FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 08-50541
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. D.C. No.
3:08-CR-02205-H-1
JOSE ALBERTO VILLASENOR,
OPINION
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Marilyn L. Huff, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted
November 4, 2009—Pasadena, California
Filed June 10, 2010
Before: Thomas G. Nelson, Jay S. Bybee, and
Milan D. Smith, Jr., Circuit Judges.
Opinion by Judge Bybee
8533
8536 UNITED STATES v. VILLASENOR
COUNSEL
Lawrence E. Spong (argued), Assistant United States Attor-
ney, Criminal Division, San Diego, California; Luella M.
Caldito, Assistant United States Attorney, Criminal Division,
San Diego, California, for the plaintiff-appellant.
Gary P. Burcham, Burcham & Zugman, APC, San Diego,
California, for the defendant-appellee.
UNITED STATES v. VILLASENOR 8537
OPINION
BYBEE, Circuit Judge:
We must decide whether a search conducted after a border
crossing qualifies as a reasonable search under the extended
border search doctrine. The district court granted the defen-
dant’s motion to suppress, ruling that the unusual factual sce-
nario presented here did not fit within the rubric of the
extended border search doctrine. We review the question of
reasonable suspicion de novo, Ornelas v. United States, 517
U.S. 690, 699 (1996), and review the district court’s findings
of fact for clear error, United States v. Berber-Tinoco, 510
F.3d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 2007). On appeal, the government
argues that we have recognized similar extended border
searches as reasonable. We agree with the government and
reverse the judgment of the district court.
I
On June 17, 2008, Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(“ICE”) Agent Enrique Torregrosa helped ICE Agent Chad
Worgen interview a person caught smuggling drugs through
the Calexico West Port of Entry in Southern California. Dur-
ing their conversation, the smuggler admitted to being
involved in a larger drug trafficking organization. He told the
agents that in the near future he was to meet up with a white
Toyota Tacoma, which would serve as a “load vehicle,” and
a white PT Cruiser, which would serve as a “scout vehicle.”
He was supposed to meet the cars on the California side of the
border at either PepBoys or McDonald’s, at which point he
would be led to a separate drop-off location. The smuggler
did more than just talk: he showed the agents a picture of the
PT Cruiser on his cell phone, from which Agent Worgen was
able to decipher a license plate number, 6CHU366. Agent
Worgen later entered the license plate number in the Treasury
Enforcement Communications System (“TECS”), a computer-
based information system designed to identify individuals
8538 UNITED STATES v. VILLASENOR
crossing the border who are suspected of violating federal
law.
At some point the following morning, eighty-two year old
Jose Villasenor drove a white PT Cruiser up to the Calexico
West Port of Entry. The car’s license plate, 6CHU366 (match-
ing the one in the photo on the smuggler’s cell phone), trig-
gered an automatic referral to secondary inspection, where a
narcotics detecting dog (“NDD”) sniffed the car but failed to
alert.1
At 9:10 that morning, Agent Torregrosa was driving south-
bound on Imperial Avenue hoping to park at the Port of Entry.
When he saw there was no parking available, he made a U-
turn, and began heading north on Imperial. While stopped at
a red light at Imperial and Second Avenue, Torregrosa sud-
denly realized that he had pulled up right behind a white PT
Cruiser. Although he had not seen the car cross the border, he
quickly deduced that it must have come from the Port of Entry.2
After calling and confirming that Agent Worgen had entered
the car’s license plate number in TECS, Torregrosa decided
to follow Villasenor.
Villasenor stopped at the next block at a FillCo gas station.
He got out, talking on his cell phone, and walked to the corner
of the gas station while looking south toward the Port of
Entry. After two or three minutes on the corner, Villasenor
turned around and went into the gas station’s restroom.
Shortly thereafter, he got in his car and left the gas station,
never having filled up. All together, he was at the FillCo for
approximately ten minutes and was talking on his cell phone
the entire time.
1
The dog was later “fired.”
