Lewis v. Wheeler

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

TERESA WILSON LEWIS, 
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
BARBARA J. WHEELER, Warden,  No. 09-4
Fluvanna Correctional Center for
Women,
Respondent-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Virginia, at Roanoke.
Glen E. Conrad, District Judge.
(7:07-cv-00538-gec-mfu)

Argued: March 23, 2010

Decided: June 4, 2010

Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, WILKINSON,
Circuit Judge, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by published opinion. Chief Judge Traxler wrote the
opinion, in which Judge Wilkinson and Senior Judge Hamil-
ton joined.

COUNSEL

ARGUED: James Elmer Rocap, III, STEPTOE & JOHN-
SON, LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Katherine Bal-
2 LEWIS v. WHEELER
dwin Burnett, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF:
Michele J. Brace, VIRGINIA CAPITAL REPRESENTA-
TION RESOURCE CENTER, Charlottesville, Virginia, for
Appellant. William C. Mims, Attorney General, Jerry P.
Slonaker, Senior Assistant Attorney General, OFFICE OF
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond,
Virginia, for Appellee.

OPINION

TRAXLER, Chief Judge:

Teresa Wilson Lewis ("Lewis") pleaded guilty in the Cir-
cuit Court of Pittsylvania County, Virginia to two counts of
capital murder for hire, and related charges of conspiracy to
commit capital murder, robbery, and use of a firearm, arising
out of the murders of her husband, Julian Clifton Lewis, Jr.
("Julian"), and stepson, Charles J. Lewis ("C.J."). She was
sentenced to death for each conviction of capital murder for
hire, life imprisonment for the robbery conviction, and a total
of 33 years’ imprisonment for the remaining convictions.

After unsuccessfully challenging her death sentences on
direct appeal and in state habeas proceedings, Lewis filed a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court.
See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (West 2006). The district court
denied relief but granted a certificate of appealability on four
claims. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2253(c)(1) (West 2006). We
granted a certificate of appealability on two additional claims.
See id. For the reasons set forth below, we now affirm.

I.

The detailed facts surrounding the murders of Julian and
C.J. are set forth in the opinions of the Virginia Supreme
 LEWIS v. WHEELER 3
Court, which we summarize below. See Lewis v. Warden, 645
S.E.2d 492, 495-99 (Va. 2007); Lewis v. Commonwealth, 593
S.E.2d 220, 222-25 (Va. 2004).

A.

In March or April 2000, Lewis met Julian at Dan River,
Inc., where they were both employed. Julian was a recent
widower, having lost his wife and the mother of his three
adult children to an extended illness in January of that year.
In June 2000, Lewis moved in with Julian. They married soon
thereafter and Lewis quit working.

In December 2001, Julian’s son, Jason Clifton Lewis, was
killed in an accident. Julian received life insurance proceeds
in excess of $200,000, which he placed in an account with
Prudential Securities that was only accessible by him. In Feb-
ruary 2002, Julian purchased five acres of land and a mobile
home where he and Lewis began to live.

In August 2002, C.J., an Army reservist, was required to
report for active duty with the National Guard. Prior to leav-
ing, C.J. made estate arrangements, including executing a will
and obtaining a life insurance policy in the amount of
$250,000. He designated Julian as his primary beneficiary and
Lewis as his secondary beneficiary.

It was also in the fall of 2002 that Lewis first met Matthew
J. Shallenberger ("Shallenberger") and Rodney L. Fuller
("Fuller"), who would become her co-conspirators in a plot to
murder her husband and stepson. Lewis met Shallenberger,
who was 22 years old, and Fuller, who was 19 years old, at
a Wal-Mart store. Before long, Lewis began a sexual relation-
ship with Shallenberger, who was 11 years her junior. On at
least one occasion, however, Lewis performed a "lingerie
show" for both men, and had sexual intercourse with Fuller as
well as Shallenberger. On another occasion, Lewis took her
16-year-old daughter with her to meet the men at a parking
4 LEWIS v. WHEELER
lot. Lewis introduced her daughter to Fuller and the two had
sexual intercourse in one car while Lewis and Shallenberger
had sexual intercourse in the other vehicle.

At some point, Lewis and Shallenberger began discussing
a plan to kill Julian and share the money that Lewis would get
upon his death. The first plan was put into motion on October
23, 2002. Lewis withdrew $1,200 from the bank and gave the
money to the men to purchase the necessary guns and ammu-
nition. Shallenberger gave the money to an acquaintance who
purchased two shotguns for the conspirators. Lewis told Shal-
lenberger and Fuller the route that Julian would travel from
work to home that evening. The plan was for the men to stop
and kill Julian on the roadway and make the murder look like
a robbery. The presence of another vehicle close to Julian dur-
ing the trip home, however, made execution of the first plan
impossible.

Undeterred, the conspirators quickly hatched a second plan
to kill Julian. They also added a plan to murder C.J. when he
returned home for his father’s funeral in order to share the
proceeds from his life insurance policy as well. However,
when Lewis learned that C.J. would be visiting at the mobile
home on the evening of October 29-30, 2002, the decision
was made to murder Julian and C.J. at the same time.

In the early morning hours of October 30, 2002, Shallen-
berger and Fuller, armed with the shotguns purchased with
Lewis’ money, entered the mobile home through a rear door
that Lewis had left unlocked for them. Upon entering, Shal-
lenberger woke Lewis, who had fallen asleep next to Julian
while waiting, and told her to get up. She went into the
kitchen where she waited while Shallenberger shot Julian sev-
eral times with the shotgun. She then reentered the bedroom,
where Julian lay mortally wounded but still alive, retrieved
Julian’s pants and wallet, and returned to the kitchen. Mean-
while, Fuller went to C.J.’s bedroom and shot him several
times with the second shotgun. When Fuller returned to the
 LEWIS v. WHEELER 5
kitchen, he saw Lewis and Shallenberger removing the money
from Julian’s wallet. Apparently there was some uncertainty
as to whether C.J. was dead, so Fuller took Shallenberger’s
shotgun and returned to shoot C.J. two more times. After
retrieving some of the shotgun shells, Shallenberger and Ful-
ler left the mobile home.

For approximately 45 minutes after the last shots were
fired, Lewis remained in the mobile home with the victims.
She made at least two telephone calls to other persons, but did
not call authorities. At approximately 3:55 a.m., a 911 opera-
tor fielded a call from Lewis reporting that a single intruder
had entered her home at approximately 3:15 or 3:30 a.m., and
shot her husband and stepson. She told the 911 operator that
the intruder entered the bedroom where she was sleeping with
Julian and told her to get up. She claimed that Julian told her
to go into the bathroom, where she hid while the intruder fired
four or five times.

Sheriff’s deputies arrived at the Lewis home at approxi-
mately 4:18 a.m. Lewis told the deputies that her husband’s
body was on the floor in the master bedroom and that her
stepson’s body was in the other bedroom. When the officers
entered the master bedroom, however, they found Julian badly
wounded, but still alive and talking. He "‘made slow moans’
and uttered, ‘Baby, baby, baby, baby.’" Lewis, 593 S.E.2d at
223 (alteration omitted). Julian told the officers his name and,
when asked "if he knew who had shot him, . . . responded,
‘My wife knows who done this to me.’" Id. at 224. While try-
ing to assist the victims, one deputy observed Lewis talking
on the telephone and heard Lewis "state, ‘I told C.J. about
leaving that back door unlocked.’" Id. (alteration omitted).
Julian died shortly thereafter, while still in the mobile home.
When informed that Julian and C.J. were dead, Lewis did not
appear to the officers to be upset.

Investigator Barrett and Investigator Isom with the Pitt-
sylvania County Sheriff’s Office interviewed Lewis during
6 LEWIS v. WHEELER
their investigation of the murders. During one interview,
Lewis claimed that Julian had physically assaulted her a few
days before the murders, but denied killing him, having him
killed, or knowing who killed him. Lewis told the investiga-
tors that she and Julian had talked and prayed together before
he went to bed that night, and that she told him she was going
to the kitchen to pack his lunch for the next day. A lunch bag
was found in the refrigerator with an attached note stating "’I
love you. I hope you have a good day.’" Id. She had also
drawn a picture of a "smiley face" on the bag and inscribed
"‘I miss you when you’re gone,’" in the smiley face. Id.

