Prison Legal News v. Schwarzenegger

FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

PRISON LEGAL NEWS, 
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
No. 09-15006
ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER,
Governor of the State of  D.C. No.
4:07-cv-02058-CW
California; JAMES E. TILTON,
Secretary; KINGSTON PRUNTY; OPINION
STEVE KESSLER; SCOTT KERNAN; LE
ANN CHRONES; MARISELA MONTES,
Defendants-Appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Claudia Wilken, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted
December 10, 2009—San Francisco, California

Filed June 9, 2010

Before: Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, Robert E. Cowen,* and
Johnnie B. Rawlinson, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge O’Scannlain

*The Honorable Robert E. Cowen, Senior United States Circuit Judge
for the Third Circuit, sitting by designation.

8437
8440 PRISON LEGAL NEWS v. SCHWARZENEGGER

COUNSEL

Emily L. Brinkman, Deputy Attorney General, San Francisco,
California, argued the cause for the defendants-appellants and
filed the briefs. Edmund G. Brown Jr., Attorney General, Jon-
athan L. Wolff, Senior Assistant Attorney General, and
Michael W. Jorgenson, Supervising Deputy Attorney General,
were also on the briefs.

Ernest Galvan, of Rosen, Bien & Galvan, LLP, San Francisco,
California, argued the cause for the plaintiff-appellee. Sanford
Jay Rosen, of Rosen, Bien & Galvan, LLP, filed a brief. Ken-
neth M. Walczak and Blake Thompson, of Rosen, Bien &
Galvan, LLP, were also on the brief.

George C. Harris, of Morrison & Foerster LLP, San Fran-
cisco, California, filed a brief on behalf of Columbia Legal
Services, Florida Justice Institute, Inc., Legal Aid Society,
Massachusetts Correctional Legal Services, Inc., National
Center for Youth Law, National Police Accountability Proj-
ect, Prisoners’ Legal Services of New York, Southern Poverty
Law Center, Uptown People’s Law Center, and Volunteer
Lawyers’ Project for the Southern District of Florida as amici
curiae in support of the plaintiff-appellee and in support of
affirmance. Sarah E. Griswold, of Morrison & Foerster LLP,
was also on the brief.
 PRISON LEGAL NEWS v. SCHWARZENEGGER 8441
OPINION

O’SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge:

We must decide whether, and to what extent, the publisher
of a monthly prison news magazine may recover attorneys’
fees from the State of California and various of its officers for
monitoring their compliance with a settlement agreement
resolving claims about prison conditions.

I

A

Prison Legal News (“PLN”) is a nonprofit charitable orga-
nization based in Seattle, Washington. PLN publishes Prison
Legal News, a monthly magazine containing news and analy-
sis relating to the legal rights of prisoners. It also distributes
prisoner-oriented books.

In September 2005, PLN contacted the California Depart-
ment of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) with con-
cerns about the delivery of its materials to prisoners in the
CDCR’s custody. PLN complained that some CDCR institu-
tions refused to deliver Prison Legal News to prisoners
housed in particular units, while other CDCR institutions dis-
allowed delivery of the magazine altogether on the ground
that PLN was not an “approved vendor.” PLN also com-
plained about bans on its hardcover books. In PLN’s view,
these and other CDCR policies violated PLN’s First Amend-
ment right to free speech and Fourteenth Amendment right to
due process of law.

On December 11, 2006, after a year of negotiation, PLN
and the CDCR entered into “an agreement to settle specific
claims . . . alleging that the CDCR, or CDCR employees, cen-
sored PLN publications.” The agreement was signed on
behalf of the CDCR by James E. Tilton, Secretary of the
8442 PRISON LEGAL NEWS v. SCHWARZENEGGER
CDCR, and Michael W. Jorgenson, Deputy Attorney General
of the State of California. The parties agreed, among other
things, that “[t]he practice by CDCR adult institutions of
requiring publishers such as PLN to obtain approved vendor
status shall cease”; that “[t]he practice by CDCR adult institu-
tions of banning hardcover publications shall cease”; that
“when CDCR adult institutions disallow books, magazines,
newspapers, or periodicals, the adult institutions shall notify
the inmate that it is disallowed and will notify the publisher
in compliance with due process requirements”; and that
“CDCR will develop a centralized list of disapproved maga-
zines or publications that are prohibited as offensive, threaten-
ing, contain security concerns, or obscene.”

