8th Cir.) (“In order to be convicted
of mail fraud, a defendant must have made a material falsehood; materiality is an
essential element of the offense.”), cert. denied, Anderson v. United States, 129 S. Ct.
250 (2008). However, contrary to Weldon’s argument, there is no requirement that
a term be specifically designated as “material” in an insurance policy for the term to
actually be material for purposes of mail fraud. Instead, “[a] misrepresentation is
material if it is capable of influencing the intended victim.” United States v. Hively,
437 F.3d 752, 764 (8th Cir. 2006) (citing Neder, 527 U.S. at 24); see also Preston v.
United States, 312 F.3d 959, 961 (8th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (a material fact is “a fact
that would be important to a reasonable person in deciding whether to engage or not
to engage in a particular transaction”).

The record reflects that from November 2005 through January 2007, Weldon
mailed reimbursement forms to John Hancock, all of which alleged that Weldon had
paid White for care which, in reality, was never provided to Ms. Bryant by White. It
is irrelevant that Weldon himself cared for Ms. Bryant prior to her move to Fenton
because he was not a licensed nurse, a certified nurse’s aide, nor any other type of
qualified home care provider specifically listed in John Hancock’s policy. (See
Appellee’s App. 14.) John Hancock, influenced by Weldon’s false claims of care,
relied on Weldon’s misrepresentations to send Weldon reimbursement checks for care
John Hancock believed was being provided, although John Hancock was only
obligated to reimburse the actual charges Ms. Bryant incurred for care provided by

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qualifying providers. These misrepresentations thus “influenc[ed] the intended
victim,” Hively, 437 F.3d at 764, and were therefore material.

B.

Weldon next challenges his sentence, arguing that the district court: (1)
inappropriately rejected Weldon’s request for a downward departure based on his
suggestion that his criminal history was overstated; (2) erred by inadequately
explaining its reasoning at sentencing; (3) erred in its imposition of consecutive
sentences; and (4) inappropriately weighed sentencing factors and considered
prohibited factors at sentencing. We review a district court’s sentence for abuse of
discretion. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007). Under this standard, we
initially review a sentence for significant procedural error and then, if necessary, for
substantive reasonableness. United States v. Fischer, 551 F.3d 751, 754 (8th Cir.
2008).

1. Significant Procedural Error

In reviewing a sentence for significant procedural error, we review a district
court’s factual findings for clear error and its interpretation and application of the
guidelines de novo. Id. Procedural errors include “failing to calculate (or improperly
calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to
consider the §3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts,
or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence—including an explanation for any
deviation from the Guidelines range.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. “[W]hen a judge decides
simply to apply the Guidelines to a particular case, doing so will not necessarily
require lengthy explanation.” Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007).

Weldon argues that the district court erred in denying his request for a
downward departure from the advisory Guidelines range based on his alleged

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overstated criminal history. “If reliable information indicates that the defendant’s
criminal history category substantially over-represents the seriousness of the
defendant’s criminal history . . . a downward departure may be warranted.” USSG
§4A1.3(b)(1). However, in general, “[t]he discretionary denial of a motion for
downward departure is unreviewable unless the court failed to recognize its authority
to depart.” United States v. Andreano, 417 F.3d 967, 970 (8th Cir. 2005); see also
United States v. Vasquez, 433 F.3d 666, 670 (8th Cir. 2006) (“[W]e cannot review
whether the district court erred in declining to exercise its discretion to depart
downward for overstated criminal history.”). Here, the district court recognized its
authority to depart downward, yet decided not to do so, stating, “I don’t believe
there’s any proper grounds for downward departure because the criminal history
Category does not substantially over represent the seriousness of your situation and
your criminal history.” (Sent. Tr. 27.) Because the district court recognized its
authority, we are precluded from reviewing this decision.

Weldon also argues that the district court committed significant procedural error
by not adequately considering the section 3553(a) sentencing factors. Contrary to
Weldon’s contention, however, there is no requirement that the district court recite
every section 3553(a) factor, United States v. Battiest, 553 F.3d 1132, 1136 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2452 (2009), and the defendant’s PSR, arguments by the
parties, and other evidence at the sentencing hearing all provide the court with enough
information on which to base a sentencing decision. See United States v. Struzik, 572
F.3d 484, 487 (8th Cir. 2009).