Later that morning, Lewis called Mike Campbell, Julian’s
supervisor at Dan River. She told Campbell that Julian had
been murdered and asked for Julian’s paycheck. Campbell
told Lewis that she could pick it up after 4:00 p.m. that day.
The following day, Lewis contacted Campbell again, apolo-
gized for not picking up the check the day before, and again
asked when she could get it. Campbell later testified that
Julian brought his lunch to work in a blue and white cooler
and did not use lunch bags. He also testified that when he
went to pay his respects to Lewis in person a couple of days
later, Lewis told him that Julian had bought her a red sports
car before he was killed, but that she was going to trade it
along with one of his vehicles for a larger car. She also told
Campbell that she planned to sell Julian’s land and mobile
home.

Also on the day of the murders, Lewis spoke with Lieuten-
ant Michael Booker, C.J.’s commanding officer. When Lt.
Booker called Lewis to express his condolences, Lewis told
him that she was "‘still in shock’" and that the police had been
questioning her. Id. She told Lt. Booker that "[t]here is no
way I would have killed my husband and stepson. They
guessed that because I didn’t get shot that I might have done
it. My husband told me to go into the bathroom, so I did." Id.
Lewis then informed Lt. Booker that she was the secondary
beneficiary of C.J.’s military life insurance policy and that she
 LEWIS v. WHEELER 7
had been told that she would be contacted within 24 hours of
his death with information regarding when she would get her
money.

On November 4, 2002, Lewis contacted Lt. Booker and
requested C.J.’s personal effects and a photograph of C.J. that
she had given Lt. Booker for a memorial service. Lt. Booker
told Lewis that he would return the photograph to her, but that
the personal effects would be given to C.J.’s sister Kathy Clif-
ton, his immediate next of kin. Lt. Booker testified that Lewis
became "very angry" and "insisted that [Lt. Booker] bring
them to her as soon as possible." J.A. 99. When Lt. Booker
refused, Lewis again asked about the life insurance money
and "remind[ed him] that she was the secondary beneficiary."
J.A. 99. When Lt. Booker told Lewis that she would still be
entitled to the life insurance, Lewis responded, "‘that’s fine,
Kathy can have all of his effects as long as I get the money.’"
J.A. 100.

Julian’s daughter Kathy also testified about her dealings
with Lewis immediately after the murders. Lewis told Kathy
that she had waited 45 minutes after the murders to call 911,
and that she called her ex-mother-in-law, Marie Bean, and her
best friend, Debbie Yeatts, prior to doing so. Lewis also
called Kathy on the night of the murders and told her that she
had already gone over the necessary arrangements with the
funeral home. Lewis told Kathy that all she needed were the
names of some of Julian’s family members, and that Kathy
need not even come to the funeral home the following day.
When Kathy joined Lewis at the funeral home the next day
anyway, she recalled Lewis saying that "she was the sole ben-
eficiary of everything" and that "money was no object." J.A.
141. On the day of the funerals, Lewis called Kathy prior to
the services and told her "that she had just left the hairdress-
er’s and had gotten her nails done, [and] that she had bought
a beautiful suit to wear to the funeral." J.A. 141-42. She also
offered to sell Julian’s mobile home to Kathy.
8 LEWIS v. WHEELER
In addition to her attempts to obtain Julian’s paycheck,
Lewis also made a quick attempt to withdraw $50,000 from
Julian’s Prudential Securities’ account by presenting a forged
check made payable to her at the bank. The bank employee
refused to cash the check because the signature did not match
Julian’s signature in the bank’s records.

Finally, and consistent with Lewis’s immediate attempts to
obtain the cash payoff from the murders, the investigators
learned that Lewis was aware prior to the murders that she
would handsomely profit from the deaths of her husband and
stepson. She had earlier told an acquaintance that she was
"just ‘using Julian for money and that he would buy her
things.’" Lewis, 593 S.E.2d at 225. Another acquaintance
overheard her saying a couple of months before the murders
that "if Julian died, ‘she would get the money, and if [C.J.]
was killed and Julian was dead, she would get that money,
too.’" Id.

On November 7, 2002, Lewis, presented with the rapidly
accumulating evidence against her, confessed to Investigator
Isom that she had offered Shallenberger money to kill Julian.
Lewis told Isom that she met Shallenberger at Wal-Mart and
let him into their home on the night of the murders. However,
she falsely claimed that Shallenberger shot both Julian and
C.J. before taking the money and leaving the mobile home.
She told Isom that Shallenberger had expected to receive half
of the insurance proceeds, but that she had changed her mind
and decided to keep all of the money. Lewis then accompa-
nied Isom to Shallenberger’s residence, where she identified
him as her co-conspirator. The following day, Lewis asked to
speak with Isom and admitted that she had not been totally
truthful the day before. Lewis confessed Fuller’s involvement
in the murders and advised Isom that her minor daughter had
assisted during the planning process as well. During the ensu-
ing search of the mobile home where Shallenberger and Fuller
resided, officers recovered two pairs of rubber household
gloves containing primer residue caused by the firing of a
 LEWIS v. WHEELER 9
firearm shell and two shotguns, one of which was determined
to have fired the shotgun shells found in Julian’s bedroom.

According to the autopsies, Julian and C.J. both died as a
direct result of the multiple shotgun wounds. Julian was
struck in "the upper left arm, shoulder, abdomen, pelvis,
penis, thighs, legs, arms, and chest. The bullets destroyed or
removed large areas of tissue in his upper arm, shoulder, and
upper chest, [and] fractured several ribs." Id. In addition,
"[p]lastic wadding from a shotgun shell was lodged in
[Julian’s] left lung tissue." Id. However, none of Julian’s inju-
ries were immediately fatal, and Julian instead "died from
extensive blood loss" approximately 45 minutes to an hour
after the shootings. Id. C.J. was struck in the "back, abdomen,
chest, neck, left upper arm and shoulder, elbow, left thigh,
face, and forearm," but died almost immediately from his
wounds. Id.

B.

Shortly after Lewis was charged for her participation in the
murder-for-hire plot, the trial judge appointed attorneys David
Furrow and Thomas Blaylock to represent her, both of whom
had experience in capital murder cases. After investigating the
case, counsel became extremely concerned about the heinous
facts surrounding this intimate, murder-for-hire and -profit
crime and their dim prospects for preventing a death penalty
verdict by a Pittsylvania County jury. Given their knowledge
of the assigned trial judge and of juries generally in the
county, they became convinced that Lewis’ best chance of
avoiding the death penalty would be to submit to sentencing
by the trial judge, who had never imposed the death penalty
on a capital defendant and who would be sentencing Fuller,
a triggerman, to life imprisonment under an agreement he had
made with the prosecution for his cooperation against Shal-
lenberger and Lewis.

Under Virginia law, if a defendant pleads guilty to capital
murder, the trial judge conducts the sentencing proceeding
10 LEWIS v. WHEELER
without a jury. See Va. Code § 19.2-257. If the defendant
pleads not guilty, the trial court may determine the case only
with the consent of the defendant and concurrence of the
Commonwealth. See id. Accordingly, counsel recommended
that Lewis plead guilty and invoke her statutory right to be
sentenced by the trial judge.

Prior to the guilty plea proceeding, a competency assess-
ment of Lewis was performed by Barbara G. Haskins, M.D.,
a board-certified forensic psychiatrist, who also arranged for
an IQ test to be performed by Dr. Bernice Marcopulos.
According to the testing, Lewis had a Full Scale IQ of 72,
with a Verbal IQ of 70, and a Performance IQ of 79. This
placed her in the borderline range of intellectual functioning,
but not at or below the level of mental retardation. Dr.
Haskins reported that Lewis was competent to enter the pleas
and able to understand and appreciate the possible penalties.
At the guilty plea proceeding, the trial judge questioned Lewis
and ensured that she understood that she was waiving her
right to a jury and that she would be sentenced to either life
imprisonment or death by the trial judge. Satisfied that Lewis
was entering the plea voluntarily, knowingly, and intelli-
gently, the trial judge accepted the plea and scheduled the
sentencing proceeding.