2
The only other possibility, which Torregrosa discounted because he
had not noticed the PT Cruiser in front of him, was that Villasenor had
also made a U-turn on Imperial.
UNITED STATES v. VILLASENOR 8539
Next, Villasenor went to an AM/PM gas station, about two
miles from the FillCo. He got out, still on his cell phone, and
walked around the Cruiser. Less than five minutes later, again
without filling up, he got in his car and left. Villasenor then
went to the DMV, about thirty minutes away. Villasenor
exited his car and walked into the DMV.3 He returned to his
car two or three minutes later.
While surveilling Villasenor at the DMV, Torregrosa asked
the local police department—the El Centro Police Department
—to send a marked police car to conduct a traffic stop of Vil-
lasenor’s car.4 Sergeant John Seaman responded to the call,
tailing Villasenor’s car just as it was leaving the DMV.
Before long, Seaman noticed a ten-inch rosary hanging from
Villasenor’s rearview mirror. Relying on California Vehicle
Code § 26708(a)(2), which prohibits “driv[ing] any motor
vehicle with any object placed in or upon the vehicle that
obstructs or reduces the driver’s clear view through the wind-
shield,” Seaman stopped Villasenor.
Upon arriving at the scene a few minutes later, Torregrosa
called an NDD officer to conduct a sniff of the car. Seaman,
meanwhile, ticketed Villasenor for his failure to provide proof
of insurance. Upon receiving the ticket, Villasenor asked if he
could leave, but was told he would have to wait. Forty-five
minutes later Agent Biella arrived with an NDD. At that
point, Biella told Torregrosa that Villasenor’s car had gone
through secondary inspection that morning. During the ensu-
ing dog sniff, the NDD alerted to the rear rocker panel. The
agents looked behind the panel and discovered 15 packages of
cocaine weighing a total of 37.36 pounds. Villasenor was
indicted for importing and possessing an illegal substance
under 21 U.S.C. §§ 952 and 960.
3
Agent Torregrosa briefly lost sight of Villasenor as he turned the cor-
ner to enter the DMV.
4
Torregrosa said that he requested the traffic stop to avoid getting
“burned,” i.e., to avoid having his car recognized as a vehicle involved in
drug interdiction.
8540 UNITED STATES v. VILLASENOR
The district court granted Villasenor’s motion to suppress
the drug evidence. The court agreed with Villasenor that
Agent Torregrosa did not have reasonable suspicion “that
there was contraband in the vehicle.” The court also rejected
the government’s contention that the detention and subse-
quent dog sniff of Villasenor’s vehicle was a valid “extended
border search.” The court reasoned that Villasenor’s behavior
after crossing the border was not “terribly suspicious,” and
that “there was already a search of the vehicle” at the border.
The government timely appeals.
II
The Fourth Amendment protects “against unreasonable
searches and seizures . . . .” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Gener-
ally, “searches made at the border, pursuant to the longstand-
ing right of the sovereign to protect itself by stopping and
examining persons and property crossing into this country, are
reasonable simply by virtue of the fact that they occur at the
border.” United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149,
152-53 (2004) (quotation marks and citation omitted). As a
result, most border searches need not be justified by a search
warrant or by any level of individualized suspicion. United
States v. Abbouchi, 502 F.3d 850, 855 (9th Cir. 2007).
Border searches do not always occur at the physical border.
United States v. Alfonso, 759 F.2d 728, 734 (9th Cir. 1985).
On account of the “practical difficulty of getting to and
searching every vehicle or carrier at the precise moment it
crosses land or sea borders,” id., border searches sometimes
occur “at the functional equivalent of a border,” United States
v. Guzman-Padilla, 573 F.3d 865, 877 (9th Cir. 2009) (quota-
tion marks omitted); see also Almeida-Sanchez v. United
States, 413 U.S. 266, 273 (1973) (citing “a search of the pas-
sengers and cargo of an airplane arriving at a St. Louis airport
after a nonstop flight from Mexico City” as an example of
“the functional equivalent of a border search”).
