UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Fifth Circuit
No. 97-30463
ROBERT G. PENDERGRASS,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
VERSUS
THE GREATER NEW ORLEANS EXPRESSWAY COMMISSION,
DAVID HURSTELL, AND JAMES DIGBY,
Defendants-Appellants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
June 18, 1998
Before BARKSDALE, BENAVIDES, AND DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
Dennis, Circuit Judge:
The plaintiff-appellee, Robert G. Pendergrass, brought this
suit for monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. §1983 against the
defendants-appellants, the Greater New Orleans Expressway
Commission (GNOEC) and its police officer employees, David Hurstell
and James Digby, alleging that the officers had violated his Fourth
Amendment rights by using excessive force on him during an arrest.
The GNOEC and its officers moved for summary judgment and/or a
dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction alleging (1) that
the GNOEC was immune from this suit under the Eleventh Amendment
because of its status as an agency or arm of the state, and, in the
alternative, (2) that the officers involved were not “persons”
under §1983. The district court denied the motion. The defendants
appealed. We affirm.
Factual Background
On July 29, 1994, Robert Pendergrass, the plaintiff, was
exiting the Causeway Bridge in Metairie, Louisiana, on his way to
New Orleans when he was stopped for speeding by two GNOEC police
officers, the defendants David Hurstell and James Digby. After the
stop, the officers arrested Pendergrass for speeding and driving
while intoxicated and handcuffed him. The officers allegedly used
excessive and unnecessary force, striking Pendergrass’s head,
pushing him to the ground and pulling him up with the handcuffs.
Pendergrass allegedly sustained severe and disabling injuries
requiring two surgical procedures as a result.
Analysis
The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides that:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States
by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects
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of any Foreign State.
Adopted in order to override Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419, 1
L.Ed. 440 (1793), the Eleventh Amendment confirms the States’ role
in our federal system as separate sovereigns which may not be sued
in the court of another sovereign, i.e. the federal government, or
their own courts absent consent or, in certain circumstances,
congressional abrogation of sovereign immunity. See Seminole Tribe
of Fl. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54-56 (1996); see also Puerto Rico
Aqueduct and Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146
(1993)(“The [Eleventh] Amendment is rooted in a recognition that
the States, although a union, maintain certain attributes of
sovereignty, including sovereign immunity.”). In addition to
barring suits by citizens of one state against another state in
federal court, the Eleventh Amendment also “bars suits in federal
court by citizens of a state against their own state or a state
agency or department.” Voisin’s Oyster House, Inc. v. Guidry, 799
F.2d 183, 185 (5th Cir. 1986); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1
(1890). It is well settled that even though a state is not named
a party to the action, the suit may nonetheless be barred by the
Eleventh Amendment if the state is the real, substantial party in
interest because the suit seeks to impose a liability which must be
paid from public funds in the state treasury. Edelman v. Jordan,
415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974); Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury,
323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945).
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Accordingly, we must determine whether the GNOEC is “an arm of
the state enjoying eleventh amendment immunity or whether it
possesses an identity sufficiently distinct from that of the State
of Louisiana to place it beyond that shield.” Minton v. St.
Bernard Parish Sch. Bd., 803 F.2d 129, 131 (5th Cir. 1986). This
court has held that, in deciding whether a named defendant is
entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity as an “arm of the state,”
“we ‘must examine the particular entity in question and its powers
and characteristics as created by state law....’” Clark v. Tarrant
County, Texas, 798 F.2d 736, 744 (5th Cir. 1986)(quoting Laje v.
R.E. Thomason General Hosp., 665 F.2d 724, 727 (5th Cir. 1982)).
The relevant factors include: “(1) whether the state statutes and
case law characterize the agency as an arm of the state; (2) the
source of the funds for the entity; (3) the degree of local
autonomy the entity enjoys; (4) whether the entity is concerned
primarily with local, as opposed to statewide, problems; (5)
whether the entity has authority to sue and be sued in its own
name; and (6) whether the entity has the right to hold and use
property.” Minton, 803 F.2d at 131; see also Delahoussaye v. City
of New Iberia, 937 F.2d 144, 147 (5th Cir. 1991).
Applying the relevant factors, we conclude that the GNOEC is
not an arm of the state and, therefore, is not shielded by the
state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity.
