PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 09-6013
ROBERT E. GRAHAM,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of West Virginia, at Beckley.
David A. Faber, Senior District Judge.
(5:06-cr-00025-1)
Argued: January 27, 2010
Decided: June 16, 2010
Before MICHAEL, MOTZ, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Motz wrote the major-
ity opinion, in which Judge Michael joined. Judge Gregory
wrote a dissenting opinion.
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Harry Preston Henshaw, III, Charleston, West
Virginia, for Appellant. Hunter Paul Smith, Jr., OFFICE OF
THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charleston, West Vir-
2 UNITED STATES v. GRAHAM
ginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Charles T. Miller, United
States Attorney, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.
OPINION
DIANA GRIBBON MOTZ, Circuit Judge:
After the Government charged Robert E. Graham with 39
criminal offenses, he opted for a bench trial. The district court
found him not guilty of all offenses except that charged in
Count 14—embezzlement from his employer, an organization
receiving in excess of $10,000 annually in federal funds. See
18 U.S.C. § 666 (2006). Graham appealed his sole conviction,
and we reversed, holding that the Government had offered
insufficient evidence to prove, "beyond a reasonable doubt,
that Graham knowingly stole any money" as alleged in Count
14. See United States v. Graham, 269 F. App’x 281, 286 (4th
Cir. 2008) (per curiam). Graham then moved for a certificate
of innocence, a necessary prerequisite to recovery of damages
from the Government for unjust conviction and imprisonment.
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1495, 2513 (2006). Concluding that Graham
had not met the statutory prerequisites for a certificate of
innocence, the district court refused to grant him one. Graham
appeals. Because the district court did not abuse its substantial
discretion in denying the certificate, we affirm.
I.
A.
Graham served as executive director of two related non-
profit corporations—the Council on Aging, Inc. ("COA") and
All Care Home and Community Services, Inc. ("All Care")—
for more than twenty years. The corporations, which shared
a Board of Directors, provided services to the elderly and
infirm and received well over $10,000 annually in federal
funds.
UNITED STATES v. GRAHAM 3
For many years, Graham had no written employment con-
tract with either corporation. However, in December 2001, he
prepared and submitted employment contracts, which the
Board’s president signed. The contracts raised Graham’s
annual salary from $125,000 to $185,000.
In March 2002, COA agreed to assume responsibility for
All Care’s administrative expenses, including Graham’s sal-
ary and benefits, and entered into an amended employment
contract with Graham so providing. This amended contract
contains the following sick-leave provision:
Beginning on the date of employment sometime
around May 1975 until the termination of employ-
ment, [Graham] shall be entitled to accrue two days
(16[ ]hours) per month paid sick leave time. Sick
leave may be accumulated from year to year. Sick
leave benefits may be converted into cash compensa-
tion if used for illnesses or upon the termination of
this contract.
Thus, the contract authorized Graham to convert his sick-
leave benefits into cash compensation under only two
circumstances—"illness[ ] or . . . termination of th[e] con-
tract."
Nevertheless, in January 2003, without meeting these con-
ditions, Graham sought Board permission to convert some of
his sick leave to cash. Graham offered the Board the follow-
ing brief justification for the request: "I am requesting permis-
sion to buy out some of my sick leave. It shows in the books
as an accrual. I can already bu[y] out my vacation." The
Board granted his request, and on that same day, Graham con-
verted 1200 sick-leave hours to $106,728. Two more times in
the spring of 2003, again without meeting the contractual con-
ditions, Graham requested and received Board permission to
convert some of his sick leave to cash. In all, during 2003,
Graham converted sick leave to over $160,000 in cash.
4 UNITED STATES v. GRAHAM
Graham never again asked the Board to approve his con-
version of sick leave to cash. But in both January and Febru-
ary 2004, again without meeting either of the contractual
conditions, he converted sick leave to cash. In total, during
2004, Graham converted sick leave to over $30,000 in cash.
In response to ongoing state investigations of COA, the
Board called an emergency meeting in March 2004, at which
it revised the terms of Graham’s employment contract and
ordered Graham to return the money he received for sick
leave in 2003. That same month, Graham heeded his attor-
ney’s advice and repaid all the money he had received for sick
leave in both 2003 and 2004.
In July 2006, a federal grand jury in the Southern District
of West Virginia returned a second superseding 39-count
indictment against Graham. Both counts 13 and 14 charged
him with embezzling money from COA by unauthorized con-
version of sick leave to cash. See 18 U.S.C. § 666.1 Count 13
charged him with embezzling $160,092.81 in calendar year
2003; Count 14 charged him with embezzling $31,129 in
2004.
Graham pled not guilty to all counts and waived his right
to a jury trial. During his five-day bench trial, the Government
offered substantial evidence that at all relevant times, the
COA Board members were elderly (their average age
exceeded 80), hard of hearing, financially unsophisticated,
and strongly influenced by Graham. The Government argued
that this evidence required the district court to find that Gra-
1
Section 666 prohibits an agent of an organization receiving in any one-
year period federal benefits in excess of $10,000 from "embezzl[ing],
steal[ing], obtain[ing] by fraud or otherwise without authority knowingly
convert[ing] to the use of any person other than the rightful owner or
intentionally misappl[ying]" property owned or controlled by that organi-
zation and carrying a value of $5000 or more. 18 U.S.C. § 666. Graham’s
intent constituted the only disputed element at trial.
UNITED STATES v. GRAHAM 5
ham could, and did, take advantage of the Board at every turn
and so find him guilty of all 39 counts in the indictment.
The district court refused to so find. Rather, after the trial,
at which Graham did not testify, the court acquitted Graham
of all crimes but that charged in Count 14—embezzlement
from his employer of $31,129 through sick-leave conversions
to cash in 2004. Thus, the court found Graham not guilty of
mail fraud, wire fraud, tax violations, embezzlement related to
the purchase of a plasma television and the maintenance of a
SEP IRA plan, or embezzlement with respect to the 2003
sick-leave conversion charged in Count 13. United States v.
Graham, No. 5:06-00025, 2006 WL 2527613 (S.D.W. Va.
Aug. 30, 2006).
The court explained its differing finding as to Counts 13
and 14 as follows:
Evidence establishes that, in 2003, defendant went to
the boards of COA and All-Care and requested board
approval prior to cashing in sick leave. The board’s
sanction of defendant’s behavior, regardless of the
ability of its members to fully comprehend the intri-
cacies of the organizations’ finances, leads this court
to conclude that defendant did not violate 18 U.S.C.
§ 666(A)(1)(a) as to Count Thirteen. Even though
the court doubts that the board members compre-
hended in detail all of the matters before them, they
did consent. Their assent, regardless of their level of
competence, creates a reasonable doubt as to Count
Thirteen.
On the other hand, the evidence at trial did estab-
lish that defendant was guilty of Count Fourteen. It
shows clearly that he did not return to the board and
seek the same approval for his last buy out of sick
leave even though he knew he was supposed to do
so.
6 UNITED STATES v. GRAHAM
....
. . . [T]he conclusion is inescapable that Graham
cashed in the sick leave [in January and February
2004] without the approval of his board, knowing he
needed board approval, thereby effectively stealing
the money or converting it to his own use.
