IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 97-30782
SAM GREEN
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
VERMILION CORPORATION
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
June 18, 1998
Before WISDOM, JOLLY, and HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judges.
HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge:
We are called to interpret a heretofore unconstrued provision
of the Longshore and Harbor Workers Compensation Act, viz., the
“club/camp” exclusion delineated at 33 U.S.C. § 902(3)(B). Our
reading of the statute and its legislative history compels us to
conclude that Green falls into the category of employees for which
Congress drafted the “club/camp” exception. We AFFIRM the judgment
of the district court denying LHWCA coverage to Green. We REVERSE
the judgment of the district court dismissing Green’s general
maritime negligence and unseaworthiness claims and REMAND for
further proceedings.
I
The Vermilion Corporation employed Green at a “duck camp” it
operated pursuant to its contract with the Bayou Club. The camp is
located on marsh land near a private canal off a bayou. Besides a
duck camp, Vermilion uses the post as a “headquarters” for its
operations in this area, which include harvesting and selling
alligator eggs, trapping and selling alligators, fur trapping,
shrimping, and rice farming.
During duck season, which is approximately three months long,
Green worked as both a cook and watchman at the camp. During the
rest of the year, Green served as a watchman, performed general
maintenance on the camp and usually cooked a lunch meal for any
Vermilion employees working in the area. Green worked only at the
camp and was required to stay there from Monday at 8:00 a.m. to
noon on Friday, except for duck season when his hours were longer.
Green got to the camp via a boat and usually brought a week’s worth
of groceries with him on Monday morning. Green also occasionally
assisted in mooring and unloading supply boats that docked at the
camp.
On May 10, 1994, Lee Guidry, a Vermilion employee, was
piloting THE M/V GADWALL, a vessel under eighteen tons net. Guidry
radioed Green at the camp and asked him to assist in tying up the
vessel and in unloading supplies and equipment. While mooring the
vessel, Green boarded THE M/V GADWALL, slipped and fell on the
deck. Green sustained injuries to his neck and back.
2
Green filed suit against Vermilion alleging claims under the
LHWCA and general maritime law for negligence and unseaworthiness.
The district court first granted Vermilion’s motion for summary
judgment dismissing Green’s LHWCA claim because Green fell under
the “vessel under eighteen tons net” employee exception. Then,
after further briefing by the parties, the district court granted
Vermilion’s motion for summary judgment and reconsideration,
holding that Green was excluded from LHWCA coverage by the
“club/camp” employee exception. The district court dismissed the
remainder of Green’s claims on the grounds that the Louisiana
Worker’s Compensation Act was his exclusive remedy.
Green timely appealed the district court’s judgments. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
II
This court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo
applying the same standard as did the district court. Dawkins v.
Sears Roebuck & Co., 109 F.3d 241, 242 (5th Cir. 1997).
In order to qualify for coverage under the LHWCA, a worker
must pass both a situs and a status test. Director v. Perini North
River Assocs., 459 U.S. 297, 314 (5th Cir. 1983). Green satisfies
the situs test since he was injured upon navigable waters. See id.
With respect to the status test, we will assume arguendo that Green
was engaged in “maritime employment”, see 33 U.S.C. § 902(3);
Randall v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 13 F.3d 888, 897 (5th Cir.), cert.
3
denied, 513 U.S. 994 (1994), since we think it clear that he falls
within the “club/camp” exclusion from LHWCA coverage.
There are exceptions to the term “employee” under the LHWCA.
See 33 U.S.C. § 902(3)(A)-(H). In particular, § 902(3)(B)
provides:
The term “employee” means any person engaged in maritime
employment, . . . but such term does not include-
. . . .
(B) individuals employed by a club, camp,
recreational operation, museum, or retail
outlet;
. . . .
if individuals described in clauses (A) through (F) are
subject to coverage under a State workers’ compensation
law.1 Id.
Interpretation of this provision is an issue of first impression in
this circuit.
The district court held that Green fell within the “club/camp”
exclusion because he performed all of his duties at the duck camp.
The lower court found unpersuasive Green’s argument that he was
employed “by” the Vermillion Corporation, not a camp, since that
construction of § 902(3)(B) renders the exception meaningless in
today’s world of business organizations.
