UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FIFTH CIRCUIT
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No. 97-40371
(Summary Calendar)
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
REGINALD LOFTIN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Eastern District of Texas
(1:96-CR-46-1)
May 7, 1998
Before WIENER, BARKSDALE, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Reginald Loftin appeals his conditional guilty-plea conviction
for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine base in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. We affirm.
Loftin first argues that the district court erroneously failed
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R.
47.5.4.
to suppress statements that he made following his arrest because
his arrest was invalid. He contends that his arrest was invalid
because the police lacked the power under state law to rearrest him
on a valid outstanding warrant for another crime for which he had
already posted bail. We need not decide Loftin’s argument,
however, because we can affirm the district court’s judgment on any
alternative basis supported by the record. See Sojouner T. v.
Edwards, 974 F.2d 27, 30 (5th Cir. 1992). In Alabama v. White, 496
U.S. 325, 332, 110 S. Ct. 2412, 2417, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990), the
Supreme Court held that probable cause to arrest may be established
by a sufficiently detailed prediction of a defendant’s future
behavior by an informant because “it demonstrate[s] inside
information))a special familiarity with respondent’s affairs.”
Id.; see also United States v. Wangler, 987 F.2d 228, 229 (5th Cir.
1993) (finding probable cause where an informant told police that
the defendant would be delivering a shipment of cocaine to a
particular place in a particular car); but see United States v.
Roch, 5 F.3d 894, 897 (5th Cir. 1993) (finding no probable cause
where informant’s statements were not sufficiently detailed). The
record clearly shows that the police had probable cause to arrest
Loftin. The day before the police arrested Loftin, they received
a call from an anonymous informant who had previously proven
reliable. The informant told the police that Loftin and another
African-American male would be traveling through Newton County
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transporting a load of cocaine base at approximately 12:00 p.m. the
next day on Highway 87 from Orange, Texas. The informant further
stated that Loftin would be driving a small, blue rental car, that
another car would be following closely behind him, and that the
cocaine base would be hidden in the second car. The police were
familiar with Loftin’s name because they had previously arrested
him for possession of crack cocaine. When police detected Loftin
traveling at the stated time and place, they also visually
identified him from a photograph before pulling his car over.
Because the information that the informant provided police in this
case was at least as detailed as that found to be sufficient in
White and Wangler, we find that the police had probable cause to
arrest Loftin. Accordingly, the district court did not err in
refusing to suppress Loftin’s post-arrest statements.
Loftin also argues that the district court erred in finding
that he lacked standing to contest the search of the second car,
being driven by his codefendant, Andre Teal. We have reviewed the
record and the parties’ briefs. We affirm the district court’s
denial of this argument for the reasons stated in the district
court’s order. See United States v. Loftin, No. 1:96-CR-46(1) (E.D.
Tex. Sept. 6, 1996).
Loftin further argues that his guilty plea was not knowingly
and voluntarily made inasmuch as the district court, in advising
him of the nature of the charge, referred to the original
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indictment as opposed to the superseding indictment. Although the
district court initially referred to the initial indictment, the
government promptly advised the court that a superseding indictment
had been issued. The district court thereafter read the superseding
indictment, and the government recited the factual basis supporting
the charges in the superseding indictment. Based upon these facts
and our review of the sentencing hearing, we find Loftin’s argument
to be utterly meritless. See United States v. Johnson, 1 F.3d 296,
302 (5th Cir. 1993) (en banc).
Finally, Loftin argues that his counsel was ineffective for
advising him not to disclose his past drug activities during the
presentence interview. He avers that this advice resulted in the
district court’s application of the obstruction-of-justice sentence
enhancement and its denial of a reduction for acceptance of
responsibility. Even assuming, arguendo, that Loftin’s trial
counsel advised him erroneously, the record reveals that Loftin
attempted to persuade his codefendant Teal to take full
responsibility for the drugs and that he asked a person whom he
referred to as “his girl” to find another person who would claim
that the drugs were theirs. The district court accordingly did not
err in its imposition of the obstruction-of-justice sentence
enhancement and its denial of a reduction for acceptance of
responsibility. See United States v. Pofahl, 990 F.2d 1456, 1481-82
& n.28 (5th Cir. 1993) (affirming obstruction of justice sentence
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enhancement where defendant sent letter to her husband urging him
not to cooperate with authorities). Accordingly, Loftin has failed
to demonstrate the prejudice necessary to establish ineffective
assistance of counsel. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
694 (1984).
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court
is AFFIRMED.
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