The CDCR also agreed to pay PLN $65,100 for “alleged
violations of constitutional and statutory rights under federal
and state law,” and to pay PLN’s counsel “reasonable attor-
neys’ fees, costs and expenses until the time that this Settle-
ment Agreement is signed by the parties.” In addition,
paragraph 7(b) of the agreement provided:

PLN and its attorneys expressly reserve their
rights to pursue claims for attorneys’ fees, costs and
expenses for work performed after the time the Set-
tlement Agreement is signed by all parties, including
for work spent on substantive issues related to this
Agreement and/or work spent securing their fees for
fees and collecting any and all fees, costs and
expenses that are due to them. The CDCR expressly
reserves its right to oppose any such claim.

Finally, the parties agreed that PLN would file a complaint
in federal district court within 150 days of the signing of the
agreement, alleging the claims that the agreement “resolved.”
The parties stipulated that the agreement “shall accompany
the complaint,” and that following dismissal of PLN’s claims,
“the Court will retain jurisdiction to enforce the Settlement
 PRISON LEGAL NEWS v. SCHWARZENEGGER 8443
Agreement . . . and to determine, if necessary, reasonable
attorneys’ fees, costs and expenses.”

B

As contemplated by the settlement agreement, PLN filed a
complaint in April 2007 against Governor Arnold Schwar-
zenegger and various officers of the CDCR (collectively, “the
state officials”) in their individual and official capacities,
seeking monetary, injunctive, and declaratory relief under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. Soon thereafter, the parties informed the dis-
trict court that they had “negotiated resolution of claims
asserted in the complaint,” requested that the complaint be
dismissed without prejudice, and stipulated that PLN was
entitled to $320,000 in attorneys’ fees and costs for work
done through December 11, 2006—the date of the settlement.

The district court granted the parties’ request for dismissal
without prejudice, and entered an order “retain[ing] jurisdic-
tion to enforce the Settlement Agreement between the Parties
including, without limitation, disputes over Defendants’ com-
pliance with the terms of the Agreement and disputes over the
amounts of attorneys’ fees, costs and expenses to be paid to
Plaintiff’s attorneys.” The court also confirmed the award of
$320,000 in attorneys’ fees and costs to PLN for the period
leading up to the settlement.

In October 2007, PLN moved for attorneys’ fees and costs
incurred from December 12, 2006, through August 31, 2007.
Concluding that PLN was “entitled to attorneys’ fees for work
performed after the settlement agreement was signed,” Prison
Legal News v. Schwarzenegger, 561 F. Supp. 2d 1095, 1100
(N.D. Cal. 2008), the district court ordered the state officials
to pay PLN an additional $137,672.79 in fees and costs for
the period in question, id. at 1107. Although the state officials
had opposed PLN’s motion, they did not appeal the court’s
8444 PRISON LEGAL NEWS v. SCHWARZENEGGER
order, which effectively brought the total fees and costs to
nearly $458,000 as of that point.