In Struzik, we concluded that the district court “fully considered [the section
3553(a)] factors and sufficiently explained its decision” where “the court had
‘significant exposure’ to [the defendant’s] PSR, the parties’ sentencing memoranda
and their arguments at the sentencing hearing” and “imposed a sentence which he
justified by specific reference to several § 3553(a) factors.” Id. Similarly here, the
district court heard arguments by both parties, and Weldon’s PSR explained his

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offense level and recommended sentence. See United States v. Jones, 493 F.3d 938,
941 (8th Cir. 2007) (“The [PSR] contains extensive information regarding [the
defendant], his history and characteristics, the nature and circumstances of the offense,
the kinds of sentences available, and a recommended advisory sentencing guidelines
range, all of which are factors under § 3553(a).”), vacated, 552 U.S. 1091 (2008),
reinstated, 275 F. App’x 561, 562 (8th Cir. 2008) (unpublished per curiam). Although
the district court did not recite every section 3553(a) factor, the court did refer to
section 3553(a) and specifically accounted for “the sentencing objectives of just
punishment, general deterrence and incapacitation,” (Sent. Tr. 27), all of which are
considerations under section 3553(a), see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); see also United States
v. Gray, 533 F.3d 942, 943 (8th Cir. 2008) (“If a district court references some of the
considerations contained in § 3553(a), we are ordinarily satisfied that the district court
was aware of the entire contents of the relevant statute.” (quotation omitted)). We
conclude that the district court adequately considered the section 3553(a) factors.

We are further unpersuaded by Weldon’s argument that the district court erred
in sentencing him to serve consecutive and not concurrent sentences. Weldon claims
that the district court should have provided a separate statement of reasons for this
sentencing decision. “We review a district court’s decision to impose a consecutive
or concurrent sentence for reasonableness.” United States v. McDonald, 521 F.3d
975, 980 (8th Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted). A review for reasonableness is “akin”
to the “abuse-of-discretion” standard. United States v. Mathis, 451 F.3d 939, 941 (8th
Cir. 2006).

“Multiple terms of imprisonment imposed at different times run consecutively
unless the court orders that the terms are to run concurrently.” 18 U.S.C. § 3584. “To
allow for meaningful appellate review, ‘[t]he district court must explain its reasoning
for imposing a concurrent or consecutive sentence.” McDonald, 521 F.3d at 980
(quoting United States v. Winston, 456 F.3d 861, 867 (8th Cir. 2006) (alterations in
original)). Before imposing a consecutive sentence, the district court must consider

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18 U.S.C. § 3584, which refers to the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See United
States v. Mayotte, 249 F.3d 797, 799 (8th Cir. 2001) (per curiam). Recently, we held
that a consecutive sentence was reasonable where:

The court expressly referred to section 5G1.3(c) and the accompanying
application note as well as the application note’s comment that section
3584 and its reference to section 3553(a) be considered. The court
discussed the section 3553(a) factors and their applicability including:
the nature and circumstances of the offenses of conviction; the kinds of
sentences available; [the defendant’s] history and characteristics, noting
his age, education, and his history of drug use; [the defendant’s] criminal
history [and] the need to protect the public . . . .

United States v. Tonks, 574 F.3d 628, 633 (8th Cir. 2009). Although Weldon claims
that “while the District Court did mention the § 3553(a) factors, it did not do so in
connection with any discussion concerning concurrent versus consecutive sentences,”
(Appellant Br. 21), there is no requirement that a district court provide a separate
statement of reasons because, unless it is a “doubtful case,” a sentencing court need
not specifically explain its reasoning in the imposition of a consecutive sentence,
United States v. Lincoln, 956 F.2d 1465, 1474 n.9 (8th Cir. 1992).

We note that the District Court did not explain its decision to make
Lincoln’s subornation of perjury sentence consecutive to his previously
imposed arson and mail fraud sentences in terms of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
. . . . While in doubtful cases a sentencing court’s failure to explain its
decision might call its evaluation into question, our examination of the
record reveals nothing . . . to indicate that the district court erred in
imposing consecutive sentences or failed to consider the relevant factors
set forth in [18 U.S.C. §] 3553(a).

Id. (quotation omitted).

We find nothing in the district court’s sentence reflecting any failure to consider
the § 3553(a) factors or failure to explain its decision. In fact, the court explicitly

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referenced the § 3553(a) factors and its authority to impose consecutive sentences,
stating that the sentence was imposed “[p]ursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act . . .
the provisions of Title 18 . . . Section 3553(a) and also pursuant to the sentencing
objectives of just punishment, general deterrence and incapacitation,” and “the
provisions of Section 5G1.3.” (Sent. Tr. 27.) The district court’s reasoning was
sufficient and the imposition of a consecutive sentence was therefore reasonable.

We conclude that the district court did not commit significant procedural error.

2. Substantive Error

“If the decision was ‘procedurally sound,’ we then review the ‘substantive
reasonableness of the sentence’ . . . considering the totality of the circumstances.”
United States v. Shy, 538 F.3d 933, 937 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51).
“[I]n determining whether the district court considered the relevant factors in a
particular case, ‘the context for the appellate court’s review is the entire sentencing
record, not merely the district court’s statements at the hearing.’” Gray, 533 F.3d at
944 (quoting United States v. Perkins, 526 F.3d 1107, 1111 (8th Cir. 2008)).
Substantive reasonableness is presumed if a sentence is within the appropriately
calculated Guidelines range. See United States v. Keating, 579 F.3d 891, 894 (8th
Cir. 2009). However, an abuse of discretion occurs “where the sentencing court fails
to consider a relevant factor that should have received significant weight, gives
significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or considers only the
appropriate factors but commits a clear error of judgment in weighing those factors.”
United States v. Moore, 565 F.3d 435, 438 (8th Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted).