At the sentencing proceeding, the Commonwealth relied
primarily upon a written summary of evidence that would
have been presented against Lewis had the case proceeded to
a jury trial, and sought the death penalty based upon Virgin-
ia’s statutory aggravating factors of vileness (based upon both
depravity of mind and aggravated battery to the victims) and
future dangerousness.1 In mitigation, the defense presented
1
See Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.2 (providing that "[i]n assessing the
penalty of any person convicted of an offense for which the death penalty
may be imposed, a sentence of death shall not be imposed unless the court
or jury shall (1) after consideration of the past criminal record of convic-
tions of the defendant, find that there is a probability that the defendant
 LEWIS v. WHEELER 11
evidence that Lewis had no previous history of violence and
had only a single, non-violent conviction for prescription for-
gery for which she was on probation. Lewis’ probation officer
testified that Lewis had been compliant with the terms of her
probation and had never demonstrated any type of violence.
The probation officer who prepared the presentence report
also testified that Lewis seemed remorseful when he inter-
viewed her. A long-time family friend and schoolmate of
Lewis’, who was engaged to be married to Lewis’ sister, testi-
fied that he had never observed Lewis behaving in a violent
manner. Finally, an official at the Roanoke City Jail provided
a statement that there had been no incidents of violence
involving Lewis, nor even minor infractions while she was
incarcerated there awaiting trial. Lewis’ father, brother and
sister were in the courtroom during the sentencing, and the
trial judge was advised that they would all testify that they
loved and cared about Lewis and did not want her to receive
the death penalty.

At the conclusion of the sentencing proceeding, the trial
judge rejected the future dangerousness aggravator, based
upon the lack of any significant criminal history or violent
behavior. However, he imposed sentences of death for the
capital offenses based upon the vileness aggravator, finding
that Lewis’ conduct involved both depravity of mind and
aggravated battery. See Lewis, 593 S.E.2d at 227 (noting that
"[a] finding of vileness must be based on conduct which is
outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it
involved torture, depravity of mind or an aggravated battery
to the victim. Proof of any one of these three components will

would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing
serious threat to society or that his conduct in committing the offense for
which he stands charged was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or
inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind or an aggravated
battery to the victim; and (2) recommend that the penalty of death be
imposed); see also Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.4.
12 LEWIS v. WHEELER
support a finding of vileness." (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted)).

In imposing the sentences of death, the trial judge acknowl-
edged that the case was made more difficult by the fact that
Lewis had led the police to Shallenberger and Fuller and
pleaded guilty to her crimes, as well as by the fact that Fuller
would receive a life sentence for his part in the plot. However,
the trial judge found that Lewis, as wife and stepmother to the
victims, had engaged in the "cold blooded, pityless slaying of
two men, horrible and inhumane" for profit, which "fits the
definition of the outrageous or wantonly vile, horrible, act."
J.A. 213. Of particular significance, the trial judge noted the
"cold" lack of emotion displayed by Lewis, J.A. 211, and the
fact that there was "no other motivation for these killings
except greed" with "no thought on her part of what she was
doing other than these two murders and what she would
receive once they were deceased," J.A. 212. The trial judge
also found it significant that Lewis had "lured [the] men and
her juvenile daughter into [her] web of deceit and sex and
greed and murder, and within an incredibly short period of
time from meeting [the men], she had recruited them, been
involved in planning and completing these murders, and
within one week before the actual murders had one failed
attempt on Julian’s life." J.A. 212. Finally, he paid particular
note to the fact that, "while her husband lay dying . . . in the
bedroom, [Lewis] was out apparently writing a love note to
him to put in the refrigerator, splitting up the money from the
deceased’s wallet with the co-defendants in the kitchen and
waiting for Julian to die." J.A. 213. Based upon the evidence,
the trial judge was "convinced that [Lewis] waited until she
thought [Julian] was dead before she called the police" and
"that she allowed him to suffer . . . without any feelings at all,
with absolute[ ] coldness." J.A. 217.2
2
Later, in connection with Shallenberger’s death penalty sentencing
phase, the trial judge stated that Lewis was "the most culpable" of the
 LEWIS v. WHEELER 13
On appeal, the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed the death
sentences, agreeing that "without question," the evidence of
Lewis’ conduct overwhelmingly supported the trial judge’s
finding of the vileness aggravator based upon depravity of
mind. Lewis, 593 S.E.2d at 227; id. (explaining that "deprav-
ity of mind," for purposes of the vileness aggravator, is
defined as "a degree of moral turpitude and psychical debase-
ment surpassing that inherent in the definition of ordinary
legal malice and premeditation.") (internal quotation marks
omitted). Specifically, the court found that,

the defendant was the mastermind of these gruesome
crimes, which would not have occurred but for her
actions. The evidence shows that she married her
husband because she was interested in his money.
She planned to kill him and her stepson so that she
could acquire her husband’s assets and proceeds
from her stepson’s life insurance policy. She made a
prior unsuccessful attempt along with Shallenberger
and Fuller to kill her husband, and, when that plan
failed, she initiated another plan which resulted in
the deaths of her husband and her stepson while they
lay asleep in their home. She involved her 16-year-
old daughter in the plan to kill the victims, and she
encouraged her daughter to have sexual relations
with one of the murderers. The defendant also paid
for the shotguns and ammunition used to kill her
husband and stepson.

After Shallenberger and Fuller had shot the vic-
tims several times with shotguns, the defendant went

three conspirators, J.A. 313, and referred to her as "the head of th[e] ser-
pent." J.A. 310. The trial judge agreed with the Commonwealth that all
three conspirators deserved the death penalty, but felt unable "in good
conscience" to sentence Shallenberger to death when "the Commonwealth
ha[d] chosen to offer one of the shooters life." J.A. 314.
14 LEWIS v. WHEELER
to her husband’s bedroom and took his pants and
wallet. She removed cash from her husband’s wallet
and gave it to the murderers while her husband lay
bleeding to death from the wounds that he had suf-
fered. Even then, however, the defendant waited at
least 45 minutes, while her husband was still alive,
suffering and bleeding from the bullet wounds,
before she reported the crimes . . . . Once the deputy
sheriffs arrived at the residence, at least one hour
after her husband and stepson had been shot, defen-
dant’s husband remained alive, suffering and bleed-
ing to death. After her husband’s death, the
defendant showed no emotion or remorse, and she
initially denied any involvement in this murder.
Moreover, on the night of the murders, prior to the
killings, the defendant prayed with her husband and
arranged for her daughter to speak to her husband so
that he would not think that something was awry.

Id. at 228.3 Lewis’ petition for rehearing was subsequently
denied, and the United States Supreme Court denied certio-
rari. See Lewis v. Virginia, 543 U.S. 904 (2004).

C.

In subsequent state habeas proceedings, Lewis alleged that
her counsel, while successful in refuting the future dangerous-
ness aggravator, had been constitutionally ineffective in fail-
ing to adequately investigate and present mitigating evidence
to also refute the depravity-of-mind aggravator and to other-
wise mitigate her crimes. Lewis also asserted, for the first
time, constitutional challenges to Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-257,
3
Having concluded that the depravity-of-mind aggravator was over-
whelmingly supported by the evidence of record, the Virginia Supreme
Court found it unnecessary to address Lewis’ challenge to the trial judge’s
decision to impute the aggravated batteries to Lewis. See Lewis v. Com-
monwealth, 593 S.E.2d 220, 227 (Va. 2004).
 LEWIS v. WHEELER 15
and the validity of her guilty plea. Lewis claimed that she had
a constitutional right under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S.
466 (2000), and Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), to
plead guilty and have the aggravating factors determined by
a jury instead of a judge, rendering the statute and her guilty
plea constitutionally invalid. Lewis also claimed that counsel
was constitutionally ineffective in failing to advise her of this
right and preserve it before the trial judge. The Virginia
Supreme Court rejected Lewis’ ineffective-assistance-of-
counsel claims on the merits, and found Lewis’ challenges to
the statute and guilty plea to be procedurally barred because
she had failed to raise them at trial or on direct appeal.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254, Lewis then filed a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus in the district court, raising the
same claims. The district court dismissed Lewis’ petition and
denied Lewis’ motion to alter or amend the judgment.

II.

We review the district court’s denial of federal habeas
relief on the basis of a state court record de novo. See Tucker
v. Ozmint, 350 F.3d 433, 438 (4th Cir. 2003). However, when
a habeas petitioner’s constitutional claim has been "adjudi-
cated on the merits in State court proceedings," we may not
grant relief unless the state court’s adjudication "resulted in a
decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined
by the Supreme Court of the United States" or "resulted in a
decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of
the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court
proceeding." 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d).