In October 2008, PLN filed a second motion for attorneys’
fees and costs, requesting a further $143,322.96 for the period
between September 1, 2007, and October 15, 2008. Attor-
neys’ fees constituted $141,402.00 of the requested amount.
PLN arrived at that figure by multiplying the number of
claimed attorney-work hours by the 2008 hourly rates of the
attorneys who performed the work. In the relevant period,
PLN’s attorneys claimed 162.7 hours of “merits” work—i.e.,
work ensuring compliance with the settlement agreement—
and 223.7 hours of “fees” work—i.e., work securing fees,
including fees requested in PLN’s first motion. The 2008
hourly rates of the attorneys who performed the work were
$740 for a law firm partner who graduated from law school
in 1962; $370 for a law firm associate who graduated in 2001;
$340 for a law firm associate who graduated in 2003; and
$170 for a law firm paralegal.

The state officials opposed PLN’s second motion for attor-
neys’ fees and costs, arguing that the hours claimed and the
rates billed were unreasonable. The state officials further
argued that they had met all of their obligations under the set-
tlement agreement. They thus urged the district court to termi-
nate its jurisdiction over the agreement and to refuse to
entertain any additional fee requests by PLN.

In December 2008, the district court granted in part PLN’s
second motion. The court determined that the rates billed by
PLN’s attorneys were reasonable, and that the hours claimed
were reasonable as well, with the exception of 23.75 hours of
“merits” work “related to censorship issues outside the scope
of the settlement agreement.” After reducing the fee request
accordingly, the court awarded PLN $137,502.46 in attor-
neys’ fees and costs—$48,562.17 in fees and costs for “mer-
its” work, and $88,940.29 in fees and costs for “fees” work—
bringing the cumulative total to about $595,000. The court
 PRISON LEGAL NEWS v. SCHWARZENEGGER 8445
then “decline[d] [the state officials’] request to conclude that
CDCR has completed all of its obligations under the settle-
ment agreement and that no more fees applications may be
submitted by [PLN].” The court stated that the state officials
“shall continue to follow the terms of the settlement and
[PLN]’s counsel may incur reasonable fees ensuring that they
do.”

The state officials appeal the district court’s ruling on
PLN’s second motion for attorneys’ fees and costs. Until now,
they have largely acquiesced in PLN’s efforts to obtain reim-
bursement. It was, after all, they who entered into a gener-
ously worded settlement agreement with PLN; they who
acceded to the district court’s retention of jurisdiction, includ-
ing over fee disputes; they who stipulated to an award of
$320,000 in fees and costs for work leading up to the settle-
ment; and they who declined to appeal the additional award
of nearly $138,000 upon PLN’s initial fee request. All told,
including the amount at issue here, the state officials have
incurred over half a million dollars in fees and costs for
PLN’s attorneys. The narrow question before us now is
whether they can be heard to complain about the latest bill for
$137,502.46.

II

The state officials first contend that PLN is not eligible to
recover attorneys’ fees for the type of “merits” work claimed
in PLN’s motion—namely, work monitoring the state offi-
cials’ compliance with the agreement.

[1] Title 42 U.S.C. § 1988 provides that in an action, such
as this one, brought under § 1983, “the court, in its discretion,
may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee
as part of the costs.” In Buckhannon Board & Care Home,
Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health & Human
Resources, 532 U.S. 598 (2001), the Supreme Court construed
the term “prevailing party” to refer to a party that obtains a
8446 PRISON LEGAL NEWS v. SCHWARZENEGGER
judicially sanctioned “material alteration of the legal relation-
ship of the parties.” Id. at 604 (internal quotation marks omit-
ted).1 In light of Buckhannon, we have held that a plaintiff
who obtains a legally enforceable settlement agreement quali-
fies as a “prevailing party,” at least when the district court
retains jurisdiction to enforce the agreement. Richard S. v.
Dep’t of Dev. Servs., 317 F.3d 1080, 1088 (9th Cir. 2003).
Given that the district court has retained jurisdiction to
enforce the parties’ settlement agreement here, we have no
trouble concluding that PLN is a “prevailing party” within the
meaning of § 1988. The question remains, however, whether
such status renders PLN statutorily eligible to recover attor-
neys’ fees for monitoring the state officials’ post-settlement
compliance.

