FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
June 15, 2010
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
ANTHONY JEROME JOHNSON,
Petitioner - Appellant,
No. 10-6078
v. (D.C. No. 09-CV-01158-R)
(W.D. Okla.)
STATE OF OKLAHOMA; JUSTIN
JONES,
Respondents - Appellees.
ORDER
DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Before KELLY, EBEL, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner-Appellant Anthony Johnson, an Oklahoma state inmate
proceeding pro se, seeks a certificate of appealability (“COA”) allowing him to
appeal the district court’s dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas petition.
Because we conclude that Mr. Johnson has failed to make “a substantial showing
of the denial of a constitutional right,” we deny his request for a COA, and
dismiss the appeal. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
Mr. Johnson currently serves a cumulative state sentence of nineteen years
for the crimes of robbery with a firearm and eluding an officer. 1 R. 122. Those
sentences run concurrently with his sentence in a federal case. 1 R. 122-23. In
2009, he filed a federal habeas petition seeking credit on his state sentence for
time spent in custody awaiting trial on these federal and state charges. 1 R. 8-9,
15-16. Mr. Johnson’s federal sentence is not at issue in this petition. 1 R. 123.
The magistrate judge concluded that Mr. Johnson raised only questions of
state law and recommended denying his petition. 1 R. 128. The district court
adopted the magistrate’s recommendation and denied the petition. 1 R. 137-39.
Mr. Johnson now seeks a COA from this court and renews his arguments that the
state court erred in denying him pre-custody credits. Appl. Br. at 2-4.
We are limited to determining “whether a conviction violated the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” Johnson v. Mullin, 505 F.3d
1128, 1141-42 (10th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). A state
court’s denial of pre-sentence time credits can pose Fourteenth Amendment issues
when the imposed state sentence together with the pre-sentence custody exceeds
the statutory maximum. Hall v. Furlong, 77 F.3d 361, 364 (10th Cir. 1996);
Vasquez v. Cooper, 862 F.2d 250, 254-55 (10th Cir. 1988). But where a state
court sentence and pre-sentence custody total less than the maximum sentence,
these Fourteenth Amendment issues are not present. “The period of incarceration
[less than the statutory maximum] is necessarily discretionary with the sentencing
judge.” Vasquez, 862 F.2d at 255. Defendants have “no right to a particular
sentence within the statutory limits.” Id.
This type of Fourteenth Amendment claim is not present here. Mr. Johnson
-2-
has never argued, either in the district court or in this court, that his sentence plus
pre-sentence detention exceeds the statutory maximum. In fact, the magistrate, as
an alternative holding, concluded that Mr. Johnson received less than the
maximum sentence. 1 R. 126-28. Mr. Johnson does not attack this conclusion.
And although Mr. Johnson invokes the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments,
he does not articulate in any way how the state court violated those rights. Appl.
Br. at 3. His application for a COA solely argues that the state sentencing court
erred when it allegedly refused to credit his pre-custody time. Appl. Br. at 2-4.
A state court’s denial of credits for pre-sentence custody is a matter of state
law where, as here, the petitioner does not claim that the denial of good time
credits exceeds the statutory maximum and where he fails to allege any other
constitutional theory. Campbell v. Williams, 66 F. App’x 170, 173 (10th Cir.
2003); Wishom v. Roberts, 37 F. App’x 338, 339-40 (10th Cir. 2002). Because
Mr. Johnson asks this court to examine a question of state law, he does not to
make “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” Johnson, 505
F.3d at 1141 (errors of state law alone are not cognizable in habeas).
For the foregoing reasons, we DENY the request for a COA, DISMISS the
appeal, and DENY IFP status.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
-3-