Green repeats this argument to us. Green contends that
interpretation of § 902(3)(B) is controlled by the nature of the
employer’s business and not the employee’s activities. For
support, Green points to the House Document accompanying the 1984
1
The parties agree that Green falls within the purview of the
Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Act.
4
Amendments that added the “club/camp” exception to the LHWCA. The
House Document states that the “exclusions from the definition of
‘employee’ contained in the amendments . . . are intended to be
narrowly construed” and that paragraph (B) excludes employees
“because of the nature of the employing enterprise, as opposed to
the exclusions in paragraph [(A)], which are based on the nature of
the work which the employee is performing.” H. R. Doc. No. 98-570,
Part I 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. (98 Stat. 1639)
2734, 2736. Because Vermillion is involved in sundry business
ventures, including maritime activities, Green claims that his
employer was a multi-faceted corporation, not a “camp.”
“As with any statutory question, we begin with the language of
the statute.” In re Greenway, 71 F.3d 1177, 1179 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 517 U.S. 1244 (1996). Green makes much of Congress’s use
of “by” in the statute and notes that Congress did not use the
phrase “employed at a club [or] camp.” Contrary to Green, we do
not think that the word “by” bears such weight. Rather, the key
words in the provision are those designating the concerns the
employees of which are excluded from LHWCA coverage (e.g., club,
camp, restaurant, museum). Under this focus, it is evident that
Green worked exclusively to further an operation which comports
with the plain meaning of the terms “camp” and “club.” The
Vermillion facilities had all the trappings of a typical southern
Louisiana hunting camp. See R. Vol. 2 at 281. Though it used the
camp throughout the year, the primary reason Vermillion maintained
5
the facility was to fulfill its contractual obligation to the Bayou
Club to provide a duck camp for the waterfowl hunting season. In
fact, a Vermilion officer testified that but for the lease to the
Bayou Club, Vermillion would not have conducted any of its
operations from this site and would not have had any need for
Green’s services. See R. Vol. 2 at 287-88. Since Green was
employed solely to render services to promote and maintain a duck
camp, we hold that he is excluded from LHWCA coverage under §
902(3)(B).
Green’s reliance upon the legislative history of the 1984
Amendments does not alter our conclusion. Unlike Green, we do not
believe that in construing the “club/camp” exception, we are
limited to considering only the nature of the employer’s
enterprise. The House Document to which Green refers expressly
states that businesses falling under paragraph (B) may have
employees that should remain covered under the Act “because of the
nature of the work which they do, or the nature of the hazards to
which they are exposed.” H. R. Doc. No. 98-570, Part I 98th Cong.,
2nd Sess. 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. (98 Stat. 1639) 2737. By the same
token, we believe the opposite is true- clubs and camps may employ
individuals who should not be covered under the LHWCA because their
job responsibilities do not, or only minutely, involve maritime
activities and they are not exposed to hazards associated with
traditional maritime activities. The record reflects that Green’s
duties were to be a cook, watchman, and general repairman of the
6
camp buildings. We do not consider Green to be an employee for
which LHWCA benefits were intended.
III
Even if he is not entitled to LHWCA benefits, Green argues
that the district court erred in dismissing his general maritime
claims against Vermilion for negligence and unseaworthiness.
Vermilion disagrees based on its belief that the Louisiana Workers’
Compensation Act is Green’s exclusive remedy.
A
The first step in our analysis of this issue is to determine
whether there is admiralty jurisdiction. Admiralty jurisdiction
requires that the tort have a maritime locality and that “the facts
and circumstances of the claim must bear a significant relationship
to traditional maritime activity.” Thibodaux v. Atlantic Richfield
Co., 580 F.2d 841, 846 n.14 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S.
909 (1979). The situs test is met because Green was injured while
on navigable waters. See Kelly v. Smith, 485 F.2d 520, 525 (5th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 969 (1974). To determine
whether there is a sufficient nexus to maritime activity, we
examine four factors: the functions and roles of the parties; the
types of vehicles and instrumentalities involved; the causation and
the type of injury; and traditional concepts of the role of
admiralty law. See Kelly, 485 F.2d at 525. In applying this test,
we have noted that “[a]dmiralty has traditionally been concerned
with furnishing remedies for those injured while traveling
7
navigable waters”, id. at 526, and that “the relationship to
traditional maritime activity required for the invocation of
admiralty jurisdiction” may be present though “the threshold
requirement of maritime employment necessary to establish coverage
under the LHWCA” may not be met. Thibodaux, 580 F.2d at 846.