[2] In Keith v. Volpe, 833 F.2d 850 (9th Cir. 1987), we
held that a party that prevails by obtaining a consent decree
may recover attorneys’ fees under § 1988 for monitoring
compliance with the decree, even when such monitoring does
not result in any judicially sanctioned relief. Id. at 855-57.
Although this case involves a settlement agreement, not a
consent decree, the difference is immaterial. In both contexts,
monitoring serves the same purpose: causing defendants to
fulfill their obligations “more speedily and reliably.” Id. at
857 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, to the extent
Keith remains good law, we must conclude that § 1988 autho-
rizes PLN to recover attorneys’ fees for monitoring the state
officials’ compliance with the parties’ settlement agreement.

According to the Seventh Circuit in Alliance To End
Repression v. City of Chicago, 356 F.3d 767 (7th Cir. 2004),
however, Keith does not survive the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Buckhannon. Id. at 772. In clarifying the meaning of
1
Although Buckhannon involved federal fee-shifting statutes other than
§ 1988, its interpretation of the term “prevailing party” applies here. Buck-
hannon, 532 U.S. at 602-03 & n.4; Bennett v. Yoshina, 259 F.3d 1097,
1100-01 (9th Cir. 2001).
 PRISON LEGAL NEWS v. SCHWARZENEGGER 8447
the term “prevailing party,” the Court in Buckhannon rejected
the so-called catalyst theory of fee-shifting—the theory that a
party prevails insofar as its efforts bring about some desired
change, even if the change is not judicially sanctioned. 532
U.S. at 606. The Seventh Circuit reads Buckhannon’s rejec-
tion of the catalyst theory to mean that where, as here, moni-
toring has the effect only of bringing about the defendant’s
compliance, it is not compensable under § 1988. Alliance, 356
F.3d at 771. In the Seventh Circuit’s view, only monitoring
that produces a court-issued judgment or order is compensa-
ble after Buckhannon. Id. The suggestion is that Buckhannon
compels us to overrule Keith, which reached a contrary hold-
ing. We disagree.

[3] A three-judge panel may reject prior circuit precedent
in light of an intervening Supreme Court decision only when
the Court’s intervening decision has “undercut the theory or
reasoning underlying the prior circuit precedent in such a way
that the cases are clearly irreconcilable.” Miller v. Gammie,
335 F.3d 889, 900 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). In concluding
that monitoring is compensable under § 1988 even when it
does not lead to a judgment or order, Keith relied on Pennsyl-
vania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 478
U.S. 546 (1986), a Supreme Court decision that predates
Buckhannon. See Keith, 833 F.2d at 855-56. In Delaware Val-
ley, the Court considered whether a plaintiff could recover
attorneys’ fees under section 304(d) of the Clean Air Act for
post-judgment monitoring of a consent decree. 478 U.S. at
557-58. The Court noted that the availability of such fees
under § 1988 was widely recognized, citing circuit cases per-
mitting their recovery even when the monitoring in question
did not result in a judgment or order. Id. at 559. The Court
explained that “[g]iven the common purpose of both § 304(d)
and § 1988 to promote citizen enforcement of important fed-
eral policies,” there was “no reason not to interpret both pro-
visions governing attorney’s fees in the same manner.” Id. at
560. It then affirmed the award of fees for monitoring, with-
8448 PRISON LEGAL NEWS v. SCHWARZENEGGER
out considering whether the plaintiff’s monitoring led to any
judicially sanctioned relief. Id. at 561.