"A legal principle is ‘clearly established’ within the mean-
ing of this provision only when it is embodied in a holding of
th[e] [Supreme] Court." Thaler v. Haynes, 130 S. Ct. 1171,
1173 (2010) (per curiam); see also Williams v. Taylor, 529
U.S. 362, 412 (2000) ("Th[e] statutory phrase refers to the
16 LEWIS v. WHEELER
holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of this Court’s decisions as
of the time of the relevant state-court decision."). A state
court’s decision is contrary to clearly established federal law
"if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that
reached by th[e] [Supreme] Court on a question of law" or
"confronts facts that are materially indistinguishable from a
relevant Supreme Court precedent and arrives at a result
opposite" to the Supreme Court’s. Williams, 529 U.S. at 405.
A state court unreasonably applies federal law when it "identi-
fies the correct governing legal rule from th[e] Court’s cases
but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular . . .
case." Id. at 407. A state court also unreasonably applies fed-
eral law when it "unreasonably extends a legal principle from
[the Court’s] precedent to a new context where it should not
apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a
new context where it should apply." Id. Factual determina-
tions made by the state court "shall be presumed to be cor-
rect," and "[t]he applicant shall have the burden of rebutting
the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evi-
dence." 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(e)(1).

III.

We begin with Lewis’ claims that counsel was ineffective
in failing to investigate and present additional evidence during
the sentencing phase which she contends would have (1)
rebutted the Commonwealth’s theory that she was the master-
mind of the murder conspiracy and that she acted with a
depraved mind in planning and executing the murder plot, and
(2) otherwise mitigated her crimes by humanizing her, out-
weighing the aggravating evidence and making her a candi-
date for mercy.

Such claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are
reviewed under the standards of Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984), and its progeny. Lewis must dem-
onstrate "that counsel’s performance was deficient" and that
"the deficient performance prejudiced the defense." Id. at 687.
 LEWIS v. WHEELER 17
To demonstrate inadequate or deficient performance, Lewis
"must show that counsel’s representation fell below an objec-
tive standard of reasonableness" measured by "prevailing pro-
fessional norms." Id. at 688. To demonstrate prejudice, Lewis
"must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different." Id. at 694. In death penalty chal-
lenges, this showing requires a habeas petitioner to establish
a reasonable probability that the sentencer, if confronted with
the additional mitigating evidence, would have returned a dif-
ferent sentence. See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 536
(2003); see also Powell v. Kelly, 562 F.3d 656, 668 (4th Cir.
2009) ("Under Strickland, [the petitioner] must show that
‘there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the
sentencer . . . would have concluded that the balance of aggra-
vating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.’"
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695)); Emmett v. Kelly, 474
F.3d 154, 160 (4th Cir. 2007) (same).

A.

The additional evidence relied upon by Lewis in support of
her claims was presented at an evidentiary hearing conducted
by the original trial judge at the direction of the Virginia
Supreme Court, and is extensively discussed both in the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court’s decision dismissing the state habeas
petition, see Lewis, 645 S.E.2d at 499-502, and the district
court’s decision below, see Lewis v. Wheeler, 2009 WL
588957 (W.D. Va. Mar. 6, 2009). By way of summary, Lewis
obtained and presented additional evidence and opinions from
Dr. Haskins and Dr. Marcopulos, as well as new opinions and
testimony from Dr. Philip R. Costanzo, Ph.D., a psychologist,
Dr. Elinor McCance-Katz, an addiction psychiatrist, and Dr.
Louis Eliacin, Lewis’ treating gynecologist. Lewis also hired
and presented evidence from Ms. Deborah Gray, a social
worker and substance abuse counselor who performed a miti-
gation investigation, and testimony from various family mem-
bers and acquaintances. Lewis contends that the additional
18 LEWIS v. WHEELER
evidence would have established that she suffered, at the time
of the murders, from borderline intellectual functioning, a
dependent personality disorder that caused her to latch onto
men and be easily led by them, and prescription drug addic-
tion or abuse. The combined effect of these disabilities, she
asserts, would have explained her "cold" affect and demeanor
and demonstrated her inability to mastermind or otherwise
plan the heinous murders.

In response to this additional evidence, the Commonwealth
submitted an expert evaluation of Lewis performed by Dr.
Leigh D. Hagan, a forensic and clinical psychologist. Accord-
ing to Dr. Hagan, there was insufficient evidence to support
the claim that Lewis suffered from an addiction to prescrip-
tion medications, or that her use of such medications caused
an extreme mental or emotional disturbance. In addition,
Lewis failed to meet the criteria for a diagnosis of dependent
personality disorder. According to Dr. Hagan, Lewis had the
capacity to plan and carry out the murder plot.

Lewis’ counsel testified at the state habeas hearing regard-
ing their representation and strategy for defending her. They
acknowledged that they were aware of Lewis’ low IQ, alleged
difficulties with prescription drugs, and possible dependent
personality traits. However, they believed that further investi-
gation and development was unnecessary and potentially
harmful. The low IQ evidence would be placed before the
trial judge in the competency report and, in their view, the
prescription drug and dependent personality issues were
unsupported by the facts and double-edged in character. In
addition to opening Lewis up to a potentially damaging evalu-
ation by an expert for the Commonwealth, they believed that
the latter two "excuses" would have supported the future-
dangerousness aggravator and substantially undercut their
strategy to portray her as a previously non-violent defendant
who had accepted responsibility for her role in the offense and
assisted the authorities in arresting her coconspirators.
 LEWIS v. WHEELER 19
After considering the additional evidence, the trial judge
found that counsel had employed a reasonable strategy during
the sentencing phase and that Lewis had failed to demonstrate
either deficient performance or actual prejudice.4 The Virginia
Supreme Court also rejected the claims, but did so solely on
the basis of Lewis’ failure to demonstrate prejudice. The court
concluded that Lewis’ alleged problems did "not explain or
even mitigate the carefully calculated conduct that [she had]
exhibited in carrying out the[ ] crimes." Lewis, 645 S.E.2d at
506. Because there was no reasonable probability that, had the
evidence been presented in the original sentencing proceed-
ing, the trial judge would have imposed a sentence of life
imprisonment instead of death, Lewis was not entitled to
relief. See id.

B.

Lewis first contends that § 2254(d)’s deferential standards
of review do not apply to her claim that counsel was ineffec-
tive in failing to present the additional evidence to rebut the
depravity-of-mind aggravator and, consequently, that we must
4
Specifically, the trial judge found that counsel had "made reasonable
and proper choices based on the information supplied by the defendant,
statements of witnesses, her own experts, and the real evidence against
[Lewis]." J.A. 2270-71. The judge also found that counsel had made "rea-
sonable decisions not to present or investigate further certain evidence that
while it may have gone to the defense of depravity of mind was a double
edged sword that would also have supported the aggravator of future dan-
gerousness." J.A. 2271. The trial judge further found that "[t]he evidence
in th[e] case belied [Lewis]’s attempts to present herself as mentally defi-
cient and dependent such that she was incapable of planning and carrying
to execution the two murders," and that "[n]one of the experts testifying
overcame the evidence in th[e] case that [Lewis] planned, directed and
saw to finality these two murders, and her attempts, and her attempts only,
to profit from the[m]." J.A. 2271. The trial judge found that counsel’s
strategy to focus the mitigation evidence on the future dangerousness
aggravator was a reasonable one and that the "decision to avoid presenting
or investigating further the double edged evidence under the depravity of
mind vileness factor was also objectively reasonable." J.A. 2272.
20 LEWIS v. WHEELER
review this claim de novo. See Cone v. Bell, 129 S. Ct. 1769,
1784 (2009) (providing that a claim that has not been adjudi-
cated on the merits by the state court will be reviewed by the
federal court de novo); Monroe v. Angelone, 323 F.3d 286,
297 (4th Cir. 2003) (same). She contends that the state habeas
court was required to consider whether there was a reasonable
probability that the trial judge would have rejected the
depravity-of-mind aggravator prior to considering whether
there was a reasonable probability that the trial judge would
have found that the totality of the mitigating evidence out-
weighed that aggravator. We disagree.