Applying the four factors, we find that Green was injured in
the course of his employment while performing the traditional
maritime activity of mooring a vessel; Vermilion owned the vessel
on which Green fell; the vehicle involved was a vessel routinely
employed on navigable waters; the alleged cause of Green’s injury
was an unkept deck; Green’s injury was not uncommon in the maritime
context; and “upholding maritime jurisdiction does not stretch or
distort long evolved principles of maritime law,” Kelly, 485 F.2d
at 526, since federal courts have long recognized unseaworithiness
and general maritime negligence claims. These facts provide a
sufficient nexus to maritime activity for us to assert admiralty
jurisdiction over this case. See King v. Universal Elec. Constr.
Corp., 799 F.2d 1073, 1075 (5th Cir. 1986); Thibodaux, 580 F.2d at
846 n.14; Kelly, 485 F.2d at 526.
B
With respect to the merits, we note that an earlier panel of
this court was “squarely presented with the issue of whether an
exclusive remedy provision in a state workmen’s compensation
statute can operate to deprive a party of a cause of action
afforded by federal maritime law.” Thibodaux, 580 F.2d at 846.
8
The panel in that case concluded that relevant Supreme Court and
Fifth Circuit precedent made “it clear that an exclusive remedy
provision in a state workmen’s compensation law cannot be applied
when it will conflict with maritime policy and undermine
substantive rights afforded by federal maritime law.” Id. at 847.
Thus, the court specifically held that “the exclusive remedy
provision of the Louisiana Workmen’s Compensation Act” does not
preclude a plaintiff from pursuing a claim for wrongful death
occasioned in state territorial waters since the Supreme Court had
expressly recognized such a suit under admiralty jurisdiction. Id.
at 847; see also Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375
(1970) (creating wrongful death claim in admiralty law). A later
panel of this court strengthened Thibodaux by holding that
irrespective of whether the defendant in the maritime tort suit is
the plaintiff’s “statutory employer,” like in Thibodaux, or his
“actual employer,” federal maritime law overrides the exclusive
remedy provision of the Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Act in each
case. See King, 799 F.2d at 1074.
The Eleventh Circuit appears to have charted a different
course as it barred a plaintiff from asserting a negligence claim
under general maritime law where an exclusivity provision of a
state workers’ compensation scheme applied. See Brockington v.
Certified Elec., Inc., 903 F.2d 1523, 1533 (11th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 1026 (1991). That circuit distinguishes Thibodaux
and King on the grounds that they apply only to wrongful death
9
actions, a tort for which the Supreme Court expressly recognized
admiralty jurisdiction in order to provide national uniformity. We
are not persuaded that the Eleventh Circuit ruling conflicts with
our precedent with respect to a plaintiff’s ability to assert a
unseaworthiness claim in the face of an exclusive remedy provision
of a state workers’ compensation statute.
Though Thibodaux and King involved wrongful death claims,
their holdings were based on the Supreme Court’s pronouncement that
“‘[w]hile states may sometimes supplement federal maritime
policies, a state may not deprive a person of any substantial
admiralty rights as defined in controlling acts of Congress or by
interpretative decisions of this Court.’” Thibodaux, 580 F.2d at
846 (quoting Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 409-10
(1953)). As the Eleventh Circuit admitted in Brockington, the
Supreme Court has expressly authorized a claim for unseaworthiness
in admiralty jurisdiction. See Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328
U.S. 85 (1946); Brockington, 903 F.2d at 1531. That
unseaworthiness is a “right peculiar to the law of admiralty”
allowed the Brockington court to distinguish this court’s opinion
in Brown v. ITT Rayonier, Inc., 497 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1974), which
“disregard[ed] the state worker’s compensation statute in favor of
permitting an action in general maritime law,” from the case before
it in which the plaintiff was asserting a negligence claim.
Brockington, 903 F.2d at 1531. Since both the wrongful death claim
alleged in Thibodaux and King and the unseaworthiness claim
10
asserted here and in Brown trace their lineage to Supreme Court
explications of admiralty law, we see no reason to give one more
preemptive force than the other. With this principle, we think the
Eleventh Circuit would agree. Thus, following the principles
established in Thibodaux and King, we hold that the exclusive
remedy provision of the Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Act does
not preclude Green from asserting his claim for unseaworthiness.