UNITED STATES v. VILLASENOR 8541
A distinct but closely related type of border search is the so
called extended border search. Extended border searches usu-
ally occur near the border but after the border has already
been crossed. See Alfonso, 759 F.2d at 734. Because extended
border searches “intrude more on an individual’s normal
expectation of privacy,” id., their reasonableness depends on
two factors: (1) “whether the totality of the surrounding cir-
cumstances, including the time and distance elapsed as well
as the manner and extent of surveillance, . . . convince the fact
finder with reasonable certainty that any contraband . . . in or
on the vehicle at the time of search was aboard the vehicle at
the time of entry into the . . . United States,” United States v.
Sahanaja, 430 F.3d 1049, 1054 (9th Cir. 2005); and (2)
whether government agents conducting the search have “rea-
sonable suspicion that the search may uncover contraband or
evidence of criminal activity.” Abbouchi, 502 F.3d at 855; see
Guzman-Padilla, 573 F.3d at 878-79 (noting that “an
extended border search is ‘any search away from the border
where entry is not apparent,’ but where the dual requirements
of reasonable certainty of a recent border crossing and reason-
able suspicion of criminal activity are satisfied” (citations
omitted)). As with border searches generally, “the major
impetus behind the extended border search doctrine is the
government interest in stopping drug traffic.” United States v.
Yang, 286 F.3d 940, 946 (7th Cir. 2002) (quotation marks
omitted).
On appeal, the government argues that the forty-five min-
ute stop of Villasenor to wait for an NDD and its officer qual-
ifies as a reasonable extended border search. With respect to
the first factor, the government argues that because of Agent
Torregrosa’s virtually constant surveillance of Villasenor after
he crossed the border, there is reasonable certainty that the 15
packages of cocaine were in Villasenor’s car when he crossed
the border. As to the second factor, the government contends
that, viewed as a whole, the smuggler’s tip and Villasenor’s
unusual behavior after crossing the border provided Torre-
8542 UNITED STATES v. VILLASENOR
grosa with reasonable suspicion that a search of Villasenor’s
car would turn up evidence of drug-related activity.
Villasenor does not contest that there was reasonable cer-
tainty that the drugs were in his car when he crossed the bor-
der. Instead, he argues, pointing to the “intensive secondary
inspection . . . involving a narcotic-detector dog” at the bor-
der, that “there was simply no evidence” that Villasenor was
involved in some kind of criminal activity. The district court
agreed with Villasenor. The court thought—based primarily
on the failed dog sniff at the border—that Torregrosa did not
have reasonable suspicion that Villasenor’s car contained con-
traband. In addition, it found that Villasenor’s behavior after
crossing the border was “not terribly suspicious.” Accord-
ingly, the court held that the search “did not meet the qualifi-
cations for an extended border search.”
III
Although we think that there is some force to Villasenor’s
arguments and to the district court’s holding, we are per-
suaded that the search of Villasenor’s car was reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment as an extended border search.
Because Villasenor does not contest that the cocaine was in
his car at the time he crossed the border, we focus our discus-
sion on the second prong of the extended border search analy-
sis: whether Torregrosa had reasonable suspicion to believe
that a search of Villasenor’s car would turn up evidence of
criminal activity.5
5
We do not discuss the validity of the rosary-based traffic stop. As is
explained in more detail below, because Agent Torregrosa requested that
the El Centro Police Department conduct a traffic stop of Villasenor’s car,
we may impute Torregrosa’s knowledge of the tip and Villasenor’s
unusual behavior to Sergeant Seaman under the collective knowledge doc-
trine. United States v. Ramirez, 473 F.3d 1026, 1031-32 (9th Cir. 2007).
