Santos-Sanchez v. United States

Case: 07-40145 Document: 00511142218 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/15/2010 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit FILED June 15, 2010 No. 07-40145 Lyle W. Cayce Clerk JESUS NATIVIDAD SANTOS-SANCHEZ, Petitioner–Appellant v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent–Appellee Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas (06-CV-153) ON REMAND FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Before REAVLEY, CLEMENT, and PRADO, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:* In Santos-Sanchez v. United States, 548 F.3d 327, 336 (5th Cir. 2008), vacated by --- S. Ct. ----, No. 08-9888, 2010 WL 1265856 (Apr. 5, 2010), we held, inter alia, that the alleged failure of Jesus Natividad Santos-Sanchez’s attorney to warn him of the immigration consequences of his guilty plea did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel warranting coram nobis relief. In Padilla v. * Pursuant to 5TH CIR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR . R. 47.5.4. Case: 07-40145 Document: 00511142218 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/15/2010 No. 07-40145 Kentucky, the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment mandates that “counsel must inform her client whether his plea carries a risk of deportation.” 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010). Subsequently, the Supreme Court vacated our judgment in Santos-Sanchez and remanded the case to us for further consideration. We find that Padilla has abrogated our holding in Santos-Sanchez. We therefore vacate the district court’s denial of Santos-Sanchez’s petition for a writ of coram nobis and remand to the district court for further proceedings consistent with Padilla.1 VACATED and REMANDED. 1 We note that Santos-Sanchez’s deportation neither deprives the district court of jurisdiction nor renders his petition moot. See Zalawadia v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 292, 297 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding, in the context of a writ of habeas corpus, that a bar on re-admission following removal or deportation is a legally cognizable collateral consequence, and thus deportation did not render the petition moot). 2