From the evidence taken at trial it is clear that
defendant, an employee, took this money from COA
without having any board approval whatsoever.
These transactions each constituted major changes of
the sort that required board approval. The fact that
Graham sought board approval for the [2003] cash-
outs of sick leave is compelling evidence that he
knew such approval was required. Graham cavalierly
disregarded the board and treated large amounts of
COA’s money as if it were his own, diverting it to
his personal use and to the detriment of those whom
COA and All-Care were created and funded to serve.
Id. at *3-4.
As to the other counts—related to the plasma television,
SEP IRA plan, and federal taxes –- the court concluded that
although Graham’s conduct was "doubtlessly improper and
unethical," id. at *1, and "inconsistent with Graham’s duties
as Executive Director," id. at *2, the Government had failed
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Graham harbored the
requisite intent to commit the crimes charged. Id. at *1-2, *4;
see 18 U.S.C. § 666; 26 U.S.C. § 7206 (2006). The court sim-
ilarly acquitted Graham of various fraud charges, see 18
U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, 1346 (2006), finding that the Govern-
ment had not proven that Graham devised a scheme to
defraud his employer. Graham, 2006 WL 2527613, at *2-5.
The district court concluded that
UNITED STATES v. GRAHAM 7
[t]he events leading to this indictment are improper
and outrageous and cannot be condoned by the court.
Graham failed miserably to fulfill his duties as a
public servant, engaging in conduct that squandered
public resources and adopting a life-style that
reflected discredit upon COA and All-Care, their
directors and employees. Bad conduct in and of
itself, however, does not equal criminal conduct. To
convict a defendant of a crime, the government must
establish beyond a reasonable doubt by competent
evidence each and every element of each and every
crime charged. Except for Count Fourteen, the gov-
ernment has failed to do so.
Id. at *5. The court imposed on Graham a within-Guidelines
sentence of two years in prison and a $10,000 fine, and
ordered him to forfeit any portion of the funds charged as
stolen in Count 14 that he had not already returned.
Graham appealed, and we reversed his sole conviction on
sufficiency grounds. Graham, 269 F. App’x at 286-87. We
concluded that, because in 2003, "[t]he Board repeatedly
authorized Graham to buy out his accrued sick leave and did
not place any restrictions on . . . the timing of these cash
outs," his failure to obtain Board approval in 2004 for the
cash payments of sick leave was "clearly insufficient for pur-
poses of establishing Graham’s intent to steal funds." Id. at
286. Although Graham’s written contract permitted him to
receive cash payment for sick leave only upon illness or ter-
mination, we held that "the Board’s decisions in January,
March, and May of 2003 [to permit cash payment of sick
leave in circumstances not permitted in the employment con-
tract] resulted in a de facto amendment that overrode these
restrictions." Id.
We pointed to several other facts suggesting Graham did
not intentionally steal from COA, including the Board’s deci-
sion to maintain Graham as executive director in March 2004
8 UNITED STATES v. GRAHAM
after the federal and state investigations of COA had begun,
Graham’s decision to continue to obtain cash for sick leave
after the federal investigation began in early 2003, and his
filling out the proper paperwork and obtaining approval from
the Board treasurer for all of the sick-leave conversions to
cash. Id. at 286-87. Although we recognized that certain other
facts—for example, that Graham’s conversions of sick leave
ran afoul of COA’s written personnel policies—"may demon-
strate that Graham is not eligible for the priesthood," we
found them "irrelevant so far as the district court’s determina-
tion of guilt is concerned." Id. at 285 n.5.
We issued our mandate on March 20, 2008, and on that
same day the district court entered an order adjudging Gra-
ham not guilty. At that time, Graham had spent thirteen
months in prison.
B.
On July 21, 2008, Graham filed an action in the United
States Court of Federal Claims seeking damages from the
Government for unjust conviction and imprisonment. See 28
U.S.C. §§ 1495; 2513. Two months later, Graham moved in
this court for a certificate of innocence, a necessary prerequi-
site to the Federal Claims action. Id. § 2513. We dismissed
the motion without prejudice, noting that the "reversal of
appellant’s conviction was not based on technical or proce-
dural grounds, but law and fact; therefore, a certificate of
innocence is appropriate in accordance with . . . § 2513."
However, we concluded that "the district court is the most
appropriate court to issue the certificate."
Graham then moved for a certificate of innocence in the
district court, which the court denied. After examining the rel-
evant statutory language, the court concluded that § 2513 does
not mandate the payment of public funds to everyone acquit-
ted after being imprisoned. Rather, the statute "orders com-
pensation to the truly innocent who have been prosecuted
UNITED STATES v. GRAHAM 9
through no fault of their own." United States v. Graham, 595
F. Supp. 2d 681, 684 (S.D.W. Va. 2008). The court noted that
the few precedents interpreting § 2513 (and its predecessors)
agreed that the statute "provides a remedy to be applied only
in exceptional cases." Id.
The district court determined that it was "unable to reach
. . . the conclusions mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 2513" as a nec-
essary condition to the award of a certificate of innocence. Id.
at 686. Specifically, the Court found itself "not persuaded that
Graham is in fact innocent," nor able to "conclude that he did
not by misconduct or neglect bring about his own prosecu-
tion." Id.
The court first catalogued the trial evidence, which it
believed demonstrated that Graham was not actually innocent:
Graham (1) "selected and controlled the Board[ ] . . . which
w[as] composed entirely of the elderly," (2) took home an
annual salary of $185,000, which was "excessive by compari-
son to the pay of others in similar positions," (3) "used
employees on company time to perform personal services for
himself and his family," (4) "bought . . . a $6,000 television[ ]
through COA to get a better price and avoid sales taxes," (5)
"manipulated a SEP IRA to benefit his family," and (6) "as-
sumed a lavish lifestyle including regular visits to a ‘gentle-
men’s club.’" Id. at 685. This evidence led the court to
conclude that "Graham operated [COA and All Care] for
years as his own personal domain and for the financial benefit
of himself and his family." Id.
The court then explained why it found that Graham’s "mis-
conduct or neglect cause[d] or br[ought] about his own prose-
cution." 28 U.S.C. § 2513(a)(2). First, the court found that the
enumerated evidence of Graham’s wrongdoing "certainly
shows that, in a general sense, [Graham] brought about his
own prosecution." Graham, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 686. Specifi-
cally, the court found that Graham was "at the very least neg-
ligent" in not seeking Board approval before converting his
10 UNITED STATES v. GRAHAM
sick leave to cash in 2004, as he had in 2003. Id. The court
explained that Graham "either simply neglected to do so or he
purposely failed to do so for some specific reason such as the
belief his request would not be approved. In either event his
own conduct brought about his prosecution . . . ." Id.
The district court expressly recognized that on appeal, we
had "carefully reviewed the evidence against Graham on the
count of conviction and concluded that it was insufficient to
establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. The court
did not challenge this holding. Rather, the court explained that
while the evidence at trial had been found "insufficient to
prove [Graham’s] guilt beyond a reasonable doubt," this evi-
dence left the court unconvinced "that Graham is in fact inno-
cent, [or] that [Graham] did not by misconduct or neglect
bring about his own prosecution." Id.