Thus, whether Seaman had probable cause to believe that the rosary hang-
ing from Villasenor’s rearview mirror “obstruct[ed] or reduce[d Villasen-
UNITED STATES v. VILLASENOR 8543
A
[1] The Fourth Amendment generally requires that police
officers have probable cause before searching a car. See
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 807-08 (1982). Under the
extended border search doctrine, however, agents may con-
duct a search armed only “with reasonable suspicion that the
search may uncover contraband or evidence of criminal activ-
ity.” Abbouchi, 502 F.3d at 855; see Guzman-Padilla, 573
F.3d at 877-78 (explaining that an extended border search
requires “ ‘reasonable suspicion’ that the subject of the search
was involved in criminal activity” (citations omitted)).
[2] Reasonable suspicion “exists when an officer is aware
of specific, articulable facts which, when considered with
objective and reasonable inferences, form a basis for particu-
or’s] clear view through the windshield,” see Cal. Veh. Code
§ 26708(a)(2), is ultimately beside the point, see Ramirez, 473 F.3d at
1031 (“[I]t does not matter that [Sergeant Seaman] was directed to make
a ‘traffic stop,’ nor does it matter whether he had valid grounds to make
the traffic stop because of [a hanging rosary]. If [Agent Torregrosa] had
[reasonable suspicion], then the seizure and search of the vehicle [was]
justified.”); see also id. at 1037 (Kozinski, J., concurring) (“This is not a
case where the investigating officers ordered a fellow officer to conduct
a traffic stop because they lacked probable cause for a narcotics stop.
. . . [T]hat the arresting officer made it look like a ‘traffic stop’ . . . did
not change the nature of the stop, which remained—in substance—a nar-
cotics stop.” (emphasis added)).
Even if Seaman had probable cause to stop Villasenor, there is no ques-
tion, on this record, that the forty-five minute detention lasted much longer
than a traditional traffic stop, especially one for such a minor infraction.
See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 437 (1984) (“[D]etention of a
motorist pursuant to a traffic stop is presumptively temporary and brief.
The vast majority of roadside detentions last only a few minutes.”). And
if Seaman did not have probable cause, the constitutional legitimacy of the
stop still turns on whether Torregrosa had reasonable suspicion that Vil-
lasenor was involved in criminal activity, thereby justifying the length of
the stop under the extended border search doctrine. As a result, resolution
of the issue of the hanging rosary is irrelevant to the question before us.
8544 UNITED STATES v. VILLASENOR
larized suspicion.” United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208
F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Although an offi-
cer may not base his reasonable suspicion on a “hunch,”
United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989), he may “draw
on [his] own experience and specialized training to make
inferences from and deductions about the cumulative informa-
tion available . . . that might well elude an untrained person.”
United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (internal
quotation marks omitted). In reviewing whether reasonable
suspicion was present, we consider the evidence as a whole,
not piece by piece. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417
(1981).
[3] Viewed together, the smuggler’s tip and Villasenor’s
unusual behavior after crossing the border were enough to
provide Torregrosa with reasonable suspicion that a search of
Villasenor’s car would uncover evidence that Villasenor was
involved in criminal activity.6 In assessing whether the tip
contributed to Torregrosa’s reasonable suspicion, we “employ
a totality-of-the-circumstances approach that takes into con-
sideration the informant’s veracity or reliability and his basis
of knowledge.” United States v. Rowland, 464 F.3d 899, 907
(9th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). On the
whole, we think the smuggler’s tip was reliable. For one
thing, the smuggler was not an anonymous tipster; he spoke
with the officers face to face. See id. at 908; United States v.
Palos-Marquez, 591 F.3d 1272, 1275-76 (9th Cir. 2010). For
another, by admitting his involvement in a larger drug traf-
ficking operation, the smuggler may have invited more severe
criminal penalties. Cf. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143,
6
We recognize that under the Supreme Court’s decision in Illinois v.
Caballes, a dog sniff is not a “search.” 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005). But as
that decision made clear, a stop may become “unlawful if it is prolonged
beyond the time reasonably required to complete [its] mission.” Id. at 407.
In our view, therefore, the critical question is whether Torregrosa pos-
sessed the constitutional authority to search Villasenor’s car. If he did,
waiting forty-five minutes for an NDD was reasonable. If he did not, the
stop was probably too long.
