UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-4655
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CHARLES EDWARD MCCOY,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Columbia. Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., District
Judge. (3:08-cr-00404-JFA-1)
Submitted: May 26, 2010 Decided: June 18, 2010
Before WILKINSON, GREGORY, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
James P. Rogers, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Columbia,
South Carolina, for Appellant. Jeffrey Mikell Johnson, Marshall
Prince, II, Assistant United States Attorneys, Columbia, South
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Charles McCoy appeals from his conviction and
180-month sentence following a guilty plea to one count of being
a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(e) (2006). McCoy’s counsel filed
a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744
(1967), stating that there were no meritorious issues for
appeal, but questioning whether the district court complied with
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 in accepting McCoy’s guilty plea, and
whether McCoy’s sentence is reasonable. In his pro se
supplemental brief, McCoy alleges ineffective assistance of
counsel. We affirm.
During McCoy’s plea hearing, in compliance with Rule
11, the district court properly informed McCoy of the rights he
was forfeiting as a result of his plea and the nature of the
charges and penalties he faced, found that McCoy was competent
and entering his plea voluntarily, and determined there was a
sufficient factual basis for the plea. Therefore, the record
establishes McCoy knowingly and voluntarily entered into his
guilty plea with a full understanding of its consequences and
there was no error in the district court’s acceptance of his
plea.
McCoy also questions whether his sentence is
reasonable. This court reviews a sentence for reasonableness,
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applying an abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). This review requires appellate
consideration of both the procedural and the substantive
reasonableness of a sentence. Id. In determining whether a
sentence is procedurally reasonable, this court must assess
whether the district court properly calculated the guidelines
range, considered the § 3553(a) factors, analyzed any arguments
presented by the parties, and sufficiently explained the
selected sentence. Id.; see also United States v. Lynn, 592
F.3d 572, 576 (4th Cir. 2010) (“[A]n individualized explanation
must accompany every sentence.”). Here, we find no procedural
errors. Although the district court’s explanation for McCoy’s
180-month sentence was brief, we find it adequate in view of the
fact that both parties requested that sentence.
We next review the substantive reasonableness of the
sentence. McCoy was sentenced to the mandatory minimum terms of
imprisonment under the statutes of conviction. Accordingly, the
district court had no discretion to impose a lower sentence, see
United States v. Robinson, 404 F.3d 850, 862 (4th Cir. 2005),
and McCoy’s sentence is per se reasonable, see United States v.
Farrior, 535 F.3d 210, 224 (4th Cir. 2008).
Finally, McCoy’s pro se claim that counsel rendered
ineffective assistance must be considered in a post-conviction
proceeding brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp.
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2009), unless counsel’s alleged deficiencies conclusively appear
on the record. See United States v. Benton, 523 F.3d 424, 435
(4th Cir. 2008); United States v. Baptiste, 596 F.3d 214, 216
n.1 (4th Cir. 2010). Because we find no conclusive evidence on
the record that counsel rendered ineffective assistance, we
decline to consider this claim on direct appeal.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.
We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court
requires that counsel inform McCoy, in writing, of his right to
petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further
review. If McCoy requests that a petition be filed, but counsel
believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel
may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on McCoy. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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