First, although Lewis states her claims as two separate
ones, the evidentiary basis for the two claims is the same.
Moreover, both claims necessarily involve considering the
aggravating circumstances surrounding the crime in light of
the evidence presented in the habeas hearing to rebut (or, in
the alternative, mitigate) those aggravating circumstances.
Lewis contends that counsel’s failure to present the additional
evidence of her disabilities amounted to deficient perfor-
mance. She contends that she was prejudiced because there is
a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been pre-
sented, she would have received a sentence of life imprison-
ment either because (1) the judge would have rejected the
vileness predicate based upon depravity of mind, or (2) the
judge would have found that the totality of the mitigating evi-
dence sufficiently outweighed the aggravating circumstances
of the murders. In short, Lewis asserts identical claims of
deficient performance and prejudice, but alternative argu-
ments for why the outcome of her sentencing proceeding
might have been different. Under these circumstances, we see
nothing improper or unreasonable in the Virginia Supreme
Court’s joint consideration of the claims.

Second, the Virginia Supreme Court clearly appreciated the
separately stated claim challenging counsel’s failure to pre-
sent the evidence to rebut the depravity-of-mind aggravator,
explicitly noting that:
 LEWIS v. WHEELER 21
In the present case, Lewis alleges that trial counsel
provided ineffective assistance because they failed to
present available mitigation evidence during the pen-
alty phase of her trial. Lewis contends that counsel
should have presented [this] evidence to rebut the
Commonwealth’s theory that Lewis was the "master-
mind" of the murder conspiracy. According to
Lewis, her low mental functioning, prescription drug
addiction, and dependent personality disorder ren-
dered her incapable of acting with a "depraved
mind" because these problems impacted her ability
to function and exercise judgment, resist demands,
and display emotions.

Lewis, 645 S.E.2d at 504 (emphasis added). Thus, while the
court generally referred to the additional evidence as "mitiga-
tion evidence," it clearly considered Lewis’ claims that this
evidence would have both rebutted the depravity-of-mind
aggravator and otherwise served to mitigate her crimes.

Finally, the Virginia Supreme Court, after weighing the
evidence in aggravation against the totality of the mitigating
evidence, held that "[a]ny psychological, cognitive, and phys-
ical difficulties Lewis may have had could not explain or even
mitigate the carefully calculated conduct that Lewis exhibited
in carrying out these crimes." Id. at 506. We think the only
fair reading of the opinion is that the court considered both
claims but concluded that Lewis was not entitled to habeas
relief because she had both (1) failed to demonstrate that the
alleged deficiencies rebutted, or "explain[ed] . . . the carefully
calculated conduct" upon which the depravity-of-mind aggra-
vator rested and (2) failed to demonstrate that these identical
alleged deficiencies would have "even mitigate[d]" that con-
duct in the balance. Id.

Accordingly, we hold that the Virginia Supreme Court
properly considered the claims and adjudicated them on the
22 LEWIS v. WHEELER
merits, and that our review of its decision is therefore subject
to the deferential standards of review set forth in § 2254(d).

C.

Turning to the merits of Lewis’ ineffective-assistance-of-
counsel claims, we cannot say that the state court’s adjudica-
tion was an unreasonable one given the evidence presented.

The crux of Lewis’ claims is that the additional evidence
would have demonstrated that she was incapable of serving as
the mastermind of the murder conspiracy, explained her cold
affect and demeanor, and otherwise mitigated her involve-
ment in the murders. The Virginia Supreme Court, after
obtaining the findings and recommendations of the trial judge,
evaluated all of the evidence presented both in the original
and state habeas hearings and concluded that Lewis had failed
to demonstrate that there was a reasonable probability that the
outcome of her sentence would have been different had the
additional evidence been presented. Id. at 506. According to
the court:

The evidence in aggravation of Lewis’ crimes
included her extensive planning of the crimes in
which Lewis recruited the killers, paid them $1,200
to purchase weapons, arranged sexual activities for
them involving both Lewis and her 16 year old
daughter, and assisted the killers’ entry into the mar-
ital home at night.

Lewis committed the crimes because of greed,
intending to profit from the murders by receiving the
proceeds from C.J.’s life insurance policy and addi-
tional assets held by Julian. Other evidence in aggra-
vation of the murders was Lewis’ diversionary
conduct with her husband on the night of the mur-
ders, including her act of praying with him before
they retired for the night.
 LEWIS v. WHEELER 23
The brutal nature of the murders, in which Lewis’
husband and stepson were shot several times, was
further evidence in aggravation of the crimes. Also,
after Shallenberger shot Julian, Lewis went into the
bedroom while he was alive and lay bleeding and
removed Julian’s wallet in order to provide addi-
tional money to the killers.

Other powerful evidence in aggravation of the
murders was the fact that Lewis waited at least 45
minutes, while her husband was alive and suffering
from the multiple bullet wounds, before she con-
tacted emergency response personnel by telephone.
When the emergency response personnel arrived and
attempted to assist the victims, one of whom was
still alive, Lewis engaged in a telephone conversa-
tion with a friend discussing C.J.’s alleged failure to
lock the back door of the home.

Id. at 504-05. The evidence developed by Lewis to rebut
and/or mitigate these aggravating circumstances, on the other
hand, was determined to be comparatively weak:

With regard to the issue of Lewis’ mental func-
tioning, the evidence was disputed concerning her
cognitive ability to plan the murders. Although Dr.
Costanzo and Dr. McCance-Katz opined that it was
highly unlikely that persons with Lewis’ level of
mental functioning could plan the murders, Dr.
Hagan testified that Lewis had the mental capacity to
plan the murders with Shallenberger and to help exe-
cute the ultimate plan they devised. Also, Dr.
McCance-Katz acknowledged that Lewis’ behavior
around the time of the murders was purposeful and
"goal-directed."

The mitigation evidence on the issue of whether
Lewis suffered from a dependent personality disor-
24 LEWIS v. WHEELER
der also was in dispute. Dr. Costanzo and Dr.
Haskins concluded that Lewis suffered from a
dependent personality disorder. Dr. Costanzo
explained that as a result of this disorder, Lewis
experienced many problems, including trouble mak-
ing ordinary decisions without the advice of others,
a difficulty initiating activities on her own, and a
need for other people to assume responsibility for
most major aspects of her life.

Dr. Hagan, however, gave contrary testimony that
Lewis did not suffer from such a personality disorder
but exhibited conduct that showed "a passive aggres-
sive or an aggressive dependency." According to Dr.
Hagan, these characteristics involved the use of other
people to achieve one’s objectives.

With regard to Lewis’ drug use, Dr. McCance-
Katz testified that Lewis had a severe addiction to
drugs and that the amount of narcotic medications
she was taking during the time of the murders would
have impaired her cognition and inhibited the "af-
fect" or expression that she displayed to others.
However, Dr. McCance-Katz admitted that Lewis’
ability to carry out the murder plans was not affected
by her use of prescription drugs.

Dr. Eliacin and Deborah Grey also concluded that
Lewis was addicted to prescription drugs. In addi-
tion, Dr. Haskins testified that Lewis had a depen-
dence on narcotics.

In contrast, Dr. Hagan testified that "there is not
sufficient eyewitness, third party report, nor evi-
dence of record to support the conclusion that she
was actually addicted." Further, Lewis had not com-
plained of any problems associated with drug with-
 LEWIS v. WHEELER 25
drawal when incarcerated about one week after the
murders.

This evidence concerning Lewis’ prescription
drug abuse is evidence of a type that the Court in
Wiggins termed "double edge[d]." See Wiggins, 539
U.S. at 535, 123 S.Ct. 2527. While Lewis presented
evidence at the habeas hearing that her abuse of nar-
cotics and other prescription drugs could have
affected her judgment and have caused her to appear
"uncaring" at the time of the offenses, the evidence
also showed that, initially, Lewis voluntarily con-
sumed excessive prescription drugs. Therefore, this
evidence could be viewed both in aggravation and
mitigation of the offense.

Lewis, 645 S.E.2d at 505-06. In sum, the court determined
that the evidence of the "various problems Lewis faced as a
result of her personality deficits, drug dependence, and level
of intellectual functioning" failed to demonstrate prejudice
because the totality of the evidence "showed that notwith-
standing the various difficulties Lewis experienced over the
course of her life, she killed her two relatives solely for mone-
tary gain in a deliberately planned and executed scheme. Any
psychological, cognitive, and physical difficulties Lewis may
have had could not explain or even mitigate the carefully cal-
culated conduct that Lewis exhibited in carrying out these
crimes." Id. at 506.