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(1) The relevant statutes and case law characterize the GNOEC as a
local entity and not an arm of the state.
The statutes pertaining to the GNOEC characterize it as a
local or interparish entity. The GNOEC was created as a public
corporation in 1954 by the parishes of Jefferson and St. Tammany
for the purpose of building and operating a toll causeway over Lake
Pontchartrain as a direct vehicular transportation link between the
two parishes. The two parishes established the GNOEC as their own
instrumentality under the authority of the Local Services Law, La.
R.S. 33:1321 et seq., which empowers any combination of parishes to
agree to jointly construct, acquire or improve any public project,
including causeways, bridges, highway facilities and other means of
public transportation. La. R.S. 33:1324. The GNOEC articles of
incorporation provide that it is an agency and instrumentality of
the parishes of Jefferson and St. Tammany. Article VI §22(g)(5) of
the 1921 Louisiana Constitution was also added in 1952 to confer
the necessary authority on the parishes of Jefferson and St.
Tammany to construct, maintain and operate the causeway and issue
revenue bonds for that purpose. However, that constitutional
provision specifically states that such bonds shall not be or
constitute a debt of the state. La. Const. of 1921, art. VI,
§22(g).
Subsequently, the legislature enacted laws imposing financial
and budgetary regulations upon the GNOEC. Act 762 of 1986, §12,
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requires the GNOEC to comply with the Louisiana Local Government
Budget Act which governs the budgetary procedures of local
government entities. Act 875 of 1988 requires the GNOEC to comply
with the Louisiana Administrative Procedures Act with respect to
contracts and bonds and to submit its proposed annual budget to the
joint legislative budget committee for review and approval. 1988
La. Acts 875 §2(B) & (C). This legislation, however, did not alter
the essential powers or characteristics of the GNOEC in any
respect. In fact, Act 762 of 1986 expressly recognized and
reaffirmed that the GNOEC is the same commission that was “created
by the parishes as an agency and instrumentality of the parishes,
pursuant to articles of incorporation dated October 20, 1954.”
1986 La. Acts 762 §1(2)(emphasis added).
In addition, Louisiana courts have characterized the GNOEC as
a local or interparish entity rather than as an arm of the state.
See Greater New Orleans Expressway Comm’n v. Board of Tax Appeals,
681 So.2d 957, 959-60 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1996)(holding that the
GNOEC was not a state agency or commission which would be exempt
from state sales and use taxes); Parish of Jefferson v. Roemer, 539
So.2d 97, 100 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1989)(describing the GNOEC as
an “interparish entity” created under the provisions of La. R.S.
33:1324); see also Schultz v. Greater New Orleans Expressway
Comm’n, 250 F.Supp. 89, 91-92 (E.D. La. 1966)(holding that the
GNOEC was a distinct political corporation created by the parishes
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of Jefferson and St. Tammany and, therefore, not entitled to
Eleventh Amendment immunity).
In sum, Louisiana laws and court decisions characterize the
GNOEC as a local, interparish entity and not as an arm of the
state.
(2) The source of funds for the GNOEC.
An important goal of the Eleventh Amendment is the protection
of state treasuries. Delahoussaye, 937 F.2d at 148-49. Therefore,
whether “the action is in essence one for the recovery of money
from the state,” is a most significant test in determining whether
“the state is the real party in interest and is entitled to invoke
its sovereign immunity from suit even though individual officials
are nominal defendants.” Ford Motor Co., 323 U.S. at 464; see
Edelman, 415 U.S. at 663(“Thus the rule has evolved that a suit by
private parties seeking to impose liability which must be paid from
public funds in the state treasury is barred by the Eleventh
Amendment.”); United Carolina Bank v. Board of Regents, 665 F.2d
553, 560 (5th Cir. 1982).
The GNOEC finances its operation and maintenance of the Lake
Pontchartrain Causeway with self-generated income, viz., toll
revenue and bond investment income. Bonds issued by the GNOEC,
which generate construction and investment revenues, do not
constitute debts of the state and are not backed by the full faith
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and credit of the state. La. Const. of 1921, art. VI, §22(g); Cf.
Jacintoport Corp. v. Greater Baton Rouge Port Comm’n, 762 F.2d 435,
439 (5th Cir. 1985)(noting that a state’s guarantee of bonds issued
by an entity can be evidence, however slight, of state agency
status). The GNOEC finances its bond debt service with its bond
investment revenue and with money allocated from State Highway Fund
No. 2.