Graham timely noted this appeal.
II.
This case presents our first opportunity to address § 2513.
Nor has the Supreme Court ever construed, or even cited, the
statute. But the clear statutory language, its legislative history,
and the cases that have previously considered the statute pro-
vide us substantial guidance.
Section 2513, the "[u]njust conviction and imprisonment"
act, provides:
(a) Any person suing under section 1495 of this title
[which waives sovereign immunity for suits seeking
money damages from the Government, to be filed in
the Court of Federal Claims] must allege and prove
that:
(1) His conviction has been reversed or set
aside on the ground that he is not guilty of
UNITED STATES v. GRAHAM 11
the offense of which he was convicted, . . .
as appears from the record . . . of the court
setting aside or reversing such conviction,
. . . and
(2) He did not commit any of the acts
charged or his acts, deeds, or omissions in
connection with such charge constituted no
offense against the United States, or any
State, Territory or the District of Columbia,
and he did not by misconduct or neglect
cause or bring about his own prosecution.
(b) Proof of requisite facts shall be by a certificate of
the court or pardon wherein such facts are alleged to
appear, and other evidence thereof shall not be
received.
28 U.S.C. § 2513.
Thus, the plain language of § 2513 requires that one seek-
ing a certificate of innocence (who has not been pardoned)
prove three predicates. He must prove that (1) "the record . . .
of the court setting aside or reversing" his conviction demon-
strates that it did so "on the ground that he is not guilty of the
offense of which he was convicted," § 2513(a)(1); (2) he "did
not commit any of the acts charged" or those acts "constituted
no crime against the United States, or any State, Territory or
the District of Columbia," § 2513(a)(2); and (3) "he did not by
misconduct or neglect cause or bring about his own prosecu-
tion," id.
After setting forth these three requirements, § 2513 specifi-
cally characterizes them as "requisite facts." § 2513 (b). Then,
the statute expressly sets forth the only way (again absent par-
don) that a person can demonstrate these "requisite facts" in
the Court of Federal Claims—by a certificate from the court
12 UNITED STATES v. GRAHAM
in which "such facts are alleged to appear." Id. This intricate
statutory scheme renders several conclusions inescapable.
First, Congress clearly did not provide in the unjust convic-
tion and imprisonment act an avenue for monetary compensa-
tion to all whose criminal convictions are reversed after
incarceration. See Betts v. United States, 10 F.3d 1278, 1284
(7th Cir. 1993); United States v. Keegan, 71 F. Supp. 623, 635
(S.D.N.Y. 1947). Rather, "the phrasing of the Act and its leg-
islative history proclaim the care with which its framers
guarded against opening wide the door through which the
treasury may be assailed by persons erroneously convicted."
United States v. Brunner, 200 F.2d 276, 280 (6th Cir. 1952);
see also H.R. Rep. No. 75-2299, at 2 (1938), quoted in Kee-
gan, 71 F. Supp. at 633 (noting that Congress enacted this
statute to provide only "certain innocent persons" the ability
"to present a claim for financial indemnity" upon "showing
their innocence"). As the Eighth Circuit has recently recog-
nized, § 2513 "compensates only the truly innocent." United
States v. Racing Servs., Inc., 580 F.3d 710, 712 (8th Cir.
2009) (citing Betts, 10 F.3d at 1284).2
2
The legislative history of § 2513 clearly demonstrates a congressional
desire to limit the class of persons entitled to relief under the statute. In
commenting on the proposed legislation, Attorney General Homer Cum-
mings noted that "[i]deal justice would seem to require that in the rare and
unusual instances in which a person who has served the whole or part of
a term of imprisonment, is later found to be entirely innocent," he should
"receive some redress." S. Rep. No. 75-202, at 3 (1937) (emphasis added),
quoted in Keegan, 71 F. Supp. at 632. The Attorney General went on to
distinguish the "entirely innocent," who would merit a certificate of inno-
cence, from those who would not—the "more frequent[ ]" cases in which
reversal was based "on the ground of insufficiency of proof or on the ques-
tion as to whether the facts charged and proven constituted an offense
under some statute." Id. He concluded that any proposed legislation should
"necessar[ily] . . . separate from the group of persons whose convictions
have been reversed, those few who are in fact innocent of any offense
whatever." Id.
UNITED STATES v. GRAHAM 13
Second, and just as clear as its intent to permit only the
"truly innocent" to receive a § 2513 certificate, Congress
expressly directed that one seeking the certificate bear the
burden of not only "alleg[ing]" but also "prov[ing]" entitle-
ment to the certificate. 28 U.S.C. § 2513(a); see also Betts, 10
F.3d at 1286; Rigsbee v. United States, 204 F.2d 70, 72 (D.C.
Cir. 1953); Keegan, 71 F. Supp. at 635-36; Burgess v. United
States, 20 Cl. Ct. 701, 704 (Ct. Cl. 1990). Moreover, because
it constitutes a waiver of sovereign immunity, "[t]he unjust
conviction statute has always been strictly construed." Bur-
gess, 20 Cl. Ct. at 704; Osborn v. United States, 322 F.2d 835,
838 (5th Cir. 1963); Keegan, 71 F. Supp. at 636 ("[A] statute
creating a claim against the Government should be strictly
construed, and may not by implication be extended to cases
not plainly within its terms." (internal quotation marks omit-
ted)). Thus, § 2513 imposes a rigorous burden on those who
seek a certificate of innocence.
Third, as every court to consider the question has held,
"[t]he decision to deny a certificate of innocence is committed
to the sound discretion of the district court." Racing Servs.,
580 F.3d at 713; Betts, 10 F.3d at 1283; Rigsbee, 204 F.2d at
72; Eastridge v. United States, 602 F. Supp. 2d 66, 69
(D.D.C. 2009); Keegan, 71 F. Supp. at 635-36. Accordingly,
we review a district court’s denial of a certificate of innocence
for abuse of discretion, e.g., Racing Servs., 580 F.3d at 711-
12, and "must affirm [that] decision unless the court abused
its discretion, or unless the findings underlying its decision
were clearly erroneous." Betts, 10 F.3d at 1283. When a dis-
trict judge has exercised his substantial discretion to deny a
certificate of innocence, "we cannot require him to stultify
himself by certifying an opinion contrary to his real
conviction—no matter what our own view might be—except,
perhaps, in a case in which the refusal to certify innocence
was completely capricious and without rational basis." Rigs-
bee, 204 F.2d at 72; see also Humphrey v. United States, 52
Fed. Cl. 593, 597 (Fed. Cl. 2002) (noting the district court’s
14 UNITED STATES v. GRAHAM
"broad discretion in deciding whether or not to issue" a certif-
icate of innocence), aff’d, 60 F. App’x 292 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
III.
Graham does not challenge any of the above principles.