Given our own review of the evidence, we cannot say that
this determination was an unreasonable one. First, the factual
evidence surrounding these murders demonstrates that it was
Lewis who was uniquely positioned to plan or, as the Virginia
Supreme Court held on direct appeal, "mastermind . . . these
gruesome crimes, which would not have occurred but for her
actions." Lewis, 593 S.E.2d at 228. Lewis was Julian’s wife
and C.J.’s stepmother. As beneficiary of Julian’s estate, and
C.J.’s life insurance if Julian were dead, she alone stood to
26 LEWIS v. WHEELER
profit handsomely from their joint murder. There was also
evidence that Lewis was well aware of this potential as, prior
to the murders, she bragged to others that she was marrying
Julian for his money and that she would benefit financially if
Julian and C.J. were dead.

In contrast to her intimate involvement with the victims,
Shallenberger and Fuller had never met Julian or C.J. and,
without Lewis, had no way of knowing their expected move-
ments or whereabouts. The men were also substantially youn-
ger than the more experienced and knowledgeable Lewis
who, as found by the state court, lured the men into helping
her achieve her financial payoff through sexual favors and
money. She even went so far as to involve her 16-year-old
daughter (whom the men also did not previously know) in the
planning process and, on at least one occasion, she took her
daughter with her to meet the men where they engaged in
simultaneous, sexual relations in side-by-side vehicles.

The specific actions taken in preparation for the murders
also demonstrate Lewis’s ability to plan and carry out the
murderous plot. After meeting the men and enlisting their
help to kill Julian, Lewis withdrew $1,200 cash from her
bank, which she gave to Shallenberger to purchase the murder
weapons and, during the planning process, she initiated
approximately 160 of the 170 documented telephone calls
between her and Shallenberger. Also, only Lewis could have
provided the men with the necessary information regarding
her husband’s employment, expected movements, and route
home for the first, unsuccessful attempt to murder him on the
roadway. Only Lewis could have advised the men that she
would also benefit as the secondary beneficiary of C.J.’s life
insurance, prompting the added plan to murder him when he
came home for his father’s funeral. Only Lewis could have
advised the men that, as luck would have it, C.J. would be
coming home from active duty for a visit and could more eas-
ily be murdered alongside his father. And, only Lewis could
have provided the men with the expected whereabouts of the
 LEWIS v. WHEELER 27
intended victims when they entered the mobile home to kill
them.

The actions taken by Lewis at the time of the murders, and
immediately thereafter, also eliminate any reasonable likeli-
hood that Lewis was incapable of carrying out the murder
plan while away from any asserted influence or control of the
triggermen, or that her low IQ and prescription drug use ren-
dered her incapable of making the necessary plans and deci-
sions. On the night of the murders, unaided by her co-
conspirators, Lewis engaged in a number of activities
designed to ensure that everything appeared normal to her
husband and stepson, made sure the coast was clear for the
triggermen, and took steps to cover her involvement. She
prayed with her husband, lay down with him, and then got up
to make the necessary preparations. At some point she pre-
pared the lunch bag for him with the attached love note and
"smiley face," presumably to deflect attention from her as a
suspect, and, according to her, spent time with her stepson as
well. Before returning to her bed with Julian, she unlocked the
back door for the shooters and also confined the dog, a pit
bull, in the middle bedroom where it could not interfere with
them or their plans.

After the murders had been committed, and the triggermen
had left, Lewis continued to exhibit this ability to operate
alone in carrying out the plot. She waited from 30 to 45 min-
utes before calling 911, presumably hoping that Julian would
finally die, making telephone calls to others in the interim.
When the police finally arrived, she calmly related a false
story of an unknown intruder and, while on the telephone,
made a comment within earshot of the officers blaming C.J.
for leaving the door unlocked. Her ability to further the
intended goal of financial profit, without oversight or direc-
tion from her co-conspirators, was also immediately demon-
strated. While her victims were still in the mobile home,
Lewis set about to obtain Julian’s most recent paycheck from
his employer. Later that afternoon, she spoke with Lt. Booker
28 LEWIS v. WHEELER
and advised him that she was the sole beneficiary of C.J.’s life
insurance policy. In the days that followed, Lewis contacted
Lt. Booker a second time about the proceeds of the life insur-
ance policy, telling him that Kathy could have C.J.’s personal
effects so long as she got the money. She also sought to with-
draw $50,000 from Julian’s Prudential Securities account with
a forged check that she falsely claimed he had written to her
before his death. It was also later discovered that Lewis and
a friend had visited an attorney shortly after the murders to
ensure that Kathy would not inherit from her father and
brother. Lewis also made plans to liquidate and spend her
inheritance. She offered to sell Kathy her father’s land and
mobile home and started making plans to trade Julian’s vehi-
cle, along with the red sports car he had purchased for her
before he was murdered, for a larger car. Finally, Lewis dem-
onstrated no difficulty in making the funeral arrangements for
her victims. By the morning after the murders, she had
already spoken to the funeral home about the arrangements,
and attempted to subtly exclude Kathy from the process. She
also purchased a new suit for the occasion, and had her hair
and nails done as well.

In the face of this overwhelming evidence of Lewis’ actual
capacity to act alone and make decisions to further the mur-
derous plot, Lewis presented comparatively weak evidence
that this alleged dependent personality disorder combined
with her low IQ and prescription drug abuse to render her
incapable of acting in that capacity and explain the "cold"
affect and demeanor she exhibited during and after the mur-
ders. While Lewis had a low IQ, her education records indi-
cated that she successfully attended school for some time and
was an average student. There was no evidence of Shallenber-
ger’s comparative intelligence, and Fuller’s IQ was much
lower than Lewis’ IQ. There was also little evidence to sup-
port Lewis’ claim that a drug dependency played any signifi-
cant part in the crime. By her own admission, she was not
under the influence of any drugs at the time of the murders,
 LEWIS v. WHEELER 29
and there was no evidence that she experienced withdrawal or
other adverse effects after she was arrested and incarcerated.

In sum, having fully considered the evidence in support of
the vileness aggravator, and the totality of the mitigating evi-
dence presented at the sentencing hearing and on state habeas
to refute and mitigate that aggravator, the Virginia Supreme
Court properly analyzed this claim under Strickland and its
progeny, and held that there was no reasonable probability
that the sentencer, had he been confronted with the additional
evidence, would have rejected the vileness aggravator or, bar-
ring that, otherwise found that there was sufficient evidence
in mitigation to warrant rejection of the penalty of death. Hav-
ing independently considered Lewis’ contentions, we cannot
say that the state court’s adjudication of Lewis’ claims is con-
trary to or an unreasonable application of the applicable pre-
cedents. Accordingly, Lewis is not entitled to habeas relief on
this basis and we affirm the dismissal of these claims.

IV.

We turn now to Lewis’ remaining claims, all of which are
rooted in her constitutional challenge to Va. Code Ann.
§ 19.2-257, and to the validity of her guilty plea, based upon
the principles set forth in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S.
466 (2000), and Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).

A.

Under Virginia’s capital sentencing scheme, when a defen-
dant is charged with a death-eligible offense, the trial court
conducts a bifurcated proceeding. "[T]he court shall first sub-
mit to the jury the issue of guilt or innocence of the defendant
of the offense charged in the indictment . . . ." Va. Code Ann.
§ 19.2-264.3(A). If the defendant is found guilty of a death-
eligible offense, "then a separate proceeding before the same
jury shall be held as soon as is practicable on the issue of the
penalty, which shall be fixed as is provided in § 19.2-264.4."
30 LEWIS v. WHEELER
Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.3(C). When a defendant pleads
guilty and waives his or her right to a jury determination of
guilt, however, Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-257 provides that the
trial judge will conduct the sentencing proceeding alone,
determine whether an aggravating factor or factors exist, and
make the determination of whether death is the appropriate sen-
tence.5

Lewis contends that she had a constitutional right under
Apprendi/Ring to plead guilty and have a jury determine the
existence of the aggravating factors necessary to impose the
sentence of death, and that Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-257
deprived her of this right. Lewis also challenges the validity
of her guilty plea, contending that, because the trial judge’s
plea colloquy failed to advise her of this purported right, her
guilty plea and accompanying waiver of a jury trial were not
made knowingly and intelligently.