The only money the GNOEC receives from the state comes from
State Highway Fund No. 2., which was created in 1952 as part of the
enabling legislation which led to the creation of the GNOEC. See
La. Const. of 1921, art. VI, §22(g). The fund consists of
vehicular license taxes collected from a six parish area
surrounding Lake Pontchartrain.1 See Roemer, 539 So.2d at
99(discussing the creation of Fund No.2). A portion of this fund
is allocated to the GNOEC every year in order to finance debt
service on the bonds previously issued. However, Fund No.2 monies
may not be used to finance the operation and maintenance of the
causeway. In sum, the GNOEC receives no operating revenue from the
state; the funds transferred to it by the state are derived from
the six parish region served by the causeway and are dedicated
solely to debt service on GNOEC bonds.
The GNOEC treats liabilities resulting from monetary damage
1
The six parishes are as follows: Orleans, Jefferson, St. John
the Baptist, St. Charles, Tangipahoa, and St. Tammany.
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judgments as an operating expense and pays or insures against them
on its own. In order to defray such expenses, the GNOEC procures
liability insurance policy coverages and maintains a “Self
Insurance Retention Fund” for excess coverage. According to the
testimony of GNOEC’s CPA, it has never had to pay a judgment which
was not adequately covered by its insurance or the Self Insurance
Retention Fund. Moreover, the general manager of the GNOEC
testified that the state of Louisiana has never paid a judgment or
claim on behalf of the GNOEC. Therefore, on the record before us,
it appears that any judgment obtained by Pendergrass can be
satisfied by the GNOEC itself rather than by the state treasury.
Nevertheless, the defendants contend that the GNOEC should be
considered an arm of the state because judgments against it may
indirectly affect the size of the GNOEC’s surplus which it is
required by the 1988 Act to turn over to the state at the end of
each fiscal year. See 1988 La. Acts 875 §4. This not a sufficient
reason to consider the GNOEC an alter ego of the state.
Historically, judgments against the GNOEC have been paid without
any state assistance from its own insurance policies or self
insurance fund that it maintains by regular payments as current
operating expenses. The 1988 Act provides that the GNOEC shall pay
all of its maintenance and operating expenses before any of its
funds become surplus that it is obliged to turn over to the state.
Under these circumstances, a judgment in favor of Pendergrass
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against the GNOEC will not be paid with public funds from the state
treasury. Any influence upon the state treasury by such a judgment
would be too indirect and remote to characterize it as a potential
liability of the state treasury or to make the state the real,
substantial party in interest.
In summary, the GNOEC is a self-supporting entity which
finances its own operational costs through tolls and investments.
It receives money from the state for the limited purpose of
servicing bonded debt. The GNOEC’s bonds are not backed by the
full faith and credit of the state and, thus, do not constitute a
debt owed by the state. Any judgment rendered in this case would
not be paid out of the state treasury but by the GNOEC through
either its insurers or its self insurance fund. Accordingly, this
factor weighs heavily against classifying the GNOEC as an arm of
the state or permitting it to invoke Eleventh Amendment immunity.
Cf. Jacintoport Corp., 762 F.2d at 440-42.
(3) The degree of local autonomy the entity enjoys.
The third factor we look to focuses on the degree of local
autonomy the entity at issue enjoys. “Local autonomy is not only
a measure of the closeness of the connections between the entity
and the State, it is also the mechanism through which the Eleventh
Amendment ‘assure[s] that the federal courts do not interfere with
a state’s public policy and its administration of internal public
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affairs.’” Jacintoport Corp., 762 F.2d at 442 (quoting Blake v.
Kline, 612 F.2d 718, 725 (3rd Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S.
921 (1980)).
The Greater New Orleans Expressway Commission itself is
composed of five members who are charged with the construction,
operation, and maintenance of the Greater New Orleans Expressway,
which is commonly called the “causeway.” Three of the GNOEC’s
commissioners are appointed by the governor, subject to conditions,
as follows: (1) a member from Jefferson Parish, recommended by the
Jefferson Parish Legislative Delegation, for a two year term, (2)
a member from St. Tammany Parish, upon the recommendation of the
St. Tammany Parish Legislative Delegation, for a two year term, and
(3) a member for a one year term alternately from Jefferson Parish
and St. Tammany Parish, recommended by the applicable legislative
delegation. 1988 La. Acts. 875 §11. All of the governor’s
appointments are subject to confirmation by the state senate. Id.