Indeed, he expressly concedes that the district court had dis-
cretion to determine his entitlement to a certificate of inno-
cence, and that we "must affirm" absent abuse of this
discretion or unless the "findings underlying" it "were clearly
erroneous." Petr.’s Br. 4. Given our deferential review, how-
ever, even if we assume that the district court abused its dis-
cretion in finding Graham ineligible for a certificate of
innocence under § 2513(a)(1) and the first clause of
§ 2513(a)(2),3 Graham has not demonstrated that the court
abused its discretion in concluding that he failed to meet his
burden under the second clause of § 2513(a)(2), i.e. that "he
did not by misconduct or neglect cause or bring about his own
prosecution." We must therefore affirm the district court’s
denial of Graham’s motion for a certificate of innocence.
Consistent with § 2513, the factfinder designated by
Congress—the district court—reviewed all the evidence rele-
vant to Graham’s conduct and state of mind, and found that
Graham was "at the very least negligent" in failing to seek
Board approval before obtaining cash for sick leave in 2004,
and that this neglect brought about his prosecution. Graham,
3
It is not at all clear that the district court did abuse its discretion in rely-
ing on § 2513(a)(1) and the first clause of § 2513(a)(2). On direct appeal,
we concluded only that the Government failed to prove Graham harbored
the requisite intent. This may suggest that Graham’s conviction was "re-
versed or set aside on the ground that he is not guilty of the offense of
which he was convicted" and that he "did not commit any of the acts
charged." 28 U.S.C. § 2513(a)(1), (2). But reversal based on "failure of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt" also "leaves room for the possibility that
the petitioner in fact committed the offense with which he was charged."
Betts, 10 F.3d at 1284; see also Racing Servs., 580 F.3d at 712; Osborn,
322 F.2d at 840; Keegan, 71 F. Supp. at 632, 634-35.
UNITED STATES v. GRAHAM 15
595 F. Supp. 2d at 686. Ample record evidence supports that
finding. Indeed, in his first appeal in our court, Graham
expressly conceded that he "needed Board approval to cash
out sick leave," Petr.’s Reply Br. in No. 07-4106, at 4 n.2,
available at 2007 WL 1702675, and we noted that Graham’s
2004 conversions of sick leave were inconsistent with both
COA’s written policies and the employment contract Graham
prepared and executed. Graham, 269 F. App’x at 285 n.5,
286. The district court recited numerous other facts in its
account of Graham’s "sordid tale of abuse of a position of
public trust," Graham, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 686, and did not
abuse its discretion in concluding that they constituted "ne-
glect" that provided cause for Graham’s prosecution.
In fact, when Graham informed his lawyer in 2004 of his
sick-leave cash payments, his lawyer advised him that he
could not legally cash in his sick leave, and recommended
that he return the funds. J.A. in No. 07-4106, at 356. Although
the attorney’s conclusion proved inaccurate as a matter of
law, see Graham, 269 F. App’x at 286-87, it obviously consti-
tuted prudent and reasonable advice in light of the facts at
hand. In contrast, Graham’s marked lack of prudence—
particularly his repeated failure to seek Board approval for
substantial sick-leave conversions that violated the terms of
an employment contract he had prepared—supports the dis-
trict court’s finding that Graham’s neglect "brought about his
own prosecution." These omissions, combined with substan-
tial evidence of Graham’s imprudent stewardship of COA,
constitute a reasonable basis for Government officers to pros-
ecute, leading them to conclude (as indeed the trier of fact
did) that Graham committed a federal offense by stealing
from his employer.
Graham relies heavily on the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in
Betts, the only court of appeals decision to find an abuse of
discretion in a district court’s denial of a certificate of inno-
cence. Compare Racing Servs., 580 F.3d at 714 (affirming
denial of certificate of innocence), Osborn, 322 F.2d at 843
16 UNITED STATES v. GRAHAM
(same), and Rigsbee, 204 F.2d at 72-73 (same), with Betts, 10
F.3d at 1286 (reversing denial of certificate); see also Brun-
ner, 200 F.2d at 280 (reversing grant of certificate).4 The
court in Betts held that a petitioner fails to satisfy the second
clause of § 2513(a)(2) only when he has "acted or failed to act
in such a way as to mislead the authorities into thinking he
had committed an offense." Id. at 1285. Although the Betts
court acknowledged that "[n]either the statute nor the legisla-
tive history elucidates what kind of misconduct or neglect will
bar relief, and [that] the case law is sparse," id. at 1284, the
court concluded that Congress intended to preclude a certifi-
cate "‘[w]here there has been an attempt to flee, a false con-
fession, the removal of evidence, or an attempt to induce a
witness or an expert to give false testimony or opinion, or an
analogous attempt to suppress such testimony or opinion,’" id.
at 1285 (quoting Keegan, 71 F. Supp. at 638).
We reject this narrow reading of subsection (a)(2) because
it effectively reads "neglect" out of the statute. Each of the
Betts court’s enumerated examples implicates some element
of wrongful intent. Indeed, the Seventh Circuit appears to
limit denial on "neglect" grounds to situations in which "a
defendant has it within his means to avoid prosecution but
elects not to do so." Id. (emphasis added). Tellingly, the Betts
court draws its examples of "neglect" from the discussion in
Keegan of "willful misconduct," see Keegan, 71 F. Supp. at
638, not of conduct that constitutes "neglect" (or "negli-
gence," the prior statutory term), which Keegan never
addresses. Although Betts seeks to avoid a reading of § 2513
that "would require courts to assess the virtue of a petitioner’s
behavior even when it does not amount to a criminal offense,"
4
A casual reader might conclude from our analysis that federal courts
of appeal have regularly had occasion to consider certificates of inno-
cence. In fact, although Congress first enacted a certificate of innocence
statute in 1938, Keegan, 71 F. Supp. at 626, this opinion cites to all pub-
lished circuit-court opinions interpreting § 2513 or its predecessors. See
Racing Servs., 580 F.3d 710; Betts, 10 F.3d 1278; Osborn, 322 F.2d 835;
Rigsbee, 204 F.2d 70; Brunner, 200 F.2d 276.
UNITED STATES v. GRAHAM 17
10 F.3d at 1285, the statute’s "misconduct or neglect" lan-
guage on its face captures noncriminal conduct and thus
requires just such an assessment.
Moreover, even if we did accept the Betts construction of
§ 2513, we could not conclude that the district court abused
its discretion here. The court found that, given that the written
contract did not permit the sick-leave-to-cash conversions and
that Graham had obtained Board approval to modify the con-
tract in 2003, his failure to do so in 2004 at the very least con-
stituted neglect and provided prosecutors a basis for charging
that he intentionally stole from his employer. Graham’s
repeated failure to seek Board approval in 2004, while insuffi-
cient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, could rea-
sonably be said to constitute "omission[s] by the petitioner
that misle[d] the authorities as to his culpability." Betts, 10
F.3d at 1285.
Further, nothing in our opinion reversing Graham’s convic-
tion foreclosed the district court’s finding that Graham’s
neglect caused his prosecution. Rather, we expressly cabined
our reversal, holding only that "a reasonable trier of fact could
not find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Graham knowingly
stole any money from COA." Graham, 269 F. App’x at 286.
In reversing Graham’s criminal conviction, we had no occa-
sion to address the question of his "misconduct or neglect,"
but instead expressly limited our analysis to his claim of
insufficient evidence. See id. at 287 n.7. The closest we came
to a discussion of "misconduct or neglect" was to acknowl-
edge the damning nature of some of the evidence against Gra-
ham, but to distinguish it from proof necessary for conviction.