Our holding is supported by the history of the LHWCA and its
treatment of Sieracki claims. In enacting the 1972 Amendments to
the LHWCA, Congress increased the statutory benefits to
longshoremen in exchange for the termination of their claims for
breach of the warranty of seaworthiness. See 33 U.S.C. § 905(a);
Aparicio v. Swan Lake, 643 F.2d 1109, 1117 (5th Cir. 1981). We
have held, however, that longshoremen who are not entitled to LHWCA
benefits may still pursue their general maritime claims against the
vessel owner because they did not receive the benefits of the
bargain of the 1972 Amendments. See id. at 1118 (recognizing
“pockets of Sieracki seamen remaining after the 1972 amendments” to
the LHWCA); Cormier v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 696 F.2d 1112,
1113 (5th Cir.) (Higginbotham, J.) (following Aparicio that § 905
“did not deny the warranty of seaworthiness to workers not covered
by the LHWCA”), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 821 (1983). Vermilion seeks
to distinguish these cases on the ground that they did not involve
a situation, like in the instant case, where the longshoreman was
entitled to benefits under a state workers’ compensation scheme
11
which made the state compensation benefits the employee’s exclusive
remedy against his employer, including any claim under a dual
capacity theory. See La. Rev. Stat. § 23:1032(A) (Supp. 1998).
We find Vermillion’s distinction nebulous. Though Green is
entitled to seek relief under the Louisiana Workers’ Compensation
Act, that option is not exclusive. See Sun Ship, Inc. v.
Pennsylvania, 447 U.S. 715, 722 (1980) (finding concurrent federal
and state jurisdiction for maritime employees covered by both the
LHWCA and a state workers’ compensation scheme) The 1972
Amendments to the LHWCA, “which Congress enacted to abolish the
Sieracki remedy, [do] not apply to maritime workers who are not
within the coverage of the LHWCA.” Aparicio, 643 F.2d at 1116.
Where the LHWCA does not apply, we refuse to expose maritime
workers to the variegated state workers’ compensation schemes,
especially where Congress has expressly found that “most State
Workmen’s Compensation laws provide benefits which are inadequate.”
H.R. Doc. 92-1441, 92th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4698,
4707; see also Sun Ship, 447 U.S. at 723 n.5. Green may pursue his
Sieracki claim against Vermillion despite the availability of
relief under the Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Act.2
This court’s decision in Kent v. Shell Oil Co., 286 F.2d 746
(5th Cir. 1961), does not require a contrary result. In that case,
Kent, a truck driver who performed all of his job duties on land,
2
In so ruling, we do not intimate on the merits of Green’s
claim.
12
was injured while unloading pipe from a truck onto a barge. See
id. at 748-49. Kent did not plead or allege a claim of
unseaworthiness until he requested a jury instruction on this
theory of liability. See id. at 749-50. The appellate court
affirmed the district court’s refusal to instruct the jury on
seaworthiness. See id. at 750. Though one of the reasons for its
decision was the presence of the exclusive remedy provision of the
Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Act, see id. at 751-52, we think
Kent is factually and legally distinct from the case at bar.
In Kent, the court gave special significance to the fact that
Kent was solely a land-based worker who did not perform any
maritime activity and was injured on land. See id. at 751. The
court analyzed the case as one involving a land tort and controlled
by local law. See id. Given the weak nexus between the facts and
circumstances of Kent’s claim with traditional maritime activity,
we doubt if admiralty jurisdiction would even lie in such a case
under our current precedent. See Kelly, 485 F.2d at 525-26. In
addition, no evidence supported Kent’s unseaworthiness claim. See
Kent, 286 F.2d at 752-53. Here, admiralty jurisdiction lies as
Green was injured upon navigable waters while performing the
traditional maritime activity of mooring a vessel in preparation
for unloading cargo. Green also presented evidence suggesting that
the deck of the vessel was in disrepair. We limit Kent, a pre-
Kelly case, to its facts and do not ascribe to it the power to
foreclose the assertion of an unseaworthiness claim where a state
13
workers’ compensation scheme purports to be a plaintiff’s exclusive
remedy.
C
We next turn to whether Green may assert his general maritime
negligence claim against Vermilion, his employer, despite the
exclusivity provision of the Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Act.
