[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
______________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-10219 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JUNE 14, 2010
Non-Argument Calendar
JOHN LEY
______________________
CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 8:03-cr-00249-SCB-MSS-2
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
DAVID O. EDWARDS,
a.k.a. Dre,
Defendant-Appellant.
_____________________
Appeal from the Unites States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_____________________
(June 14, 2010)
Before HULL, MARTIN and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
David O. Edwards appeals the district court’s order granting him a reduced
sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). He argues that the record does not
sufficiently reflect whether the district court considered the sentencing factors
outlined at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) in amending his sentence. Edwards also argues
that, based on his post-sentencing conduct, the district court should have
sentenced him below the amended guidelines range. We review for abuse of
discretion a district court’s decision to reduce a sentence under § 3582(c)(2).
United States v. Smith, 568 F.3d 923, 926 (11th Cir. 2009). We review de novo
the district court’s legal conclusions about its authority under § 3582(c)(2).
United States v. James, 548 F.3d 983, 984 (11th Cir. 2008).
District courts have discretion to modify prison terms where those terms
were calculated within a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by
the Sentencing Commission. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). In November 2007, after
Edwards was originally sentenced, the Sentencing Commission adopted
Amendment 706, lowering the base offense level for crack cocaine offenses by
two levels. United States v. Williams, 557 F.3d 1254, 1256 (11th Cir. 2009). In
October 2009, Edwards filed a motion for modification of his sentence in
accordance with Amendment 706. The district court granted his motion,
sentencing him towards the low end of the amended guidelines range.
If a district court chooses to resentence a prisoner under § 3582(c)(2), it
must first calculate the new guidelines range, and then it must consider the
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§ 3553(a) factors to determine the appropriate amended sentence. Smith, 568 F.3d
at 927. The district court is required to consider the § 3553(a) factors, although it
need not “articulate specifically the applicability—if any—of each of the section
3553(a) factors, as long as the record demonstrates that the pertinent factors” were
considered. United States v. Eggersdorf, 126 F.3d 1318, 1322–23 (11th Cir.
1997). Where the district court states on the record that it “reviewed the motions,
the Government’s [response], the record, and [was] otherwise . . . duly advised,” it
has satisfied this requirement. Id.
While the district court did not explicitly address the § 3553 factors, its
order mentions Edwards’s response memorandum, which requested a lower
sentence in light of Amendment 706 and the § 3553(a) factors. The order also
explains the court’s reasoning that the new sentence is consistent with the original
sentence’s placement within the guidelines range. We are satisfied that the district
court adequately considered the § 3553(a) factors. Cf. United States v. Douglas,
576 F.3d 1216, 1219 (11th Cir. 2009) (vacating and remanding where the record
lacked any evidence that the district court considered the § 3553(a) factors after it
summarily granted the defendant’s motion for resentencing); Williams, 557 F.3d at
1257 (same).
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Edwards argues that, based on his post-conviction conduct, the district court
should have sentenced him below the amended guidelines range. However, any
reduced sentence must be “consistent with applicable policy statements issued by
the Sentencing Commission.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). Here, the applicable policy
statements prohibit the district court from reducing Edwards’s sentence below the
minimum of the amended guidelines range. See United States Sentencing
Guidelines § 1B1.10(b)(2)(A) (Nov. 2009). In United States v. Melvin, 556 F.3d
1190 (11th Cir. 2009), we explicitly held that the Supreme Court’s decisions in
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005) and Kimbrough v.
United States, 552 U.S. 85, 128 S. Ct. 558 (2007) do not apply to resentencing
under § 3582(c)(2). Melvin, 556 F.3d at 1192. As a result, the district court could
not deviate below the amended guidelines range. Id. at 1193–94. Although
Edwards encourages us to abandon Melvin, we are bound by our precedent
“‘unless and until it is overruled by this court en banc or by the Supreme Court.’”
Douglas, 576 F.3d at 1219 (quoting United States v. Vega-Castillo, 540 F.3d
1235, 1236 (11th Cir. 2008)).
Upon review of the record and consideration of the parties’ briefs, we
conclude that the record is sufficient to show that the district court considered the
§ 3553(a) sentencing factors in resentencing Edwards. We AFFIRM.
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