In Buckhannon, the Court did not mention, much less over-
rule, Delaware Valley. Given that Delaware Valley survives
Buckhannon, and that Keith applies the reasoning of Dela-
ware Valley, we cannot say that the reasoning of Keith is so
“clearly irreconcilable” with Buckhannon that we must reject
Keith “as having been effectively overruled.” Miller, 335 F.3d
at 893; accord Johnson v. City of Tulsa, 489 F.3d 1089, 1108
(10th Cir. 2007) (“In light of Delaware Valley and this cir-
cuit’s precedents, we cannot accept the proposition that [in the
aftermath of Buckhannon,] attorney fees for post-decree
efforts are compensable only if they result in a judicially sanc-
tioned change in the parties’ legal relationship.”). We remain
bound by Keith, notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s inter-
vening decision in Buckhannon. See S.F. NAACP v. S.F. Uni-
fied Sch. Dist., 284 F.3d 1163, 1166 (9th Cir. 2002)
(reaffirming in dicta the holding of Keith post-Buckhannon).
We therefore hold that PLN may recover attorneys’ fees
under § 1988 for monitoring the state officials’ compliance
with the parties’ settlement agreement.

[4] The state officials maintain that there is “no language”
in the settlement agreement that allows PLN’s counsel to
monitor their activities and then submit bills for that work.2
Paragraph 7(b) of the agreement, however, provides that
“PLN and its attorneys expressly reserve their rights to pursue
claims for attorneys’ fees, costs and expenses for work per-
formed after the time the Settlement Agreement is signed by
all parties, including for work spent on substantive issues
2
PLN notes that the district court rejected the state officials’ argument
that PLN “has no right to ‘monitor compliance’ under the Agreement” in
ruling on PLN’s first motion for attorneys’ fees. PLN contends that
because the state officials failed to appeal that ruling, they are estopped
from raising the argument here. PLN, however, failed to raise the issue of
estoppel in the district court. Accordingly, we consider the issue waived.
See Gieg v. DDR, Inc., 407 F.3d 1038, 1046 n.10 (9th Cir. 2005).
 PRISON LEGAL NEWS v. SCHWARZENEGGER 8449
related to this Agreement.” The work of PLN’s attorneys
monitoring the state officials’ compliance was not only “per-
formed after the time the Settlement Agreement [was]
signed,” but also “spent on substantive issues related to [the]
Agreement.” There can thus be no question that PLN’s pursuit
of fees for that work under § 1988 is consistent with the terms
of the agreement.

III

We next address whether the district court awarded a “rea-
sonable attorney’s fee” under § 1988. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b).
We review the district court’s award for abuse of discretion.
Corder v. Gates, 947 F.2d 374, 377 (9th Cir. 1991).

A

The state officials first challenge the number of hours
included in the district court’s fee award. They assert that the
district court should not have approved attorneys’ fees for
31.5 hours of “merits” work that they characterize as “corre-
spondence with inmates” unrelated to the settlement.3

[5] “The district court has a great deal of discretion in
determining the reasonableness of the fee and, as a general
rule, we defer to its determination, including its decision
regarding the reasonableness of the hours claimed by the pre-
vailing party.” Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1398
(9th Cir. 1993). “This is appropriate in view of the district
court’s superior understanding of the litigation and the desir-
ability of avoiding frequent appellate review of what essen-
3
PLN asserts that the state officials are estopped from raising this argu-
ment because a similar one was rejected in the district court’s ruling on
PLN’s first motion for attorneys’ fees, which the state officials did not
appeal. By failing to raise the issue of estoppel in the district court, how-
ever, PLN has waived the issue on appeal. See Gieg, 407 F.3d at 1046
n.10.
8450 PRISON LEGAL NEWS v. SCHWARZENEGGER
tially are factual matters.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S.
424, 437 (1983).

The 31.5 hours at issue here involved reviewing and
responding to letters from inmates in CDCR institutions com-
plaining about access to published materials. Representative
billing entries include time spent screening inmate mail for
“urgent case issues”; reviewing inmate letters regarding the
“banning of hardback books” and “problems receiving recent
issues of PLN"; and writing to inmates about “settlement
compliance.” Noting that “prisoners themselves are often in
the best position to observe whether the settlement agreement
is being enforced,” the district court determined that the 31.5
hours in question were reasonably expended on monitoring
the state officials’ compliance with the agreement and there-
fore were compensable.