We examine Green’s general maritime negligence claim separately
from his unseaworthiness claim. A general maritime negligence
claim has a Supreme Court heritage, see Leathers v. Blessing, 105
U.S. (15 Otto) 626 (1882) (recognizing general maritime negligence
claim); Pope & Talbot, 346 U.S. 406 (same), but is not as unique to
admiralty law as unseaworthiness. See 1 Thomas J. Schoenbaum,
Admiralty and Maritime Law § 5-2 to § 5-4 (2d ed. 1994) (discussing
fundamental negligence concepts in maritime context); see also Cox
v. Esso Shipping Co., 247 F.2d 629, 637 (5th Cir. 1957)
(delineating differences between unseaworthiness and general
maritime negligence claims). In addition, states have a greater
interest in overriding negligence claims of an employee against his
employer via its workers’ compensation statute than a claim of
unseaworthiness since states enacted employment compensation
schemes to preclude precisely these types of suits. See Ellis v.
Normal Life, 638 So. 2d 422, 426-27 (La. Ct. App. 1994).
We begin our discussion by noting that the Supreme Court
admittedly has been “unable to give any guiding, definite rule to
determine the extent of state power” in the maritime field with
14
respect to providing remedies to injured workers. Davis v.
Department of Labor, 317 U.S. 249, 253 (1942); see also Hahn v.
Ross Island Sand & Gravel Co., 358 U.S. 272, 274 (1959) (Stewart,
J., dissenting) (observing the Supreme Court’s struggle with
harmonizing federal and state compensation schemes in the maritime
area); Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 216 (1916) (“[I]t
would be difficult, if not impossible, to define with exactness
just how far the general maritime law may be changed, modified, or
affected by state legislation.”). There are conflicting lines
deciding the force to be given an exclusive remedy provision of a
state workers’ compensation statute in the maritime context.3 See
Davis, 317 U.S. at 253 (listing cases).
One line of cases unequivocally holds that state workers’
compensation statutes can not preclude an employee from asserting
a general maritime negligence claim against his employer for
injuries sustained on navigable waters during the course of his
employment. See Southern Pac., 244 U.S. at 217 (holding the New
York Workers’ Compensation Act unconstitutional to the extent it
bars an employee from alleging a general maritime negligence claim
3
Apparently the court in Brockington only unearthed the line
of Supreme Court cases giving preclusive effect to state workers’
compensation statutes since it failed to cite any of the cases
recognizing the superiority of general maritime tort claims over
state remedies. See Brockington, 903 F.2d at 1532. Since our
holding today relies heavily on this more venerable line of Supreme
Court precedent which the Eleventh Circuit did not treat, we think
the split with our sister circuit which we create today will be
short-lived.
15
against his employer); Clyde S.S. Co. v. Walker, 244 U.S. 255, 257
(1916) (following Jensen); Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253
U.S. 149, 163-64 (1920) (striking down Congress’s first attempt to
permit application of state workers’ compensation schemes in
maritime field because Congress may not delegate its power to
alter, amend, or revise the maritime law to the states); Washington
v. W.C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219, 227-28 (1924) (invalidating
Congress’s second attempt to incorporate state workers’
compensation statutes into federal maritime law); Gonsalves v.
Morse Dry Dock & Repair Co., 266 U.S. 171, 172 (1924) (approving
assertion of general maritime negligence claim by employee against
his employer); Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Dahl, 266 U.S. 449,
457 (1924) (finding erroneous a jury instruction which permitted
the jury to consider state law in determining whether employer was
negligent because “[t]he rights and liabilities of the parties
arose out of and depended upon the general maritime law and could
not be enlarged or impaired by the state statute”); Northern Coal
& Dock Co. v. Strand, 278 U.S. 142, 147 (1928) (reversing judgment
awarding state workers’ compensation benefits to widow of deceased
stevedore because only federal maritime law may provide remedies);
John Baizley Iron Works v. Span, 281 U.S. 222, 230-32 (1930)
(denying workers’ compensation benefits to ship repairman injured
upon navigable waters since state law may not modify rights under
admiralty law); Employers’ Liab. Assurance Corp. v. Cook, 281 U.S.