UNITED STATES v. VILLASENOR 8545
146-47 (1972) (noting that one of the indicia of reliability is
that the informant could be subject to criminal penalties for
lying to the police). The smuggler had “first-hand knowledge”
concerning cars that would be involved and potential rendez-
vous sites. Palos-Marquez, 591 F.3d at 1277. Most impor-
tantly, he provided the agents with a photo and the license
plate number of the car to be driven by one of his accom-
plices. When a car with that same license plate number
crossed the border the very next day, Torregrosa could be rea-
sonably confident that the smuggler “ha[d] knowledge of con-
cealed criminal activity.” Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 272
(2000).
[4] To be sure, not everything about the tip played out
exactly as the smuggler described it. For instance, the smug-
gler’s prediction that the white PT Cruiser would meet up
with a white Toyota Tacoma at either McDonald’s or Pep-
Boys proved to be inaccurate. Although a tipster’s failure to
accurately predict an accused’s future movement often under-
mines his credibility, we do not think that is the case here.
Because the smuggler was describing future events in which
he was involved, his arrest may have substantially affected the
likelihood that the predicted activities would occur. One pos-
sibility, for example, is that the arranged meeting was cancel-
led when Villasenor and his conspirators were unable to
contact the smuggler after his arrest. In any event, under these
circumstances, the fact that the meeting did not occur does not
significantly undercut the tip’s other indicia of reliability. See
Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 331 (1990) (finding reason-
able suspicion despite the fact “that not every detail men-
tioned by the tipster was verified”).
[5] To Torregrosa’s trained eye, Villasenor’s behavior
after crossing the border aroused further suspicion. Villasenor
first stopped at a FillCo, which, according to Torregrosa, was
a regular site of vehicle-swapping, drug-swapping, and other
drug-related activity. Villasenor got out and walked over to
the corner of the lot, looking back toward the port of entry as
8546 UNITED STATES v. VILLASENOR
if he was expecting someone, talking on his cell phone all the
while. After using the restroom, he got back in his vehicle and
left. He did not fill up when he next drove to AM/PM, another
gas station that was, according to Torregrosa, associated with
drug-related activity. Villasenor then went to the DMV, about
thirty minutes away; he did not appear to have any lawful
business there either. Each of Villasenor’s moves, on its own,
might have an innocent explanation. But “[a] determination
that reasonable suspicion exists [ ] need not rule out the possi-
bility of innocent conduct.” Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277. Overall,
Villasenor’s behavior, combined with the smuggler’s tip, pro-
vided Torregrosa with reason to believe that a search of Vil-
lasenor’s car would uncover evidence of criminal activity.
Under the extended border search doctrine, that was all he
needed to search Villasenor’s vehicle. See Guzman-Padilla,
573 F.3d at 877-78; Abbouchi, 502 F.3d at 855.
B
Villasenor contests this conclusion on two principal
grounds. First, he argues that the detention and sniff of Vil-
lasenor’s car cannot qualify as an extended border search
because Torregrosa did not have reasonable suspicion that the
car contained drugs. Second, he argues that the extended bor-
der search doctrine does not apply in cases where an “inten-
sive secondary inspection” takes place at the border, including
a dog sniff. Both arguments are foreclosed by our precedent.
1
In arguing that Torregrosa did not have reasonable suspi-
cion that Villasenor’s car contained drugs, Villasenor empha-
sizes that Torregrosa knew, or at least should have known,
that a dog sniffed Villasenor’s car at the border but failed to
alert. With that knowledge, Villasenor maintains, Torregrosa
could not have reasonably believed that Villasenor’s car con-
tained drugs. There are two problems with Villasenor’s argu-
ment, one factual and one legal.
