IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 97-30855
ANTHONY BOUDREAUX,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
NORTHWESTERN NATIONAL LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANY, ET AL.,
Defendants,
BAKER HUGHES INC. LONG
TERM DISABILITY PLAN,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
(93-CV-1456)
May 11, 1998
Before WIENER, BARKSDALE and DEMOSS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
In this appeal from the district court’s grant of summary
judgment rejecting his claim under the Employment Retirement Income
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
Security Act (ERISA),1 Plaintiff-Appellant Anthony Boudreaux
complains that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to
whether the plan administrator of Defendant-Appellee Baker Hughes
Long Term Disability Plan (the Plan) acted arbitrarily and
capriciously in terminating Plan benefits to Boudreaux. He also
complains that the district court abused its discretion in denying
attorneys’ fees pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(G). In our de novo
review of summary judgment, we reach the same conclusion as did the
district court and therefore affirm.2 As such, we need not and
therefore do not reach the issue raised by the Plan, i.e., whether
a participant’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies within
the period of time specified by an ERISA plan constitutes a
procedural bar to filing suit, pursuant to 29 U.S.C.
§ 1132(a)(1)(B). Under the instant circumstances, that issue is
more properly left to a future panel of this court in a future
case.
The operable facts of this case and its procedural history in
district court are fully and accurately set forth in the Memorandum
Ruling and Judgment of the district court filed July 28, 1997. We
therefore adopt them herein by reference.
When distilled to its essence, the issue that was before the
1
29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq.
2
We also conclude that, under the facts and circumstances of
this case, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
denying attorneys’ fees to Boudreaux.
2
court for consideration on the Plan’s motion for summary judgment
was whether the plan administrator’s termination of Boudreaux’s
disability benefits as of July 26, 1993, amounted to an abuse of
discretion. As the Plan gives its administrator “discretionary
authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the
terms of the Plan,”3 factual applications made by its plan
administrator can only be reviewed by the courts under the
deferential abuse of discretion standard.4 Here, the plan
administrator was not interpreting the Plan, but merely applying
its provisions to Boudreaux’s factual situation. The principle is
well settled that in testing determinations of entitlement to
benefits for abuse of discretion by plan administrators when they
are not interpreting the plans, courts cannot consider evidence
that was not available to the plan administrator and must look
solely to the administrative record.5
We have carefully reviewed the administrative record in this
case, have duly considered the appellate briefs submitted by
counsel for the parties to this appeal, and have considered well
the legal arguments advanced and the facts that are material to the
3
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115
(1989).
4
Pierre v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 932 F.2d 1552
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 973 (1991); see also Sweatman v.
Commercial Union Ins. Co., 39 F.3d 594, 597-98 (5th Cir. 1994).
5
Bellaire Gen. Hosp. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich.,
97 F.3d 822, 827 (5th Cir. 1996).
3
question of the plan administrator’s purported abuse of discretion.
As a result, we are convinced, as was the district court —— and for
essentially the same reasons —— that there is no genuine issue of
material fact whether the plan administrator abused its discretion
in determining that Boudreaux ceased to be disabled within the
contemplation of the Plan as of July 26, 1993. When we are
constrained under the abuse of discretion standard as we are today,
we cannot say that the administrator of the Plan abused its
discretion in terminating Boudreaux’s benefits. For the foregoing
reasons, the rulings of the district court are, in all respects,
AFFIRMED.
4