Id. at 285 n.5 ("[T]hese facts . . . are irrelevant so far as the
district court’s determination of guilt is concerned"). Our con-
clusion that "[i]n essence, the Board gave Graham the ability
to cash out his accrued sick leave early without any limita-
tion," id. at 286—which we reached in narrowly addressing
the issue of criminal intent—left open the possibility that Gra-
ham nonetheless acted with neglect in failing to take the pru-
18 UNITED STATES v. GRAHAM
dent, established course of seeking Board approval to
circumvent express company policy.
What Graham refuses to recognize is that the Government’s
failure to offer sufficient evidence to prove his guilt does not
require the district court, in considering the same evidence, to
find him entitled to a certificate of innocence. See, e.g., Rac-
ing Servs., 580 F.3d at 712 ("A reversal of the criminal con-
viction based on insufficiency of the prosecution’s evidence
does not entitle the defendant to a certificate of innocence.")
At trial, the Government had to prove, as a matter of fact, that
Graham acted with a guilty state of mind, e.g. that he intended
to steal from his employer. We have held that the Government
failed to meet its burden of proof on this issue, and so
reversed his conviction. But to obtain a certificate of inno-
cence, Graham must address the same issue and prove, as a
matter of fact, not only that he acted with no criminal intent
but also that no "neglect" on his part caused his prosecution.
The district court exercised its discretion to conclude that
Graham, who presented no evidence in support of his applica-
tion, failed to prove this. We can discern nothing "completely
capricious and without rational basis," Rigsbee, 204 F.2d at
72, in that conclusion. Although a reasonable trier of fact
might disagree, the district court’s finding was surely reason-
able in light of the record evidence.
In sum, the district court’s painstaking, fact-intensive anal-
ysis of the evidence that had been admitted during Graham’s
five-day bench trial resulted in a conclusion consistent with
§ 2513, supported by the facts, and permitted (perhaps even
suggested) by our earlier decision. See Graham, 269 F. App’x
at 285 n.5. The district court, which acquitted Graham on 38
of 39 counts, expressly recognized the difference between
"[b]ad conduct" and "criminal conduct." Graham, 2006 WL
2527613, at *5. And while we have held Graham’s neglectful
conduct irrelevant in determining his criminal guilt, § 2513
renders this evidence relevant, indeed critical, in determining
UNITED STATES v. GRAHAM 19
his eligibility for a certificate of innocence. We find no abuse
of discretion.
IV.
Before concluding, we must briefly respond to the dissent’s
contention that we have misread the second clause of
§ 2513(a)(2). Our friend in dissent maintains that this clause
requires a petitioner to prove only that he did not cause his
prosecution by "misconduct or neglect" that is "separate"
from the charged conduct. (Dissent at 28 (emphasis added).)
The plain language of the statute forecloses this theory.
Section 2513(a)(2) provides that in addition to proving that
"[h]e did not commit any of the acts charged" or that those
acts are not criminal, a petitioner must prove that "he did not
by misconduct or neglect cause or bring about his own prose-
cution." 28 U.S.C. § 2513(a)(2). The statute does not in any
way limit the type of causative "misconduct or neglect" that
will bar relief. To make its argument then, the dissent must
(and does) insert a modifier—"other," "additional," "subse-
quent," or "separate"—before "misconduct" in the second
clause of § 2513(a)(2). (See Dissent at 23, 27, 28.) Thus,
under the dissent’s view, the statute would require a petitioner
to prove only that "he did not by ["other" or "additional" or
"subsequent" or "separate"] misconduct or neglect cause or
bring about his own prosecution."5 Congress could have so
legislated. But it did not.
5
The dissent interprets a statute of its own creation. In addition to
adding these words to § 2513(a)(2), the dissent repeatedly ignores other
statutory language. Hence, the dissent asserts that one may somehow
"elect" to be "neglect[ful]" (Dissent at 32), and that misconduct taking
place once a prosecution "ha[s] already begun" can nonetheless "cause or
bring about" that very prosecution (id. at 28). The dissent would rewrite
the second clause of § 2513(a)(2) to bar relief only when, after a prosecu-
tion "ha[s] already begun," a petitioner commits intentional misconduct
that in and of itself furnishes probable cause for charges "separate" from
that misconduct. (See id. at 28 & n.2.) Congress, however, has chosen a
different path.
20 UNITED STATES v. GRAHAM
Rather, the plain language of the statute dictates that any
"misconduct or neglect" that "cause[s] or bring[s] about" a
petitioner’s prosecution renders him ineligible for a certificate
of innocence. In the face of the unambiguous words of the
statute, we cannot construe § 2513(a)(2) to add language that
Congress omitted. See United States v. Deluxe Cleaners &
Laundry, Inc., 511 F.2d 926, 929 (4th Cir. 1975) (noting that
it is not "permissible to construe a statute on the basis of a
mere surmise as to what the Legislature intended and to
assume . . . that it failed to state something other than what
it plainly stated" (internal quotation marks omitted)). This is
so particularly when the statute we interpret waives sovereign
immunity. See Middlebrooks v. Leavitt, 525 F.3d 341, 347
(4th Cir. 2008) (noting that "waivers of sovereign immunity
‘must be construed strictly in favor of the sovereign and not
enlarged beyond what the language requires’" (quoting United
States v. Nordic Vill., Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 34 (1992))). Indeed,
the Supreme Court has directed that proper statutory construc-
tion "begins with the language of the statute," and when, as
here, "the statutory language provides a clear answer, it ends
there as well." Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S.
432, 438 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Contrary to the dissent’s suggestion, our decision to give
effect to the plain language of the statute, and our refusal to
add to or disregard any of its language, does not "conflate[ ]"
the first and second clauses of § 2513(a)(2) or render the first
clause "incoherent or unnecessary." (Dissent at 28-29.) The
first clause requires a petitioner to prove that he did not com-
mit the charged criminal acts or that they do not constitute a
crime; the second clause requires him to prove that his mis-
conduct or neglect did not cause or bring about his prosecu-
tion. The first clause addresses criminal conduct; the second
addresses acts of "misconduct or neglect." Therefore, the two
clauses require a court to ask two distinct questions about the
defendant’s conduct. Even the dissent recognizes that a per-
UNITED STATES v. GRAHAM 21
son may commit an act constituting misconduct or neglect
without committing a crime. (See id. at 28 (listing examples).)6
Nothing in § 2513(a)(2) (or in simple logic) requires the
conclusion that a finding that a given act is not a crime man-
dates a finding that it does not constitute "misconduct or
neglect." Rather, because only acts of "misconduct or neglect"
that "cause or bring about" a petitioner’s "own prosecution"
disqualify him from relief, it seems likely that those acts often
will have originally been charged as crimes, as they were
here. In the dissent’s view, however, only acts that do not gar-
ner criminal charges of their own (and yet somehow cause the
levying of other charges) may prevent a petitioner from
receiving compensation from the Government under the sec-
ond clause of § 2513(a)(2). But an appellate court’s holding
that certain acts are not criminal surely does not eliminate the
possibility that those acts nonetheless constitute "misconduct
or neglect" that "cause[d]" the prosecution. Indeed, in Kee-
gan, one of the first and most exhaustive interpretations of
what is now § 2513, the court concluded that the petitioner
6
The dissent’s interpretation of § 2513(a)(2) also fails to account for the
statute’s purpose, to "compensate[ ] only the truly innocent," Racing
Servs., 580 F.3d at 712, by examining the petitioner’s conduct and the
prosecutors’ charging decisions in light of the "entire record," Brunner,
200 F.2d at 280. To avoid confronting the statute’s true purpose, the dis-
sent invents a new one, asserting that when Congress drafted the second
clause of § 2513(a)(2), it wished to create "an estoppel defense that pro-
tects the United States Treasury against defendants who could have
thwarted a prosecution that had already begun, but instead went to prison
and then attempted to collect money damages." (Dissent at 27.) Not only
is this asserted purpose completely unsupported by caselaw or legislative
history, but it rests on the assumption that Congress’s primary concern in
drafting § 2513(a)(2) was that criminal defendants innocent of any crime
would "elect" to face federal prosecution—and in fact would "elect" to go
to prison—in the hopes that they could subsequently prove their innocence
and then sue for damages. We are not aware of any criminal defendant
who has attempted such a feat. Therefore, it seems extremely unlikely that
Congress would create legislation to prevent recovery in such circum-
stances.