Two members are appointed by the parish governing bodies as
follows: one is appointed for a two year term by the Jefferson
Parish Council and the other for a two year term by the St. Tammany
Parish Police Jury. Id.
The defendants assert that because the governor appoints a
majority of the GNOEC, it enjoys very little local autonomy. The
governor’s appointment power is not plenary, however. The governor
is authorized to make appointments only upon the recommendation of
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the local legislative delegations and subject to senate approval.
Furthermore, the three members appointed by the governor serve for
a specified term and not at his or her pleasure. Contrast
Jacintoport, 762 F.2d at 442(“It is true that the vulnerability of
the commissioners to the governor’s pleasure militates against a
finding of local autonomy.”). Finally, the other two members of
the GNOEC are appointed by the local governing bodies and are thus
indirectly responsible to the local electorate. See McDonald v.
Board of Mississippi Levee Comm’rs, 832 F.2d 901, 907 (5th Cir.
1987)(finding that the fact that the Levee Board was locally
elected evidenced autonomy).
In this case, the governor’s role in the appointment process
does not prevent the GNOEC from having a high degree of local
autonomy because the parish appointments, fixed terms of
appointments, local legislative delegation nomination, and senate
approval tug strongly in that direction.
(4) Whether the entity is concerned with primarily local, as
opposed to state-wide problems.
The district court found the business of the GNOEC to be
primarily a local concern. The defendants counter that because the
heavily traveled expressway is considered part of the state highway
system, the work of the GNOEC is of state-wide concern. See 1986
La. Acts. 762 §9(1)(designating the expressway as part of the state
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highway system).
The relevant test, enunciated by this court in the Jacintoport
Corp. case, is whether the entity acts for the benefit and welfare
of the state as a whole or for the special advantage of local
inhabitants. Jacintoport, 762 F.2d at 443. Originally, the
causeway project was undertaken by the parishes of Jefferson and
St. Tammany to encourage the development of each parish. To that
end, the GNOEC has been a success and clearly works for the benefit
and welfare of the inhabitants of St. Tammany and Jefferson, along
with those residents of near-by parishes who occasionally make use
of the bridge. While the causeway is certainly an important part
of the state highway system, it predominantly benefits the
commuters who live in St. Tammany and work or shop in Jefferson or
Orleans Parishes, as well as their south shore employers and
suppliers of goods and services. The concern of the GNOEC is
solely the causeway, a bridge connecting and serving principally
three parishes, and is thus primarily local. Cf. Id.(holding that
Greater Baton Rouge Port Commission dealt with matters of local
concern).
(5) & (6) Whether the entity has authority to sue and be sued in
its own name; and Whether the entity has the right to hold and use
property?
The GNOEC‘s power to sue and be sued tends to favor a finding
13
that it is not an arm of the state.
In addition, the GNOEC has the right to hold and use property.
This factor points toward a finding that the GNOEC is not an arm of
the state. The fact that at some time in the distant future, after
the GNOEC’s bonds are paid and the tolls dispensed with, the
GNOEC’s property may revert to the state, does not change the
present state of affairs under which the GNOEC owns, operates, and
maintains the causeway system with a high degree of autonomy.
In the alternative, the defendants assert that Officers
Hurstell and Digby are not “persons” within the meaning of 42
U.S.C. §1983 because they should be considered “state” police
officers at the time of the plaintiff’s arrest, regardless of the
status of the GNOEC. The district court rejected this argument and
we agree. In this case, the district court correctly construed the
plaintiff’s complaint as evidencing an intent to sue the two
officers in their individual capacities. Thus, even if the GNOEC
were a state agency, which it is not, then this suit could still
proceed against these putative state officials in their individual
capacities because, in such a capacity, they are “persons” within
the meaning of §1983. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 31 (1991).
Conclusion
Upon considering all relevant factors, we conclude that the
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GNOEC is not an arm of the state of Louisiana and therefore may not
invoke Eleventh Amendment immunity. For essentially the same
reasons ably assigned by the district court, its decisions to deny
GNOEC’s motion for summary judgment and/or dismissal for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction is AFFIRMED and the case is REMANDED
for further proceedings.
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