Weldon argues that the district court committed substantive error by failing to
consider relevant sentencing factors, including: (1) the stress he was under while
caring for his elderly mother; (2) the fact that he could satisfy the restitution award
more quickly if he was working and not incarcerated; and (3) his age, health, and

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family situation. However, the district court was provided this information at
sentencing and we find that the district court did not commit a “clear error of
judgment in weighing [the factors].” Id.; see also Rita, 551 U.S. at 359 (“Where a
matter is as conceptually simple as in the case at hand and the record makes clear that
the sentencing judge considered the evidence and arguments, we do not believe the
law requires the judge to write more extensively.”).

Further, Weldon challenges the district court’s alleged reliance on his socio-
economic status at sentencing. He argues that the district court erred by discussing
his “advantages” in comparison to other defendants because the court was not
permitted to consider Weldon’s socio-economic status pursuant to USSG §5H1.10.
His argument, however, is belied by the fact that the district court’s sentence falls
within the advisory Guidelines range and the limitations in USSG Chapter 5H8 only
apply when a district court departs from the Guidelines. See United States v.
Robinson, 409 F.3d 979, 980 (8th Cir. 2005) (“Subchapter 5H of the Guidelines
contains policy statements that ‘address the relevance of certain offender
characteristics to the determination of whether a sentence should be outside the

8
The introduction to Chapter Five, Part H, of the Guidelines states:

The Commission has determined that certain circumstances are not
ordinarily relevant to the determination of whether a sentence should be
outside the applicable guideline range. Unless expressly stated, this
does not mean that the Commission views such circumstances as
necessarily inappropriate to the determination of the sentence within the
applicable guideline range or to the determination of various other
incidents of an appropriate sentence.

USSG Ch.5H, intro. comment. These circumstances include race, sex, national origin,
creed, religion, and socio-economic status. See USSG § 5H1.10.

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applicable guideline range.’” (quoting USSG Ch.5, Pt. H, intro. comment.)); see also
United States v. Dyck, 334 F.3d 736, 743 (8th Cir. 2003) (“The district court’s other
asserted bases for departing downward [including those reasons listed in USSG §
5H1.10] do not support the departure.”).

Additionally, there is no indication in the record that the district court even
relied upon Weldon’s socio-economic status during sentencing. The court did not
discuss Weldon’s income or race or that of the general population in which Weldon
resided. In fact, all that the district court noted was that Weldon had “advantages” and
a “successful” life. (Sent. Tr. 26-27.)

We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in the imposition
of Weldon’s sentence.

C.

Weldon next appeals the district court’s award of restitution in the amount of
$29,444 to John Hancock, arguing that a portion of the restitution should be paid to
his mother’s estate as she will now qualify for fewer benefits because of his fraud.
“We review a restitution order for abuse of discretion and the district court’s
application of the restitution statute de novo.” United States v. Reichow, 416 F.3d
802, 804 (8th Cir. 2005). The Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (“MVRA”)
mandates that a trial court order “that the defendant make restitution to the victim of
the offense,” 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(1), when the defendant is convicted of “an offense
against property under [Title 18] . . . including any offense committed by fraud or
deceit,” id. § 3663A(c)(1)(A)(ii). Under the MVRA, a “victim” is defined as “a
person directly and proximately harmed as a result of the commission of an offense
for which restitution may be ordered . . . .” Id. § 3663A(a)(2). This court has applied

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the MVRA to mail fraud cases. See United States v. Stennis-Williams, 557 F.3d 927,
930 (8th Cir. 2009).

Ms. Bryant’s policy provided for reimbursement of caregiver services paid by
Ms. Bryant (or Weldon, her agent). Because Weldon did not actually pay for the
services he represented that White had provided for his mother, Weldon was not
legally entitled to any reimbursement from John Hancock. However, because John
Hancock reimbursed Weldon under these fraudulent claims, John Hancock was
“directly and proximately harmed as a result of the commission of [Weldon’s]
offense,” 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(2), and John Hancock, not Ms. Bryant, is the victim
and the proper recipient of the restitution award. Furthermore, if the restitution was
paid to Ms. Bryant’s estate, Weldon could inappropriately benefit as a potential
beneficiary of his mother’s estate. This would defeat the purpose of the MVRA,
which is to restore the injured party, not to benefit the wrongdoer. United States v.
Balentine, 569 F.3d 801, 806 (8th Cir.) (the purpose of the MVRA “is to make victims
of crime whole, to fully compensate these victims for their losses and to restore these
victims to their original state of well-being.” (quotation omitted) pet. for cert. filed
(U.S. Sept. 28, 2009) (No. 09-6760)). We, therefore, conclude that the district court
did not abuse its discretion in awarding the full restitution amount to John Hancock.

III.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
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