22 UNITED STATES v. GRAHAM
did not qualify for a certificate of innocence in part because
the very conduct for which he was charged "constitute[d]
wil[l]ful misconduct which contributed to bring about his
arrest and conviction." 71 F. Supp. at 640.
In sum, it is the dissent that offers a "novel interpretation"
of § 2513, which if adopted would create a circuit split. (See
Dissent at 23.) Although, as explained within, we disagree
with the Seventh Circuit’s cramped reading of the statute, nei-
ther that court nor any other has held that acts charged as
crimes but ultimately found not to be criminal cannot consti-
tute acts of misconduct or neglect causing the petitioner’s
prosecution. In fact, as noted above, even if we adopted the
statutory construction of the Betts court, we would have to
hold that the district court in this case did not abuse its discre-
tion in denying Graham a certificate of innocence. For even
the Betts court concluded that the disqualifying misconduct or
neglect need only constitute "an affirmative act or an omis-
sion by the petitioner that misleads the authorities as to his
culpability." 10 F.3d at 1285. Graham’s failure in 2004 to
seek Board approval to modify his contract so as to convert
sick leave to cash certainly constitutes such an act or "omis-
sion."7
7
Surprisingly, the dissent advances a broader definition of "neglect" that
Graham has never advocated, perhaps because he recognizes that, if
adopted, that definition would doom even a suggestion of recovery under
§ 2513. (See Dissent at 30 n.3 (quoting Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Bruns-
wick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 388 (1993) (defining "neglect" in
another statute as "encompass[ing] both simple, faultless omissions to act
and, more commonly, omissions caused by carelessness")).) For if "ne-
glect" in § 2513 "encompasses . . . simple, faultless omissions to act," Pio-
neer, 507 U.S. at 388, as the dissent apparently believes, then it is obvious
that the district court acted within its discretion in denying Graham a cer-
tificate based on his "faultless omissions" in failing to seek Board
approval in 2004. The district court did not adopt this broad definition of
"neglect." Instead, the court equated "neglect" with "negligence"—perhaps
relying on the fact that Congress originally used the term "negligence" in
the statute, and replaced it with "neglect" only to "clarify ambiguities." See
Revisor’s Notes, 28 U.S.C. § 2513. Because the definition of "neglect" the
court adopted is more favorable to petitioners like Graham than the defini-
tion the dissent prefers, it is no wonder that Graham does not ask us to find
error in the district court’s definition of "neglect."
UNITED STATES v. GRAHAM 23
V.
We of course regret that Graham suffered imprisonment for
an unsupported conviction. However, Congress has deter-
mined that this unfortunate fact alone does not establish eligi-
bility for damages against the Government. Rather, § 2513
vests the court that heard the evidence at trial with the discre-
tion to ascertain not just whether a defendant is not guilty, but
whether he is in fact entitled to a certificate of innocence.
Because the district court did not abuse that discretion, we
must affirm.
AFFIRMED
GREGORY, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
Both the district court and the majority misconstrue § 2513,
imposing a standard of their own design in place of what is
required by the statute. Congress made clear that in order to
recover under § 2513, a petitioner must prove that the
charged acts did not constitute a crime. Separately, a peti-
tioner must prove that he did not cause his own prosecution
through some other misconduct or neglect. The majority errs
by conflating these two elements, requiring a petitioner to
show not only that the charged acts were not criminal but also
that those acts conform to some amorphous, unwritten code
of conduct. Today, through its novel interpretation of the stat-
ute, the majority creates a circuit split and encourages the
government to prosecute acts it deems "immoral" rather than
acts that are criminal under the law.
I.
In order to obtain a certificate of innocence and collect
money damages for wrongful imprisonment, a petitioner must
satisfy three requirements under 28 U.S.C. § 2513. He must
prove: 1) "the record . . . of the court setting aside or reversing
such conviction" establishes that "his conviction has been
24 UNITED STATES v. GRAHAM
reversed or set aside on the ground that he is not guilty of the
offense of which he was convicted," § 2513(a)(1); 2) either
"he did not commit any of the acts charged" or "his acts,
deeds, or omissions in connection with such charge consti-
tuted no offense against the United States, or any State, Terri-
tory or the District of Columbia," § 2513(a)(2); and 3) "he did
not by misconduct or neglect cause or bring about his own
prosecution," § 2513(a)(2).
The majority relies on the substantial discretion afforded to
the district court in determining whether or not a petitioner
has successfully met his burden under the statute. See Maj.
Op. at 2, 13-14. However, this case cannot rest on the district
court’s discretion because the district court’s failure to cor-
rectly apply the statute is an error of law, which is necessarily
an abuse of discretion. See Thorn v. Jefferson-Pilot Life Ins.
Co., 445 F.3d 311, 317 (4th Cir. 2006). Under the majority’s
reading, a person who has met the standard set forth in
§ 2513(a)(1) must not only show that they are truly innocent
under the first prong of § 2513(a)(2), but additionally that the
same, non-criminal conduct does not constitute negligence
under the second prong of § 2513(a)(2). Inserting this extrane-
ous impediment into the statute is unwarranted and unsup-
ported by the law. I therefore would reverse the district court
and remand with instructions to grant the certificate of inno-
cence.
A.
The first two requirements under the statute, § 2513(a)(1)
and the first prong of § 2513(a)(2), evince Congress’ intent to
compensate only those who are "truly innocent," both of the
charges for which they were convicted and any other crime
which their conduct could constitute. See Betts v. United
States, 10 F.3d 1278, 1284 (7th Cir. 1993) (citing Burgess v.
United States, 20 Cl.Ct. 701, 704 (1990) ("Consequently, it
would be necessary to separate from the group of persons
UNITED STATES v. GRAHAM 25
whose convictions have been reversed, those few who are in
fact innocent of any offense whatever.") (citation omitted).