UNITED STATES v. VILLASENOR 8547
[6] As to facts, there is no indication that Torregrosa knew
that Villasenor’s car had been sniffed at the border. Indeed,
Torregrosa testified that he did not know the car had been sent
to secondary. It is true that Torregrosa knew, prior to stopping
Villasenor, that Agent Worgen had entered Villasenor’s
license plate number in TECS. It is also true that he knew that
a hit on TECS should trigger an “automatic referral to second-
ary,” including a dog sniff. But all that suggests is that Torre-
grosa should have known that Villasenor’s car should have
been sent to secondary inspection.
Villasenor argues that we need not concern ourselves with
whether Torregrosa actually knew or should have known the
car had been sniffed, because we may impute knowledge of
the failed dog sniff to Torregrosa under the collective knowl-
edge doctrine. That doctrine allows courts to impute police
officers’ collective knowledge to the officer conducting a
stop, search, or arrest. It generally applies in two situations.
The first is “where law enforcement agents are working
together in an investigation but have not explicitly communi-
cated the facts each has independently learned.” United States
v. Ramirez, 473 F.3d 1026, 1032 (9th Cir. 2007). The second
occurs “where an officer . . . with direct personal knowledge
of all the facts necessary to give rise to reasonable suspicion
. . . directs or requests that another officer . . . conduct a stop,
search or arrest.” Id. at 1033. In both situations, collective
knowledge may be imputed only if there has been some
“communication among agents.” Id. at 1032. According to
Villasenor, because there is a “close working relationship”
between ICE agents and inspectors of Customs and Border
Protection (“CBP”), we may impute the CBP Inspectors’
knowledge of the failed dog sniff to Agent Torregrosa. We
are unpersuaded.
[7] The first situation in which the collective knowledge
doctrine is invoked does not apply here. Although CBP agents
and ICE agents have a “close working relationship,” there is
no evidence in the record that CBP agents and Agent Torre-
8548 UNITED STATES v. VILLASENOR
grosa were “working together in an investigation.” Ramirez,
473 F.3d at 1032. Moreover, even if we assume that the
agents were working together in an investigation, “the cases
suggest a limited requirement that there be a communication
. . . among officers.” Id. at 1032-33. The record is devoid of
any communication between CBP agents and Torregrosa
regarding Villasenor.7 The second situation does not apply
because there is no evidence in the record that CBP agents
“direct[ed] or request[ed] that [Torregrosa] conduct a stop,
search or arrest.” Id. at 1032. Just as we would not permit the
government to comb its collective files to establish probable
cause or reasonable suspicion, we decline to indulge Villasen-
or’s effort to assemble everything known by agents working
on the border in an effort to show that Torregrosa knew too
much. Cf. Savino v. New York, 331 F.3d 63, 74 (2d Cir. 2003)
(reiterating that court’s holding that the collective knowledge
doctrine “cannot be used to impute to an officer facts . . .
which exonerate an arrestee”) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted).
[8] As to law, as we explained above, an extended border
search is proper as long as the searching agent possesses “sus-
picion that the search may uncover contraband or evidence of
criminal activity.” Abbouchi, 502 U.S. at 855 (emphasis
added). Thus, even if Torregrosa did not suspect that Vil-
lasenor himself was carrying drugs, he still had reasonable
suspicion, based on specific, articulable facts, that a search of
Villasenor’s car would uncover other evidence of drug-related
activity; indeed, Torregrosa had strong evidence to suspect
that Villasenor was involved in drug-smuggling. That evi-
dence included: a tip from an apprehended smuggler that Vil-
lasenor’s car was to serve as the scout vehicle in an illegal
7
We recognize that Officer Biella, a CBP agent, told Torregrosa that
Villasenor had gone through secondary inspection after Villasenor had
been stopped and held for forty-five minutes. That, of course, does not
affect our conclusion that CBP agents’ knowledge may not be imputed to
Torregrosa before he stopped and held Villasenor.