233, 236 (1930) (precluding state workers’ compensation award
16
because “State lacked power to prescribe the rights and liabilities
of the parties growing out of the accident”); Nogueira v. New York,
New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co., 281 U.S. 128, 138 (1930) (commenting
that “had the petitioner been engaged in intrastate commerce, his
case still would have been within the maritime jurisdiction of the
Federal courts, and he would have been denied the benefits of the
state compensation law”); Spencer Kellogg Co. v. Hicks, 285 U.S.
502, 513 (1932) (“The workmen’s compensation law of New Jersey, the
purpose of which was to supersede the common law redress in tort
cases and statutory rights consequent upon death by wrongful act,
and to substitute a commuted compensation for injury or death of an
employee, irrespective of fault, is not applicable to the injuries
and deaths under consideration.”).
This line of precedent is itself supported by cases refusing
to subordinate federal admiralty principles to the dictates of
state law. See e.g., The Key City, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 653, 660
(1871) (stating that doctrine of laches, not state statutes of
limitations, apply to suits enforcing maritime liens); Workman v.
City of New York, 179 U.S. 552, 560 (1900) (“[I]t becomes manifest
that the decisions of this court overthrow the assumption that the
local law or decisions of a State can deprive of all rights to
relief, in a case where redress is afforded by the maritime law and
is sought to be availed of in a cause of action maritime in its
nature and depending in a court of admiralty of the United
States.”); Atlantic Transp. Co. v. Imbrovek, 234 U.S. 52, 61-63
17
(1913) (recognizing admiralty jurisdiction over stevedore’s
negligence claim against employer for injuries sustained while on
navigable waters); Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372,
382 (1918) (“[N]o State has power to abolish the well recognized
maritime rule concerning measure of recovery and substitute
therefor the full indemnity rule of the common law.”); Union Fish
Co. v. Erickson, 248 U.S. 308, 312-14 (1919) (refusing to void
maritime contract for failure to comply with state statutes of
frauds); Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 742 (1961)
(same).
Other cases run directly contrary to the authorities supra as
they purport to hold that the exclusive remedy provision of a state
workers’ compensation statute precludes an employee from asserting
a general maritime negligence claim against his employer. See
Grant Smith-Porter Co. v. Rohde, 257 U.S. 469, 477 (1922)
(enforcing exclusive remedy provision of state workers’
compensation statute so as to bar any maritime claim); State Indus.
Comm’n v. Nordenholt Corp., 259 U.S. 263, 276 (1922) (affirming
award of workers’ compensation benefits to widow of longshoremen
killed while unloading a vessel on navigable waters because
employment contract was not maritime in nature); Millers’ Indem.
Underwriters v. Braud, 270 U.S. 59, 64-65 (1926) (concluding that
state workers’ compensation statute’s “exclusive features abrogate
the right to resort to the admiralty court which otherwise would
exist”); T. Smith & Son, Inc. v. Taylor, 276 U.S. 179, 181 (1928)
18
(Louisiana workers’ compensation law provided the exclusive remedy
because the longshoreman was killed while standing on land and not
on navigable waters); Alaska Packers, Assoc. v. Industrial Accident
Comm’n, 276 U.S. 467, 468-69 (1928) (affirming award of workers’
compensation benefits as employee’s sole remedy against employer);
Sultan Ry. & Timber Co. v. Deptartment of Labor & Indus., 277 U.S.
135, 137 (1928) (rejecting constitutional attack on workers’
compensation statute requiring companies engaged in maritime
activities to pay into state fund); P.J. Carlin Constr. Co. v.
Heaney, 299 U.S. 41, 44 (1936) (refusing to allow general maritime
law claim where workers’ compensation statute applied).4
Though there is an apparent rift in precedent, the Supreme
Court harmonized its cases on the grounds that the state workers’
compensation statutes could only apply where the maritime tort
involved matters of local concern which had remote or no relation
to navigation or maritime commerce. See Baizley, 281 U.S. at 230-
31; Perini, 459 U.S. at 306 (tracing history of “maritime but
local” doctrine).5 In fact, the constant theme of these Supreme
4
The court in Brockington relies heavily on Heaney for its
holding, see Brockington, 903 F.2d at 1532, but we distinguish
Heaney from the other cases in the Grant Smith line and the case at
bar on the grounds that in Heaney the employee plaintiff did not
assert negligence on the part of his employer. See Heaney, 299
U.S. at 44.