The majority first contends that it is "unclear" if Graham
met his burden to prove his actual innocence under
§ 2513(a)(1) and the first prong of § 2513(a)(2), asserting that
this Court merely held that "the Government failed to prove
Graham harbored the requisite intent," and therefore reversed
his conviction based on insufficiency of the evidence. Maj.
Op. at 14 n.3. However, we made plain in reversing Graham’s
conviction that no crime was committed. United States v.
Graham, 269 F. App’x 281, 286 (4th Cir. 2007).
In overturning his conviction, we held that Graham was not
required to return to the Board for permission to convert his
sick-leave to cash. See id. at 286 ("Quite simply, Graham’s
cash-outs in June and July of 2003 and January and February
of 2004 were not contrary to the authority given to him by the
Board."). The majority makes much of the fact that Graham
failed to seek the Board’s permission in light of the limita-
tions his employment contract placed on his ability to convert
sick-leave to cash. Per the terms of his contract, he was only
allowed such a pay-out only upon illness or termination.
However, we explicitly acknowledged those contractual con-
ditions and held that "the Board’s decisions in January,
March, and May of 2003 resulted in a de facto amendment
that overrode these restrictions." Id. (emphasis added). Gra-
ham’s employment contract term was thus altered by the party
empowered to do so — the Board. Our decision reversing
Graham’s conviction was therefore not based on some techni-
cality or procedural issue, but rather on finding Graham "truly
innocent" of the crime for which he was convicted. "[T]he
record of . . . the court reversing" Graham’s conviction thus
demonstrates that the "conviction has been reversed or set
aside on the ground that [Graham] is not guilty of the offense
of which he was convicted," as is mandated by § 2513(a)(1).
Additionally, in no way does the record below support the
inference that Graham was guilty of some other, unindicted
26 UNITED STATES v. GRAHAM
crime, as is prohibited by § 2513(a)(2). Instead, it is clear that
the government pursued every possible charge against Gra-
ham. Graham’s indictment contained thirty-nine counts, only
one of which resulted in a conviction. Although the majority
points to the district court’s recitation of "Graham’s ‘sordid
tale of abuse of a position of public trust,’" Maj. Op. at 15
(citing United States v. Graham, 595 F. Supp. 2d 681, 686),
none of that behavior was found to be illegal or even evidence
of some further crime of which the government was unable to
obtain proof. Compare, United States v. Keegan, 71 F. Supp.
623, 633-34, 635, 639 (S.D.N.Y. 1947) (holding that denial of
a certificate of innocence is appropriate in cases "where the
indictment may fail on the original count, but claimant may
yet be guilty of another or minor offense"). It is indisputable
that Graham’s conduct "constituted no offense against the
United States, or any State, Territory or the District of Colum-
bia," as is required under § 2513(a)(2).
Because Graham’s conviction was not overturned on proce-
dural grounds, and nothing in the record indicates that the
conduct for which Graham was acquitted somehow consti-
tutes a different crime against the United States, Graham
clearly met his burden under both § 2513(a)(1) and the first
clause of § 2513(a)(2) to show that he was truly innocent.
B.
Beyond the initial question of whether a petitioner is truly
innocent, the final clause of § 2513(a)(2) requires a petitioner
to show "he did not by misconduct or neglect cause or bring
about his own prosecution." 28 U.S.C. § 2513(a)(2) (empha-
sis added). "The statute expressly requires a causal connec-
tion between the petitioner’s conduct and his prosecution; it
does not preclude relief simply because the petitioner engaged
in misconduct or neglect period." Betts, 10 F.3d at 1285
(emphasis added). It must follow that to give meaning to all
words in the statute, one cannot "cause" one’s own prosecu-
tion by engaging in the very conduct which was found to be
UNITED STATES v. GRAHAM 27
non-criminal in the first part of the inquiry. Instead, the sec-
ond prong of the statute must be referring to some additional
conduct, be it intentional or unintentional, willful or neglect-
ful, which misleads the authorities into continuing their inves-
tigation of, and ultimately prosecuting, a person later cleared
of criminal wrongdoing. To say otherwise conflates the "acts,
deeds, or omissions in connection with [the] charge" refer-
enced in the first clause of § 2513(a)(2) and the "misconduct
or neglect" required in the second clause.
Congress made clear that the two inquiries are fundamen-
tally different. A petitioner must show that the underlying
conduct for which he was charged was "no offense against the
United States, or any State, Territory, or the District of
Columbia." § 2513 (a)(2). In other words, the only thing that
a petitioner must prove regarding his underlying conduct is
that it was not a crime. The second clause of § 2513(a)(2)
requires the petitioner show that no other, subsequent conduct
during the course of the government’s investigation induced
the government to commence a wrongful prosecution. Id.
Essentially, the "misconduct or neglect" prong is an estoppel
defense that protects the United States Treasury against defen-
dants who could have thwarted a prosecution that had already
begun, but instead went to prison and then attempted to col-
lect money damages.1
1
The majority’s reading of my view in dissent continues to ignore the
fact that the statute requires a petitioner to show that his "misconduct or
neglect" did not cause his prosecution. In zeroing in on the first clause of
§ 2513(a)(2), the majority repeatedly asserts that "Graham’s failure in
2004 to seek Board approval to modify his contract so as to convert sick
leave to cash certainly constitutes . . . an act or ‘omission.’" Maj. Op. at
22. One can certainly speculate as to whether or not Graham’s conduct at
COA constituted "misconduct or neglect." But the statute requires some-
thing more: a causal link between those actions and the prosecution at
issue. Neither the district court nor the majority has or can point to how
Graham’s conduct, for which he was charged and ultimately acquitted,
caused his prosecution.
28 UNITED STATES v. GRAHAM
Any other reading of the statute would be nonsensical. Why
would Congress explicitly specify that a petitioner need only
prove that the "acts, deeds, or omissions" for which he was
charged "constituted no offense against the United States,"
only to further require in the next clause proof that those same
acts were not an offense against any private entity, public
decorum or social mores? If Congress intended this result,
surely it would not have limited a petitioner’s burden regard-
ing the charged acts to offenses against the State; instead it
would have remained silent or at minimum broadened the
offenses to include more than actual crimes. But it did not do
so. Instead, the statute clearly demarcates the sphere of
charged acts as separate from the "misconduct or neglect"
which "cause or bring about . . . [the] prosecution."2 Thus, a
petitioner could cause his own prosecution by giving a false
confession, removing evidence, or by failing to disclose
clearly exculpatory evidence within his possession, either
intentionally or carelessly. Though this list is not exhaustive,
it certainly encompasses conduct which constitutes miscon-
duct and neglect, which, under § 2513(a)(2), could cause the
petitioner’s prosecution.
Rather than recognize the separate nature of the two prongs
of § 2513(a)(2), the majority conflates the two and affirms the
district court’s finding that "Graham was ‘at the very least
negligent’ in failing to seek Board approval before obtaining
cash for sick leave in 2004, and that this neglect brought
about his prosecution." Maj. Op. at 14 (citing Graham, 595 F.
