UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-5179
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CAMERON ONEIL ANDERSON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Spartanburg. Henry F. Floyd, District Judge.
(7:08-cr-00216-HFF-3)
Submitted: May 27, 2010 Decided: June 17, 2010
Before MOTZ and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Michael D. Brown, RAINEY & BROWN, LLC, Spartanburg, South
Carolina, for Appellant. Robert Frank Daley, Jr., Jeffrey
Mikell Johnson, Assistant United States Attorneys, Columbia,
South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Cameron ONeil Anderson appeals his conviction and
1035-month sentence imposed following a jury trial on four
counts of robbery and aiding and abetting the same, in violation
of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1951(a) (2006) (Counts 1, 3,
5, and 7), and four counts of possession of a firearm in
furtherance of a crime of violence and aiding and abetting the
same, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 924(c)(1)(A) (2006)
(Counts 2, 4, 6, and 8). On appeal, Anderson contends that the
district court erred in refusing to accept his guilty plea and
that the Government engaged in prosecutorial misconduct during
the plea hearing. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
Anderson first argues that the district court erred in
refusing to accept his guilty plea. The district court is not
required to accept a guilty plea simply because the defendant
wishes to plead guilty. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25,
38 n.11 (1970). The district court “may reject a plea in
exercise of sound judicial discretion.” Santobello v. New York,
404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971). We must determine whether,
considering the law and facts, the district court’s rejection
was an abuse of its discretion.
“Before a court may enter judgment on a plea of
guilty, it must find a sufficient factual basis to support the
plea.” United States v. Mitchell, 104 F.3d 649, 652 (4th Cir.
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1997); see Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(3). Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 11(b)(3) “ensures that the court make clear exactly
what a defendant admits to, and whether those admissions are
factually sufficient to constitute the alleged crime.” United
States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 120 (4th Cir. 1991).
Here, the Government proffered facts that Anderson
denied. The district court twice gave Anderson the opportunity
to explain the facts he did not agree with; however, Anderson
failed to provide an explanation. In light of Anderson’s
denial, the district court rejected Anderson’s guilty plea and
scheduled him to stand trial with his co-defendant. We find
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
rejecting Anderson’s guilty plea, as Anderson appeared to deny
any involvement in the robberies and did not attempt to clearly
explain the facts with which he disagreed.
Anderson also argues that the Government presented
misleading information to the district court, compromising his
ability to enter a valid plea. Essentially, Anderson’s claim is
one of prosecutorial misconduct; thus, he is required to prove:
“(1) that the prosecutors engaged in improper conduct, and
(2) that such conduct prejudiced the defendant’s substantial
rights so as to deny the defendant a fair trial.” United
States v. Alerre, 430 F.3d 681, 689 (4th Cir. 2005). Because
Anderson failed to raise this issue in the district court, we
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review for plain error, affirming unless Anderson “can show that
(1) an error was made, (2) it was plain, and (3) it affected
[his] substantial rights.” Id.
We find that Anderson has failed to demonstrate that
the Government engaged in improper conduct at the plea hearing.
Anderson alleges that the Government provided false information
to the district court, compromising his ability to plead guilty.
However, although trial testimony differed somewhat from the
facts proffered at the plea hearing, Anderson has offered no
evidence showing that the Government intentionally misled the
district court. Moreover, Anderson’s substantial rights were
not affected by the Government’s actions during the plea
hearing, because he had “no absolute right to have [his] guilty
plea accepted,” Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262, and there is no
indication he was denied a fair trial by any improper
governmental action.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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