Because Lewis failed to challenge the constitutionality of
the statute or the validity of her guilty plea before the state
trial judge or on direct appeal, however, the state habeas court
held that the claims were procedurally barred under Slayton
v. Parrigan, 205 S.E.2d 680, 682 (Va. 1974) (holding that
claims that could have been raised at trial or on direct appeal
may not be raised on state collateral review). It has long been
held that federal habeas courts are precluded from reviewing
a claim that "a state court has declined to consider [on] its
merits on the basis of an independent and adequate state pro-
cedural rule," Bacon v. Lee, 225 F.3d 470, 476 (4th Cir.
5
See Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-257 ("Upon a plea of guilty in a felony case,
tendered in person by the accused after being advised by counsel, the court
shall hear and determine the case without the intervention of a jury; or if
the accused plead not guilty, with his consent after being advised by coun-
sel and the concurrence of the attorney for the Commonwealth and of the
court entered of record, the court shall hear and determine the case without
the intervention of a jury. In such cases the court shall have and exercise
all the powers, privileges and duties given to juries by any statute relating
to crimes and punishments.").
 LEWIS v. WHEELER 31
2000); see Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731-32
(1991), and that the Slayton procedural bar qualifies as such
an adequate and independent state law ground, see Vinson v.
True, 436 F.3d 412, 417 (4th Cir. 2006). Thus, "[a]bsent a
fundamental miscarriage of justice, which [Lewis] does not
assert, [we] may not review [the] claims unless [Lewis] can
demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a
result of the alleged violation of federal law." Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750.

B.

Lewis asserts—both as independent grounds for relief and
to demonstrate the requisite cause which would allow us to
review her substantive claims on the merits — that her coun-
sel was constitutionally ineffective in (1) failing to inform her
that she had a right to plead guilty and obtain a jury determi-
nation of aggravating factors and (2) failing to preserve the
challenge to the statute before the trial judge.

In order to prevail on her claim, Lewis must demonstrate
that a reasonably competent attorney would have believed that
the Apprendi/Ring cases established that a defendant who
pleads guilty to a capital offense and waives his or her right
to a jury trial nevertheless retains a right to a jury determina-
tion of aggravating factors. Lewis must also demonstrate that
counsel’s failure to raise the issue with her and the trial judge
prejudiced her because, had they done so, there is a reason-
able probability that the outcome of her sentencing proceed-
ing would have been different. We hold that she has failed to
meet this burden.

1.

First, neither Apprendi nor Ring holds that a defendant who
pleads guilty to capital murder and waives a jury trial under
the state’s capital sentencing scheme retains a constitutional
right to have a jury determine aggravating factors.
32 LEWIS v. WHEELER
In Apprendi, the defendant pleaded guilty to two firearm
offenses carrying maximum sentences of ten years each, pre-
serving his right to challenge the constitutionality of any
enhancement under a separate, hate-crime statute. See
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 469-70. At sentencing, the trial judge
increased the sentence for one firearm count to twelve years
based upon the hate-crime law and defendant appealed. See
id. at 468, 471. The Supreme Court reversed the enhanced
sentence, holding that the sentencing facts necessary to
increase the defendant’s maximum punishment served as ele-
ments of the enhanced or separate offense and, therefore,
were required to be found by a jury. See id. at 490 (holding
that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statu-
tory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved
beyond a reasonable doubt"). Apprendi was not a capital case,
however, and the Supreme Court specifically noted that its
decision did not invalidate capital sentencing schemes which
allow judges to determine the existence of aggravating factors
necessary to impose a sentence of death following a jury’s
conviction of a defendant for a capital crime. See id. at 496-
97 (noting that the Court had "previously considered and
rejected the argument that the principles guiding [its] decision
. . . render invalid state capital sentencing schemes requiring
judges, after a jury verdict holding a defendant guilty of a
capital crime, to find specific aggravating factors before
imposing a sentence of death." (citing Walton v. Arizona, 497
U.S. 639, 647-49 (1990)). Thus, as the district court noted
below, "if anything, Apprendi would have led a reasonable
defense attorney to believe that capital defendants were not
entitled to a jury determination of the aggravating factors,
regardless of whether they pled guilty to capital murder or
proceeded to a jury trial." J.A. 2697.

In Ring, the defendant was convicted of a capital crime by
a jury and sentenced to death by the trial judge pursuant to the
Arizona capital sentencing scheme previously upheld in Wal-
ton. See Ring, 536 U.S. at 588-89. The Court reversed, how-
 LEWIS v. WHEELER 33
ever, overruling its decision in Walton and holding that
"[b]ecause Arizona’s enumerated aggravating factors operate
as ‘the functional equivalent of an element of a greater
offense,’" the defendant also has a right to have them submit-
ted to the jury for its determination. Ring, 536 U.S. at 609.
Ring, therefore, established that a defendant who has exer-
cised his right to a jury trial on a capital offense is also enti-
tled to a jury determination of the aggravating factors
necessary to impose the sentence of death.

Lewis contends that any reasonable attorney or jurist would
have concluded after Ring that a defendant who pleads guilty
to a capital offense—and waives his right to a jury pursuant
to a state statute that mandates that a judge conduct the sen-
tencing proceeding when such a guilty plea is entered —
retains this constitutional right to have a jury determine the
existence of aggravating factors. However, neither Apprendi
nor Ring stand for that proposition. In both cases, the chal-
lenged sentencing procedures denied defendants the option of
having a jury determine a sentence enhancement, or aggravat-
ing factor, regardless of whether the defendant pleaded guilty
or not guilty to the charged offense. In Apprendi, the defen-
dant pleaded guilty but expressly preserved his right to chal-
lenge any hate-crime enhancement. And in Ring, the
defendant was convicted of capital murder by a jury. Thus, in
neither case did the defendant waive his right to a jury deter-
mination of facts upon which the enhancement or aggravating
factor rested.

In short, the Ring decision did not clearly establish or even
necessarily forecast that a capital defendant who pleads guilty
and waives his right to a jury trial can insist upon a jury trial
on aggravating factors. As noted by the district court, the
claim that "a defendant who pleads guilty to a capital offense
is nonetheless entitled to a jury determination of the aggravat-
ing factors would have been an extension of" that precedent.
J.A. 2698 (emphasis added). Consequently, we cannot say
that counsel’s failure to question the constitutionality of the
34 LEWIS v. WHEELER
Virginia statute and discuss the issue with Lewis amounted to
objectively unreasonable performance. See Engle v. Isaac,
456 U.S. 107, 134 (1982) ("We have long recognized . . . that
the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants only a fair
trial and a competent attorney. It does not insure that defense
counsel will recognize and raise every conceivable constitu-
tional claim."); Honeycutt v. Mahoney, 698 F.2d 213, 217 (4th
Cir. 1983) (noting that counsel was not ineffective for failing
to perceive an extension of precedent).6

2.

Second, even if we were to conclude that reasonable coun-
sel would have recognized a potential Apprendi/Ring chal-
lenge to the Virginia statute, Lewis cannot meet her burden of
demonstrating deficient performance by counsel which preju-
diced her because pressing the issue in this case would have
been in direct conflict with the defense strategy to have Lewis
plead guilty in order to obtain sentencing before the judge
instead of a jury.

As noted previously, Lewis was provided appointed coun-
sel with extensive criminal experience, including experience
in handling capital cases.7 In light of the overwhelming evi-
6
The Supreme Court’s decision in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296
(2004), was not issued until after Lewis pleaded guilty and her sentences
were affirmed on appeal. See id. at 303 (holding that "the ‘statutory maxi-
mum’ for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may
impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or
admitted by the defendant" (emphasis omitted)). Thus, we express no
opinion as to what effect, if any, Blakely has upon the question of whether
a capital defendant has a constitutional right to plead guilty and demand
a jury trial on aggravating factors or under what circumstances that right,
if it exists, will be deemed waived. See Blakely, 542 U.S. at 310 (noting
that "[i]f appropriate waivers are procured, States may continue to offer
judicial factfinding as a matter of course to all defendants who plead
guilty" and that "[e]ven a defendant who stands trial may consent to judi-
cial factfinding as to sentence enhancements").
7
Attorney Blaylock had twenty-three years of experience and had han-
dled at least fifteen capital murder cases. Attorney Furrow had twenty-six
years of experience and had worked with Blaylock on as many as ten capi-
tal murder cases.
 LEWIS v. WHEELER 35
dence of guilt and Lewis’ confession, counsel first attempted
to obtain an agreement that the Commonwealth would not
seek the death penalty in return for Lewis’ guilty plea. The
prosecutor, however, viewed Lewis as "the worst of the three
[conspirators] and . . . was . . . adamant about seeking the
death penalty against her." J.A. 2177.