Supp. 2d at 686) (emphasis added). In equating "neglect" with
"negligence" and then applying it to the charged conduct, the
2
It is important to distinguish between conduct that could cause a gov-
ernment investigation and that which would cause a prosecution. Improper
corporate stewardship could be grounds for government investigation to
determine whether or not a crime has been committed. It would not be rea-
sonable, however, to prosecute unless the government had probable cause
to believe that the defendant’s conduct satisfied all of the elements of the
crime. This is another example of the majority’s failure to analyze the
words actually used by Congress in the statute.
UNITED STATES v. GRAHAM 29
majority renders the first clause of § 2513(a)(2) incoherent or
unnecessary, thereby violating a basic cannon of statutory
construction. See Corley v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1558,
1566 (2009) ("[A] statute should be construed so that effect
is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative
or superfluous, void or insignificant.") (citation omitted)). As
stated above, if Congress intended for district courts to re-
evaluate the charged conduct under a lower standard of cul-
pability, it would not have limited the charged conduct to
offenses against the State, nor would it have distinguished the
acts associated with the charged conduct from the "miscon-
duct or neglect" that "causes or brings about" the prosecution.
It is a distortion of the statute to hold that the very act which
was found to be "no offense against the United States" could
mislead the government into prosecuting a defendant and
thereby preclude recovery. If "charged conduct" and "miscon-
duct and neglect" are really interchangeable as the majority’s
reading requires, then there is no foreseeable scenario in
which someone wrongfully imprisoned could recover. After
all, even a person prosecuted for simply being at the wrong
place at the wrong time could easily be said to have been at
the wrong place through his own "neglect."
The majority rejects the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Betts
v. United States, which also holds that the "misconduct and
neglect" prong does not apply to the charged conduct, but
rather requires some additional conduct which "mislead[s] the
authorities into thinking [petitioner] had committed an
offense." 10 F.3d at 1285. The majority’s only basis for doing
so is that "this narrow reading of subsection (a)(2) . . . effec-
tively reads ‘neglect’ out of the statute." Op. at 16. Instead, it
asserts that the "statute’s ‘misconduct or neglect’ language on
its face captures noncriminal conduct" and therefore the
charged conduct should be reassessed under a negligence
standard. Id. at 17. Yet, what the majority fails to recognize
in summarily dismissing the reasoning of the one circuit that
has specifically interpreted the second clause of § 2513(a)(2)
is that Betts specifically accounts for both affirmative miscon-
30 UNITED STATES v. GRAHAM
duct and careless omissions.3 Betts, 10 F.3d at 1285 (holding
that petitioner must have "acted or failed to act in such a way
as to mislead the authorities into thinking he had committed
an offense"). Thus, contrary to the majority’s assertion, the
Seventh Circuit interpreted the statute in its entirety and gave
the statute its most natural reading.4
3
When Congress uses "neglect" without otherwise specifying, it means
"carelessness." Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assoc. Ltd. P’Ship,
507 U.S. 380, 388 (1993) ("The word therefore encompasses both simple,
faultless omissions to act and, more commonly, omissions caused by care-
lessness."). The majority reads neglect out of the statute and replaces it
with "negligence." It must do so in order to maintain that the "misconduct
or neglect" prong refers to the same conduct as the "acts charged" prong,
while at the same time reading the statute to allow recovery for a person
charged with completely non-culpable conduct, i.e., simple carelessness.
The majority can only have it both ways by replacing the word actually
used by Congress with a word that it would prefer.
The much easier reading of the statute, and the one that gives Congress’
intended effect to the word "neglect," is to read the "acts charged" and
"misconduct or neglect" prongs separately. Under this reading, an individ-
ual prosecuted for the crime of simple carelessness, even though there is
not and has never been a crime of simple carelessness, could rightfully
recover for wrongful prosecution. On the other hand, the individual
wrongfully prosecuted for a crime he truly did not commit, but who none-
theless carelessly fails to turn over exculpatory evidence in his possession,
would be barred from recovery. This application gives meaning to every
word in the statute and is consistent with the array of estoppel defenses
available in the law.
4
Even if we were to assume arguendo that neglect somehow constitutes
negligence, Graham’s failure to seek Board approval for converting sick-
leave to cash cannot be considered negligent when there was no duty
breached. The majority did not even define the standards under which it
measured Graham’s alleged negligent conduct. In order for a cause of
action to lie in negligence, the proponent must show there was a duty of
care owed. In reversing Graham’s conviction, we held that Graham was
not required to return to the Board to obtain permission to cash-out his
sick leave, see Graham, 269 F. App’x at 286, and therefore had no duty
to return and get permission. Thus, even under the majority’s own reading
of the statute, Graham would have met the requirements and should have
been issued a certificate of innocence.
UNITED STATES v. GRAHAM 31
The majority’s strained statutory construction imputes to
Congress a vision of government power that is anathema to
the rule of law. Consider the statement that "Graham’s impru-
dent stewardship of COA, constitute[s] a reasonable basis for
Government officers to prosecute," Maj. Op. at 15, regardless
of the fact that being a "sub-par" executive is clearly not crimi-
nal.5 The district court described Graham’s misconduct as
including:
Graham operated [COA and All Care] for years as
his own personal domain and for the financial bene-
fit of himself and his family. His $185,000 annual
salary, excessive by comparison to the pay of others
in similar positions, was supplemented by the gener-
ous cash-out of sick leave Graham arranged for him-
self. . . . Graham used employees on company time
to perform personal services for himself and his fam-
ily; bought at least one expensive item, a $6,000
television, through COA to get a better price and
avoid sales taxes; manipulated a SEP IRA to benefit
his family; and assumed a lavish lifestyle including
regular visits to a "gentlemen’s club." "Bailey," a
dancer at Graham’s favorite club, on whom he lav-
ished gifts and money, inquired where his money
came from.
Graham, 595 F. Supp. at 685. The majority repeats this recita-
tion at page eleven of its opinion. Clearly both the district
court and the majority are offended by this conduct. However,
being over-paid, living a lavish lifestyle, and frequenting strip
clubs, for better or worse, are not crimes in this country.
Only probable cause to believe that a person committed
acts that satisfy the elements of a crime gives the government
5
Again, conduct which is not criminal, but leads to a government inves-
tigation, is categorically different from conduct which causes one’s prose-
cution.
32 UNITED STATES v. GRAHAM
reasonable basis to prosecute. The enduring principles on
which our government was founded make it clear that the
government does not have a reasonable basis to prosecute a
person engaged in immoral or "bad conduct" if that conduct
does not satisfy the elements of a crime. It is dangerous to
suggest that any time a person’s conduct offends the sensibili-
ties of three judges or society at large, the government is priv-
ileged to incarcerate him. And it strains credulity to suggest
that the United States Congress intended a statute to be con-
strued as such.
The purpose of § 2513 is to limit compensation for unjust
imprisonment to those who are truly innocent and to estopp
those who elect not to avoid prosecution, by their actions or
omissions, from relief. In light of the error of law committed
by the district court in interpreting § 2513, I would reverse
and remand with instructions to grant the certificate of inno-
cence. Thus, I respectfully dissent.