UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-4831
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CHANDRA SPIGNER,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Orangeburg. Margaret B. Seymour, District
Judge. (5:06-cr-00665-MBS-1)
Submitted: May 21, 2010 Decided: June 18, 2010
Before NIEMEYER, GREGORY, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
John H. Hare, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Columbia, South
Carolina, for Appellant. Winston David Holliday, Jr., Assistant
United States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Chandra Spigner pled guilty to embezzlement, in
violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 657 (West Supp. 2009). The district
court sentenced her to thirty-seven months of imprisonment, the
bottom of the advisory sentencing guidelines range. On appeal,
Spigner’s counsel has filed a brief in accordance with Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that, in his view,
there are no meritorious issues for appeal. Counsel questions,
however, whether the district court fully complied with Rule 11
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in accepting
Spigner’s guilty plea and whether the court adequately explained
the chosen sentence. Spigner filed a pro se supplemental brief. ∗
Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
Counsel questions whether the district court fully
complied with Rule 11 in accepting Spigner’s guilty plea. We
have carefully reviewed the record and conclude that the
district court fully complied with the mandates of Rule 11.
Moreover, the district court ensured that Spigner’s guilty plea
∗
Spigner asserts that counsel provided ineffective
assistance. This court “may address [claims of ineffective
assistance] on direct appeal only if the lawyer’s
ineffectiveness conclusively appears from the record.” United
States v. Baldovinos, 434 F.3d 233, 239 (4th Cir. 2006). Our
review of the record leads us to conclude that counsel’s
ineffectiveness does not conclusively appear from the record.
Thus, we decline to review Spigner’s ineffective assistance
claims on direct appeal.
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was knowing and voluntary and supported by a sufficient factual
basis. See United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 116, 119-20
(4th Cir. 1991). We therefore affirm Spigner’s conviction.
Next, counsel questions whether the district court
provided an individualized explanation for the sentence imposed.
An appellate court reviews a sentence for reasonableness under
an abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552
U.S. 38, 51 (2007). This review requires consideration of both
the procedural and substantive reasonableness of a sentence.
Id. This court must assess whether the district court properly
calculated the advisory guidelines range, considered the factors
set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006), analyzed any arguments
presented by the parties, and sufficiently explained the
selected sentence. Id. at 49-50; see United States v. Lynn, 592
F.3d 572, 576 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d
325, 330 (4th Cir. 2009). If there is no procedural error, the
appellate court reviews the substantive reasonableness of the
sentence, “examin[ing] the totality of the circumstances to see
whether the sentencing court abused its discretion in concluding
that the sentence it chose satisfied the standards set forth in
§ 3553(a).” United States v. Mendoza-Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 216
(4th Cir. 2010).
Here, Spigner preserved her challenge to the adequacy
of the court’s explanation of the chosen sentence by arguing in
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the district court for a variance sentence of twenty-four
months. Lynn, 592 F.3d at 578. Thus, we review her claim for
an abuse of discretion. Id. at 579. Our review of the record
on appeal convinces us that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in explaining the chosen sentence. Id. at 576 (“[I]n
explaining a sentencing decision, a court need not robotically
tick through § 3553(a)’s every subsection, particularly when
imposing a within-Guidelines sentence.”) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.
We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. We deny
Spigner’s motion to appoint new counsel. This court requires
that counsel inform his client, in writing, of the right to
petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further
review. If the client requests that a petition be filed, but
counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then
counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on the client. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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