[6] The district court’s determination was not an abuse of
discretion. It was reasonable for the district court to conclude
that the 31.5 hours spent corresponding with inmates was part
of PLN’s efforts to monitor the state officials’ compliance
with the agreement. Without such correspondence, it would
be difficult for PLN to discover or to document violations of
the terms of the settlement. Given that PLN may recover
attorneys’ fees for monitoring the state officials’ compliance,
we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion by
awarding fees for the 31.5 hours of “correspondence with
inmates” disputed here.

B

The state officials also challenge the hourly rates approved
by the district court in awarding fees. They argue that the dis-
trict court abused its discretion in several ways by relying on
the 2008 hourly rates of PLN’s San Francisco-based attor-
neys.

[7] First, the state officials argue that the district court
should not have awarded fees at 2008 rates for 187.3 hours of
 PRISON LEGAL NEWS v. SCHWARZENEGGER 8451
work performed by PLN’s attorneys in 2007. The district
court approved 2008 rates for work performed in 2007 in
order to compensate for the delay in the payment of fees for
that work. The state officials contend that the court instead
should have awarded interest. We have said, however, that a
“district court’s determination to adjust to current rates rather
than to make an interest adjustment squarely [is] within the
bounds of its discretion.” Deukmejian, 987 F.2d at 1407; see
also Welch v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 480 F.3d 942, 947 (9th Cir.
2007). Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discre-
tion by applying 2008 rates to work performed in 2007.

[8] Second, the state officials contend that the district court
should have applied the so-called Laffey matrix to arrive at the
appropriate hourly rates. Approved originally in Laffey v.
Northwest Airlines, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 354 (D.D.C. 1983),
aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 746 F.2d 4 (D.C.
Cir. 1984), the Laffey matrix is an inflation-adjusted grid of
hourly rates for lawyers of varying levels of experience in
Washington, D.C. Id. at 371-75; see Salazar v. District of
Columbia, 123 F. Supp. 2d 8, 13 (D.D.C. 2000). The state
officials argue that the district court should have increased the
rates in the matrix by nine percent to account for the higher
cost of living in San Francisco, and then based its fee award
on the resulting rates. But just because the Laffey matrix has
been accepted in the District of Columbia does not mean that
it is a sound basis for determining rates elsewhere, let alone
in a legal market 3,000 miles away. It is questionable whether
the matrix is a reliable measure of rates even in Alexandria,
Virginia, just across the river from the nation’s capital. Robin-
son v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 560 F.3d 235, 245 (4th Cir.
2009); see also Grissom v. Mills Corp., 549 F.3d 313, 323
(4th Cir. 2008) (noting that the plaintiff provided “no evi-
dence” that the Laffey matrix was “a reliable indicator of the
hourly rates of litigation attorneys in Reston, Virginia, a sub-
urb of Washington, D.C.”). We thus cannot fault the district
court for declining to use the Laffey matrix.
8452 PRISON LEGAL NEWS v. SCHWARZENEGGER
Third, the state officials argue that the 2008 hourly rates of
PLN’s attorneys are inconsistent with rates prevailing in the
relevant legal community. Noting that a suit by a prisoner
challenging the same CDCR policies would have been subject
to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e(d)(3)—which would have capped at around $170 the
hourly rate for calculating attorneys’ fees—the state officials
argue that the “relevant community in this case is more in line
with PLRA civil rights cases than with a firm practicing
securities litigation.” Accordingly, the state officials urge us
to compare the rates billed by PLN’s attorneys to the rates
billed by other civil rights attorneys involved in prison litiga-
tion.4