5
The Supreme Court tried to use the “maritime but local”
doctrine to establish the boundaries of LHWCA and state workers’
compensation coverage, but abandoned its efforts after such a
distinction proved unworkable. See Davis, 317 U.S. at 253-56. In
Davis, the Supreme Court charted a new course by recognizing the
19
Court opinions is that the uniformity of admiralty law must be
preserved and that state law may be applied only where it works no
“material prejudice to the essential features of the general
maritime law.” Baizley, 281 U.S. at 230. That uniformity is not
to be sacrificed to accommodate state law is a fundamental premise
of admiralty jurisdiction. See Grant Gilmore & Charles L. Black,
Jr., The Law of Admiralty § 6-58 to § 6-61 (2d Ed. 1975). In one
of its earliest pronouncements on the interplay between federal and
state law in the maritime context, the Supreme Court stated:
One thing, however, is unquestionable; the Constitution
must have referred to a system of law coextensive with,
and operating uniformly in, the whole country. It
certainly could not have been the intention to place the
rules and limits of maritime law under the disposal and
regulation of the several States, as that would have
defeated the uniformity and consistency at which the
Constitution aimed on all subjects of a commercial
character affecting the intercourse of the States with
each other or with foreign states.
The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558, 575 (1874). This is not to
say that state law may play no part in the maritime arena; rather,
the flip side of this principle is that “[w]ith respect to maritime
torts . . . the State may modify or supplement the maritime law .
. . when the state action is not hostile to the characteristic
features of the maritime law or inconsistent with federal
legislation.” Just v. Chambers, 312 U.S. 383, 388 (1941). For
existence of a “twilight zone” in which employees are
simultaneously covered by both the LHWCA and the state workers’
compensation scheme. Id. at 256. With the 1972 Amendments to the
LHWCA, Congress extended the realm of concurrent jurisdiction
shoreward. See Sun Ship, 447 U.S. at 720.
20
example, prior to its decision in Moragne, the Supreme Court
consistently gave effect to state statutes providing a wrongful
death action to the representatives of maritime workers killed
during the course of employment. See id. at 388-89; see also
Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310, 321
(1955) (leaving the regulation of marine insurance to the states).
Our review of the Supreme Court’s admiralty jurisprudence
assures us of the soundness of our earlier holdings in Thibodaux
and King. As we noted supra, Thibodaux’s holding was driven by the
Supreme Court’s decision in Pope which iterated the supremacy of
federal admiralty rights over state law mandates where uniformity
concerns were present. See Thibodaux, 580 F.2d at 846. Contrary
to the Eleventh Circuit’s view, see Brockington, 903 F.2d at 1531,
we do not read Thibodaux and King to be limited to wrongful death
actions. We see no principled basis for distinguishing between an
employee’s negligence claim against his employer for wrongful death
and an employee’s negligence claim against his employer where the
injury stops short of a fatality. The key factor is maintaining
uniformity in admiralty law and preserving the rights granted to
maritime workers, not the degree of harm the worker suffers. An
action for negligence has long been a vestige of general maritime
law; subjecting it to the ebbs and flows of state legislation would
disrupt the essential features of admiralty law. See Stanley
Morrison, Workmen’s Compensation and the Maritime Law, 38 Yale L.J.
472, 496 (1929). Fidelity to the Supreme Court’s and our own
21
precedent requires that we hold that the exclusive remedy provision
of the Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Act does not preclude Green
from asserting his general maritime negligence claim against
Vermilion for the non-fatal injuries he sustained during the course
of his employment while upon navigable waters.6
IV
The judgment of the district court denying Green LHWCA
benefits is AFFIRMED. The judgment of the district court
dismissing Green’s unseaworthiness and general maritime negligence
claims is REVERSED. We REMAND for proceedings not inconsistent
with this opinion.
6
Our holding is consistent with the decision in Koninklyke
Nederlandsche Stoomboot Maalschappy v. Strachan Shipping Co., 301
F.2d 741 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 921 (1962), where this
court held that the exclusive remedy provision of the Texas
Workers’ Compensation Act did not bar a ship owner’s indemnity suit
against the stevedore for breach of warranty where the stevedore
had made payments under the state workers’ compensation scheme. As
with his unseaworthiness claims, we make no comment concerning the
merits of Green’s negligence claim.
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