As the investigation continued, and the case developed,
counsel became increasingly concerned about the gruesome
nature of the crimes, which was graphically reflected in the
crime scene photographs, and the chilling nature of the evi-
dence of Lewis’ actions before and after the murders to plan
and profit from them. Based upon their knowledge of typical
juries in the area, and available information regarding the
assigned trial judge, counsel believed that a death sentence by
a jury was a virtual certainty and that Lewis stood a better
chance of being sentenced to life imprisonment by the trial
judge. Of particular note, counsel was aware of no cases in
which the trial judge had imposed a death sentence and, as a
result of a cooperation deal between the prosecution and Ful-
ler, knew that the trial judge would sentence Fuller to life
imprisonment for his role as an actual triggerman in the mur-
ders.8

In a ten-page letter to Lewis, Attorney Furrow summarized
the expected testimony and evidence that would be presented
at trial, along with counsel’s concerns. Attorney Furrow
pointed out to Lewis the "particularly gruesome" photographs
of the bodies of Julian and C.J. as "among the worst I have
seen" due to "[t]he use of small caliber ammunition." J.A.
1033. He also advised Lewis that they fully expected the pros-
ecutor to engage in the dramatic tactic of "rack[ing] the
[pump] shot gun" while showing the photographs, a particu-
8
In addition to relying upon their own experience, counsel sought guid-
ance and opinions from at least one national death penalty expert, as well
as local criminal defense attorneys who regularly practiced before the trial
judge.
36 LEWIS v. WHEELER
larly effective technique which counsel had personally wit-
nessed in another case. J.A. 1033. Counsel also discussed the
murder-for-hire and profit facts and the expected testimony by
Lewis’ minor daughter that Lewis "sat in the car next [to her]
while she was having sex with an adult black male," which
counsel believed would "have a horrible impact on the jury
both among white[s] and blacks, men and women." J.A. 1033.

In light of their opinion that death was a virtually certain
penalty if Lewis were sentenced by a jury, counsel advised
Lewis that her "best chance to receive a sentence of life in
prison without the possibility of parole [was] to plead guilty
and take [her] chances with the Judge." J.A. 1036. In doing
so, counsel explained that pleading guilty and being sentenced
by the trial judge had several advantages, including: (1)
removal of the "drama" from the case, such as having the jury
hear "the racking of the shotgun" which would "not have the
same impact on the Judge as it would on a jury"; (2) the fact
that Fuller would have already received a life sentence and
counsel’s belief that the judge’s "sense of fairness" would
render him "more likely to hand out similar sentences"; (3)
the fact that there had only been "two cases in Virginia in
which the hirer in a murder for hire case ha[d] received the
death penalty"; (4) the fact that "[a] woman ha[d] never
received the death penalty"; and (5) the fact that Lewis "ha[d]
no history of violent crimes." J.A. 1036.

Counsel also met with Lewis to discuss their concerns and
opinions. According to counsel, Lewis appeared to understand
their advice, was in agreement with it, and made the decision
to plead guilty. Lewis voluntarily signed the letter, stating that
she "wish[ed] to plead guilty and be sentenced by the Judge."
J.A. 1037. In connection with this guilty plea, the competency
assessment performed by Dr. Haskins revealed that Lewis
"was able to recount her basic defense strategy . . . and . . .
explain the reasons behind the strategy," understood "the role
of a jury in a capital case, and of a judge," and knew "the pros
and cons of a jury [versus] a bench trial." J.A. 1194, 1195.
 LEWIS v. WHEELER 37
With the benefit of hindsight, Lewis now contends that her
counsel was ineffective in failing to preserve and advise her
of a potential challenge to the constitutionality of the Virginia
statute based upon Apprendi/Ring. However, it is well estab-
lished that when considering claims that counsel’s perfor-
mance has been constitutionally ineffective in a state
proceeding, our scrutiny must be "highly deferential." Strick-
land, 466 U.S. at 689.

It is all too tempting for a defendant to second guess
counsel’s assistance after conviction or adverse sen-
tence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining
counsel’s defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to
conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel
was unreasonable. A fair assessment of attorney per-
formance requires that every effort be made to elimi-
nate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct
the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct,
and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspec-
tive at the time.

Id. (internal citation omitted). To prevail, Lewis must "over-
come the presumption that, under the circumstances, the chal-
lenged action might be considered sound trial strategy." Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). And, we "must indulge a
strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the
wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Id.

Here, Lewis has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s strat-
egy to have her plead guilty and take advantage of her statu-
tory right to have a judge sentence her was unsound. And
Lewis’ current claim—that she would have insisted on plead-
ing guilty and have a jury determine her sentence — is wholly
inconsistent with this reasonable and agreed-upon strategy at
the time. In sum, Lewis’ current claim "suffer[s] from the
classic hindsight that we are cautioned not to apply to upset
state court judgments." Emmett, 474 F.3d at 171.9 Accord-
9
We also note that, in contrast to the many ineffective assistance of
counsel claims that require state and federal habeas courts to consider
38 LEWIS v. WHEELER
ingly, even if we were to determine that counsel should have
been aware of a potential Apprendi/Ring challenge to the state
statute, counsel’s failure to raise the issue with Lewis and pre-
serve the challenge before the trial judge in the circumstances
of this case did not amount to objectively unreasonable per-
formance.

For the same reasons, Lewis has failed to demonstrate that
she was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to raise the potential
Apprendi/Ring challenge to the statute. See Strickland, 466
U.S. at 694. In order to demonstrate such prejudice, Lewis
must show that there is a reasonable probability that she
would have pleaded guilty and demanded a jury sentencing.
Lewis does summarily now contend that she would have done
so, asserting that this would have allowed her to demonstrate
to the jury that she was remorseful and had accepted responsi-
bility for her crimes. However, this assertion wholly ignores
the agreed-upon strategy at the time, which was not simply to
plead guilty in order to bolster the evidence of Lewis’ cooper-
ation and confession, but rather to achieve the goal of remov-
ing the sentencing decision from the hands of the jury and
placing it with a judge the defense reasonably believed would
be more inclined to sentence her in parity with her co-
conspirators. There were but two means to employ this strat-
egy. The prosecutor had to consent to trial by jury on guilt
and sentencing before the judge, which would not have served
any of Lewis’ goals, or Lewis had to plead guilty in order to
take advantage of the very statute she now seeks to challenge.
Accordingly, Lewis has failed to demonstrate a reasonable
probability that, had counsel recognized a potential challenge
to the constitutionality of the statute and advised her of that

after-the-fact explanations by defense counsel regarding their investiga-
tions and strategy decisions, Lewis’ counsel’s strategy was quite clearly
laid out in a comprehensive letter to the defendant and signed by her. This
was followed by the trial judge clearly advising Lewis that she was waiv-
ing her right to a jury and that she would be sentenced by him instead.
 LEWIS v. WHEELER 39
potential challenge, she would have abandoned the agreed-
upon strategy and opted instead to plead guilty and insist upon
a sentencing proceeding before a jury.10

C.

Having fully considered the record in this case, we agree
that Lewis has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s failure to
preserve and advise her of a possible Apprendi/Ring challenge
to the constitutionality of Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-257 rises to
the level of constitutionally deficient representation and has
also failed to demonstrate that she was prejudiced as a result
of counsel’s alleged deficiencies. Accordingly, we affirm dis-
missal of her ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims on the
merits, as well as the dismissal of her procedurally defaulted
challenges to the statute and her guilty plea.

V.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s
denial of habeas relief.

AFFIRMED
10
To the extent Lewis presses her claim that she has demonstrated preju-
dice from counsel’s failure to preserve the Apprendi/Ring challenge to the
state statute because there is a reasonable probability that the death sen-
tence she received from the trial judge would have been reversed by a fed-
eral court, we are unpersuaded. Lewis’ attempt to demonstrate prejudice
in this way is more accurately described as a claim that her counsel’s per-
formance was deficient because they failed to advance an argument before
the trial judge that they did not wish to prevail upon, solely for the purpose
of setting up an appealable ground should their actual strategy fail.
Although the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants a competent
attorney, and one that employs reasonable strategies for success, it does
not require defense counsel to engage in such judicial game-play, and the
speculation required to guess what might have occurred had counsel made
the attempt falls far short of the standard necessary for federal habeas
courts to upset valid state court judgments.