UNITED STATES v. VILLASENOR 8549
drug operation; Villasenor’s unusual behavior at two gas sta-
tions located a mile and a half apart and known for their asso-
ciation with drug-related activity; and Villasenor’s seemingly
purposeless visit to the DMV. Though far from conclusive,
the totality of the circumstances suggests that Torregrosa had
enough, under the extended border search doctrine, to search
Villasenor’s car. See Yang, 286 F.3d at 949 (citing “unusual
conduct,” “tips from informants,” and “information from [an]
. . . interrogation of a traveling companion,” as objective fac-
tors going to the heart of whether reasonable suspicion was
present).
2
[9] We also disagree with Villasenor’s assertion that the
fact that a search takes place at the border prohibits the gov-
ernment from relying on the extended border search doctrine
to justify a subsequent search of the same person or vehicle.
Indeed, we have previously rejected this argument.
In United States v. Espericueta-Reyes, special agent George
Cons learned from a reliable source “that a certain vehicle
containing contraband and displaying a certain [ ] license
plate was about to pass through the . . . Port of Entry.” 631
F.2d 616, 618 (9th Cir. 1980). Customs agents decided that
they would allow the car through the port but would place it
under surveillance to “determine whether others were
involved . . . .” Id. Upon crossing the border, the “car was
routed to secondary inspection where it was searched,” but
“[n]o contraband was found, and the car was allowed to pro-
ceed.” Id. (footnote omitted). After crossing the border, the
car pulled into a gas station. Espericueta-Reyes, who was
standing by the gas pumps waiting, gave the driver of the car
what looked like money and then joined him in the car.
Shortly thereafter agents stopped the car. They conducted a
“cursory inspection” of the vehicle, but forestalled a more
extensive search due to dangerous traffic conditions. After
8550 UNITED STATES v. VILLASENOR
conducting a more extensive search at the port of entry,
agents discovered heroin in the right rear wheel well.
Noting that “[t]he fact that a prior search ha[s] been con-
ducted at the time of the initial border crossing is not disposi-
tive of whether later searches are properly considered
extended border searches,” we upheld the search as a valid
extended border search. Id. at 619; see also United States v.
Caicedo-Guarnizo, 723 F.2d 1420, 1422 (9th Cir. 1984)
(“[A]n extended border search can be valid even where the
suspect was already searched at the initial border crossing.”).
In reaching this conclusion, we explained: “Clearly, the task
of policing our borders would be made far more difficult, and
the illicit activities of smugglers less risky, if an inspection at
the border automatically foreclosed subsequent inspections by
customs officials absent probable cause.” Espericueta-Reyes,
631 F.2d at 620.
Similarly instructive, though not as factually on point, is
the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Yang, 286 F.3d 940. There,
Teng Yang and his cousin Lee Pao Yang, coming from Laos
through Tokyo, arrived at Chicago’s O’Hare International
Airport. At customs, Teng was allowed to pass through after
an x-ray of his luggage revealed nothing suspicious. Lee Pao,
however, was randomly selected for a more extensive search,
during which agents discovered that his luggage contained
opium-soaked clothing. After further interrogation and inves-
tigation, agents discovered that Lee Pao was traveling on the
same itinerary as his cousin, Teng. Their suspicions aroused,
agents set out to find Teng, which they did a few minutes
later. A thorough search of Teng’s luggage revealed more
opium-soaked clothes. The Seventh Circuit upheld the search
as a valid extended border search. According to the court, the
fact that Teng’s luggage had been x-rayed at the border and
that he had already passed customs mattered little. What mat-
tered was that “[o]fficers had a reasonable certainty that Teng
had crossed the border . . . and [that] they had a reasonable
suspicion that criminal activity was occurring.” Id. at 949.
UNITED STATES v. VILLASENOR 8551
[10] We suppose that in “striking a sensible balance
between the legitimate privacy interests of the individual and
society’s vital interest in the enforcement of customs laws,”
Caicedo-Guarnizo, 723 F.2d at 1423, there could be instances
where continual searches at or near the border would eventu-
ally become unreasonable despite formal satisfaction of the
test for extended border searches. But wherever that line is,
we are confident that the stop and search of Villasenor’s car
did not cross it.
IV
The judgment of the district court is REVERSED.