[9] The rates billed by PLN’s attorneys are extremely high,
of course, as compared to prevailing rates under the PLRA.
But the state officials, in the settlement agreement, invited
this § 1983 suit by a plaintiff who is not a prisoner, which
means the PLRA’s limits do not apply. Id. § 1997e(d)(1). And
given the record before us, we cannot say that the rates billed
by PLN’s attorneys are out of step with the rates charged by
others in the relevant legal community. “Generally, when
determining a reasonable hourly rate, the relevant community
is the forum in which the district court sits.” Camacho v.
Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 979 (9th Cir. 2008).
Here, the forum is the Northern District of California. The
rates prevailing in that district for “similar services by lawyers
of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation”
thus furnish the proper measure of the reasonableness of the
rates billed by PLN’s attorneys. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S.
886, 895 n.11 (1984). Although the state officials urge us to
4
PLN argues that the state officials are estopped from challenging the
relevant legal community referenced by the district court because they did
not appeal the district court’s ruling on PLN’s first motion for attorneys’
fees. PLN, however, did not raise the issue of estoppel in the district court.
Accordingly, we do not consider the issue here. See Gieg, 407 F.3d at
1046 n.10.
 PRISON LEGAL NEWS v. SCHWARZENEGGER 8453
look only to the rates charged by other attorneys involved in
prison litigation, the proper scope of comparison is not so lim-
ited, but rather extends to all attorneys in the relevant commu-
nity engaged in “equally complex Federal litigation,” no
matter the subject matter. Id. at 893 (internal quotation marks
omitted).

In support of its second motion for attorneys’ fees and
costs, PLN submitted the declaration of one of its own attor-
neys as well as that of an attorneys’ fee expert compiling the
hourly rates charged by various San Francisco-area law firms.
These supporting documents show that the 2008 hourly rates
billed by PLN’s attorneys fall within the range of rates
charged by other attorneys involved in federal civil litigation
in the Northern District of California during the same period.
At one firm, for example, a partner with twenty-three years’
experience charged $700 per hour, an associate with five
years’ experience charged $325 per hour, and paralegals
charged up to $190 per hour. At another firm, partners billed
an hourly rate of up to $875, and associates billed an average
hourly rate of $403. At yet another firm—a disability rights
advocacy firm—the co-director of litigation, a 1961 law
school graduate, charged $745 per hour, while a staff attor-
ney, a 2003 law school graduate, charged $425 per hour.
Although the record could be clearer on how the work of
these firms compares to the post-settlement work performed
here, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion
by awarding fees at the 2008 hourly rates billed by PLN’s
attorneys, which are not so out of line as to be unreasonable.
We therefore affirm the district court’s award of $137,502.46
in attorneys’ fees and costs to PLN.

IV

Finally, the state officials argue that the district court erred
by retaining jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement.
They maintain that they have completed all of their obliga-
tions under the terms of the settlement. They contend that
8454 PRISON LEGAL NEWS v. SCHWARZENEGGER
because there is nothing further they must do, the district
court should have terminated its jurisdiction, thereby foreclos-
ing any future requests for attorneys’ fees in federal court.

[10] The state officials are correct that the district court’s
jurisdiction over the agreement must eventually end; PLN
may not pursue reimbursement of attorneys’ fees in federal
court indefinitely. Whether the time has come for the district
court to terminate its jurisdiction, however, cannot be dis-
cerned from the record before us. The record is silent with
respect to many of the state officials’ obligations under the
agreement and the extent to which they have been fulfilled. At
this juncture, therefore, we are unable to conduct any mean-
ingful review of the district court’s refusal to terminate juris-
diction over the agreement. Accordingly, we vacate the
district court’s decision not to terminate jurisdiction, and
remand the case with instructions that the parties be permitted
to develop a record of what, if any, obligations under the
agreement the state officials have not yet completed. Once the
record has been developed more fully, the state officials may
move, if they wish, for termination of the district court’s juris-
diction.

V

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court
is AFFIRMED in part and VACATED in part, and the case
is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion. The state officials shall bear PLN’s costs for this
appeal.